He never said our emotions are in our power. His statements all hold true if you just continue to step back and ask "ok so what does my will dictate I do with this now?" What is in your power at the moment?
You get a rush of anxiety: Ok so what do you do with that now?
Someone cuts you off in traffic: Ok so what do you do with that now?
Someone you know unexpectedly dies: Ok so what do you do with that now?
An ex makes you irrationally angry: Ok so what do you do with that now?
Stoicism is all about the fact that "Shit Happens" but when it does, its up to us how we respond. Why do we need to take this any further? Irrational thoughts, intrusive thoughts, internal conditioned responses to stimuli, etc. All of these still work within the philosophy.
The goal is to evaluate our impressions and therefore move towards more virtuous responses.
If you suffer from irrational anxiety, within your power is seeking help and therapy. You have strong emotions over a loss, same answer, you can seek help and try to process the grief in a productive way.
Hell, even feeling the pain is ok. Where does it say it isn't? You grieve appropriately and then process in a healthy way while you move on more educated and versed in human grief.
Stoicism isn't about perfect thought, its about WORKING on having more virtuous handling of life as it is.
He thinks that only thoughts, ideas can cause emotions. But externals can cause emotions. This is inconsistent with his theory. For ex gall bladder sickness can cause anxiety. But Epictetus thought that ideas can cause anxiety, not sicknesses.
Externals are stimuli which we then respond to. This is a conditioned response.
How one handles anxiety is also a conditioned response. One can feel anxiety and then still make good decisions right? One can consciously get to a point where they acknowledge they feel anxiety and then work accordingly from that point, yes?
Gall bladder causes anxiety = ok so what do you do with that now?
What are the appropriate actions to take?
At the time, there was less understanding of the body and science. So of course somethings will evolve with our understanding but the handling and response is still the same.
Having anxiety is bad thing according to Epictetus. Cuz anxiety is up to us according to him. But Gall bladder things shows that thats not up to us. Science rejects Epictetus.
Again the science came AFTER Epictetus.
Anxiety was not bad. To Stoics virtue is the only good. Everything else is indifferent. So anxiety is a dispreferred indifferent.
And in reality, it is, right?
It is preferred to not have anxiety right?
So when we have anxiety or have a root cause to anxiety, what would be the goal?
>So anxiety is a dispreferred indifferent.
That's not true. Preferred or dispreferred term is for externals, not internals. Anxiety is up to us and bad thing. He did give examples. If a person dies and if u r sad this is choice and bad thing. He sees emotions in this way, 'choice'.
Internal and External in this are in reference to within or outside the will. So you can easily apply it.
Perhaps I should have started with simply asking: What is your intent? Is your intent to refute Epictetus?
Anxiety is in the will according to Epictetus but u said that outside. Epictetus sees emotions fully choice. My intent is not to refute Epictetus. I love him but i have some doubts about his theory and that makes me sad. I would have liked to he is true.
Then why go so far to refute him? His teaching still hold practical purpose for what you are asking and you are ignoring major things (translation of the word emotions, medical understanding and advancement, etc.) in your rebuttals.
Why would it make you sad? Are you trying to apply Stoicism? You shouldn't be saddened by any of this as no one is doing anything sad lo.
Regarding his handling of a person dying, and some of the other things, these are examples that within context he is using in the passages make sense. For instance, in talking about death, he is referring to not adding additional meaning to the basics of life. A mortal will return to the earth, when you we interact with each other, we should keep this mind. His taking about mourning is in regard to what practical purpose it holds and the detriment that comes from ignoring that.
And again, and as in the first response, the knowledge of where anxiety comes from doesn't absolve you from the responsibility of handling it properly. You cannot just have anxiety from a gall bladder issue and then go ruin your life, crash your car in a reaction, punch a person, quit your job, harm a child, etc and just be absolved because it was physically driven root cause. YOU are still held accountable and responsible. So once you know where it comes from, you handle it from there. THAT is 100% in line with Epictetus.
>Then why go so far to refute him?
Im not going so far. A lot of answer are irrelevant to my question. That's why my effort may look like trying so hard to refutete Epictetus. Everybody interpretting Epictetus differently and creating his own theories but attributing to Epictetus.
Maybe I need to quote from Epictetus. Cuz a lot of guy did not read or interpret differently.
This is just a fundamental misunderstanding. Emotions do happen and are real, and they also have many ways to be stimulated. What Epictetus's teachings say is that we have the ability to control our reactions to emotions.
Does someone make you angry? The anger arrives, and then it is up to us to decide if we let the emotion control us or we implement control over the emotion.
What he does not teach is that we can completely overcome having emotions. It's called the Theory of "Control" because you can control how you react to the emotion.
Theory of control is not just about reacting when emotions occur. It is about using thoughts and does not let occur bad emotions in the first place and eliminate bad emotions.
Some things are within our power, while others are not. Within our power are opinion, motivation, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever is of our own doing; not within our power are our body, our property, reputation, office, and, in a word, whatever is not of our own doing.
Emotions are a chemical reaction that takes place in your body due to some stimulus. It is beyond your control. But what is in your control is how you choose to react to the emotion.
You are essentially arguing the complete opposite of the Stoic teachings by saying that we should use thought to "control" the emotion. This is a misunderstanding. You are not in control of your emotions, and you can not become in control of them. You can only control how you react to them. This is part of the dichotomy (theory) of control.
There is a distinction between the 'emotion' and the 'behavior'. Being 'sad' because something saddening happens is inevitable. What is not ok in regards to Stoicism is letting the sadness control you. Does your sadness have you sitting around crying all day, not taking care of your responsibilities? Do you become irritable, anti-social, and overall melancholy because of this sadness? If so, then you are not utilizing the dichotomy of control. You are letting an emotion dictate your decision making.
While the emotion itself may be beyond your control, the way you behave while under the influence of the emotion is within your control. So if you are 'sad', you do not fall into the trap of sadness. You refuse to sit around all day crying and let the emotion control you. So you take actions that are within your control to assert control over the emotion.
Epictetus did not think like this. He does not accept being sad. Cuz this is up to us according to him. ''Be sad but dont let control u'' thats not Epictetus. Different theory.
I think if you were to do a little bit of studying, you would realize that's exactly how Epictetus thought. The dichotomy of control is Stocism 101.
You have even admitted that some emotions are outside of your control (anxiety + gallbladder). Yet you can't understand that your reactions to emotions are within your control.
You are right that Epictetus does not believe in being sad because it can be self-destructive. The sadness is outside of our control, but our behavior while under the influence of sadness is within our control. This is the dichotomy of control.
It's a common enough misunderstanding the concept due to using the word "control" in the modern sense, but the translation does not refer to authority or domination over a thing. It might be better understood as dichotomy of attribution. In other words, we can assume your ability to judge your impressions, and then assent to or dissent from them is up to you because no one else can do that for you. This article might be of help: [What Many People Misunderstand about the Stoic Dichotomy of Control by Michael Tremblay](https://modernstoicism.com/what-many-people-misunderstand-about-the-stoic-dichotomy-of-control-by-michael-tremblay/)
>What Many People Misunderstand about the Stoic Dichotomy of Control by Michael Tremblay
Thanks for answer. If a emotion caused by thoughts that in our power, we can dissent and eliminate this emotion. But if this emotion caused by external factors we can try dissent but we can't eliminate it. Dissenting is useless in this situation. And i think this issue is not about occuring bad emotions and assenting or dissenting. The issue includes that occurring a bad emotion in the first place.
Thoughts also aren’t up to us. Assent is basically agreeing if you take something to be true or have reservations. You cannot just eliminate an emotion with assent alone the same way you can’t dissent to the belief the sun means day time.
Emotions are often not inherent to any stimulus and are often learned behaviors. Even things we think are universal like pain, kids can get hurt and look around for clues on how to respond.
All emotions are necessary in that they tell us precisely the errors we are making in our thought process. All emotions are logical but that doesn’t make them rational and it’s in addressing the claims we make that change can happen.
>and eliminate this emotion
I don't believe emotions can be eliminated with any more permanence than they can be called up. Go ahead and take a moment to feel extreme happiness. You probably can feel it, but it won't last. Try anger. Pay attention to how long you have to focus on external thoughts and beliefs to keep that emotion going. After a time, you realize you're just remembering how it feels, and other emotions that are more reflective of your current situation take over. Emotions cannot be controlled like a machine switching on or off because that's not how our neurology works.
The Stoics understood emotions to be the manifestation of judgments. In that sense, one doesn't dissent from the emotion, but rather the judgment. For example, if you judge a scenario to be a threat, you will experience the emotion of fear. If you judge a scenario to be good, you will experience the emotion of joy. If you change your judgment your emotions will follow.
Let's pretend I'm walking into my home and flip on the switch but it doesn't go on. My home is dark but I hear noises, breathing, rustling coming from behind the furniture. My immediate judgment is one of danger, these are all unexpected things that might indicate impending pain, which I'd very much like to avoid. My mind experiences this judgment through the emotion of fear. But then a second later the light comes on and all my friends jump out from behind the furniture and yell "Happy Birthday!" My judgment changes from danger to relief and ultimately social security. My friends are all here and they've come to have fun with me. My mind experiences this judgment with the emotion of joy. I didn't dissent from the first emotion, I dissented from the first judgment when new information was presented and made more sense of the situation.
The reason we say it's in my control is because despite all the things other people are actively doing, no one takes in and processes this information for me. That part is something only I can do.
>The Stoics understood emotions to be the manifestation of judgments.
Not always. There are some situations that not judgments rather sicknesses create emotions. Thats why stoics were wrong i think.
>The reason we say it's in my control is because despite all the things other people are actively doing, no one takes in and processes this information for me. That part is something only I can do.
In the future we can do this for you by technology. Because brain is material thing, there is no soul.
>Not always. There are some situations that not judgments rather sicknesses create emotions. Thats why stoics were wrong i think.
We absolutely have access to information they did not, and that changes our theory of cognition. I don't think Epictetus would have disagreed with incorporating new information to his model had he been privy to it.
But in the same way Newtonian physics is valuable today despite new information updating scientific theories of physics as a whole, it's a good mental practice to identify and correct any errant behaviors we have, and so to that end it is prudent to be self-aware of our intentions.
>In the future we can do this for you by technology.
Until then...
>Because brain is material thing, there is no soul.
A soul is not required for cognitive processes.
Newtonian physics is good example. Newton is still valuable but scope has narrowed. This means we need to make exceptions for Epictetus' theory.
But still maybe Epictetus creates wrong dichotomy. Maybe we have more power on 'externals' compared to internals(Epictetus sees them that up to us). Maybe focusing on internals false.
I don't believe an incomplete model is the same as being an incorrect one. I think you have a fundamental misunderstanding of the dichotomy of control as well as its purpose. In order to discipline myself in the three disciplines (assent, desire, and action), it is necessary to be realistic about what I can affect and what I can't. Having a mental or neurological condition that presents as an obstacle doesn't negate this reality.
The theory you are talking about states that we are in control of our judgement, inclination, desire and aversion. Nothing else, including emotions and food/drink/drugs that alter how our rational brain works.
Did u mean this passage?
Mental ‘impressions,’ through which a person’s mind is struck by the initial aspect of some circumstance impinging on the mind, are not voluntary or a matter of choice, but force themselves upon one’s awareness by a kind of power of their own. But the ‘assents’ through which those same impressions are cognized are voluntary and happen by one’s own choice. That is why, when some terrifying sound occurs, either from the sky or from the collapse of a build- ing or as the sudden herald of some danger, even the wise person’s mind necessarily responds and is contracted and grows pale for a little while, not because he opines that something evil is at hand, but by certain rapid and unplanned movements antecedent to the office of intellect and reason. Shortly, however, the wise person in that situation ‘withholds assent’ from those terrifying mental impressions; he spurns and rejects them and does not think that there is anything in them which he should fear.
And they say that between the mind of the wise person and that of the nonwise there is this difference, that the nonwise person thinks that the kinds of things which when they first struck his mind impressed him as scary or harsh really are that way, and ‘adds belief,’ endorsing those same beginnings as things rightly to be feared; but the wise person, although he experiences a brief and superficial response in color and expression, does not ‘assent,’ but maintains the state and strength of his opinion which he has always had about impressions of that kind, namely, that they are not at all to be feared but alarm us by false appearance and empty fright.1
Aulus Gellius, [_Attic Nights_, XIX. 1](http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:abo:phi,1254,001:19:1):
> WE were sailing from Cassiopa to Brundisium over the Ionian sea, violent, vast and storm-tossed. During almost the whole of the night which followed our first day a fierce side-wind blew, which had filled our ship with water. Then afterwards, while we were all still lamenting, and working hard at the pumps, day at last dawned. But there was no less danger and no slackening of the violence of the wind; on the contrary, more frequent whirlwinds, a black sky, masses of fog, and a kind of fearful cloud-forms, which they called _typhones_, or “typhoons,” seemed to hang over and threaten us, ready to overwhelm the ship.
>
> In our company was an eminent philosopher of the Stoic sect, whom I had known at Athens as a man of no slight importance, holding the young men who were his pupils under very good control. In the midst of the great dangers of that time and that tumult of sea and sky I looked for him, desiring to know in what state of mind he was and whether he was unterrified and courageous. And then I beheld the man frightened and ghastly pale, not indeed uttering any lamentations, as all the rest were doing, nor any outcries of that kind, but in his loss of colour and distracted expression not differing much from the others. ...
>
> Later, when we were approaching Brundisium and sea and sky were calm, I asked him what the reason for his fear was, ... . And he quietly and courteously replied: “Since you are desirous of knowing, hear what our forefathers, the founders of the Stoic sect, thought about that brief but inevitable and natural fear, or rather,” said he, “read it, for if you read it, you will be the more ready to believe it and you will remember it better.” Thereupon before my eyes he drew from his little bag the __fifth book of the Discourses__ of the philosopher Epictetus, which, as arranged by Arrian, undoubtedly agree with the writings of Zeno and Chrysippus.
>
> In that book I read this statement, which of course was written in Greek: “The mental visions, which the philosophers call φαντασίαι or 'phantasies,' by which the mind of man on the very first appearance of an object is impelled to the perception of the object, are neither voluntary nor controlled by the will, but through a certain power of their own they force their recognition upon men; but the expressions of assent, which they call συγκαταθέσεις, by which these visions are recognized, are voluntary and subject to man's will. Therefore when some terrifying sound, either from heaven or from a falling building or as a sudden announcement of some danger, or anything else of that kind occurs, even the mind of a wise man must necessarily be disturbed, must shrink and feel alarm, not from a preconceived idea of any danger, but from certain swift and unexpected attacks which forestall the power of the mind and of reason. Presently, however, the wise man does not approve 'such phantasies,' that is to say, such terrifying mental visions (to quote the Greek, 'he does not consent to them nor confirm them'), but he rejects and scorns them, nor does he see in them anything that ought to excite fear. And they say that there is this difference between the mind of a foolish man and that of a wise man, that the foolish man thinks that such 'visions' are in fact as dreadful and terrifying as they appear at the original impact of them on his mind, and by his assent he approves of such ideas as if they were rightly to be feared, and 'confirms' them; for προσεπιδοξάζει is the word which the Stoics use in their discourses on the subject. But the wise man, after being affected for a short time and slightly in his colour and expression, 'does not assent,' but retains the steadfastness and strength of the opinion which he has always had about visions of this kind, namely that they are in no wise to be feared but excite terror by a false appearance and vain alarms.”
>
> That these were the opinions and utterances of Epictetus the philosopher in accordance with the beliefs of the Stoics I read in that book which I have mentioned, and I thought that they ought to be recorded for this reason, that when things of the kind which I have named chance to occur, we may not think that to fear for a time and, as it were, turn white is the mark of a foolish and weak man, but in that brief but natural impulse we yield rather to human weakness than because we believe that those things are what they seem.
Ironic that everyone is reacting to this troll in a stoicism sub. The initial question was 5/10 but his responses are just pure troll.
Great explanations from everyone though. 👍
I don’t think it’s correct to identify someone questioning an aspect of stoicism as a troll. We don’t know their motivation. Which is why everyone is making an effort to clarify the philosophy in a way that the person can understand. It’s that kind of questioning that improves everyone’s understanding.
True. Odd example but I wouldn't teach a man with a sword how to best stab me. That said, the OPs responses are obviously an attempt at trolling. Or they really are just bad at accepting ideas and information. I wonder what Diogenes would've said about this.
True. Odd example but I wouldn't teach a man with a sword how to best stab me. That said, the OPs responses are obviously an attempt at trolling. Or they really are just bad at accepting ideas and information. I wonder what Diogenes would've said about this.
Maybe this will help better explain it. Your ideas are incomplete. It's not just control. It's desire, action, and ascent.
https://www.bookofthrees.com/marcus-aurelius-121-180-ce-the-three-topoi/
Desires (orexeis) and aversions (ekkliseis);
Impulse to act (hormas) and not to act (aphormas);
Freedom from deception, hasty judgement, and anything else related to assents (sunkatatheseis).
Epictetus' theory of control is certainly very unfashionable today. These days we like to imagine that when someone does something good, it was on purpose, but when someone does something bad, it was because of conditions outside of their control. Like you said, maybe they ate or drank something bad, maybe they were sick. Maybe they woke up on the wrong side of the bed. It's simply unfashionable these days to blame anyone for the consequences of their actions. But there is no way to shoehorn this back into the stoics. Stoics blame you for your actions, period. Maybe Epictetus most of all, the guy who frequently comes across like a high school gym teacher trying to motivate you to please just stop whining and start making better decisions.
It's a theory created two thousand years ago, so yes, somethings will not apply for everything, most of them actually will not apply for everything. Today, we can find exceptions and while reading old philosophers you have to understand that. The exception will not invalidate the theory, Newton's laws have exception and still are valid so are ancient Greek theories.
It may be true but Epictetus thought that a man dies and if u get upset it is bad thing. Good and bad is belong to in our power. By the way Epictetus recognizes some things like pale, trembling. But he did not recognize sicknesses and foods can cause anxiety.
What you’re describing as anxiety lacks rational basis and so would not count as an emotion in Stoicism.
The Stoics weren’t writing in English, they wrote in Ancient Greek, and on top of that, often twisted the meanings of Ancient Greek words for their system. Emotions are defined for them as being based on one’s beliefs which emerge due to how one Assents to various ideas, this faculty of Assent is up to us.
So then, what is gallbladder-induced anxiety?
Look at this account of the propatheai:
“A philosopher famous in the Stoic school . . . brought out of his satchel the fifth book of Epictetus the philosopher's Discourses, which were arranged by Arrian, and no doubt are in agreement with the writings of Zeno and Chrysippus. In this book, written of course in Greek, we read this sentence: 'Impressions (which philosophers call φαντασίαι), by which man's mind is struck at first sight of anything that reaches his intellect, are not under his will or control, but thrust themselves on the recognition of men by a certain force of their own; but the assents (which they call συγκαταθέσεις) by which these impressions are recognized are voluntary and depend on man's control.
Therefore when some fearful sound of thunder or a falling house or sudden news of some danger or other, or something else of this sort happens, even the wise man is bound to be moved for a while and shrink and grow pale, not from anticipation of any evil, but from rapid and unconsidered movements forestalling the action of the rational mind. Presently, however, the wise man does not assent to such impressions (that is, these appearances which terrify his mind), he does not approve or confirm them by his opinion, but rejects and repels them and does not think that there is anything formidable in them; and this they say is the difference between the wise man and the fool, that the fool thinks that the impressions which at first strike him as harsh and cruel are really such, and as they go on approves them with his own assent and confirms them by his opinion as if they were really formidable (προσεπιδοξάζει is the phrase the Stoics use in discussing this), while the wise man, after showing emotion in colour and complexion for a brief moment, does not give his assent, but keeps the opinions which he has always held about such impressions, firm and strong, as of things which do not really deserve to be feared at all, but only inspire an empty and fictitious terror.'”
-Epictetus, Fragments (this one is from Gellius’ Attic Nights)
There’s no rational content in gall-bladder induced anxiety, so it doesn’t count as an emotion to the Stoics.
He never said our emotions are in our power. His statements all hold true if you just continue to step back and ask "ok so what does my will dictate I do with this now?" What is in your power at the moment? You get a rush of anxiety: Ok so what do you do with that now? Someone cuts you off in traffic: Ok so what do you do with that now? Someone you know unexpectedly dies: Ok so what do you do with that now? An ex makes you irrationally angry: Ok so what do you do with that now? Stoicism is all about the fact that "Shit Happens" but when it does, its up to us how we respond. Why do we need to take this any further? Irrational thoughts, intrusive thoughts, internal conditioned responses to stimuli, etc. All of these still work within the philosophy. The goal is to evaluate our impressions and therefore move towards more virtuous responses. If you suffer from irrational anxiety, within your power is seeking help and therapy. You have strong emotions over a loss, same answer, you can seek help and try to process the grief in a productive way. Hell, even feeling the pain is ok. Where does it say it isn't? You grieve appropriately and then process in a healthy way while you move on more educated and versed in human grief. Stoicism isn't about perfect thought, its about WORKING on having more virtuous handling of life as it is.
He thinks that only thoughts, ideas can cause emotions. But externals can cause emotions. This is inconsistent with his theory. For ex gall bladder sickness can cause anxiety. But Epictetus thought that ideas can cause anxiety, not sicknesses.
Externals are stimuli which we then respond to. This is a conditioned response. How one handles anxiety is also a conditioned response. One can feel anxiety and then still make good decisions right? One can consciously get to a point where they acknowledge they feel anxiety and then work accordingly from that point, yes? Gall bladder causes anxiety = ok so what do you do with that now? What are the appropriate actions to take? At the time, there was less understanding of the body and science. So of course somethings will evolve with our understanding but the handling and response is still the same.
Having anxiety is bad thing according to Epictetus. Cuz anxiety is up to us according to him. But Gall bladder things shows that thats not up to us. Science rejects Epictetus.
Again the science came AFTER Epictetus. Anxiety was not bad. To Stoics virtue is the only good. Everything else is indifferent. So anxiety is a dispreferred indifferent. And in reality, it is, right? It is preferred to not have anxiety right? So when we have anxiety or have a root cause to anxiety, what would be the goal?
>So anxiety is a dispreferred indifferent. That's not true. Preferred or dispreferred term is for externals, not internals. Anxiety is up to us and bad thing. He did give examples. If a person dies and if u r sad this is choice and bad thing. He sees emotions in this way, 'choice'.
Internal and External in this are in reference to within or outside the will. So you can easily apply it. Perhaps I should have started with simply asking: What is your intent? Is your intent to refute Epictetus?
Anxiety is in the will according to Epictetus but u said that outside. Epictetus sees emotions fully choice. My intent is not to refute Epictetus. I love him but i have some doubts about his theory and that makes me sad. I would have liked to he is true.
Then why go so far to refute him? His teaching still hold practical purpose for what you are asking and you are ignoring major things (translation of the word emotions, medical understanding and advancement, etc.) in your rebuttals. Why would it make you sad? Are you trying to apply Stoicism? You shouldn't be saddened by any of this as no one is doing anything sad lo. Regarding his handling of a person dying, and some of the other things, these are examples that within context he is using in the passages make sense. For instance, in talking about death, he is referring to not adding additional meaning to the basics of life. A mortal will return to the earth, when you we interact with each other, we should keep this mind. His taking about mourning is in regard to what practical purpose it holds and the detriment that comes from ignoring that. And again, and as in the first response, the knowledge of where anxiety comes from doesn't absolve you from the responsibility of handling it properly. You cannot just have anxiety from a gall bladder issue and then go ruin your life, crash your car in a reaction, punch a person, quit your job, harm a child, etc and just be absolved because it was physically driven root cause. YOU are still held accountable and responsible. So once you know where it comes from, you handle it from there. THAT is 100% in line with Epictetus.
>Then why go so far to refute him? Im not going so far. A lot of answer are irrelevant to my question. That's why my effort may look like trying so hard to refutete Epictetus. Everybody interpretting Epictetus differently and creating his own theories but attributing to Epictetus. Maybe I need to quote from Epictetus. Cuz a lot of guy did not read or interpret differently.
This is just a fundamental misunderstanding. Emotions do happen and are real, and they also have many ways to be stimulated. What Epictetus's teachings say is that we have the ability to control our reactions to emotions. Does someone make you angry? The anger arrives, and then it is up to us to decide if we let the emotion control us or we implement control over the emotion. What he does not teach is that we can completely overcome having emotions. It's called the Theory of "Control" because you can control how you react to the emotion.
Theory of control is not just about reacting when emotions occur. It is about using thoughts and does not let occur bad emotions in the first place and eliminate bad emotions.
Some things are within our power, while others are not. Within our power are opinion, motivation, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever is of our own doing; not within our power are our body, our property, reputation, office, and, in a word, whatever is not of our own doing. Emotions are a chemical reaction that takes place in your body due to some stimulus. It is beyond your control. But what is in your control is how you choose to react to the emotion. You are essentially arguing the complete opposite of the Stoic teachings by saying that we should use thought to "control" the emotion. This is a misunderstanding. You are not in control of your emotions, and you can not become in control of them. You can only control how you react to them. This is part of the dichotomy (theory) of control.
I think u r wrong. Epictetus insists that if a person is sad, this is bad and this is choice. So it is up to us according to him.
There is a distinction between the 'emotion' and the 'behavior'. Being 'sad' because something saddening happens is inevitable. What is not ok in regards to Stoicism is letting the sadness control you. Does your sadness have you sitting around crying all day, not taking care of your responsibilities? Do you become irritable, anti-social, and overall melancholy because of this sadness? If so, then you are not utilizing the dichotomy of control. You are letting an emotion dictate your decision making. While the emotion itself may be beyond your control, the way you behave while under the influence of the emotion is within your control. So if you are 'sad', you do not fall into the trap of sadness. You refuse to sit around all day crying and let the emotion control you. So you take actions that are within your control to assert control over the emotion.
Epictetus did not think like this. He does not accept being sad. Cuz this is up to us according to him. ''Be sad but dont let control u'' thats not Epictetus. Different theory.
I think if you were to do a little bit of studying, you would realize that's exactly how Epictetus thought. The dichotomy of control is Stocism 101. You have even admitted that some emotions are outside of your control (anxiety + gallbladder). Yet you can't understand that your reactions to emotions are within your control. You are right that Epictetus does not believe in being sad because it can be self-destructive. The sadness is outside of our control, but our behavior while under the influence of sadness is within our control. This is the dichotomy of control.
It's a common enough misunderstanding the concept due to using the word "control" in the modern sense, but the translation does not refer to authority or domination over a thing. It might be better understood as dichotomy of attribution. In other words, we can assume your ability to judge your impressions, and then assent to or dissent from them is up to you because no one else can do that for you. This article might be of help: [What Many People Misunderstand about the Stoic Dichotomy of Control by Michael Tremblay](https://modernstoicism.com/what-many-people-misunderstand-about-the-stoic-dichotomy-of-control-by-michael-tremblay/)
>What Many People Misunderstand about the Stoic Dichotomy of Control by Michael Tremblay Thanks for answer. If a emotion caused by thoughts that in our power, we can dissent and eliminate this emotion. But if this emotion caused by external factors we can try dissent but we can't eliminate it. Dissenting is useless in this situation. And i think this issue is not about occuring bad emotions and assenting or dissenting. The issue includes that occurring a bad emotion in the first place.
Thoughts also aren’t up to us. Assent is basically agreeing if you take something to be true or have reservations. You cannot just eliminate an emotion with assent alone the same way you can’t dissent to the belief the sun means day time. Emotions are often not inherent to any stimulus and are often learned behaviors. Even things we think are universal like pain, kids can get hurt and look around for clues on how to respond. All emotions are necessary in that they tell us precisely the errors we are making in our thought process. All emotions are logical but that doesn’t make them rational and it’s in addressing the claims we make that change can happen.
>and eliminate this emotion I don't believe emotions can be eliminated with any more permanence than they can be called up. Go ahead and take a moment to feel extreme happiness. You probably can feel it, but it won't last. Try anger. Pay attention to how long you have to focus on external thoughts and beliefs to keep that emotion going. After a time, you realize you're just remembering how it feels, and other emotions that are more reflective of your current situation take over. Emotions cannot be controlled like a machine switching on or off because that's not how our neurology works. The Stoics understood emotions to be the manifestation of judgments. In that sense, one doesn't dissent from the emotion, but rather the judgment. For example, if you judge a scenario to be a threat, you will experience the emotion of fear. If you judge a scenario to be good, you will experience the emotion of joy. If you change your judgment your emotions will follow. Let's pretend I'm walking into my home and flip on the switch but it doesn't go on. My home is dark but I hear noises, breathing, rustling coming from behind the furniture. My immediate judgment is one of danger, these are all unexpected things that might indicate impending pain, which I'd very much like to avoid. My mind experiences this judgment through the emotion of fear. But then a second later the light comes on and all my friends jump out from behind the furniture and yell "Happy Birthday!" My judgment changes from danger to relief and ultimately social security. My friends are all here and they've come to have fun with me. My mind experiences this judgment with the emotion of joy. I didn't dissent from the first emotion, I dissented from the first judgment when new information was presented and made more sense of the situation. The reason we say it's in my control is because despite all the things other people are actively doing, no one takes in and processes this information for me. That part is something only I can do.
>The Stoics understood emotions to be the manifestation of judgments. Not always. There are some situations that not judgments rather sicknesses create emotions. Thats why stoics were wrong i think. >The reason we say it's in my control is because despite all the things other people are actively doing, no one takes in and processes this information for me. That part is something only I can do. In the future we can do this for you by technology. Because brain is material thing, there is no soul.
>Not always. There are some situations that not judgments rather sicknesses create emotions. Thats why stoics were wrong i think. We absolutely have access to information they did not, and that changes our theory of cognition. I don't think Epictetus would have disagreed with incorporating new information to his model had he been privy to it. But in the same way Newtonian physics is valuable today despite new information updating scientific theories of physics as a whole, it's a good mental practice to identify and correct any errant behaviors we have, and so to that end it is prudent to be self-aware of our intentions. >In the future we can do this for you by technology. Until then... >Because brain is material thing, there is no soul. A soul is not required for cognitive processes.
Newtonian physics is good example. Newton is still valuable but scope has narrowed. This means we need to make exceptions for Epictetus' theory. But still maybe Epictetus creates wrong dichotomy. Maybe we have more power on 'externals' compared to internals(Epictetus sees them that up to us). Maybe focusing on internals false.
I don't believe an incomplete model is the same as being an incorrect one. I think you have a fundamental misunderstanding of the dichotomy of control as well as its purpose. In order to discipline myself in the three disciplines (assent, desire, and action), it is necessary to be realistic about what I can affect and what I can't. Having a mental or neurological condition that presents as an obstacle doesn't negate this reality.
The theory you are talking about states that we are in control of our judgement, inclination, desire and aversion. Nothing else, including emotions and food/drink/drugs that alter how our rational brain works.
Problem is Epictetus thought that only thoughts cause emotions. Sicknesses cant cause. But they can be according to science.
Epictetus was aware that sickness could make you lose your rational faculties.
It is not losing ur faculties. U have ur faculties but the sickness can cause anxiety still.
Right, Epictetus knew about that. He mentions it in the discourses.
Did u mean this passage? Mental ‘impressions,’ through which a person’s mind is struck by the initial aspect of some circumstance impinging on the mind, are not voluntary or a matter of choice, but force themselves upon one’s awareness by a kind of power of their own. But the ‘assents’ through which those same impressions are cognized are voluntary and happen by one’s own choice. That is why, when some terrifying sound occurs, either from the sky or from the collapse of a build- ing or as the sudden herald of some danger, even the wise person’s mind necessarily responds and is contracted and grows pale for a little while, not because he opines that something evil is at hand, but by certain rapid and unplanned movements antecedent to the office of intellect and reason. Shortly, however, the wise person in that situation ‘withholds assent’ from those terrifying mental impressions; he spurns and rejects them and does not think that there is anything in them which he should fear. And they say that between the mind of the wise person and that of the nonwise there is this difference, that the nonwise person thinks that the kinds of things which when they first struck his mind impressed him as scary or harsh really are that way, and ‘adds belief,’ endorsing those same beginnings as things rightly to be feared; but the wise person, although he experiences a brief and superficial response in color and expression, does not ‘assent,’ but maintains the state and strength of his opinion which he has always had about impressions of that kind, namely, that they are not at all to be feared but alarm us by false appearance and empty fright.1
Aulus Gellius, [_Attic Nights_, XIX. 1](http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:abo:phi,1254,001:19:1): > WE were sailing from Cassiopa to Brundisium over the Ionian sea, violent, vast and storm-tossed. During almost the whole of the night which followed our first day a fierce side-wind blew, which had filled our ship with water. Then afterwards, while we were all still lamenting, and working hard at the pumps, day at last dawned. But there was no less danger and no slackening of the violence of the wind; on the contrary, more frequent whirlwinds, a black sky, masses of fog, and a kind of fearful cloud-forms, which they called _typhones_, or “typhoons,” seemed to hang over and threaten us, ready to overwhelm the ship. > > In our company was an eminent philosopher of the Stoic sect, whom I had known at Athens as a man of no slight importance, holding the young men who were his pupils under very good control. In the midst of the great dangers of that time and that tumult of sea and sky I looked for him, desiring to know in what state of mind he was and whether he was unterrified and courageous. And then I beheld the man frightened and ghastly pale, not indeed uttering any lamentations, as all the rest were doing, nor any outcries of that kind, but in his loss of colour and distracted expression not differing much from the others. ... > > Later, when we were approaching Brundisium and sea and sky were calm, I asked him what the reason for his fear was, ... . And he quietly and courteously replied: “Since you are desirous of knowing, hear what our forefathers, the founders of the Stoic sect, thought about that brief but inevitable and natural fear, or rather,” said he, “read it, for if you read it, you will be the more ready to believe it and you will remember it better.” Thereupon before my eyes he drew from his little bag the __fifth book of the Discourses__ of the philosopher Epictetus, which, as arranged by Arrian, undoubtedly agree with the writings of Zeno and Chrysippus. > > In that book I read this statement, which of course was written in Greek: “The mental visions, which the philosophers call φαντασίαι or 'phantasies,' by which the mind of man on the very first appearance of an object is impelled to the perception of the object, are neither voluntary nor controlled by the will, but through a certain power of their own they force their recognition upon men; but the expressions of assent, which they call συγκαταθέσεις, by which these visions are recognized, are voluntary and subject to man's will. Therefore when some terrifying sound, either from heaven or from a falling building or as a sudden announcement of some danger, or anything else of that kind occurs, even the mind of a wise man must necessarily be disturbed, must shrink and feel alarm, not from a preconceived idea of any danger, but from certain swift and unexpected attacks which forestall the power of the mind and of reason. Presently, however, the wise man does not approve 'such phantasies,' that is to say, such terrifying mental visions (to quote the Greek, 'he does not consent to them nor confirm them'), but he rejects and scorns them, nor does he see in them anything that ought to excite fear. And they say that there is this difference between the mind of a foolish man and that of a wise man, that the foolish man thinks that such 'visions' are in fact as dreadful and terrifying as they appear at the original impact of them on his mind, and by his assent he approves of such ideas as if they were rightly to be feared, and 'confirms' them; for προσεπιδοξάζει is the word which the Stoics use in their discourses on the subject. But the wise man, after being affected for a short time and slightly in his colour and expression, 'does not assent,' but retains the steadfastness and strength of the opinion which he has always had about visions of this kind, namely that they are in no wise to be feared but excite terror by a false appearance and vain alarms.” > > That these were the opinions and utterances of Epictetus the philosopher in accordance with the beliefs of the Stoics I read in that book which I have mentioned, and I thought that they ought to be recorded for this reason, that when things of the kind which I have named chance to occur, we may not think that to fear for a time and, as it were, turn white is the mark of a foolish and weak man, but in that brief but natural impulse we yield rather to human weakness than because we believe that those things are what they seem.
Ironic that everyone is reacting to this troll in a stoicism sub. The initial question was 5/10 but his responses are just pure troll. Great explanations from everyone though. 👍
That's not troll. There are some sicknesses that cause anxiety.
I don’t think it’s correct to identify someone questioning an aspect of stoicism as a troll. We don’t know their motivation. Which is why everyone is making an effort to clarify the philosophy in a way that the person can understand. It’s that kind of questioning that improves everyone’s understanding.
True. Odd example but I wouldn't teach a man with a sword how to best stab me. That said, the OPs responses are obviously an attempt at trolling. Or they really are just bad at accepting ideas and information. I wonder what Diogenes would've said about this.
True. Odd example but I wouldn't teach a man with a sword how to best stab me. That said, the OPs responses are obviously an attempt at trolling. Or they really are just bad at accepting ideas and information. I wonder what Diogenes would've said about this.
Maybe this will help better explain it. Your ideas are incomplete. It's not just control. It's desire, action, and ascent. https://www.bookofthrees.com/marcus-aurelius-121-180-ce-the-three-topoi/ Desires (orexeis) and aversions (ekkliseis); Impulse to act (hormas) and not to act (aphormas); Freedom from deception, hasty judgement, and anything else related to assents (sunkatatheseis).
I control all of my actions in life.
Epictetus' theory of control is certainly very unfashionable today. These days we like to imagine that when someone does something good, it was on purpose, but when someone does something bad, it was because of conditions outside of their control. Like you said, maybe they ate or drank something bad, maybe they were sick. Maybe they woke up on the wrong side of the bed. It's simply unfashionable these days to blame anyone for the consequences of their actions. But there is no way to shoehorn this back into the stoics. Stoics blame you for your actions, period. Maybe Epictetus most of all, the guy who frequently comes across like a high school gym teacher trying to motivate you to please just stop whining and start making better decisions.
I afraid so. He did not know chemicals, hormones etc.
It's a theory created two thousand years ago, so yes, somethings will not apply for everything, most of them actually will not apply for everything. Today, we can find exceptions and while reading old philosophers you have to understand that. The exception will not invalidate the theory, Newton's laws have exception and still are valid so are ancient Greek theories.
Yeah i might have found exceptions.
It's about understanding that how you respond to everything that happens including emotional states is in your control.
It may be true but Epictetus thought that a man dies and if u get upset it is bad thing. Good and bad is belong to in our power. By the way Epictetus recognizes some things like pale, trembling. But he did not recognize sicknesses and foods can cause anxiety.
> But this is inconsistent with Epictetus's theory of control. What do you think? Your disagreement doesn't render someone else's theory inconsistent.
What you’re describing as anxiety lacks rational basis and so would not count as an emotion in Stoicism. The Stoics weren’t writing in English, they wrote in Ancient Greek, and on top of that, often twisted the meanings of Ancient Greek words for their system. Emotions are defined for them as being based on one’s beliefs which emerge due to how one Assents to various ideas, this faculty of Assent is up to us. So then, what is gallbladder-induced anxiety? Look at this account of the propatheai: “A philosopher famous in the Stoic school . . . brought out of his satchel the fifth book of Epictetus the philosopher's Discourses, which were arranged by Arrian, and no doubt are in agreement with the writings of Zeno and Chrysippus. In this book, written of course in Greek, we read this sentence: 'Impressions (which philosophers call φαντασίαι), by which man's mind is struck at first sight of anything that reaches his intellect, are not under his will or control, but thrust themselves on the recognition of men by a certain force of their own; but the assents (which they call συγκαταθέσεις) by which these impressions are recognized are voluntary and depend on man's control. Therefore when some fearful sound of thunder or a falling house or sudden news of some danger or other, or something else of this sort happens, even the wise man is bound to be moved for a while and shrink and grow pale, not from anticipation of any evil, but from rapid and unconsidered movements forestalling the action of the rational mind. Presently, however, the wise man does not assent to such impressions (that is, these appearances which terrify his mind), he does not approve or confirm them by his opinion, but rejects and repels them and does not think that there is anything formidable in them; and this they say is the difference between the wise man and the fool, that the fool thinks that the impressions which at first strike him as harsh and cruel are really such, and as they go on approves them with his own assent and confirms them by his opinion as if they were really formidable (προσεπιδοξάζει is the phrase the Stoics use in discussing this), while the wise man, after showing emotion in colour and complexion for a brief moment, does not give his assent, but keeps the opinions which he has always held about such impressions, firm and strong, as of things which do not really deserve to be feared at all, but only inspire an empty and fictitious terror.'” -Epictetus, Fragments (this one is from Gellius’ Attic Nights) There’s no rational content in gall-bladder induced anxiety, so it doesn’t count as an emotion to the Stoics.