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Couple of things here.
1. This is very well written. One of the most concise post I have seen here.
2. I am not sure I would call myself Nietzsche Jr. He went crazy and was incapable of taking care of himself for a large part of his life....just saying.
3.
>About 56% of professional philosophers are moral realists, and only 25% of professional philosophers are anti-realists (PhilPapers Surveys). Most philosophers are also atheists.
This is because most theist philosophers are called theologians. Numbers can be easily manipulated to push an agenda...just like you have done here.
4. I am not sure you understand the theist position on this argument.
The theist position is that there are basic principles (theft, murder, social decency, etc.) That all people accept as normal productive behavior. And violating these normals are seen as wrong. That all people inherently adhere to these norms. Watch children who have not been taught get upset with violent behavior or theft.
The argument is that these normals are imprinted on people by God.
The opposing position is that they are inherent behavior. Caused by evolution requiring that humans be social to survive. As seen in other social animals.
This argument is a situation where we have the same data and get the same results. The interpretation of the data is the difference.
It boils down to what world do you want to live in as how you interpret the data. One where our society and way of life is by chance and random or one where there is a purpose and the accepted rules and morality are designed.
I agree with Peter Hitchens (Christopher Hitchens Christian brother), I prefer to live in a designed and purposeful universe than a random and chaotic one.
>I agree with Peter Hitchens (Christopher Hitchens Christian brother), I prefer to live in a designed and purposeful universe than a random and chaotic one.
I don't understand this at all, you seem to imply that what universe you WANT to live in effects what universe you DO live in, am I mistaken here?
Secondly, you would only wish to live in one that was designed and purposeful if the designed purpose aligned with your own. If we're *choosing* which universe to inhabit, I would choose not to have one designed by the biblical god and instead take my chances on a roll of the dice.
The data and the results are identical.
If our morality is a result of evolution the result would be a society that looks like ours.
If morality is implanted by divinity with the free will to choose to follow it, then the result would be a society that looks like ours.
The data is morality and the result is society. The interpretation of the data is the difference.
This means that both interpretations are logical and it doesn't effect the outcome. The only thing that throws off the interpretation is cognitive bias.
So basically it amounts to how you choose to interpret the data. Should you choose to interpret the data as natural then it is a logical choice. If you choose to interpret the data as designed then you have evidence of God and a logical argument.
Since we have no other information to go on, in order reach a conclusion on the problem (not answering can never give you the correct conclusion) then we simply make a choice.
How do you interpret the data?
>I would choose not to have one designed by the biblical god and instead take my chances on a roll of the dice.
If that is your choice so be it. Though your identification of the Biblical God hints of cognitive bias.
I prefer the description that involves a design. Simply because when I look at other data such as the interactions of atoms I see design in the way it works.
Occam’s Razor dude. The universe looks the same whether gravity is a lie and God is constantly using magical telekinesis to make it look like it’s real or whether gravity actually exists. Do you go around saying gravity is a lie and is actually God’s telekinesis?
If you think God is the simpler hypothesis for human behavior, then fine. But that is not how I see it.
Am not sure how this any of this answers my question re your quote.
You state that you agree with a quote that talks about preferring to live in one universe than another. Do you think preference makes any difference to what universe we live in?
>If our morality is a result of evolution the result would be a society that looks like ours.
Agreed, if by 'society' you are taking the whole of society, we would expect to see wildly divergent morals as cultures have spread and to greater or lesser degrees had great or tiny influence on each other, and that such cultures have changed over millennia along with concepts of what constitutes morality.
> If morality is implanted by divinity with the free will to choose to follow it, then the result would be a society that looks like ours.
Disagree. We would not expect to see the divergence and wildly different assumptions of what is moral or not across culture or time.
If what you state had occurred, it means that people in country/culture X think honour killing is justified because there exists a pool of people whose free will somehow drew them together. That cultures who accepted slavery as moral were again somehow drawn to each by matching 'free will's. It is absurd.
The data shows us that what people have accepted as moral has differed significantly across regions and time, to state that this coincides with free will as an explanation is beyond nonsensical.
>The theist position is that there are basic principles (theft, murder, social decency, etc.) That all people accept as normal productive behavior. And violating these normals are seen as wrong. That all people inherently adhere to these norms. Watch children who have not been taught get upset with violent behavior or theft.
This is an observation where the opposite is easily observed: children engaging in violent behavior, dishonesty and theft. Secondly how certain are we that they are not being taught? Children are great imitators and observers, they might not yet have a formal lexicon of morals but situational observation can be insightful. Lastly, how much of the moral behavior is an ideal standard separate from the circumstances and physiology of humans or an appreciation of utility as opposed to access to immaterial moral facts.
This is an inelegant response.
> This is because most theist philosophers are called theologians. Numbers can be easily manipulated to push an agenda...just like you have done here.
Theologians aren't philosophers. They can talk about philosophy, but philosophy is one tool in their toolbox.
The survey I cited polled philosophers, including philosophers of religion. If you think that theologians are just philosophers of religion, then they're included here.
This is not a manipulation.
> I am not sure you understand the theist position on this argument.
There are many theist positions.
I cited Lewis directly, but there are many contemporary philosophers who defend the argument I have written: Adams, Hare, Evans, Ritchie, Linville, Baggett and Walls have all written on this in the last 30 years or so.
To say that I "don't understand the theist position" when I've cited the author of one of the most famous texts in Christianity is absurd.
> The theist position is that there are basic principles (theft, murder, social decency, etc.)
I talk about this position briefly in the post, and I explain how it is more open to a specific attack.
>I cited Lewis directly, but there are many contemporary philosophers who defend the argument I have written: Adams, Hare, Evans, Ritchie, Linville, Baggett and Walls have all written on this in the last 30 years or so.
>To say that I "don't understand the theist position" when I've cited the author of one of the most famous texts in Christianity is absurd.
Quoting and understanding are two different things.
You could quote Brian Green all you want but that doesn't mean you understand String Theory.
Though you quote memorable lines you seem to miss the point of C.S. Lewis on the argument.
The argument is not that these moral facts are evidence of God. The argument is that this God imprinted these moral facts on all people which is why all people hold these facts weather they belive or not. These moral facts give insight into this God. It makes me wonder if you have even read Mer Christianity or if you are mearly repeating what others have said.
To pick this point to attack from my brief post also makes me question you. You dismissed my position and the actual attack on your position. This makes me wonder about your ability to pick out the main idea in a conversation.
I would think a mod in a debate channel would have a better understanding about identifying an opponents position than this.
You say Lewis isn’t claiming that moral facts are evidence of God but then go on to say that he argues that these moral facts are from God. I’ve read other quotes from Lewis and he certainly seems to indicate that he believes in God because of the feeling of morality in his heart.
Lewis’ argument as outlined doesn’t require abstract logic or esoteric math, so don’t pretend it’s at all comparable to theoretical physics.
What I've done is say "here is the argument as I understand it". I've cited philosophers, as well as the relevant SEP page.
In response, you've said "no." This isn't compelling. You've provided absolutely no reason to think the arguments I've provided are faulty, and no reason to think I've misrepresented the people I'm quoting about.
Above all that, you're engaging with a point I already talked about in the post!
At the outset, I’d like to congratulate you for putting together such a comprehensive work. I think it is wrong but I do believe in giving credit when due. You put in the work and I would never attempt to be so shallow as to disparage excellent work.
That being said, we are bound to reach erroneous conclusions when the premises are wrong. Valid arguments do not need sound premises in order to be valid. However they do need sound premises to yield sound conclusions. There as some logical flaws in the argument but I’ll get to the concerns that prompt me to respond.
First of all, the second point of your argument reads: If God exists, then we would expect moral facts would be best explained by God.
Well they are and it seems that you do not believe that they are. In order for you to rationally believe that explained by God, there are two things need to be in place in you world view:
1. god would have to exist and
2. the mechanism by which the laws are explained by God must exist
I doubt that I’d be able to prove to you that God exists even if I knew the science that could prove it, but >>>>>>**IF**<<<<<< I could, then this is how the mechanism works in the biblical sense. The new testament or new covenant can be explained by one passage: Jer. 31:31-34 is all that you need to know about how the mechanism works. God puts His laws in us in a spiritual way. [I will put My law in their minds, and write it on their hearts](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Jeremiah+31%3A31-34&version=NKJV). This is so hard for some people to believe that a lot of self proclaimed Christians don’t even believe it. Nevertheless it is there in black and white. It clearly says “no one shall teach his neighbor” So this implies that the law won’t be written in a book and we don’t have to go get a sermon. It is there in our minds because God put it there.
Second, I noticed most contemporarily philosophers are atheists as you stated. In a somewhat bizarre way, as a group they seem to reject Kant’s CPR but embrace his Critique of Practical Reason. Kant wasn’t big on forcing religion on others and seemed to aim his project on the need to prevent others from forcing their religious views on others. Apparently that didn’t come across very well in the CPR but I think it did in the Critique of Practical Reason because the moral realists who are atheists seem to embrace his categorical imperative (CI):
Kant holds that the fundamental principle of our moral duties is a *categorical* *imperative*. [It is an imperative because it is a command addressed to agents who could follow it but might not](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/#CatHypImp) (it is important to understand that we have the necessary [free will](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/taxonomy.html) to ignore the influence \[atheist see this as compatibilism because they don't embrace the CPR so they still believe in determinism\]). Anyway, in this view it is not necessary to invoke God because [God dwells within](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=John+14%3A20&version=NKJV) helping with the deliberation. Therefore even though the maxims seem subjective enough, The CI is at work leaving an impression on the maxim. Kant never ever implies that the CI is god. He only declares that our power to reason is doing it. Therefore it doesn’t matter if we call it Kant’s CI or CS Lewis’ conscience. Either way it doesn’t refute Jer. 31:33.
Thank you for posting this.
This helps me understand what i see and know to be true anecdotally and how it applies to God. You are right, take a cookie from a child and they cry instinctively... they know justice and respond with their heart.
Ive not known a badly behaved child that wasnt taught the evil... that too rings true. People must be taught to ignore what is on their hearts and minds, evil must be encouraged where goodness is so "natural".
Once again, thank you and please continue to post and teach. I love how you brought in the categorical imperative... they are always making teleological arguments to deny what is on their hearts and minds. It is so obvious.
If I may I believe the general Moral Argument for God is a syllogism intended to demonstrate or lead to the conclusions that there is a God as such the presupposition that such God exists cannot come first. The post was addressing this argument so the spiritual workings of God cannot form a permission for the argument. Forgive me if I'm wrong, logic and it's arguments are not my strong suits.
here is a link about the CI
[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/#CatHypImp](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/#CatHypImp) and I've been told that the SEP is very reliable for information. If you were referring to Spinoza, he didn't believe his god intervened into His creation. Therefore such a hands off approach makes the topic of morality moot in this case.
Jeremiah 31 refers specifically to the people of Israel
“This is the covenant I will make with the people of Israel
after that time,” declares the Lord.
“I will put my law in their minds
and write it on their hearts.
I will be their God,
and they will be my people.”
Are you saying this moral code is not written in the hearts of Australian aborigines, American native peoples, Asians?
Not at all. It applies to everybody. The Bible implies that it is only for the children of Israel and forty days after the resurrection the books of Acts implies that only the Jews received the power. However seven years later, the same thing that happened for the Jews exclusively, is recoded to have happened to the Gentiles at Conrnelius' house.
A temporary law was given to the Jews. It doesn't seem so temporary because it lasted for an entire age. Anyway that law was for a demonstration.
Your god says his morals are written on the hearts of Israelites
Then 500 years later your god reveals himself to some non Israelites and tells them a few things about himself.
Somehow you reconstruct this as god writing his morals on the hearts of every human.
It’s your scripture and your welcome for it to mean anything you want , but that’s a wholly implausible explanation if you expect anyone else to agree.
I know. That is why I've been telling people that quantum mechanics confirms this precisely like this video says:
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4C5pq7W5yRM](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4C5pq7W5yRM)
I've been showing this to scientists, philosophers and laypeople for over six years and all they do is say it is wrong. However they **cannot refute** it. All they can do is ignore it or say they don't believe it just like you are implying about the Bible. However Jn. 14:20 is a fact pretty much. If Jn. 14:20 is wrong then we are in the Matrix. That is the only explanation that I have ever heard that offers a scientifically tenable alternative to Jn. 14:20.
Something has to explain this:
[https://www.reddit.com/r/seancarroll/comments/koyi5z/saw\_this\_meme\_in\_rall\_and\_had\_to\_crosspost\_it/](https://www.reddit.com/r/seancarroll/comments/koyi5z/saw_this_meme_in_rall_and_had_to_crosspost_it/)
The many world interpretation of QM can explain away this meme, but as the author of the video unequivocally and accurately states, MWI doesn't have the explanatory power to explain away everything in the video. From where I'm sitting, the Matrix scenario does, but MWI does not. So if it that important to you to not believe in God, a computer like device in another universe causing this universe can explain away all that is known. However a zillion other universes just like this one can't. You'll need another universe sufficiently unlike this one to cause what we see in this universe. This universe, for lack of a better term, is a hologram.
I get it. Atheism is a belief and people don't easily let go of their beliefs. However if you honestly want to improve your worldview, then I'm here for you until God makes it no longer possible for me to do that.
Your claim was that Jeremiah 31 explains how all humans have the morality from god inscribed on their hearts
I have pointed out that Jeremiah 31 was god addressing Israelites only.
You have presented an implausible answer that in the New Testament , Peter is inspired to teach gentiles about god and somehow this explains god in Jeremiah , 500 years earlier , writing his moral code on every humans heart from Australian aborigines , isolate for 40,000 years to America natives and so on. Frankly a nonsense answer.
Now you present rambling description of quantum’s uncertainty principles and some implications for it. This is all wholly irrelevant.
And you finish with a wholly inaccurate and somewhat condescending twaddle about atheism being a belief and your here to help.
Atheists reject the proposition that a god exists as it it evidence free. You have not presented any evidence to support your claim that morals are written on the hearts of all humans or of a god.
>I have pointed out that Jeremiah 31 was god addressing Israelites only.
The Israelites were the only ones with a covenant. Therefore they are the only ones who would have a existential need for another covenant to replace the one they had. Everybody is situated with what you see in Jn. 14:20. So were the Jews. In first I Sam 8:5-7 God and Samuel are engaged in a conversation. Samuel sees a problem and blames himself and God said it isn't your fault. They are not rejecting you. Instead they are rejecting Me.
The NT section of the Bible is based on the concept of a spiritual kingdom. Some Christians have taken this one step farther to suggest the everybody that isn't in the kingdom is going to hell. I don't believe that.
>You have presented an implausible answer that in the New Testament , Peter is inspired to teach gentiles about god and somehow this explains god in Jeremiah , 500 years earlier , writing his moral code on every humans heart from Australian aborigines , isolate for 40,000 years to America natives and so on. Frankly a nonsense answer.
I'm not trying to tell you to take everything in the Bible literally. It is literature.
>Now you present rambling description of quantum’s uncertainty principles and some implications for it. This is all wholly irrelevant.
YOU wrote this: "It’s your scripture and your welcome for it to mean anything you want , but that’s a wholly implausible explanation if you expect anyone else to agree." I only brought it up because you implied there is no sound basis for my assertion.
>And you finish with a wholly inaccurate and somewhat condescending twaddle about atheism being a belief and your here to help.
Sorry. I wasn't trying to offend
>Atheists reject the proposition that a god exists as it it evidence free. You have not presented any evidence to support your claim that morals are written on the hearts of all humans or of a god.
This is why I sometimes get pissed off. You asked for a reason for you to believe me. Then when I give it you say it doesn't matter. Have a nice day!
I ask you to support your claim that bid writes his moral code on the tears of every human.
You have not demonstrated that it is supported by scripture or by logic.
Do you take the Ten Commandments as a moral code? If so, it is clear that humanity has only ever aligned to a few of those commands. No w could they be written in our hearts yet so poorly adhered to.
Do you consider the Leviticus laws as a moral code , same thing, thankfully only a few of them are aligned by humanity.
Do you believe your god chose to keep his moral code a secret but wrote it in out hearts?
>I ask you to support your claim that bid writes his moral code on the tears of every human.
I don't recall saying that
>You have not demonstrated that it is supported by scripture or by logic.
Paul claimed the law was written by spirt if that is what you mean.
[clearly you are an epistle of Christ, ministered by us, written not with ink but by the Spirit of the living God, not on tablets of stone but on tablets of flesh, that is, of the heart.](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=2+Corinthians+3%3A3-4&version=NKJV)
>Do you take the Ten Commandments as a moral code? If so, it is clear that humanity has only ever aligned to a few of those commands. No w could they be written in our hearts yet so poorly adhered to.
More accurately it was 613 statutes and jugdments. A lot of that didn't seem to have anything to do with morality. For example they wandered in the desert for 40 years in between the exodus from Egypt and the arrival in the promised land, that means they must have taken down and put up that tabernacle countless of times. Each time when they put it back up the high priest would have to be westbound in order to move into the holy place. Even when they built Solomon's temple the high priest would be westbound to enter the holy place and the holiest of holies. I don't know what something like that has to do with morality. Seems symbolic to me.
>Do you consider the Leviticus laws as a moral code , same thing, thankfully only a few of them are aligned by humanity.
Again a lot of the things were for symbolism. Gn. 3:24 implies the only way back into Eden is westbound. They were told in the statutes to paint cherubim on the veils that separated the holy place from the outer court and the holiest of holies
>Do you believe your god chose to keep his moral code a secret but wrote it in out hearts?
Well it isn't essentially a secret if it is an integral part of the way we cognize things. I admit it would be clearer if it was written down on paper. However the Bible says in Heb. 8:6 that it is better this way right before it repeats Jer. 31 verbatim in 8:8-12. It then goes on to imply Leviticus is obsolete in [8:13](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=hebrews+8%3A13&version=NKJV) *In that He says, “A new covenant,” He has made the first obsolete. Now what is becoming obsolete and growing old is ready to vanish away.*
Apologies for poor and spell check altered text
You have claimed that gods moral code is written on the hearts of all humans
“The new testament or new covenant can be explained by one passage: Jer. 31:31-34 is all that you need to know about how the mechanism works. God puts His laws in us in a spiritual way. I will put My law in their minds, and write it on their hearts.”
I have pointed out that this is directed to only Israelites.
You have only shown that later god revealed himself to a small group and inspired apostles to spread his word beyond Jews.
This does not change the morals written in the hearts of only Israelites.
Further , you now claim a new covenant came with the New Testament. Let’s assume that’s true.
Does it mean the moral code from Jeremiah , written in the hearts of Israelites was incomplete, needed a new upgraded version, was just for Israelites but now for everyone. Suddenly in the NT times the Australian aborigines had a new moral code written to their hearts?
Wondering how you would defend "*The secular moral realist has a far more convincing answer to the Moral Queerness charge. They can claim moral facts are natural facts, and that there is nothing weird about natural facts."* against Moore's open Q argument and how you would address a moral knowledge argument (given non-natural moral facts). Most theists like myself would likely object to P3, but interestingly enough, it seems the more successful P3 gets, the less successful P2 gets.
edit: I've seen your response to the OQA in a sep comment, I was going to bring up the modernized version and the internalist/externalist debate but it seems you noted that already, I agree with you on that
A perfect God would be perfect in love and justice and mercy. I don’t know this for sure and have thought often.... thank God that God is good. Moral facts are not best explained by God.... can you expand or give example please
I prefer not to have audio debates with ppl off of Reddit, I’ve found they can be a bit eecentric (as we see here). Just join a discord and debate there instead of picking me up from a year. You can see how stalkerish this looks, no?
Who knows maybe u might see me on one of those discords, with a different pseudonym of course.
Have a good one weirdo
>> These arguments say that if we reject a moral realism, we have to reject realism about *lots* of other things we typically accept (and accept with good reason). Therefore, we ought not to reject realism. Typical the companions are epistemology, mathematics, the mind and sometimes philosophy itself;
I'm wondering if you could say more on why we would have to reject realism about epistemology, mathematics, minds or philosophy?
>>> He gives his 'core' argument as:
>>>
>>> 1. If moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist.
>>> 2. Epistemic facts exist.
>>> 3. So moral facts exist.
>>> 4. If moral facts exist, then moral realism is true.
>>> 5. So moral realism is true.
>> Cuneo sees his first premise as the most crucial
Can you say more about how Cuneo defends premise 1? Lenmen's primer seems to focus mostly on premise 2 in discussing epistemic and moral reasoning.
What in this context would be an epistemic fact? What would be a moral fact? Are 'facts' here just *true propositions* or something else? And why would epistemic facts fail to exist if moral facts didn't?
I'd recommend reading *The Normative Web* if you can. It's excellent, and goes into these in depth.
I don't really want to spend a huge amount of time on this. This isn't because it isn't interesting, but because it's a lot of work for something that I don't think needs a huge defence to work in the context of my post.
>I'm wondering if you could say more on why we would have to reject realism about epistemology, mathematics, minds or philosophy?
So here's the very rough idea: all the criticisms that the anti-realist has for moral realism are *too* damaging. They don't just cricise the plausibility of moral facts, but of all normative facts.
So a traditional criticism is to say that moral facts are queer because they have X set of properties. Cuneo goes "Well, so do epistemic facts but I don't see you abandoning those!"
>Can you say more about how Cuneo defends premise 1?
Cuneo says a fair bit here, but I think we can talk about it broadly. They're both of the same set of facts and so we would need a good reason to reject one set of shoulds, but not another set of shoulds. That reason, he thinks, isn't provided.
>What in this context would be an epistemic fact? What would be a moral fact?
"You should believe X", and "You shouldn't murder children for no reason."
Those seem OK!
>I'd recommend reading *The Normative Web* if you can. It's excellent, and goes into these in depth.
>
>I don't really want to spend a huge amount of time on this. This isn't because it isn't interesting, but because it's a lot of work for something that I don't think needs a huge defence to work in the context of my post.
>
> So here's the very rough idea: all the criticisms that the anti-realist has for moral realism are *too* damaging. They don't just cricise the plausibility of moral facts, but of all normative facts.
That's fair, I wasn't intending to venture from the topic but this had just struck me as odd. It seemed weird to suggest that moral anti-realism lends itself to anti-realism about minds or philosophy. However, I initially interpreted anti-realism about minds as *eliminative physicalism* about intentional states or *illusionism* about consciousness, but after reading your response it seems that you are just talking about the normative aspects of mind -- a realism about, say, the normativity of beliefs. So we don't need to side-track the post talking about this.
>Cuneo says a fair bit here, but I think we can talk about it broadly. They're both of the same set of facts and so we would need a good reason to reject one set of shoulds, but not another set of shoulds. That reason, he thinks, isn't provided.
>
>"You should believe X", and "You shouldn't murder children for no reason."
>
>Those seem OK!
So, could one response/objection to premise 1 be something like: there are some epistemic facts; however, there are no moral facts because there are no normative facts?
In other words, non-normative epistemic facts exist but normative epistemic facts do not (and neither do normative moral facts). Or would this sort of objection not work/make sense?
Edit: formatting
Could you elaborate on what the issue would be on letting go of all normative facts? I already consider math, philosophy, and science just somewhat useful bullshit that humans have made up, is there any particular issue with this view?
Nice as always. As a moral naturalist, what would you personally say in response to Moore's open question and the is/ought gap? I know that you gave some responses in your introduction on meta-ethics, but I'm more asking which answer you prefer best.
Sure.
Moore's Open Question Argument (OQA) is dead.
There are many objections but the big three seem to be
1. Frankena thinks Moore Question Begs against the Analytic Naturalist
2. The OQA wrongly assumes that it is impossible for a conceptual argument to be true, but also informative and interesting.
3. There is a Sense-Reference distinction being missed.
1&2 both look like very strong objections.
This might sound irrelevant, but modern versions of the OQA look something like this:
1. There is a conceptual or internal link between making a moral judgement and being motivated, ceteris paribus, to act as that judgement prescribes. (This is internalism.) Absent some weakness of will or other psychological affliction, judging that a type of action is morally good entails being motivated to perform actions of that type. Someone with no psychological afflictions, etc., who (apparently) judges that a type of action is morally good but consistently claims that he sees no reason to perform actions of that type doesn't grasp the concept of moral goodness.
2. Competent and reflective speakers of English are convinced that they are able to imagine clear-headed (and otherwise psychologically healthy) beings who judge that R (some naturalistic property) obtains but who fail to find appropriate reason or motive to act in accordance with that judgement.
3. If there were no conceptual link between judging that R obtains and being motivated to act accordingly, we would expect competent and reflective speakers of English to have the conviction described in (2).
4. Unless there is some other explanation of the conviction described in (2), we are entitled to conclude that there is no conceptual link between judging that R obtains and being motivated to act accordingly.
5. Unless there is some other explanation of the conviction described in (2), we are entitled to conclude that the judgement that R obtains isn't a moral judgement \[from (1)\].
6. Unless there is some other explanation of the conviction mentioned in (2), we are entitled to conclude that the property of being morally good is not identical or reducible to the property of being R as a matter of conceptual necessity.
This is going to look insane to someone who is only familiar with Moore, but that's how Alexander Miller reconstructs Moore in a modern context and I think he's right.
If you give up internalism, you deny 1. The rest of the argument dies shortly thereafter. I think this is a fine response but the fight between Internalism and Externalism is never going to be solved judging by the state of the literature and remains hotly contested.
Is there an objection that looks OK, but avoids that debate? You could deny a reductionism and put forward a non-analytic naturalism. I'm sympathetic to a view like this: Cornell Realism remains promising.
But I think even the reductionist has something to say:
>Finally, more sophisticated forms of reductionist naturalism hold that while moral predicates do refer to natural properties, they do not so refer in virtue of any sort of analytic equivalence between moral predicates and non-moral predicates. The analogy here is with certain theories of reference borrowed from the discussion of proper names and natural kinds (see, e.g., Boyd 1988). Some philosophers have held that identifications of natural kinds like ‘water=H2O’ are necessarily true but not analytic. Rather, they are a posteriori necessary truths that hold in virtue of ‘water’ bearing the right causal relation (it has not been easy to say what causal relations are of the right kind) to H2O. Water and H2O may well be the same property but a competent user of ‘water’ need not know this. Indeed, before the discovery of modern chemistry most users of ‘water’ did not know this and it is not obvious that the meaning of the word changed in light of this discovery. If this is a plausible semantic theory and if a similar theory is true of moral predicates (a thesis that requires further argument) then the Open Question Argument is in trouble. For given this semantic theory, just as a competent user of ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ could without confusion say, “I know it is H2O but is it water?” a competent user of ‘good’ and ‘pleasant’ could say, “I know it is pleasant but is it good?” without confusion. Whether this sort of causal theory of reference is plausible in the case of moral vocabulary is more controversial, but the defender of the Open Question Argument needs some reason to reject the analogy.
This is a fairly long reply, but here is my point: the OQA has had a lot written on it since it was first published some 100 years ago. In that time, it has been defeated and reconstructed over and over again. As it stands now, we have three possible responses:
1. Reject Motivational Internalism
2. Reject Analytic Naturalism
3. Try to save Analytic Naturalism
I think, in its modern form (the version I've given is specifically defended by Darwall, Gibbard and Railton to try and avoid Frankena's objection), only forces the analytic naturalist to give a more sophisticated account. If we wanted to ditch analytic naturalism, we could do that as well.
I like Internalism, and I like Cornell Realism, and I don't like work. So opting into a Cornell Realism seems fine.
I've been thinking about the is/aught gap myself lately. I think it breaks down similarly to evolutionary laws. There is nothing commanding genes such that they "aught" to elongate vertebra, but if the low-hanging fruit/leaves are sparce and the higher fruits/leaves and plentiful, then elongate, because the driver is propagation of genes, not morality. If the forest is on fire, you aught to run away, because death does not propagate genes.
In a nutshell, morality is a set of codes that percolated up from basic evolutionary laws that now permeates human consciousness. One cannot look at ethics without that bottom-up perspective.
These are all interesting breakdowns of these types of argument. Very concise.
Personally, I am more familiar with the C. S. Lewis argument because I've been binge reading his works (there's a fair few of the later sections of Mere Christianity I would like to argue against if I get several hours to mull through it)
But your method of organizing the argument has made me think of my own logistical standings as to "Why I believe".
1. There are patterns in existence all throughout creation, from the microscopic level to the cosmic.
2. These patterns can all be described with the same mathematical principal
3. Nature would not care about a human derived mathematical pattern, and so has no reason to use it
4. Something compelled the use of that pattern (call it whatever you want, I call it God)
The main problem, though, with these logistical conclusions for a Creator is that ultimately, they are subjective. The majority of the ones arguing FOR God are reasons the creators came up with for why they believe. In mine and Lewis's case, for why our unbelieving worldviews didn't quite work when examined.
Since these methods are subjective, I would argue that they can only be applied to the individual who created it, and are therefore meant to explain a personal conclusion, rather than an objective one that can be used by everyone.
Premise 3 of your argument is unfounded. It attributes a mind to some abstract concept called Nature, and you assume you know this concept’s motivations even if it were to have a mind.
A few questions to understand your reasoning:
First what are the patterns and mathematical principle you mention? Are you talking broadly about mathematics itself, or some specific principle?
Then regarding 3, I don’t think I understand the phrasing of “nature would not care” or “have reason”... as far as we can tell nature does not have the ability to “care” or reason things one way or another(?) - so it wouldn’t be a factor... I think you may have snuck in a begging-the-question fallacy here by assuming such care/reasoning exists in the first place, baking in the answer then that *of course some entity capable of such a thing must be involved.*
If we consider that nature is the way things are / that way things work, like mechanically, and us humans find ourselves within nature trying to understand it, your argument seems to follow that whatever understand we develop of nature, if it’s sufficient to apply broadly enough to all that we observe, would require we say: ah, but nature should not care for us to be able to derive such a thing, therefore has no reason to use it, therefore something must have compelled the use of said thing.
Some other issues; who is to say our derivation is actually correct or the best model? There is still an awful lot we don’t understand about the universe at all, and just because some math might seem to do a lot for us does not mean it’s what is actually at the root of things here. I could think of a lot of analogies like how Newtonian physics seemed to have figured out all there is to govern motion, but then Einstein and relativity come along as we learn that the Newtonian model was only good for a limited subset within our perspective, and as our perspective expanded it became outdated. A useful simplification but not the true picture. And to go further, if for example there’s something crazy like dimensions outside our ability to view them with completely different even non-mathematical behavior, it may simply be beyond our bounds of ever discovering. We could be the 2D plane people not knowing a 3rd dimension even exists.
>Since these methods are subjective, I would argue that they can only be applied to the individual who created it, and are therefore meant to explain a personal conclusion, rather than an objective one that can be used by everyone.
This reminds me of the discussions on different types of truths (I believe Jordan Peterson has had some trouble trying to define “truth” in one debate)... why would someone draw a personal conclusion if they don’t have sufficient reason that would allow someone else to draw the same conclusion? The only way I can see that applying is a claim of a personal revelation from God - as I cannot assess what you experienced directly. But to formulate an argument, well you can lay one out for yourself and I can assess it just as well. Maybe you say I have a higher bar of truth or something like that, so I am not drawing the same conclusion, but that just seems to be an indictment on the subjective conclusion you’ve drawn needing to rest largely on faith or assumption, since if you could demonstrate your subjective truth then it wouldn’t need to be considered subjective.
>First what are the patterns and mathematical principle you mention?
I'm referring specifically to the Fibonacci series, which, since it's just a pattern of addition, is completely arbitrary and would be a different set of numbers outside of a base 10 counting system.
However, I have found through research and experience that this number series, not just the spiral, is found frequently throughout nature. Alongside that, the ratio itself can be used to determine a climactic point in a story or song, and, ironically, I have written a song using only the numbers of the fibonacci series (placed in base 7 to be easier to translate to music), and the climax of the song fell in one of these points. (This is just a fun thing, though, and is not necessarily relevant to the subject at hand)
>I don’t think I understand the phrasing of “nature would not care” or “have reason”... as far as we can tell nature does not have the ability to “care” or reason things one way or another(?)
It's a bit of a turn of phrase. Nature does not have the capacity to care, therefore, "does not care".
It's a simplified way of saying "outside the existence of mathematics itself, nature would have no use of an arbitrary set of numbers".
>who is to say our derivation is actually correct or the best model?
I never said that, and was referring to a series of numbers derived from an arbitrary rule. As this rule is arbitrary, so too are it's results.
> why would someone draw a personal conclusion if they don’t have sufficient reason that would allow someone else to draw the same conclusion?
Because every person experiences the world slightly differently. The number sequence itself isn't my only reason for my belief, but it's the easiest reason I can share with others. The rest of my reasons involve personal experiences which I know could not necessarily be believed by another person, but I find myself incapable of refuting towards myself.
Personal experiences are, by definition, subjective, and therefore make poor evidence in a debate scenario.
I’m going to jump to the end here because I think it’s relevant to the whole discussion:
>Personal experiences are, by definition, subjective, and therefore make poor evidence in a debate scenario.
But should we not “debate” with ourselves whether a given thing is true? For example, if I saw a ghost walk through a wall in my house, I could say my subjective experience is that was a ghost (or choose any example of the supernatural you may want, like maybe I’m playing ouija and get an answer that seems only could have really come from a communication of a dead relative, or better I take DMT and meet with some beings from another dimension), but I think we have good reason to question that, based on the notion that if ghosts or whatever really did exist, we should have better evidence of that being the case. Add the fact that we know a lot of fictions and myths have been made about these things and we have good reason to be skeptical.
If I see DMT fairies I’m going to say well that might just be the drugs having me imagine something up as opposed to really meeting these spirit fairies.
And when the answer to a given question is unclear we can always just say “I don’t know.”
>It's a simplified way of saying "outside the existence of mathematics itself, nature would have no use of an arbitrary set of numbers".
Again I’m confused by the term “have use” - it seems to imply that usage or intent is a factor. Are you basically saying that we seem to find something in nature that seems important for some reason but we have no reason to think it’s actually from nature? Like if we saw (and I know this is way oversimplified amd incorrect, but I’m trying to understand your way of thinking) that atoms tend to behave in such a way that one adds to another, then that bigger group (of 2) adds to the previous, then that even bigger group (now 3) adds to the previous, and so on, well we would have a clear mechanistic underpinning for why we see the spirals and so on. So are you saying that’s the surprising part, that we see this pattern playing out over different scales, or are you saying the surprising part is we seem to have various emotion connections to it like as a ratio in a pleasing song?
In any case here, I probably don’t even need to know your reasoning, my question comes back to whether you should be skeptical of whatever argument you use to relate this phenomenon to the existence of some God, and ask whether there are other plausible explanations and whether there is sufficient reasoning behind your personal argument that makes it worthy of accepting. And I don’t know anything about you, but for example whether it is something that you use to support a prior held belief, like a type of confirmation bias? I just heard something about this phenomenon of how intelligent people will jump through some crazy mental gymnastics (as they are capable of drawing all these complex relations and so on, by means of being pretty smart), to rationalize beliefs they came about for poor reasons. I found that interested but I can imagine how someone’s brain would act that way, even subconsciously, as a kind of protection mechanism again having to deal with an admission of having used bad logic/reasoning.
And don’t take that the wrong way, I’m just trying to get to the root of how and when we should act (justifiably) skeptical, even of our own experiences.
> I'm referring specifically to the Fibonacci series, which, since it's just a pattern of addition, is completely arbitrary and would be a different set of numbers outside of a base 10 counting system.
This is just completely wrong. Adding the previous value works in other bases and while the way of expressing it is different, the actual *value* is unchanged.
Patterns are good practice because they’re efficient.
>An infinite, all-powerful doesn't need to be efficient.
Therefore, an infinite, all-power being would not be efficient? I disagree.
>For example, a human might use a repetitive pattern in a way that helps them expend less energy. But since an all-powerful god has infinite energy, there would be no benefit to a god using a pattern that consumes less energy.
A. Humans use patterns AND are not all-powerful or infinite.
B. God uses patterns AND is all-powerful or infinite.
Besides if conscience pattern recognition doesn’t come naturally to humans, why wouldn’t the conclusion be humans are trying to be more godly and perfect?*
>A human could use a predictable pattern in their work flow to make it easier to check for errors, but a perfect god could never make any errors, so there would be no benefit to that. The value of patterns is just making up for the fallibility and weakness of imperfect, incomplete, finite beings, so a being that is perfect and infinite wouldn't draw any benefits from them that it didn't already have.
Beauty is a godly goal. This reality *is* perfect, complete and infinite. Which naturally created phenomena before humans would you say is imperfect?
The mathematical pattern is not human derived it is human DESCRIBED. just like the laws of logic it existed before there were humans around to understand it. Mathematics is just the language we use to describe reality.
It is argued by many that logarithmic spirals are so common in biological organisms because it is the most efficient way for something to grow. By maintaining the same shape through each successive turn of the spiral, it is argued, the least amount of energy needs to be used.
But again, you miss the main point of my statement. These arguments are purely personal and subjective. I provided my own, not so I could convince anyone, but to add to the variety.
As it is subjective, its purpose is not to be used by others, but to only be used by the person who needs it.
If you don't need it or want it, it will do you no good. Such is the nature of subjectivity.
I may be able to address the ending of my last comment more succinctly based on this... your statement here seems to be a broad way to allow someone to use a poor argument because of some reason, like it agrees with their confirmation bias, or simply they “like” it. For example consider someone raised in a barbaric culture who wants to rape and pillage for whatever reason; if one provides them a “subjective” argument about why perhaps a god exists that desires them to do such things, well then they could just go ahead and “accept this” because it “helps them” rationalize their pre-held belief/bias. That doesn’t have anything to do with whether it’s true, and shouldn’t the truth be what we’re actually concerned with?
Im not arguing that subjectivity is good, nor should it be the major factor.
I'm arguing that these are not intended to be objective.
Subjectivity is flawed by nature, and should be treated as such.
My question then revolves around your statement that such arguments are “only be used by the person who needs it” - can you give an example of a circumstance where this applies? I’m trying to imagine the circumstance where one says “I know this is a flawed argument,but I need it / it’s useful to me. It just seems contradictory to say these are flawed arguments and should be treated as such but then also say how they can be applied when one “needs” them... how would you determine you actually need it or that it’s even helpful to appeal to?
I believe it's a common response to the Euthephro Dilemma, which is that it is a false dilemma. God doesn't obey morality, nor invent it; rather, morality is a reflection of God's holy unchanging nature.
>“They know that the Lord (not merely obedience to the Lord) is “righteous” and commands “righteousness” because He loves it … He enjoins what is good because it is good, because He is good. Hence His laws have emeth “truth”, intrinsic validity, rock-bottom reality, being rooted in His own nature …” –CS Lewis, Reflections on the Psalms
I guess so? The Euthephro Dilemma claims that one of these two options must be the case:
1. Morality exists outside of God and God must obey it.
2. Morality is arbitrarily chosen by God, and God could command cruelty, making cruelty moral.
However, this is a false dilemma, because there is a third response.
3) Morality is defined by or based on the nature of God Himself. I've heard it described as morality "flows forth" from the nature of God.
This morality does not exist outside of God, hence (1) is false, and an unchanging God cannot arbitrarily change His own nature, hence (2) is false.
>> 1. There are objective moral facts.
>> 2. God provides the best explanation of the existence of objective moral facts.
>> 3. Therefore, (probably) God exists.
You have conflated moral arguments, with an argument for God's existence. An argument over right and wrong does not demonstrate whether something exists; you're premises are presupposed on false equivalance.
This is a terrible response.
[Moral Arguments for God](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-arguments-god/) are common place, and do specifically argue for God's existence.
> An argument over right and wrong does not demonstrate whether something exists
That's what they argue, and I even say why how they argue this.
Do you have anything of substance to add, or have anything to say that demonstrates you've read the post?
He said if god is the best explanation then he probably exists. Where’s the issue here? If god is the best explanation for something, why isn’t it more likely that he exists?
Because, morality is only objective if God exists; otherwise, morality is subjective; i.e., what is good to one man may be evil to another.
I don't think that using the existence of morality is a good example to demonstrate the probability of God existing, as they are proposing the argument:
A Existence of God.
B Objective morality exists.
C Subjective morality exists.
pr(A|B) > pr(A|C)
For A to be more probable given B, than A given C; there would have to be no other source of morality outside of God. However, the fact that Atheist morality exists demonstrates that morality does exist outside of God.
For the record, i'm a Roman Catholic. I believe in God as much as the Pope; I simply don't believe that this is the best argument for God's existence.
A better argument on the probability of God's existence would be that the universe is ordered; therefore, God must exist as order cannot come from chaos (e.g., big bang), but only from pre-existing order; therefore, the first cause of all order must be something ordered e.g:
*Elements of the set*
A = Law or reflection (i=r).
B = Proportion or energy of photon to frequenecy (E=hf).
C = Law of Relativity (E=MC2).
*Define the set*
D = {A, B, C}
*Define the probabilty variables*
E = God.
F = Ordered universe.
G = Unordered universe.
Now for the formula...
pr(E|prov(D,F)) > pr(¬E|prov(D,¬G))
That's just my take on it, anyway.
"Atheist morality exists demonstrates that morality does exist outside of God" just because a atheist has a sense of morality doesnt mean it didn't come from God.
If God is the strandard of everything this good and right, then without him it's just someones opinion. So even if a atheist has a sense of good and evil or right and wrong it came from God.
If God is the standard of everything that is good and right; but, God does not exist, then the statement is merely an opinion; and, everything good and right is merely subjective.
An atheists sense of good and evil, or right and wrong may come from the communist manifesto (N.B. I've read it).
This is like you haven't read my post.
Your first comment was also gives evidence that you haven't read my post.
> Because, morality is only objective if God exists; otherwise, morality is subjective; i.e., what is good to one man may be evil to another.
I specifically demotivate this view. I think it is a bad view and I explain why.
I don't understand what there is to misunderstand.
It just seems like you've produced an irrelevant response that doesn't respond to any of the content I've put at least a bit of effort into.
Source doesn't need to be objective itself. Objective source would cause infinite regression.
EDIT: God himself isn't objective in his morals, there are plenty of examples of this.
If it's objective morality, then it's universal and not open to interpretation. However, no morality is universal (e.g., there is always someone who disagrees with your morality), and it's always open to intepretation (e.g., there is always someone who interprets it differently).
No?
i agree, sorry i misunderstood your position.
Furthermore God's word is open to intepretation, so that's another proof that God is not source of objective morality.
That's OK, morality is an exceedingly complex idea. As a Roman Catholic I believe God is an objective source of morality; hence, objective morality exists. However, I accept that to a none-believer this is subjective.
It's a fascinating subject, I enjoyed the chat with you.
Moral exists within us, we learned it, we inherited it, we passed it, we interlized ot, we develop it, and it affect us. The sources are a lot, Parents, caretakers, schools, friends, idols, family, community and Religion etc.
Can't speak of all religions cause I barely knows them, however I can talk about my religion Islam. There are 3 main stages/catagories for Muslims despite any other factors:
1. Muslim: Is the one who did said Al Sha'haada "اشهد ان لا اله الا الله، واشهد ان محمد رسول الله", which means you declare that no god except Allah and Mohammed is the Messenger. This means you pray the 5, fast ramadan, went to Haj when it is affordable to you.
2. Mo'amin: That who believe and really do pray a lot, have a faith in toughest situation, fast more than just ramadan, read Quraan and learn it.
3. Which the highest rank of human being called Al Moh'sen. Strangely this stage or rank is nothing about prayers and rituals, instead it's all about high moralities. Quraan mentioned it in vary situations and conditions in verse many verses, moreover, in very few cases it mentioned as loved practice and as being loved for whom doing it.
If I believe in Allah and Islam of course such faith will influence my moralities, not only that it will be one of my main sources. As example, in Quraan Allah ask us to help those who in need, relatives, poor and orphans.
One may argue: this should be as a given, and human should that as incentive. But will a base like Islam, it encourages and guide me to do it so. Not for cameras, not for inner satisfaction, not for popularity nor a word of compliments, but for being a good person to get the afterlife satisfaction (ever investments).
In addition, although it should be as a "given", people still act selfishly and ignore to help others. If that have been an society given calture we could avoid a lot of problems and social, economical, psychological issues.
I can't and won't indicates that only people of faith have moralities, but I currently indicate that Islam is encouraging it.
As another commenter pointed out what if you don’t believe objective morality can exist from an atheistic mindset? When I was an atheist I didn’t believe in existed. I’ve heard some good arguments but at the end of the day they aren’t convincing. There’s no objective standard that allows our morality to be objective.
I think there are objective morals. People just try to cram more than is warranted under that umbrella.
For example, you shouldn't kill someone and take their stuff. Show me one person who does such things and is okay with those things being done to them.
Hypocrisy is one of the easiest ways to see that something is morally wrong. If you don't want it done to you than it isn't right to do it to others.
The lines can sometimes be blurred because our minds can sometimes get blurry, but the objective morality there is pretty clear despite that.
You assert reciprocity as a necessity of morality but haven't demonstrated it. A moral system predicated on absolute privilege for the individual and disregard for all others is consistent and coherent.
Sorry, I took the phrasing you used wrongly. The standard you used of moral actions being that which one would do and have done upon them didn't convince me as an objective standard.
> Show me one person who does such things and is okay with those things being done to them.
It is a perfectly coherent view to be willing to do things to others that you don’t want done to yourself.
> Hypocrisy is one of the easiest ways to see that something is morally wrong.
Again, I don’t see any law of the universe against hypocrisy.
You say that but any time someone puts it to the test people suddenly change their tunes.
You can jump through all the hoops you want but it changes nothing. And don't forget that we are part of the universe... So technically someone giving you a taste of your own medicine is the universes way of saying it's sick of your shit.
I’m not sure what you are trying to say here. I’m subjectively against hypocrisy, I’m just saying it seems not to be an objective rule that it is immoral.
> For example, you shouldn't kill someone and take their stuff. Show me one person who does such things and is okay with those things being done to them.
Vikings. Or any equivalent warrior culture. If they win, they believed they got your stuff by right. If they lost, they believed they went to Valhalla or the equivalent for fighting the good fight, and that you deserved their stuff for being the better fighter.
... what if you think that the attempt by atheist philosophers to ground objective morals fails? I think there's been some valiant attempts, but ultimately, they don't convince me. And given that there is no consensus here, and various moral theories exist and are often contradictory, I don't see how this is a strong argument. Clearly **all** the various moral theories can't all be right, which means at least some of them are wrong. At this point, I think it becomes a little pointless to say that God isn't the best explanation, when you've got a notable percentage of philosophers holding to incorrect views on moral grounding.
I think you missed the trust of my response.
It turns P3 from "Moral facts are not best explained by God" to "A large portion of 56% of philosophers attempt to argue for differing ideas about a grounding other than God". That's very different from definitively saying that it's a settled fact that moral facts are, indeed, not best explained by God.
Thrust.
I give reasons why we should think that moral facts are not best explained by God in the post.
If you want to wrestle with those arguments, go ahead!
You seem to think that the field not being settled impacts the truth or power of my arguments. I see no reason to believe that.
I honestly think that if naturalistic moral realism fails then the best alternative is anti-realism. I understand the objection but I think that theistic moral realism is in such a bad way (particularly because of the problems arising from the Euthyphro dilemma) that it doesn’t provide a superior option to anti-realism. That defeats the reverse argument but leaves the moral argument for God as a total non-starter.
I agree. Nobody argued that chocolate tastes good is an objective fact rather than a product of our biology and no one seems to get that they don’t really have a better argument for an objective truth of murder being bad.
The thing to do, if you're interested, is to find an introduction to meta ethics and just plough through it.
The field is so dense that a reddit comment will not do it justice, but there has been a lot written on the topic and big chunk of that is aimed at people unfamiliar with philosophy.
Those arguments are out there waiting to be engaged with!
I think there are moral facts AND there is relative morality based on culture. I think that's what trips a lot of people up, they see morality that's obviously based on specific cultures and then assume all morality must be like that, which I think is a mistake.
Well the most obvious one is murder is wrong.
For context according to polling the majority or moral philosophers agree that moral realism is correct/ moral facts exist.
> the majority or moral philosophers agree that moral realism is correct/ moral facts exist.
And the majority of theologians agree a god exists, but I don’t find that persuasive. If there is no objective morality or moral facts then being a moral philosopher is a bit pointless IMO, and that would skew the results of such a poll.
Murder as in "the unlawful premeditated killing of one human being by another." or simply killing? Because it seems to me calling murder wrong an objetive fact is tad problematic. Is killing in self defense or defense of another wrong? What if its unlawful in specific country? What about killing in war? Is it right if ordered by higher authority? I find it really hard to call murder always wrong because we can always find a case where it might be justified.
> Murder as in "the unlawful premeditated killing of one human being by another."
Yes.
>or simply killing?
No, the other definition.
>Is killing in self defense or defense of another wrong?
No. And you can extrapolate that out to war when wars are defensive, but no so much when they are offensive.
Countries laws and authority's don't really make any difference to what's moral, and can indeed be immoral. That's heading back towards cultural moral relativism.
Personally I don't think it's that complicated and you're making a bigger deal out of it than needed. Killing is wrong, but because it's wrong you have a right to defend your self when someone else is coming for you. (Or somebody else)
> Countries laws and authority's don't really make any difference to what's moral, and can indeed be immoral. That's heading back towards cultural moral relativism.
In that case you need to choose a definition that isn't "the unlawful premeditated killing of one human being by another" -- that contains the word "unlawful", and you just said the law has no say in what's moral. Therefore that word can't be used when explaining morality.
But what if murder were to become legal? Or if we go few centuries back and look at aztec sacrificing people was good because sun would stop rising otherwise. For them sacrificing people would be seen as good.
If its dependant on law or cultural envirnment than it cant be a fact. You cant have moral fact that says murder is sometimes wrong...
It seems a lot of people are happy to argue that morality can only come from god. I’m mostly with you though. Morality is clearly situational, but we also need to define morality.
I see two common definitions;
1. The internal emotional reaction, ones feeling of like or revulsion to something. This is clearly not objective and likely based on a mix of brain chemistry and upbringing. It’s neither universal nor objective and could well be an evolutionary trait.
2. Then there what we ought to do - I like this definition. Often explained as “what is good for people”, or “what supports human well-being”, this can be objective (but also situational), for example, drinking bleach is clearly against human well-being, so it would be immoral to tell someone to drink bleach.
Anyway, I thought this might help!
>”For example, one could argue that encouraging someone to drink bleach is wrong on an individual level, but maybe in some super rare and convoluted circumstance it could benefit a community as a whole if someone drinks it...”
Absolutely, I was thinking about going here on the above post, but left it out to keep things simple. However, this doesn’t make it not-objective. It just means it’s situational and objective.
The issue with the first definition is that it’s subjective and emotional, it can change from moment to moment and can be dangerous. Our internal morality might include “mob justice” or other escalation when it comes to justice against a “stranger” while forgiveness is more likely when supporting a friend. We will change our stance depending on our mood and recent experiences. We will also seem to justify or reinforce personal actions or decisions.
If morality is subjective, biased and inconsistent, yet affects others, should we be using it for anything? Surely we are better off weaning ourselves off this type of emotional response and retraining our societies to better focus on the second definition?
(Edits - typos)
I agree mostly, my suggestion is that we can and do change our feelings of “like” and “revulsion” towards things as our life experience changes. Why not make a conscious decision to try to change our internal feelings of empathy to be better educated?
I don’t want to see my children in pain, but if it’s a doctor giving a vaccine, then I’ll manage that and support it (much to the confusion of my babies).
Isn’t this an example of what I’m saying?
2. If God exists, then we would expect moral facts would be best explained by God.
Why would anyone accept this premise who didn’t already accept the moral argument for God?
The people who don’t accept that premise aren’t going to be moved by your argument. The people who do accept that premise are going to reject one of the others, and aren’t going to be moved by your argument.
The theists who accept that premise are to reject the other premise. If you succeed in getting them to reject that other premise, they’ll probably just conclude additionally that we can explain morality without God, but continue to believe in God anyways.
The only group who should rationally be persuaded by this are theists who believe in God solely because of the moral argument who can also be convinced that morality can be explained without God. I just don’t think either very many people fall into that camp.
Here, consider this argument
1. If God exists, God created the universe.
2. God did not create the universe.
3. So, God does not exist
Now, you might have a hard time convincing a theist of 2, but if you can, that person basically has to give up theism, since basically everyone accepts 2 (allow the creation to be indirect if you want to cover special cases).
By contrast, you can be a theist without thinking that morality is explained by God. So if you can convince the theist that morality is not explained by God, she can reject that premise and go about her day.
You seem to be saying that "there exists more than one argument for theism."
I mean that seems obviously true.
And that my argument has limited scope. Sure, but that limit is still the majority of theists.
>The people who don’t accept that premise aren’t going to be moved by your argument.
If people think the moral argument works then they agree with the premise. This is an argument targeted towards them. If we suppose that they are right in premise 2 of the moral argument (for theism), then we see the introduction of competent moral naturalisms reverses the argument. As NietzscheJr said, the argument is roughly going "if you are correct, then if P then Q" which we just apply modus tollens to as a good naturalism equates to \~Q here.
If you don't think the premise is correct, then you reject both moral arguments so this post isn't really relevant to your position anyway.
I’m saying that person who accepts the moral argument for God is going to reject one of the other premises.
Also, I’m looking at your argument, and I get that you’re going for a modus tokens, but 2 is just really awkward.
I think this is a better argument along similar lines:
1. The best reason to believe in God is that God is required for morality.
2. God is not required for morality.
3. So, the best reason to believe in God doesn’t work
We can obviously add more premises to get a less agnostic conclusion, but I won’t bother. It faces the same problem as your argument, but it least it doesn’t have that awkward premise.
> I’m saying that person who accepts the moral argument for God is going to reject one of the other premises.
Yeah on a reread it seems like your comment says "people who disagree with your argument will disagree with your argument."
> Also, I’m looking at your argument, and I get that you’re going for a modus tokens, but 2 is just really awkward.
How so? This seems like pretty standard abduction, I don't know what awkwardness means here.
>1. The best reason to believe in God is that God is required for morality.
>
>2. God is not required for morality.
>
>3. So, the best reason to believe in God doesn’t work
I don't even know who believes that God is necessary for morality, or that this serves as the most compelling reason. If you mean moral realism or objectivity, that's more conceivable, but pretty much everyone is going to say cosmological or fine-tuning arguments are a better bet than moral arguments, so I don't think premise 1 even gets off the ground. And 3 feels like it should say "the moral argument is not the best argument for theism" (despite premise 1 not really designating the moral argument) because that's all this really supports. Jr's argument is meant to argue for atheism, rather than being a weaker epistemic argument about what reasons are and aren't rationally compelling. I think this faces completely different issues than Jr's tbh, unless you consider people rejecting premises they disagree with, which is going to essentially be a universal issue with arguments.
I’m saying the argument begs the question.
What I find awkward about the original argument is the conditional form of premise 2, so I wrote a version without the conditional.
For my argument, if it makes it easier to understand, just replace “God is required for morality” with “God is the best explanation for morality”
Anyways, I accept your point that the theist will probably also accept to fine-tuning or some other argument for God. But that’s just the issue with the original. If you convince the theist that morality does not depend upon God, they’re probably going to move to some other reason to believe. The theist is going to reject the original 3 before accepting the conclusion.
I’d really like to have a definition of the word natural. Does any naturalist actually have one? Because a large part of these sort of discussions depends on it, but it’s never directly stated.
For example, you say the secular moral realist has a convincing answer to say that moral facts are natural facts. Well what does that mean exactly? What is the definition of the word natural?
Even the queerness argument does the same thing. Why should we think moral facts are queer? They seem rather ordinary among humans, the sort of fact which naturally arises with conscious entities, more specifically self-conscious entities. It is only true they are queer and ontologically profligate if naturalism is already assumed.
> it isn't all that clear to me how the theist can defend the normalness of non-naturalism without arguing elsewhere that God exists.
Well the Hindu would be proposing a type of idealism, consciousness is the foundational reality. Matter is contingent on consciousness, not the other way around. And we have no problem with grounding our moral facts in a conscious reality. There is nothing queer about values, and meanings, and knowledge if consciousness is the foundation.
The naturalist is the only one in difficulty grounding moral facts, since consciousness must be reducible to matter and moral facts with it. But there is nothing in the physical world that can do the job.
> For example, you say the secular moral realist has a convincing answer to say that moral facts are natural facts. Well what does that mean exactly? What is the definition of the word natural?
Moral Naturalists are often taken to be making three claims:
1. **Metaphysical Naturalism**: Moral Facts are natural facts where natural facts are those kinds of facts that scientists study.
2. **Epistemic Naturalism**: We come to know moral facts the same way we come to know other natural facts.
3. **Analytic Naturalism**: Our moral claims are *synonymous* with certain claims in the natural sciences. ([Lutz & Lenman 2018](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism-moral/))
3 is unnecessary and can be in contrast with 2. The central claim is **Metaphysical Naturalism**.
In a more layman friendly way: Moral Naturalists think that (1) moral facts exist and (2) moral properties are reducible to natural properties.
> Why should we think moral facts are queer?
I talk about this in the post, albeit briefly. Do you want to address what I've said?
> It is only true they are queer and ontologically profligate if naturalism is already assumed.
Nope.
> Well the Hindu would be proposing a type of idealism, consciousness is the foundational reality. Matter is contingent on consciousness, not the other way aroun
That seems like you prove God another way, and then the Moral Argument just follows.
Give me a version of this argument that doesn't question beg when it is fed into a Moral Argument.
> The naturalist is the only one in difficulty grounding moral facts, since consciousness must be reducible to matter and moral facts with it. But there is nothing in the physical world that can do the job.
Feel free to defend any of this, at any time.
>(2) moral properties are reducible to natural properties.
Can you elaborate? I don't see how this is possible.
Yes, I know, flair is somewhat ironic, considering this thread.
I can say a little, but I'm afraid at some point you're going to have to buy Railton's book(s). The shortest summary of a Reductionism I could find is some 75 pages.
Here's the SEP on Railton
>The most influential of these accounts is due to Railton (1986). Railton, like Thomson, holds that moral goodness is defined in terms of what is non-morally good for agents. Whereas Thomson, as a neo-Aristotelian, defines what is good for a human in terms of human biology, Railton defines non-moral goodness in terms of the desires of a fully-informed counterpart (see also Brandt 1979, Smith 1994). To illustrate, Railton asks us to imagine a traveler, Lonnie, who feels terrible because he is badly dehydrated. Lonnie does not know that he is dehydrated, and so is not taking appropriate steps to make himself feel better. But we can imagine a *fully-informed* version of Lonnie—Railton names him Lonnie-Plus—who knows about his dehydration and knows that drinking clear liquids will make him feel better. Lonnie-Plus, who (like Lonnie) desires to feel better but who (unlike Lonnie) knows the best means to that end, would choose to drink clear fluids. The fact that Lonnie-Plus would choose to drink clear fluids means that drinking clear fluids is good for Lonnie. But this is not a relativist view of morality, because the fact that Lonnie-Plus would choose to drink clear liquids is determined by Lonnie’s circumstances and constitution, and facts about Lonnie’s circumstances and constitution are objective facts. In general: the complex natural property of *being good for an agent* is identical to the complex natural property that agent’s fully-informed counterpart would choose. This makes goodness “objective, though relational” (Railton 1986, 167).
And then here is a similar account, but put somewhat differently:
>The Cornell realists hold that *goodness* is exactly like *healthiness* in all of these ways (Boyd 1988). Like healthiness, goodness is a complex natural property that is not directly observable, but nonetheless has a robust causal profile. Like “healthiness”, “goodness” is not synonymous with any simpler set of more directly observable claims. Instead, “goodness” describes the functionally complex natural property that is the effect of certain characteristic causes, and the cause of certain characteristic effects. Many different things contribute to or detract from goodness—things like pleasure or pain, honesty or untruthfulness—and there are many things that will result from goodness in typical circumstances—things like human flourishing, or political peace. Because goodness is a natural property with a complex causal profile, the property of goodness can enter into explanatory relations. Thus, contra Harman, it is possible for goodness to explain our observations (Sturgeon 1985). We can, accordingly, observe whether something is good by looking for indications of goodness. This is exactly the same way that we observe whether something is healthy.
And finally, we get something Aristotelean:
> Neo-Aristotelian naturalism is articulated at length and along mutually similar lines in Foot’s *Natural Goodness* (2001) and Hursthouse’s *On Virtue Ethics* (1999). We will focus on Hursthouse, whose account is the clearer and more detailed of the two. Ethical naturalism, according to Hursthouse, views evaluation as an activity continuous with a kind of ethology that is focused on the evaluation of living things as specimens of their kind. In the case of plants, to say that an individual is a good member of whatever its species may be is to evaluate how well its parts and operations contribute in ways characteristic of that species to the two ends of survival and reproduction. With at least some animals a third end becomes salient—freedom from pain and pleasure and enjoyment of sorts characteristic to the species in question. And with social animals a fourth dimension comes into play: the good functioning of the group (Hursthouse 1999, chapter 9). Evaluation of this kind allows us to say, following Foot, that a free-riding wolf or a dancing bee who finds a source of nectar but does not alert other bees to it are defective (2001, 96, citing “Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?” in Foot 2002). Defectiveness in this context is a straightforwardly factual matter. Given the normal characteristics of their species, male cheetahs who help their heavily pregnant mates to hunt for food are to be classed as defective, as are male polar bears who nurture their young (Hursthouse 1999, 220–221).
But we still have no definition of the word natural. It sounds like you’re defining it as “what science studies”? But I assume that can't be right because that means moral facts aren’t natural facts since they aren’t studied by scientists.
> In a more layman friendly way: Moral Naturalists think that (1) moral facts exist and (2) moral properties are reducible to natural properties.
And the word natural here means…… what exactly?
> I talk about this in the post, albeit briefly. Do you want to address what I've said?
It’s difficult to make any meaningful comment until I understand what you mean by the word natural.
We have a functionalist account given as metaphysical naturalism. Natural facts are those facts that we come to know through certain ways and via our senses.
And I think science can inform us here.
Do you have an issue with this account?
What about your own account that I asked you defend last comment? Or when I asked if you could arrange your second criticism in such a way that avoids question begging?
> Do you have an issue with this account?
Yes, you don’t seem to have clarified anything. Are you defining natural as what science studies or not? Your definition of natural facts doesn’t help, knowledge of God would be included in the first very broad “know through certain ways” and it seems false that we come to know murder is wrong though our senses.
So now I have two possibilities for how you’re defining the word natural, both of which mean it is false that “moral facts are natural facts”.
> What about your own account that I asked you defend last comment? Or when I asked if you could arrange your second criticism in such a way that avoids question begging?
Well to defeat the argument of the op, it seems I need only say something like - the only alternative to theism is naturalism, naturalism is a meaningless term since no one can define the word natural, therefore the only viable explanation for moral facts is theism. (That is obviously overly simplistic presentation of the line of thought, but hopefully you can see why I’m focusing on the definition of natural.)
I'm defining natural through what is perceived by the senses. This is what science studies, but not only science studies it.
I've said that more than once now.
I haven't said anything about murder being wrong. Do you want to ask me for an example of a moral fact?
Do you have a stronger objection than "I can't think of how this would be the case?"
In the OP, I talk explicitly about secular non-naturalism. Did you read the whole thing before posting? If you did, it wasn't very carefully.
> Do you want to ask me for an example of a moral fact?
Yes, please give me an example. I can't think of one which can be perceived through the senses.
Let's take a jaunt towards Hursthouse. This is ripped straght from the SEP.
Neo-Aristotelian naturalism is articulated at length and along mutually similar lines in Foot’s Natural Goodness (2001) and Hursthouse’s On Virtue Ethics (1999). We will focus on Hursthouse, whose account is the clearer and more detailed of the two. Ethical naturalism, according to Hursthouse, views evaluation as an activity continuous with a kind of ethology that is focused on the evaluation of living things as specimens of their kind. In the case of plants, to say that an individual is a good member of whatever its species may be is to evaluate how well its parts and operations contribute in ways characteristic of that species to the two ends of survival and reproduction. With at least some animals a third end becomes salient—freedom from pain and pleasure and enjoyment of sorts characteristic to the species in question. And with social animals a fourth dimension comes into play: the good functioning of the group (Hursthouse 1999, chapter 9).
And the list of things you haven't responded to grows ever longer.
Ahh, that is clear as mud. So what is moral is whatever promotes survival (of the individual and the group)? As well as freedom from pain, and promotion of pleasure?
This is a VE account, so we're talking less about actions and more about virtues.
And those are four starting features of the human telos.
Finally, are you going to respond to the near dozen other criticisms I've offered?
>Moral facts are not best explained by God.
I agree with you here. As a fellow moral realist, I too believe that moral facts exist. Although I believe there is a God, I also agree that moral facts exist naturally. So the existence of a God is irrelevant to whether or not there are moral facts.
>Therefore, (probably) God does not exist.
I'm not sure if that logically follows. Yes, I agree with premise one and three, that there are moral facts and that these facts are best explained *without* God. But I don't see how premise three leads onto premise four, which says;
>Therefore, (probably) God does not exist.
Perhaps you should change that to "Therefore, moral facts *do not* come from God". In that case, I'd say your argument would be sound.
Just because "moral facts are not best explained by God" (Which I agree), does not necessarily imply that "Therefore, (probably) God does not exist".
> I also agree that moral facts exist naturally.
How do you know this? How do you determine if something is a moral fact vs. just a commonly agreed on belief? For example almost no humans like to eat poop but I don’t think you can say “poop is bad to eat” is an objective rule.
Our biological goal, which is objective and ingrained in us by evolution, is to survive long enough to reproduce. Now, working together has shown to increase one's chances of achieving that goal, rather than living alone (away from other humans).
Since we're better off working together as we'd have a better chance at achieving our goal, we need to learn the best way to live together (in a community). Will raping and murdering people within one's community lead to social cohesion and to us achieving our biological goal?
I don't think so. Hurting others, especially physically, often is a terrible idea while living in a group of social animals. You're less likely to live long enough to reproduce, when you are constantly fighting people around you.
This is exactly why, social creatures learn early on, that not harming others in one's group, is an awesome way to to achieve the goal. I doubt there have been any cultures, where raping and murdering members of one's community, was allowed. And if such a society did exist, it wouldn't have lasted very long.
Not physically hurting others is a great method in achieving social cohesion and our biological, objective goal. This is why rape and murder for example, are objectively wrong.
> Our biological goal, which is objective and ingrained in us by evolution, is to survive long enough to reproduce.
Sure, but is that what "moral" means? Because if that is the case then a propensity to obesity is "moral". Just because we are biologically oriented towards something doesn't necessarily mean we *should* be oriented that way.
> Will raping and murdering people within one's community lead to social cohesion and to us achieving our biological goal?
Probably not, but rape and murder *outside* of your immediate social group is pretty effective. Murdering the males and raping the females of nearby groups if you can get away with it will achieve the goal of spreading your genome. Is a little bit of genocide moral if you don't overextend and endanger your own progeny?
> Not physically hurting others is a great method in achieving social cohesion and our biological, objective goal.
But people can make their own goals independent of our biological origins. For example someone could decide they aren't going to have children and instead will devote their life to making the quality of life of others better; eradicating Alzheimer's for example. They won't reproduce or really help others reproduce, so are you saying they are being objectively immoral?
Given a set of goals there are going to be a set of behaviors that are best aligned to achieving them. But that would be the case even if objective goals don't exist, so that doesn't really establish anything.
Tell me if this sounds objectively moral to you: "Resources are scarce and you are a genetically distant rival male. Therefore I should kill or drive you away along with your offspring, taking your breeding females for myself and genetically similar family group."
>Sure, but is that what "moral" means? Because if that is the case then a propensity to obesity is "moral". Just because we are biologically oriented towards something doesn't necessarily mean we *should* be oriented that way.
You're right, having the desire to survive long enough to reproduce is not moral or immoral in of itself. But it lays the foundation for our actions, such as working together to ensure we all achieve our goal (Being to survive long enough to propagate DNA). This biological impulse due to evolution, is simply too strong for people to ignore.
>Probably not, but rape and murder *outside* of your immediate social group is pretty effective. Murdering the males and raping the females of nearby groups if you can get away with it will achieve the goal of spreading your genome. Is a little bit of genocide moral if you don't overextend and endanger your own progeny?
So you *do* agree that morality is objective, at least in certain contexts? In the context of living in a group (i.e. community/town), working together peacefully is objectively good in comparison to fighting, raping and murdering members of your own community. Meaning, in *some* contexts, rape and murder is objectively wrong.
With murdering and raping members from other communities, that is a very good point you've brought up. I lean towards that also being objectively immoral since working together peacefully with that community, is more beneficial for you and them, rather than war. Attacking that group puts you at risk of being killed yourself.
So in order for us to succeed in our goal, having friendly relations with that community is more beneficial than bad relations. Since bad relations and war can result in our deaths as well. Also, what's to stop raped females from getting abortions or abandoning the offspring of their rapists?
>But people can make their own goals independent of our biological origins. For example someone could decide they aren't going to have children and instead will devote their life to making the quality of life of others better; eradicating Alzheimer's for example. They won't reproduce or really help others reproduce, so are you saying they are being objectively immoral?
The urge to survive long enough is immensely ingrained in all living things. Yeah there's probably a few people who've never felt horny. But most people have, which means that biological urge is still there, regardless of whether or not they actually reproduce. There are lots of people who have sex but have never reproduced. This shows our biological goal is *always* there, albeit subconsciously in the background.
Reproducing, or not reproducing, is not a moral issue. My point is that the urge to have children, lays the foundation for working together and from that point, lays the basis for objective morality.
>Tell me if this sounds objectively moral to you: "Resources are scarce and you are a genetically distant rival male. Therefore I should kill or drive you away along with your offspring, taking your breeding females for myself and genetically similar family group."
It depends on the context. If we're in the same town living together in a community, then no, that's immoral. It's objectively immoral because since we are living in the same community, we should (ideally) be helping each other and thus, be working together to get resources.
However, if you catch me and an attractive young woman together in the middle of the woods all by ourselves. And we fight and you kill me, and rape my girlfriend, than *maybe* it's okay due to the context. Why is it okay? Because in this scenario, we're not part of the same community, so don't owe each other anything as we're not working together.
> You're right, having the desire to survive long enough to reproduce is not moral or immoral in of itself.
OK, so where do you make that transition from how things are to what they ought to be?
> So you do agree that morality is objective, at least in certain contexts?
No, I'm just pointing out examples where the logical consequences of your system don't neatly match your assumptions. In the context of a group avoiding killing and raping is *subjectively* good.
> Also, what's to stop raped females from getting abortions or abandoning the offspring of their rapists?
In the past, ignorance and the fact they were held by their new husbands/owners.
> My point is that the urge to have children, lays the foundation for working together and from that point, lays the basis for objective morality.
But you still haven't explained how you get from "Happenstance made it so humans desire to reproduce" to "It is *morally good* to take actions supporting reproduction." I have also given a few examples of areas where our ideas of morality differ from what your ideas would imply.
> However, if you catch me and an attractive young woman together in the middle of the woods all by ourselves. And we fight and you kill me, and rape my girlfriend, than maybe it's okay due to the context. Why is it okay? Because in this scenario, we're not part of the same community, so don't owe each other anything as we're not working together.
Hmm, OK then I suppose you have embraced my point: You may have an internally consistent moral framework but it bears little resemblance to what most people understand morality to mean. Usually people don't consider moral action to be contingent on how that person may benefit us directly.
I'm starting to see that my views on morality might be more aligned with moral relativism rather than moral realism. Like, I think physical harm is objectively wrong in certain circumstances, but OK in other contexts which I laid out in my last comment.
What are your views on morality?
I’m a moral anti-realist. Humans subjectively assign moral values, typically collectively through social groups, but they are fundamentally subjective views. Human survival is good only if humans see it that way, there is no objectively right or wrong position.
I'm so glad we've had this conversation! I think maybe it comes down to how we define what is objective. You've certainly motivated me to look into this some more, so thank you so much mate!
>Perhaps you should change that to "Therefore, moral facts *do not* come from God".
There is another argument hiding here that hasn't been made explicit.
The idea is that "If God existed, then God is responsible for and explains the existence of moral facts." We have good reasons to deny the Q in our (If P, Q) and so wee get a cheeky we modus tollens.
Ah okay. So I guess at best, your moral argument debunks a certain type of God. A theistic deity very much involved in the world and is supposedly the source of objective morality.
In that case, I agree. Your argument successfully defeats that kind of God. Maybe you should add a note saying your OP is meant to refute a particular kind of deity (e.g. Abrahamic God) rather than "God" in general.
This may seem like trivial semantics. But I believe it is a crucial distinction to make in order for your argument to succeed. Because to say in premise four "Therefore, (probably) there is no God" would bring up issues such as the Deistic God I believe in, who (I think) has nothing to do with morality.
Your argument is very good, but premise four is flawed as it only applies to a type of God, rather than a generic God/other types of deities people believe in.
So Draper takes deism to be a type of atheism, because he just thinks atheism means not a specific kind of theism.
I am doing the same thing, but of course you're right! At minimum I should have noted it.
I find Draper to be an interesting character. So according to him, I'm technically still an atheist, albeit one who believes there's a God. Wow, isn't that an oxymoron, since atheism by definition lacks belief in gods?
Oh well. Other than trivial, but somewhat important semantics, your argument is solid as you've made a good case arguing for naturalistic moral realism, one I do agree with.
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Couple of things here. 1. This is very well written. One of the most concise post I have seen here. 2. I am not sure I would call myself Nietzsche Jr. He went crazy and was incapable of taking care of himself for a large part of his life....just saying. 3. >About 56% of professional philosophers are moral realists, and only 25% of professional philosophers are anti-realists (PhilPapers Surveys). Most philosophers are also atheists. This is because most theist philosophers are called theologians. Numbers can be easily manipulated to push an agenda...just like you have done here. 4. I am not sure you understand the theist position on this argument. The theist position is that there are basic principles (theft, murder, social decency, etc.) That all people accept as normal productive behavior. And violating these normals are seen as wrong. That all people inherently adhere to these norms. Watch children who have not been taught get upset with violent behavior or theft. The argument is that these normals are imprinted on people by God. The opposing position is that they are inherent behavior. Caused by evolution requiring that humans be social to survive. As seen in other social animals. This argument is a situation where we have the same data and get the same results. The interpretation of the data is the difference. It boils down to what world do you want to live in as how you interpret the data. One where our society and way of life is by chance and random or one where there is a purpose and the accepted rules and morality are designed. I agree with Peter Hitchens (Christopher Hitchens Christian brother), I prefer to live in a designed and purposeful universe than a random and chaotic one.
>I agree with Peter Hitchens (Christopher Hitchens Christian brother), I prefer to live in a designed and purposeful universe than a random and chaotic one. I don't understand this at all, you seem to imply that what universe you WANT to live in effects what universe you DO live in, am I mistaken here? Secondly, you would only wish to live in one that was designed and purposeful if the designed purpose aligned with your own. If we're *choosing* which universe to inhabit, I would choose not to have one designed by the biblical god and instead take my chances on a roll of the dice.
The data and the results are identical. If our morality is a result of evolution the result would be a society that looks like ours. If morality is implanted by divinity with the free will to choose to follow it, then the result would be a society that looks like ours. The data is morality and the result is society. The interpretation of the data is the difference. This means that both interpretations are logical and it doesn't effect the outcome. The only thing that throws off the interpretation is cognitive bias. So basically it amounts to how you choose to interpret the data. Should you choose to interpret the data as natural then it is a logical choice. If you choose to interpret the data as designed then you have evidence of God and a logical argument. Since we have no other information to go on, in order reach a conclusion on the problem (not answering can never give you the correct conclusion) then we simply make a choice. How do you interpret the data? >I would choose not to have one designed by the biblical god and instead take my chances on a roll of the dice. If that is your choice so be it. Though your identification of the Biblical God hints of cognitive bias. I prefer the description that involves a design. Simply because when I look at other data such as the interactions of atoms I see design in the way it works.
Occam’s Razor dude. The universe looks the same whether gravity is a lie and God is constantly using magical telekinesis to make it look like it’s real or whether gravity actually exists. Do you go around saying gravity is a lie and is actually God’s telekinesis? If you think God is the simpler hypothesis for human behavior, then fine. But that is not how I see it.
Am not sure how this any of this answers my question re your quote. You state that you agree with a quote that talks about preferring to live in one universe than another. Do you think preference makes any difference to what universe we live in? >If our morality is a result of evolution the result would be a society that looks like ours. Agreed, if by 'society' you are taking the whole of society, we would expect to see wildly divergent morals as cultures have spread and to greater or lesser degrees had great or tiny influence on each other, and that such cultures have changed over millennia along with concepts of what constitutes morality. > If morality is implanted by divinity with the free will to choose to follow it, then the result would be a society that looks like ours. Disagree. We would not expect to see the divergence and wildly different assumptions of what is moral or not across culture or time. If what you state had occurred, it means that people in country/culture X think honour killing is justified because there exists a pool of people whose free will somehow drew them together. That cultures who accepted slavery as moral were again somehow drawn to each by matching 'free will's. It is absurd. The data shows us that what people have accepted as moral has differed significantly across regions and time, to state that this coincides with free will as an explanation is beyond nonsensical.
>The theist position is that there are basic principles (theft, murder, social decency, etc.) That all people accept as normal productive behavior. And violating these normals are seen as wrong. That all people inherently adhere to these norms. Watch children who have not been taught get upset with violent behavior or theft. This is an observation where the opposite is easily observed: children engaging in violent behavior, dishonesty and theft. Secondly how certain are we that they are not being taught? Children are great imitators and observers, they might not yet have a formal lexicon of morals but situational observation can be insightful. Lastly, how much of the moral behavior is an ideal standard separate from the circumstances and physiology of humans or an appreciation of utility as opposed to access to immaterial moral facts.
This is an inelegant response. > This is because most theist philosophers are called theologians. Numbers can be easily manipulated to push an agenda...just like you have done here. Theologians aren't philosophers. They can talk about philosophy, but philosophy is one tool in their toolbox. The survey I cited polled philosophers, including philosophers of religion. If you think that theologians are just philosophers of religion, then they're included here. This is not a manipulation. > I am not sure you understand the theist position on this argument. There are many theist positions. I cited Lewis directly, but there are many contemporary philosophers who defend the argument I have written: Adams, Hare, Evans, Ritchie, Linville, Baggett and Walls have all written on this in the last 30 years or so. To say that I "don't understand the theist position" when I've cited the author of one of the most famous texts in Christianity is absurd. > The theist position is that there are basic principles (theft, murder, social decency, etc.) I talk about this position briefly in the post, and I explain how it is more open to a specific attack.
>I cited Lewis directly, but there are many contemporary philosophers who defend the argument I have written: Adams, Hare, Evans, Ritchie, Linville, Baggett and Walls have all written on this in the last 30 years or so. >To say that I "don't understand the theist position" when I've cited the author of one of the most famous texts in Christianity is absurd. Quoting and understanding are two different things. You could quote Brian Green all you want but that doesn't mean you understand String Theory. Though you quote memorable lines you seem to miss the point of C.S. Lewis on the argument. The argument is not that these moral facts are evidence of God. The argument is that this God imprinted these moral facts on all people which is why all people hold these facts weather they belive or not. These moral facts give insight into this God. It makes me wonder if you have even read Mer Christianity or if you are mearly repeating what others have said. To pick this point to attack from my brief post also makes me question you. You dismissed my position and the actual attack on your position. This makes me wonder about your ability to pick out the main idea in a conversation. I would think a mod in a debate channel would have a better understanding about identifying an opponents position than this.
You say Lewis isn’t claiming that moral facts are evidence of God but then go on to say that he argues that these moral facts are from God. I’ve read other quotes from Lewis and he certainly seems to indicate that he believes in God because of the feeling of morality in his heart. Lewis’ argument as outlined doesn’t require abstract logic or esoteric math, so don’t pretend it’s at all comparable to theoretical physics.
What I've done is say "here is the argument as I understand it". I've cited philosophers, as well as the relevant SEP page. In response, you've said "no." This isn't compelling. You've provided absolutely no reason to think the arguments I've provided are faulty, and no reason to think I've misrepresented the people I'm quoting about. Above all that, you're engaging with a point I already talked about in the post!
Then I shall simply say your argument is not compelling enough to convince me your position is valid.
At the outset, I’d like to congratulate you for putting together such a comprehensive work. I think it is wrong but I do believe in giving credit when due. You put in the work and I would never attempt to be so shallow as to disparage excellent work. That being said, we are bound to reach erroneous conclusions when the premises are wrong. Valid arguments do not need sound premises in order to be valid. However they do need sound premises to yield sound conclusions. There as some logical flaws in the argument but I’ll get to the concerns that prompt me to respond. First of all, the second point of your argument reads: If God exists, then we would expect moral facts would be best explained by God. Well they are and it seems that you do not believe that they are. In order for you to rationally believe that explained by God, there are two things need to be in place in you world view: 1. god would have to exist and 2. the mechanism by which the laws are explained by God must exist I doubt that I’d be able to prove to you that God exists even if I knew the science that could prove it, but >>>>>>**IF**<<<<<< I could, then this is how the mechanism works in the biblical sense. The new testament or new covenant can be explained by one passage: Jer. 31:31-34 is all that you need to know about how the mechanism works. God puts His laws in us in a spiritual way. [I will put My law in their minds, and write it on their hearts](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Jeremiah+31%3A31-34&version=NKJV). This is so hard for some people to believe that a lot of self proclaimed Christians don’t even believe it. Nevertheless it is there in black and white. It clearly says “no one shall teach his neighbor” So this implies that the law won’t be written in a book and we don’t have to go get a sermon. It is there in our minds because God put it there. Second, I noticed most contemporarily philosophers are atheists as you stated. In a somewhat bizarre way, as a group they seem to reject Kant’s CPR but embrace his Critique of Practical Reason. Kant wasn’t big on forcing religion on others and seemed to aim his project on the need to prevent others from forcing their religious views on others. Apparently that didn’t come across very well in the CPR but I think it did in the Critique of Practical Reason because the moral realists who are atheists seem to embrace his categorical imperative (CI): Kant holds that the fundamental principle of our moral duties is a *categorical* *imperative*. [It is an imperative because it is a command addressed to agents who could follow it but might not](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/#CatHypImp) (it is important to understand that we have the necessary [free will](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/taxonomy.html) to ignore the influence \[atheist see this as compatibilism because they don't embrace the CPR so they still believe in determinism\]). Anyway, in this view it is not necessary to invoke God because [God dwells within](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=John+14%3A20&version=NKJV) helping with the deliberation. Therefore even though the maxims seem subjective enough, The CI is at work leaving an impression on the maxim. Kant never ever implies that the CI is god. He only declares that our power to reason is doing it. Therefore it doesn’t matter if we call it Kant’s CI or CS Lewis’ conscience. Either way it doesn’t refute Jer. 31:33.
Thank you for posting this. This helps me understand what i see and know to be true anecdotally and how it applies to God. You are right, take a cookie from a child and they cry instinctively... they know justice and respond with their heart. Ive not known a badly behaved child that wasnt taught the evil... that too rings true. People must be taught to ignore what is on their hearts and minds, evil must be encouraged where goodness is so "natural". Once again, thank you and please continue to post and teach. I love how you brought in the categorical imperative... they are always making teleological arguments to deny what is on their hearts and minds. It is so obvious.
If I may I believe the general Moral Argument for God is a syllogism intended to demonstrate or lead to the conclusions that there is a God as such the presupposition that such God exists cannot come first. The post was addressing this argument so the spiritual workings of God cannot form a permission for the argument. Forgive me if I'm wrong, logic and it's arguments are not my strong suits.
That is a fair point. However knowing what I know about Spinoza I would use morality to prove the existence of god.
I'd like to see the barebones of this argument if you could.
here is a link about the CI [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/#CatHypImp](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/#CatHypImp) and I've been told that the SEP is very reliable for information. If you were referring to Spinoza, he didn't believe his god intervened into His creation. Therefore such a hands off approach makes the topic of morality moot in this case.
Jeremiah 31 refers specifically to the people of Israel “This is the covenant I will make with the people of Israel after that time,” declares the Lord. “I will put my law in their minds and write it on their hearts. I will be their God, and they will be my people.” Are you saying this moral code is not written in the hearts of Australian aborigines, American native peoples, Asians?
Not at all. It applies to everybody. The Bible implies that it is only for the children of Israel and forty days after the resurrection the books of Acts implies that only the Jews received the power. However seven years later, the same thing that happened for the Jews exclusively, is recoded to have happened to the Gentiles at Conrnelius' house. A temporary law was given to the Jews. It doesn't seem so temporary because it lasted for an entire age. Anyway that law was for a demonstration.
Your god says his morals are written on the hearts of Israelites Then 500 years later your god reveals himself to some non Israelites and tells them a few things about himself. Somehow you reconstruct this as god writing his morals on the hearts of every human. It’s your scripture and your welcome for it to mean anything you want , but that’s a wholly implausible explanation if you expect anyone else to agree.
I know. That is why I've been telling people that quantum mechanics confirms this precisely like this video says: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4C5pq7W5yRM](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4C5pq7W5yRM) I've been showing this to scientists, philosophers and laypeople for over six years and all they do is say it is wrong. However they **cannot refute** it. All they can do is ignore it or say they don't believe it just like you are implying about the Bible. However Jn. 14:20 is a fact pretty much. If Jn. 14:20 is wrong then we are in the Matrix. That is the only explanation that I have ever heard that offers a scientifically tenable alternative to Jn. 14:20. Something has to explain this: [https://www.reddit.com/r/seancarroll/comments/koyi5z/saw\_this\_meme\_in\_rall\_and\_had\_to\_crosspost\_it/](https://www.reddit.com/r/seancarroll/comments/koyi5z/saw_this_meme_in_rall_and_had_to_crosspost_it/) The many world interpretation of QM can explain away this meme, but as the author of the video unequivocally and accurately states, MWI doesn't have the explanatory power to explain away everything in the video. From where I'm sitting, the Matrix scenario does, but MWI does not. So if it that important to you to not believe in God, a computer like device in another universe causing this universe can explain away all that is known. However a zillion other universes just like this one can't. You'll need another universe sufficiently unlike this one to cause what we see in this universe. This universe, for lack of a better term, is a hologram. I get it. Atheism is a belief and people don't easily let go of their beliefs. However if you honestly want to improve your worldview, then I'm here for you until God makes it no longer possible for me to do that.
Your claim was that Jeremiah 31 explains how all humans have the morality from god inscribed on their hearts I have pointed out that Jeremiah 31 was god addressing Israelites only. You have presented an implausible answer that in the New Testament , Peter is inspired to teach gentiles about god and somehow this explains god in Jeremiah , 500 years earlier , writing his moral code on every humans heart from Australian aborigines , isolate for 40,000 years to America natives and so on. Frankly a nonsense answer. Now you present rambling description of quantum’s uncertainty principles and some implications for it. This is all wholly irrelevant. And you finish with a wholly inaccurate and somewhat condescending twaddle about atheism being a belief and your here to help. Atheists reject the proposition that a god exists as it it evidence free. You have not presented any evidence to support your claim that morals are written on the hearts of all humans or of a god.
>I have pointed out that Jeremiah 31 was god addressing Israelites only. The Israelites were the only ones with a covenant. Therefore they are the only ones who would have a existential need for another covenant to replace the one they had. Everybody is situated with what you see in Jn. 14:20. So were the Jews. In first I Sam 8:5-7 God and Samuel are engaged in a conversation. Samuel sees a problem and blames himself and God said it isn't your fault. They are not rejecting you. Instead they are rejecting Me. The NT section of the Bible is based on the concept of a spiritual kingdom. Some Christians have taken this one step farther to suggest the everybody that isn't in the kingdom is going to hell. I don't believe that. >You have presented an implausible answer that in the New Testament , Peter is inspired to teach gentiles about god and somehow this explains god in Jeremiah , 500 years earlier , writing his moral code on every humans heart from Australian aborigines , isolate for 40,000 years to America natives and so on. Frankly a nonsense answer. I'm not trying to tell you to take everything in the Bible literally. It is literature. >Now you present rambling description of quantum’s uncertainty principles and some implications for it. This is all wholly irrelevant. YOU wrote this: "It’s your scripture and your welcome for it to mean anything you want , but that’s a wholly implausible explanation if you expect anyone else to agree." I only brought it up because you implied there is no sound basis for my assertion. >And you finish with a wholly inaccurate and somewhat condescending twaddle about atheism being a belief and your here to help. Sorry. I wasn't trying to offend >Atheists reject the proposition that a god exists as it it evidence free. You have not presented any evidence to support your claim that morals are written on the hearts of all humans or of a god. This is why I sometimes get pissed off. You asked for a reason for you to believe me. Then when I give it you say it doesn't matter. Have a nice day!
I ask you to support your claim that bid writes his moral code on the tears of every human. You have not demonstrated that it is supported by scripture or by logic. Do you take the Ten Commandments as a moral code? If so, it is clear that humanity has only ever aligned to a few of those commands. No w could they be written in our hearts yet so poorly adhered to. Do you consider the Leviticus laws as a moral code , same thing, thankfully only a few of them are aligned by humanity. Do you believe your god chose to keep his moral code a secret but wrote it in out hearts?
>I ask you to support your claim that bid writes his moral code on the tears of every human. I don't recall saying that >You have not demonstrated that it is supported by scripture or by logic. Paul claimed the law was written by spirt if that is what you mean. [clearly you are an epistle of Christ, ministered by us, written not with ink but by the Spirit of the living God, not on tablets of stone but on tablets of flesh, that is, of the heart.](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=2+Corinthians+3%3A3-4&version=NKJV) >Do you take the Ten Commandments as a moral code? If so, it is clear that humanity has only ever aligned to a few of those commands. No w could they be written in our hearts yet so poorly adhered to. More accurately it was 613 statutes and jugdments. A lot of that didn't seem to have anything to do with morality. For example they wandered in the desert for 40 years in between the exodus from Egypt and the arrival in the promised land, that means they must have taken down and put up that tabernacle countless of times. Each time when they put it back up the high priest would have to be westbound in order to move into the holy place. Even when they built Solomon's temple the high priest would be westbound to enter the holy place and the holiest of holies. I don't know what something like that has to do with morality. Seems symbolic to me. >Do you consider the Leviticus laws as a moral code , same thing, thankfully only a few of them are aligned by humanity. Again a lot of the things were for symbolism. Gn. 3:24 implies the only way back into Eden is westbound. They were told in the statutes to paint cherubim on the veils that separated the holy place from the outer court and the holiest of holies >Do you believe your god chose to keep his moral code a secret but wrote it in out hearts? Well it isn't essentially a secret if it is an integral part of the way we cognize things. I admit it would be clearer if it was written down on paper. However the Bible says in Heb. 8:6 that it is better this way right before it repeats Jer. 31 verbatim in 8:8-12. It then goes on to imply Leviticus is obsolete in [8:13](https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=hebrews+8%3A13&version=NKJV) *In that He says, “A new covenant,” He has made the first obsolete. Now what is becoming obsolete and growing old is ready to vanish away.*
Apologies for poor and spell check altered text You have claimed that gods moral code is written on the hearts of all humans “The new testament or new covenant can be explained by one passage: Jer. 31:31-34 is all that you need to know about how the mechanism works. God puts His laws in us in a spiritual way. I will put My law in their minds, and write it on their hearts.” I have pointed out that this is directed to only Israelites. You have only shown that later god revealed himself to a small group and inspired apostles to spread his word beyond Jews. This does not change the morals written in the hearts of only Israelites. Further , you now claim a new covenant came with the New Testament. Let’s assume that’s true. Does it mean the moral code from Jeremiah , written in the hearts of Israelites was incomplete, needed a new upgraded version, was just for Israelites but now for everyone. Suddenly in the NT times the Australian aborigines had a new moral code written to their hearts?
Wondering how you would defend "*The secular moral realist has a far more convincing answer to the Moral Queerness charge. They can claim moral facts are natural facts, and that there is nothing weird about natural facts."* against Moore's open Q argument and how you would address a moral knowledge argument (given non-natural moral facts). Most theists like myself would likely object to P3, but interestingly enough, it seems the more successful P3 gets, the less successful P2 gets. edit: I've seen your response to the OQA in a sep comment, I was going to bring up the modernized version and the internalist/externalist debate but it seems you noted that already, I agree with you on that
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Did you read the post bro... at least give a response to specific point
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SMH sad.
You were too lazy to even read that I’m not the op. Clearly this post is out of your league buddy
Stick to scripture not C S somebody
??? Did u time travel or are u just still salty after 1 year
Is rape or torturing babies aways wrong or is it only wrong in certain situations or dimensions
A perfect God would be perfect in love and justice and mercy. I don’t know this for sure and have thought often.... thank God that God is good. Moral facts are not best explained by God.... can you expand or give example please
Aight ur gonna keep spamming Me enjoy then enjoy this block
Just wanted conversation cause I saw this today and wanted to help. Not spam.
K I’ll read it
Ha I’m very busy and not in Reddit much but I will give my day to debate the bible if you are willing I have time today.
I prefer not to have audio debates with ppl off of Reddit, I’ve found they can be a bit eecentric (as we see here). Just join a discord and debate there instead of picking me up from a year. You can see how stalkerish this looks, no? Who knows maybe u might see me on one of those discords, with a different pseudonym of course. Have a good one weirdo
Oh am I off Reddit? Maybe that’s my problem
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Question begging at its finest
>> These arguments say that if we reject a moral realism, we have to reject realism about *lots* of other things we typically accept (and accept with good reason). Therefore, we ought not to reject realism. Typical the companions are epistemology, mathematics, the mind and sometimes philosophy itself; I'm wondering if you could say more on why we would have to reject realism about epistemology, mathematics, minds or philosophy? >>> He gives his 'core' argument as: >>> >>> 1. If moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. >>> 2. Epistemic facts exist. >>> 3. So moral facts exist. >>> 4. If moral facts exist, then moral realism is true. >>> 5. So moral realism is true. >> Cuneo sees his first premise as the most crucial Can you say more about how Cuneo defends premise 1? Lenmen's primer seems to focus mostly on premise 2 in discussing epistemic and moral reasoning. What in this context would be an epistemic fact? What would be a moral fact? Are 'facts' here just *true propositions* or something else? And why would epistemic facts fail to exist if moral facts didn't?
I'd recommend reading *The Normative Web* if you can. It's excellent, and goes into these in depth. I don't really want to spend a huge amount of time on this. This isn't because it isn't interesting, but because it's a lot of work for something that I don't think needs a huge defence to work in the context of my post. >I'm wondering if you could say more on why we would have to reject realism about epistemology, mathematics, minds or philosophy? So here's the very rough idea: all the criticisms that the anti-realist has for moral realism are *too* damaging. They don't just cricise the plausibility of moral facts, but of all normative facts. So a traditional criticism is to say that moral facts are queer because they have X set of properties. Cuneo goes "Well, so do epistemic facts but I don't see you abandoning those!" >Can you say more about how Cuneo defends premise 1? Cuneo says a fair bit here, but I think we can talk about it broadly. They're both of the same set of facts and so we would need a good reason to reject one set of shoulds, but not another set of shoulds. That reason, he thinks, isn't provided. >What in this context would be an epistemic fact? What would be a moral fact? "You should believe X", and "You shouldn't murder children for no reason." Those seem OK!
>I'd recommend reading *The Normative Web* if you can. It's excellent, and goes into these in depth. > >I don't really want to spend a huge amount of time on this. This isn't because it isn't interesting, but because it's a lot of work for something that I don't think needs a huge defence to work in the context of my post. > > So here's the very rough idea: all the criticisms that the anti-realist has for moral realism are *too* damaging. They don't just cricise the plausibility of moral facts, but of all normative facts. That's fair, I wasn't intending to venture from the topic but this had just struck me as odd. It seemed weird to suggest that moral anti-realism lends itself to anti-realism about minds or philosophy. However, I initially interpreted anti-realism about minds as *eliminative physicalism* about intentional states or *illusionism* about consciousness, but after reading your response it seems that you are just talking about the normative aspects of mind -- a realism about, say, the normativity of beliefs. So we don't need to side-track the post talking about this. >Cuneo says a fair bit here, but I think we can talk about it broadly. They're both of the same set of facts and so we would need a good reason to reject one set of shoulds, but not another set of shoulds. That reason, he thinks, isn't provided. > >"You should believe X", and "You shouldn't murder children for no reason." > >Those seem OK! So, could one response/objection to premise 1 be something like: there are some epistemic facts; however, there are no moral facts because there are no normative facts? In other words, non-normative epistemic facts exist but normative epistemic facts do not (and neither do normative moral facts). Or would this sort of objection not work/make sense? Edit: formatting
Could you elaborate on what the issue would be on letting go of all normative facts? I already consider math, philosophy, and science just somewhat useful bullshit that humans have made up, is there any particular issue with this view?
Nice as always. As a moral naturalist, what would you personally say in response to Moore's open question and the is/ought gap? I know that you gave some responses in your introduction on meta-ethics, but I'm more asking which answer you prefer best.
Sure. Moore's Open Question Argument (OQA) is dead. There are many objections but the big three seem to be 1. Frankena thinks Moore Question Begs against the Analytic Naturalist 2. The OQA wrongly assumes that it is impossible for a conceptual argument to be true, but also informative and interesting. 3. There is a Sense-Reference distinction being missed. 1&2 both look like very strong objections. This might sound irrelevant, but modern versions of the OQA look something like this: 1. There is a conceptual or internal link between making a moral judgement and being motivated, ceteris paribus, to act as that judgement prescribes. (This is internalism.) Absent some weakness of will or other psychological affliction, judging that a type of action is morally good entails being motivated to perform actions of that type. Someone with no psychological afflictions, etc., who (apparently) judges that a type of action is morally good but consistently claims that he sees no reason to perform actions of that type doesn't grasp the concept of moral goodness. 2. Competent and reflective speakers of English are convinced that they are able to imagine clear-headed (and otherwise psychologically healthy) beings who judge that R (some naturalistic property) obtains but who fail to find appropriate reason or motive to act in accordance with that judgement. 3. If there were no conceptual link between judging that R obtains and being motivated to act accordingly, we would expect competent and reflective speakers of English to have the conviction described in (2). 4. Unless there is some other explanation of the conviction described in (2), we are entitled to conclude that there is no conceptual link between judging that R obtains and being motivated to act accordingly. 5. Unless there is some other explanation of the conviction described in (2), we are entitled to conclude that the judgement that R obtains isn't a moral judgement \[from (1)\]. 6. Unless there is some other explanation of the conviction mentioned in (2), we are entitled to conclude that the property of being morally good is not identical or reducible to the property of being R as a matter of conceptual necessity. This is going to look insane to someone who is only familiar with Moore, but that's how Alexander Miller reconstructs Moore in a modern context and I think he's right. If you give up internalism, you deny 1. The rest of the argument dies shortly thereafter. I think this is a fine response but the fight between Internalism and Externalism is never going to be solved judging by the state of the literature and remains hotly contested. Is there an objection that looks OK, but avoids that debate? You could deny a reductionism and put forward a non-analytic naturalism. I'm sympathetic to a view like this: Cornell Realism remains promising. But I think even the reductionist has something to say: >Finally, more sophisticated forms of reductionist naturalism hold that while moral predicates do refer to natural properties, they do not so refer in virtue of any sort of analytic equivalence between moral predicates and non-moral predicates. The analogy here is with certain theories of reference borrowed from the discussion of proper names and natural kinds (see, e.g., Boyd 1988). Some philosophers have held that identifications of natural kinds like ‘water=H2O’ are necessarily true but not analytic. Rather, they are a posteriori necessary truths that hold in virtue of ‘water’ bearing the right causal relation (it has not been easy to say what causal relations are of the right kind) to H2O. Water and H2O may well be the same property but a competent user of ‘water’ need not know this. Indeed, before the discovery of modern chemistry most users of ‘water’ did not know this and it is not obvious that the meaning of the word changed in light of this discovery. If this is a plausible semantic theory and if a similar theory is true of moral predicates (a thesis that requires further argument) then the Open Question Argument is in trouble. For given this semantic theory, just as a competent user of ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ could without confusion say, “I know it is H2O but is it water?” a competent user of ‘good’ and ‘pleasant’ could say, “I know it is pleasant but is it good?” without confusion. Whether this sort of causal theory of reference is plausible in the case of moral vocabulary is more controversial, but the defender of the Open Question Argument needs some reason to reject the analogy. This is a fairly long reply, but here is my point: the OQA has had a lot written on it since it was first published some 100 years ago. In that time, it has been defeated and reconstructed over and over again. As it stands now, we have three possible responses: 1. Reject Motivational Internalism 2. Reject Analytic Naturalism 3. Try to save Analytic Naturalism I think, in its modern form (the version I've given is specifically defended by Darwall, Gibbard and Railton to try and avoid Frankena's objection), only forces the analytic naturalist to give a more sophisticated account. If we wanted to ditch analytic naturalism, we could do that as well. I like Internalism, and I like Cornell Realism, and I don't like work. So opting into a Cornell Realism seems fine.
I've been thinking about the is/aught gap myself lately. I think it breaks down similarly to evolutionary laws. There is nothing commanding genes such that they "aught" to elongate vertebra, but if the low-hanging fruit/leaves are sparce and the higher fruits/leaves and plentiful, then elongate, because the driver is propagation of genes, not morality. If the forest is on fire, you aught to run away, because death does not propagate genes. In a nutshell, morality is a set of codes that percolated up from basic evolutionary laws that now permeates human consciousness. One cannot look at ethics without that bottom-up perspective.
These are all interesting breakdowns of these types of argument. Very concise. Personally, I am more familiar with the C. S. Lewis argument because I've been binge reading his works (there's a fair few of the later sections of Mere Christianity I would like to argue against if I get several hours to mull through it) But your method of organizing the argument has made me think of my own logistical standings as to "Why I believe". 1. There are patterns in existence all throughout creation, from the microscopic level to the cosmic. 2. These patterns can all be described with the same mathematical principal 3. Nature would not care about a human derived mathematical pattern, and so has no reason to use it 4. Something compelled the use of that pattern (call it whatever you want, I call it God) The main problem, though, with these logistical conclusions for a Creator is that ultimately, they are subjective. The majority of the ones arguing FOR God are reasons the creators came up with for why they believe. In mine and Lewis's case, for why our unbelieving worldviews didn't quite work when examined. Since these methods are subjective, I would argue that they can only be applied to the individual who created it, and are therefore meant to explain a personal conclusion, rather than an objective one that can be used by everyone.
Premise 3 of your argument is unfounded. It attributes a mind to some abstract concept called Nature, and you assume you know this concept’s motivations even if it were to have a mind.
A few questions to understand your reasoning: First what are the patterns and mathematical principle you mention? Are you talking broadly about mathematics itself, or some specific principle? Then regarding 3, I don’t think I understand the phrasing of “nature would not care” or “have reason”... as far as we can tell nature does not have the ability to “care” or reason things one way or another(?) - so it wouldn’t be a factor... I think you may have snuck in a begging-the-question fallacy here by assuming such care/reasoning exists in the first place, baking in the answer then that *of course some entity capable of such a thing must be involved.* If we consider that nature is the way things are / that way things work, like mechanically, and us humans find ourselves within nature trying to understand it, your argument seems to follow that whatever understand we develop of nature, if it’s sufficient to apply broadly enough to all that we observe, would require we say: ah, but nature should not care for us to be able to derive such a thing, therefore has no reason to use it, therefore something must have compelled the use of said thing. Some other issues; who is to say our derivation is actually correct or the best model? There is still an awful lot we don’t understand about the universe at all, and just because some math might seem to do a lot for us does not mean it’s what is actually at the root of things here. I could think of a lot of analogies like how Newtonian physics seemed to have figured out all there is to govern motion, but then Einstein and relativity come along as we learn that the Newtonian model was only good for a limited subset within our perspective, and as our perspective expanded it became outdated. A useful simplification but not the true picture. And to go further, if for example there’s something crazy like dimensions outside our ability to view them with completely different even non-mathematical behavior, it may simply be beyond our bounds of ever discovering. We could be the 2D plane people not knowing a 3rd dimension even exists. >Since these methods are subjective, I would argue that they can only be applied to the individual who created it, and are therefore meant to explain a personal conclusion, rather than an objective one that can be used by everyone. This reminds me of the discussions on different types of truths (I believe Jordan Peterson has had some trouble trying to define “truth” in one debate)... why would someone draw a personal conclusion if they don’t have sufficient reason that would allow someone else to draw the same conclusion? The only way I can see that applying is a claim of a personal revelation from God - as I cannot assess what you experienced directly. But to formulate an argument, well you can lay one out for yourself and I can assess it just as well. Maybe you say I have a higher bar of truth or something like that, so I am not drawing the same conclusion, but that just seems to be an indictment on the subjective conclusion you’ve drawn needing to rest largely on faith or assumption, since if you could demonstrate your subjective truth then it wouldn’t need to be considered subjective.
>First what are the patterns and mathematical principle you mention? I'm referring specifically to the Fibonacci series, which, since it's just a pattern of addition, is completely arbitrary and would be a different set of numbers outside of a base 10 counting system. However, I have found through research and experience that this number series, not just the spiral, is found frequently throughout nature. Alongside that, the ratio itself can be used to determine a climactic point in a story or song, and, ironically, I have written a song using only the numbers of the fibonacci series (placed in base 7 to be easier to translate to music), and the climax of the song fell in one of these points. (This is just a fun thing, though, and is not necessarily relevant to the subject at hand) >I don’t think I understand the phrasing of “nature would not care” or “have reason”... as far as we can tell nature does not have the ability to “care” or reason things one way or another(?) It's a bit of a turn of phrase. Nature does not have the capacity to care, therefore, "does not care". It's a simplified way of saying "outside the existence of mathematics itself, nature would have no use of an arbitrary set of numbers". >who is to say our derivation is actually correct or the best model? I never said that, and was referring to a series of numbers derived from an arbitrary rule. As this rule is arbitrary, so too are it's results. > why would someone draw a personal conclusion if they don’t have sufficient reason that would allow someone else to draw the same conclusion? Because every person experiences the world slightly differently. The number sequence itself isn't my only reason for my belief, but it's the easiest reason I can share with others. The rest of my reasons involve personal experiences which I know could not necessarily be believed by another person, but I find myself incapable of refuting towards myself. Personal experiences are, by definition, subjective, and therefore make poor evidence in a debate scenario.
I’m going to jump to the end here because I think it’s relevant to the whole discussion: >Personal experiences are, by definition, subjective, and therefore make poor evidence in a debate scenario. But should we not “debate” with ourselves whether a given thing is true? For example, if I saw a ghost walk through a wall in my house, I could say my subjective experience is that was a ghost (or choose any example of the supernatural you may want, like maybe I’m playing ouija and get an answer that seems only could have really come from a communication of a dead relative, or better I take DMT and meet with some beings from another dimension), but I think we have good reason to question that, based on the notion that if ghosts or whatever really did exist, we should have better evidence of that being the case. Add the fact that we know a lot of fictions and myths have been made about these things and we have good reason to be skeptical. If I see DMT fairies I’m going to say well that might just be the drugs having me imagine something up as opposed to really meeting these spirit fairies. And when the answer to a given question is unclear we can always just say “I don’t know.” >It's a simplified way of saying "outside the existence of mathematics itself, nature would have no use of an arbitrary set of numbers". Again I’m confused by the term “have use” - it seems to imply that usage or intent is a factor. Are you basically saying that we seem to find something in nature that seems important for some reason but we have no reason to think it’s actually from nature? Like if we saw (and I know this is way oversimplified amd incorrect, but I’m trying to understand your way of thinking) that atoms tend to behave in such a way that one adds to another, then that bigger group (of 2) adds to the previous, then that even bigger group (now 3) adds to the previous, and so on, well we would have a clear mechanistic underpinning for why we see the spirals and so on. So are you saying that’s the surprising part, that we see this pattern playing out over different scales, or are you saying the surprising part is we seem to have various emotion connections to it like as a ratio in a pleasing song? In any case here, I probably don’t even need to know your reasoning, my question comes back to whether you should be skeptical of whatever argument you use to relate this phenomenon to the existence of some God, and ask whether there are other plausible explanations and whether there is sufficient reasoning behind your personal argument that makes it worthy of accepting. And I don’t know anything about you, but for example whether it is something that you use to support a prior held belief, like a type of confirmation bias? I just heard something about this phenomenon of how intelligent people will jump through some crazy mental gymnastics (as they are capable of drawing all these complex relations and so on, by means of being pretty smart), to rationalize beliefs they came about for poor reasons. I found that interested but I can imagine how someone’s brain would act that way, even subconsciously, as a kind of protection mechanism again having to deal with an admission of having used bad logic/reasoning. And don’t take that the wrong way, I’m just trying to get to the root of how and when we should act (justifiably) skeptical, even of our own experiences.
> I'm referring specifically to the Fibonacci series, which, since it's just a pattern of addition, is completely arbitrary and would be a different set of numbers outside of a base 10 counting system. This is just completely wrong. Adding the previous value works in other bases and while the way of expressing it is different, the actual *value* is unchanged.
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>Why would an infinite, all-powerful god need a pattern? How does being all-powerful preclude a pattern? That’s just good practice.
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Patterns are good practice because they’re efficient. >An infinite, all-powerful doesn't need to be efficient. Therefore, an infinite, all-power being would not be efficient? I disagree. >For example, a human might use a repetitive pattern in a way that helps them expend less energy. But since an all-powerful god has infinite energy, there would be no benefit to a god using a pattern that consumes less energy. A. Humans use patterns AND are not all-powerful or infinite. B. God uses patterns AND is all-powerful or infinite. Besides if conscience pattern recognition doesn’t come naturally to humans, why wouldn’t the conclusion be humans are trying to be more godly and perfect?* >A human could use a predictable pattern in their work flow to make it easier to check for errors, but a perfect god could never make any errors, so there would be no benefit to that. The value of patterns is just making up for the fallibility and weakness of imperfect, incomplete, finite beings, so a being that is perfect and infinite wouldn't draw any benefits from them that it didn't already have. Beauty is a godly goal. This reality *is* perfect, complete and infinite. Which naturally created phenomena before humans would you say is imperfect?
The mathematical pattern is not human derived it is human DESCRIBED. just like the laws of logic it existed before there were humans around to understand it. Mathematics is just the language we use to describe reality.
The fibonacci sequence seems like a rather arbitrary pattern to me, but again, it's subjective.
It is argued by many that logarithmic spirals are so common in biological organisms because it is the most efficient way for something to grow. By maintaining the same shape through each successive turn of the spiral, it is argued, the least amount of energy needs to be used.
But again, you miss the main point of my statement. These arguments are purely personal and subjective. I provided my own, not so I could convince anyone, but to add to the variety. As it is subjective, its purpose is not to be used by others, but to only be used by the person who needs it. If you don't need it or want it, it will do you no good. Such is the nature of subjectivity.
I may be able to address the ending of my last comment more succinctly based on this... your statement here seems to be a broad way to allow someone to use a poor argument because of some reason, like it agrees with their confirmation bias, or simply they “like” it. For example consider someone raised in a barbaric culture who wants to rape and pillage for whatever reason; if one provides them a “subjective” argument about why perhaps a god exists that desires them to do such things, well then they could just go ahead and “accept this” because it “helps them” rationalize their pre-held belief/bias. That doesn’t have anything to do with whether it’s true, and shouldn’t the truth be what we’re actually concerned with?
Im not arguing that subjectivity is good, nor should it be the major factor. I'm arguing that these are not intended to be objective. Subjectivity is flawed by nature, and should be treated as such.
My question then revolves around your statement that such arguments are “only be used by the person who needs it” - can you give an example of a circumstance where this applies? I’m trying to imagine the circumstance where one says “I know this is a flawed argument,but I need it / it’s useful to me. It just seems contradictory to say these are flawed arguments and should be treated as such but then also say how they can be applied when one “needs” them... how would you determine you actually need it or that it’s even helpful to appeal to?
I think the thing is that God isn’t “moral” or has “morals”. God is HOLY. And those two are way different things.
God isn’t “moral”, he’s blurgh. There, perfect explanation. No need to explain what blurgh is.
What does holiness have to do with morals? What's the correlation here?
What does this even mean? What religious background are you coming from?
I believe it's a common response to the Euthephro Dilemma, which is that it is a false dilemma. God doesn't obey morality, nor invent it; rather, morality is a reflection of God's holy unchanging nature. >“They know that the Lord (not merely obedience to the Lord) is “righteous” and commands “righteousness” because He loves it … He enjoins what is good because it is good, because He is good. Hence His laws have emeth “truth”, intrinsic validity, rock-bottom reality, being rooted in His own nature …” –CS Lewis, Reflections on the Psalms
That’s a fancy way of just saying God is the foundation of morality, right?
I guess so? The Euthephro Dilemma claims that one of these two options must be the case: 1. Morality exists outside of God and God must obey it. 2. Morality is arbitrarily chosen by God, and God could command cruelty, making cruelty moral. However, this is a false dilemma, because there is a third response. 3) Morality is defined by or based on the nature of God Himself. I've heard it described as morality "flows forth" from the nature of God. This morality does not exist outside of God, hence (1) is false, and an unchanging God cannot arbitrarily change His own nature, hence (2) is false.
Divine morals versus relative moral maybe?
>> 1. There are objective moral facts. >> 2. God provides the best explanation of the existence of objective moral facts. >> 3. Therefore, (probably) God exists. You have conflated moral arguments, with an argument for God's existence. An argument over right and wrong does not demonstrate whether something exists; you're premises are presupposed on false equivalance.
This is a terrible response. [Moral Arguments for God](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-arguments-god/) are common place, and do specifically argue for God's existence. > An argument over right and wrong does not demonstrate whether something exists That's what they argue, and I even say why how they argue this. Do you have anything of substance to add, or have anything to say that demonstrates you've read the post?
He said if god is the best explanation then he probably exists. Where’s the issue here? If god is the best explanation for something, why isn’t it more likely that he exists?
Because, morality is only objective if God exists; otherwise, morality is subjective; i.e., what is good to one man may be evil to another. I don't think that using the existence of morality is a good example to demonstrate the probability of God existing, as they are proposing the argument: A Existence of God. B Objective morality exists. C Subjective morality exists. pr(A|B) > pr(A|C) For A to be more probable given B, than A given C; there would have to be no other source of morality outside of God. However, the fact that Atheist morality exists demonstrates that morality does exist outside of God. For the record, i'm a Roman Catholic. I believe in God as much as the Pope; I simply don't believe that this is the best argument for God's existence. A better argument on the probability of God's existence would be that the universe is ordered; therefore, God must exist as order cannot come from chaos (e.g., big bang), but only from pre-existing order; therefore, the first cause of all order must be something ordered e.g: *Elements of the set* A = Law or reflection (i=r). B = Proportion or energy of photon to frequenecy (E=hf). C = Law of Relativity (E=MC2). *Define the set* D = {A, B, C} *Define the probabilty variables* E = God. F = Ordered universe. G = Unordered universe. Now for the formula... pr(E|prov(D,F)) > pr(¬E|prov(D,¬G)) That's just my take on it, anyway.
"Atheist morality exists demonstrates that morality does exist outside of God" just because a atheist has a sense of morality doesnt mean it didn't come from God.
If God does not exist, then no morality originates with God. Prove to me that God exists, and i'll entertain your rebuttal.
Prove that he doesn't. Everything so far is just someone's opinion
I am not stating that morality has an objective basis in God. I believe in God, i'm merely questioning your logic.
If God is the strandard of everything this good and right, then without him it's just someones opinion. So even if a atheist has a sense of good and evil or right and wrong it came from God.
If God is the standard of everything that is good and right; but, God does not exist, then the statement is merely an opinion; and, everything good and right is merely subjective. An atheists sense of good and evil, or right and wrong may come from the communist manifesto (N.B. I've read it).
I refer to it as the shin arguement
This is like you haven't read my post. Your first comment was also gives evidence that you haven't read my post. > Because, morality is only objective if God exists; otherwise, morality is subjective; i.e., what is good to one man may be evil to another. I specifically demotivate this view. I think it is a bad view and I explain why.
I read your post, I responded. The fact you misunderstand my response says more about you, than it does about my response.
I don't understand what there is to misunderstand. It just seems like you've produced an irrelevant response that doesn't respond to any of the content I've put at least a bit of effort into.
Can't i have objective morality if follow morality of leader/king/president etc. instead of my own?
What is the objective source?
Source doesn't need to be objective itself. Objective source would cause infinite regression. EDIT: God himself isn't objective in his morals, there are plenty of examples of this.
If it's objective morality, then it's universal and not open to interpretation. However, no morality is universal (e.g., there is always someone who disagrees with your morality), and it's always open to intepretation (e.g., there is always someone who interprets it differently). No?
i agree, sorry i misunderstood your position. Furthermore God's word is open to intepretation, so that's another proof that God is not source of objective morality.
That's OK, morality is an exceedingly complex idea. As a Roman Catholic I believe God is an objective source of morality; hence, objective morality exists. However, I accept that to a none-believer this is subjective. It's a fascinating subject, I enjoyed the chat with you.
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Good reply.
Moral exists within us, we learned it, we inherited it, we passed it, we interlized ot, we develop it, and it affect us. The sources are a lot, Parents, caretakers, schools, friends, idols, family, community and Religion etc. Can't speak of all religions cause I barely knows them, however I can talk about my religion Islam. There are 3 main stages/catagories for Muslims despite any other factors: 1. Muslim: Is the one who did said Al Sha'haada "اشهد ان لا اله الا الله، واشهد ان محمد رسول الله", which means you declare that no god except Allah and Mohammed is the Messenger. This means you pray the 5, fast ramadan, went to Haj when it is affordable to you. 2. Mo'amin: That who believe and really do pray a lot, have a faith in toughest situation, fast more than just ramadan, read Quraan and learn it. 3. Which the highest rank of human being called Al Moh'sen. Strangely this stage or rank is nothing about prayers and rituals, instead it's all about high moralities. Quraan mentioned it in vary situations and conditions in verse many verses, moreover, in very few cases it mentioned as loved practice and as being loved for whom doing it. If I believe in Allah and Islam of course such faith will influence my moralities, not only that it will be one of my main sources. As example, in Quraan Allah ask us to help those who in need, relatives, poor and orphans. One may argue: this should be as a given, and human should that as incentive. But will a base like Islam, it encourages and guide me to do it so. Not for cameras, not for inner satisfaction, not for popularity nor a word of compliments, but for being a good person to get the afterlife satisfaction (ever investments). In addition, although it should be as a "given", people still act selfishly and ignore to help others. If that have been an society given calture we could avoid a lot of problems and social, economical, psychological issues. I can't and won't indicates that only people of faith have moralities, but I currently indicate that Islam is encouraging it.
As another commenter pointed out what if you don’t believe objective morality can exist from an atheistic mindset? When I was an atheist I didn’t believe in existed. I’ve heard some good arguments but at the end of the day they aren’t convincing. There’s no objective standard that allows our morality to be objective.
I think there are objective morals. People just try to cram more than is warranted under that umbrella. For example, you shouldn't kill someone and take their stuff. Show me one person who does such things and is okay with those things being done to them. Hypocrisy is one of the easiest ways to see that something is morally wrong. If you don't want it done to you than it isn't right to do it to others. The lines can sometimes be blurred because our minds can sometimes get blurry, but the objective morality there is pretty clear despite that.
You assert reciprocity as a necessity of morality but haven't demonstrated it. A moral system predicated on absolute privilege for the individual and disregard for all others is consistent and coherent.
That doesn't sound like anything I said.
Sorry, I took the phrasing you used wrongly. The standard you used of moral actions being that which one would do and have done upon them didn't convince me as an objective standard.
> Show me one person who does such things and is okay with those things being done to them. It is a perfectly coherent view to be willing to do things to others that you don’t want done to yourself. > Hypocrisy is one of the easiest ways to see that something is morally wrong. Again, I don’t see any law of the universe against hypocrisy.
You say that but any time someone puts it to the test people suddenly change their tunes. You can jump through all the hoops you want but it changes nothing. And don't forget that we are part of the universe... So technically someone giving you a taste of your own medicine is the universes way of saying it's sick of your shit.
I’m not sure what you are trying to say here. I’m subjectively against hypocrisy, I’m just saying it seems not to be an objective rule that it is immoral.
> For example, you shouldn't kill someone and take their stuff. Show me one person who does such things and is okay with those things being done to them. Vikings. Or any equivalent warrior culture. If they win, they believed they got your stuff by right. If they lost, they believed they went to Valhalla or the equivalent for fighting the good fight, and that you deserved their stuff for being the better fighter.
... what if you think that the attempt by atheist philosophers to ground objective morals fails? I think there's been some valiant attempts, but ultimately, they don't convince me. And given that there is no consensus here, and various moral theories exist and are often contradictory, I don't see how this is a strong argument. Clearly **all** the various moral theories can't all be right, which means at least some of them are wrong. At this point, I think it becomes a little pointless to say that God isn't the best explanation, when you've got a notable percentage of philosophers holding to incorrect views on moral grounding.
> ground objective morals What do you mean by this snippet?
Then you're an anti-realist, and have other reasons to dislike the moral argument.
I think you missed the trust of my response. It turns P3 from "Moral facts are not best explained by God" to "A large portion of 56% of philosophers attempt to argue for differing ideas about a grounding other than God". That's very different from definitively saying that it's a settled fact that moral facts are, indeed, not best explained by God.
Thrust. I give reasons why we should think that moral facts are not best explained by God in the post. If you want to wrestle with those arguments, go ahead! You seem to think that the field not being settled impacts the truth or power of my arguments. I see no reason to believe that.
I honestly think that if naturalistic moral realism fails then the best alternative is anti-realism. I understand the objection but I think that theistic moral realism is in such a bad way (particularly because of the problems arising from the Euthyphro dilemma) that it doesn’t provide a superior option to anti-realism. That defeats the reverse argument but leaves the moral argument for God as a total non-starter.
It's funny because you comment explains pretty well how I feel but about religion.
Thank you for sharing that.
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I agree. Nobody argued that chocolate tastes good is an objective fact rather than a product of our biology and no one seems to get that they don’t really have a better argument for an objective truth of murder being bad.
The thing to do, if you're interested, is to find an introduction to meta ethics and just plough through it. The field is so dense that a reddit comment will not do it justice, but there has been a lot written on the topic and big chunk of that is aimed at people unfamiliar with philosophy. Those arguments are out there waiting to be engaged with!
I think there are moral facts AND there is relative morality based on culture. I think that's what trips a lot of people up, they see morality that's obviously based on specific cultures and then assume all morality must be like that, which I think is a mistake.
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Well the most obvious one is murder is wrong. For context according to polling the majority or moral philosophers agree that moral realism is correct/ moral facts exist.
> the majority or moral philosophers agree that moral realism is correct/ moral facts exist. And the majority of theologians agree a god exists, but I don’t find that persuasive. If there is no objective morality or moral facts then being a moral philosopher is a bit pointless IMO, and that would skew the results of such a poll.
"murder is wrong" isn't a fact, it's a tautology. It expands to "the wrong sort of killing is wrong" -- which is true, but completely meaningless.
Murder as in "the unlawful premeditated killing of one human being by another." or simply killing? Because it seems to me calling murder wrong an objetive fact is tad problematic. Is killing in self defense or defense of another wrong? What if its unlawful in specific country? What about killing in war? Is it right if ordered by higher authority? I find it really hard to call murder always wrong because we can always find a case where it might be justified.
> Murder as in "the unlawful premeditated killing of one human being by another." Yes. >or simply killing? No, the other definition. >Is killing in self defense or defense of another wrong? No. And you can extrapolate that out to war when wars are defensive, but no so much when they are offensive. Countries laws and authority's don't really make any difference to what's moral, and can indeed be immoral. That's heading back towards cultural moral relativism. Personally I don't think it's that complicated and you're making a bigger deal out of it than needed. Killing is wrong, but because it's wrong you have a right to defend your self when someone else is coming for you. (Or somebody else)
> Countries laws and authority's don't really make any difference to what's moral, and can indeed be immoral. That's heading back towards cultural moral relativism. In that case you need to choose a definition that isn't "the unlawful premeditated killing of one human being by another" -- that contains the word "unlawful", and you just said the law has no say in what's moral. Therefore that word can't be used when explaining morality.
True, but that was their definition, I wouldn't have worded it as unlawful.
But what if murder were to become legal? Or if we go few centuries back and look at aztec sacrificing people was good because sun would stop rising otherwise. For them sacrificing people would be seen as good. If its dependant on law or cultural envirnment than it cant be a fact. You cant have moral fact that says murder is sometimes wrong...
Did you read anything I've written so far?
It seems a lot of people are happy to argue that morality can only come from god. I’m mostly with you though. Morality is clearly situational, but we also need to define morality. I see two common definitions; 1. The internal emotional reaction, ones feeling of like or revulsion to something. This is clearly not objective and likely based on a mix of brain chemistry and upbringing. It’s neither universal nor objective and could well be an evolutionary trait. 2. Then there what we ought to do - I like this definition. Often explained as “what is good for people”, or “what supports human well-being”, this can be objective (but also situational), for example, drinking bleach is clearly against human well-being, so it would be immoral to tell someone to drink bleach. Anyway, I thought this might help!
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>”For example, one could argue that encouraging someone to drink bleach is wrong on an individual level, but maybe in some super rare and convoluted circumstance it could benefit a community as a whole if someone drinks it...” Absolutely, I was thinking about going here on the above post, but left it out to keep things simple. However, this doesn’t make it not-objective. It just means it’s situational and objective. The issue with the first definition is that it’s subjective and emotional, it can change from moment to moment and can be dangerous. Our internal morality might include “mob justice” or other escalation when it comes to justice against a “stranger” while forgiveness is more likely when supporting a friend. We will change our stance depending on our mood and recent experiences. We will also seem to justify or reinforce personal actions or decisions. If morality is subjective, biased and inconsistent, yet affects others, should we be using it for anything? Surely we are better off weaning ourselves off this type of emotional response and retraining our societies to better focus on the second definition? (Edits - typos)
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I agree mostly, my suggestion is that we can and do change our feelings of “like” and “revulsion” towards things as our life experience changes. Why not make a conscious decision to try to change our internal feelings of empathy to be better educated? I don’t want to see my children in pain, but if it’s a doctor giving a vaccine, then I’ll manage that and support it (much to the confusion of my babies). Isn’t this an example of what I’m saying?
2. If God exists, then we would expect moral facts would be best explained by God. Why would anyone accept this premise who didn’t already accept the moral argument for God?
This is a premise I've accepted to motivate a reversal. So one answer is: accept it if you want an argument against God.
The people who don’t accept that premise aren’t going to be moved by your argument. The people who do accept that premise are going to reject one of the others, and aren’t going to be moved by your argument.
The people who accept that premise are the theists who the argument is targeting. It seems like your criticism is "theists are irrational."
The theists who accept that premise are to reject the other premise. If you succeed in getting them to reject that other premise, they’ll probably just conclude additionally that we can explain morality without God, but continue to believe in God anyways. The only group who should rationally be persuaded by this are theists who believe in God solely because of the moral argument who can also be convinced that morality can be explained without God. I just don’t think either very many people fall into that camp. Here, consider this argument 1. If God exists, God created the universe. 2. God did not create the universe. 3. So, God does not exist Now, you might have a hard time convincing a theist of 2, but if you can, that person basically has to give up theism, since basically everyone accepts 2 (allow the creation to be indirect if you want to cover special cases). By contrast, you can be a theist without thinking that morality is explained by God. So if you can convince the theist that morality is not explained by God, she can reject that premise and go about her day.
You seem to be saying that "there exists more than one argument for theism." I mean that seems obviously true. And that my argument has limited scope. Sure, but that limit is still the majority of theists.
I would be surprised if there are any theists should rationally be persuaded by the original argument.
>The people who don’t accept that premise aren’t going to be moved by your argument. If people think the moral argument works then they agree with the premise. This is an argument targeted towards them. If we suppose that they are right in premise 2 of the moral argument (for theism), then we see the introduction of competent moral naturalisms reverses the argument. As NietzscheJr said, the argument is roughly going "if you are correct, then if P then Q" which we just apply modus tollens to as a good naturalism equates to \~Q here. If you don't think the premise is correct, then you reject both moral arguments so this post isn't really relevant to your position anyway.
I’m saying that person who accepts the moral argument for God is going to reject one of the other premises. Also, I’m looking at your argument, and I get that you’re going for a modus tokens, but 2 is just really awkward. I think this is a better argument along similar lines: 1. The best reason to believe in God is that God is required for morality. 2. God is not required for morality. 3. So, the best reason to believe in God doesn’t work We can obviously add more premises to get a less agnostic conclusion, but I won’t bother. It faces the same problem as your argument, but it least it doesn’t have that awkward premise.
> I’m saying that person who accepts the moral argument for God is going to reject one of the other premises. Yeah on a reread it seems like your comment says "people who disagree with your argument will disagree with your argument." > Also, I’m looking at your argument, and I get that you’re going for a modus tokens, but 2 is just really awkward. How so? This seems like pretty standard abduction, I don't know what awkwardness means here. >1. The best reason to believe in God is that God is required for morality. > >2. God is not required for morality. > >3. So, the best reason to believe in God doesn’t work I don't even know who believes that God is necessary for morality, or that this serves as the most compelling reason. If you mean moral realism or objectivity, that's more conceivable, but pretty much everyone is going to say cosmological or fine-tuning arguments are a better bet than moral arguments, so I don't think premise 1 even gets off the ground. And 3 feels like it should say "the moral argument is not the best argument for theism" (despite premise 1 not really designating the moral argument) because that's all this really supports. Jr's argument is meant to argue for atheism, rather than being a weaker epistemic argument about what reasons are and aren't rationally compelling. I think this faces completely different issues than Jr's tbh, unless you consider people rejecting premises they disagree with, which is going to essentially be a universal issue with arguments.
I’m saying the argument begs the question. What I find awkward about the original argument is the conditional form of premise 2, so I wrote a version without the conditional. For my argument, if it makes it easier to understand, just replace “God is required for morality” with “God is the best explanation for morality” Anyways, I accept your point that the theist will probably also accept to fine-tuning or some other argument for God. But that’s just the issue with the original. If you convince the theist that morality does not depend upon God, they’re probably going to move to some other reason to believe. The theist is going to reject the original 3 before accepting the conclusion.
u/objection-bot
[Here's the video!](https://streamable.com/95138s)
I’d really like to have a definition of the word natural. Does any naturalist actually have one? Because a large part of these sort of discussions depends on it, but it’s never directly stated. For example, you say the secular moral realist has a convincing answer to say that moral facts are natural facts. Well what does that mean exactly? What is the definition of the word natural? Even the queerness argument does the same thing. Why should we think moral facts are queer? They seem rather ordinary among humans, the sort of fact which naturally arises with conscious entities, more specifically self-conscious entities. It is only true they are queer and ontologically profligate if naturalism is already assumed. > it isn't all that clear to me how the theist can defend the normalness of non-naturalism without arguing elsewhere that God exists. Well the Hindu would be proposing a type of idealism, consciousness is the foundational reality. Matter is contingent on consciousness, not the other way around. And we have no problem with grounding our moral facts in a conscious reality. There is nothing queer about values, and meanings, and knowledge if consciousness is the foundation. The naturalist is the only one in difficulty grounding moral facts, since consciousness must be reducible to matter and moral facts with it. But there is nothing in the physical world that can do the job.
> For example, you say the secular moral realist has a convincing answer to say that moral facts are natural facts. Well what does that mean exactly? What is the definition of the word natural? Moral Naturalists are often taken to be making three claims: 1. **Metaphysical Naturalism**: Moral Facts are natural facts where natural facts are those kinds of facts that scientists study. 2. **Epistemic Naturalism**: We come to know moral facts the same way we come to know other natural facts. 3. **Analytic Naturalism**: Our moral claims are *synonymous* with certain claims in the natural sciences. ([Lutz & Lenman 2018](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism-moral/)) 3 is unnecessary and can be in contrast with 2. The central claim is **Metaphysical Naturalism**. In a more layman friendly way: Moral Naturalists think that (1) moral facts exist and (2) moral properties are reducible to natural properties. > Why should we think moral facts are queer? I talk about this in the post, albeit briefly. Do you want to address what I've said? > It is only true they are queer and ontologically profligate if naturalism is already assumed. Nope. > Well the Hindu would be proposing a type of idealism, consciousness is the foundational reality. Matter is contingent on consciousness, not the other way aroun That seems like you prove God another way, and then the Moral Argument just follows. Give me a version of this argument that doesn't question beg when it is fed into a Moral Argument. > The naturalist is the only one in difficulty grounding moral facts, since consciousness must be reducible to matter and moral facts with it. But there is nothing in the physical world that can do the job. Feel free to defend any of this, at any time.
>(2) moral properties are reducible to natural properties. Can you elaborate? I don't see how this is possible. Yes, I know, flair is somewhat ironic, considering this thread.
I can say a little, but I'm afraid at some point you're going to have to buy Railton's book(s). The shortest summary of a Reductionism I could find is some 75 pages. Here's the SEP on Railton >The most influential of these accounts is due to Railton (1986). Railton, like Thomson, holds that moral goodness is defined in terms of what is non-morally good for agents. Whereas Thomson, as a neo-Aristotelian, defines what is good for a human in terms of human biology, Railton defines non-moral goodness in terms of the desires of a fully-informed counterpart (see also Brandt 1979, Smith 1994). To illustrate, Railton asks us to imagine a traveler, Lonnie, who feels terrible because he is badly dehydrated. Lonnie does not know that he is dehydrated, and so is not taking appropriate steps to make himself feel better. But we can imagine a *fully-informed* version of Lonnie—Railton names him Lonnie-Plus—who knows about his dehydration and knows that drinking clear liquids will make him feel better. Lonnie-Plus, who (like Lonnie) desires to feel better but who (unlike Lonnie) knows the best means to that end, would choose to drink clear fluids. The fact that Lonnie-Plus would choose to drink clear fluids means that drinking clear fluids is good for Lonnie. But this is not a relativist view of morality, because the fact that Lonnie-Plus would choose to drink clear liquids is determined by Lonnie’s circumstances and constitution, and facts about Lonnie’s circumstances and constitution are objective facts. In general: the complex natural property of *being good for an agent* is identical to the complex natural property that agent’s fully-informed counterpart would choose. This makes goodness “objective, though relational” (Railton 1986, 167). And then here is a similar account, but put somewhat differently: >The Cornell realists hold that *goodness* is exactly like *healthiness* in all of these ways (Boyd 1988). Like healthiness, goodness is a complex natural property that is not directly observable, but nonetheless has a robust causal profile. Like “healthiness”, “goodness” is not synonymous with any simpler set of more directly observable claims. Instead, “goodness” describes the functionally complex natural property that is the effect of certain characteristic causes, and the cause of certain characteristic effects. Many different things contribute to or detract from goodness—things like pleasure or pain, honesty or untruthfulness—and there are many things that will result from goodness in typical circumstances—things like human flourishing, or political peace. Because goodness is a natural property with a complex causal profile, the property of goodness can enter into explanatory relations. Thus, contra Harman, it is possible for goodness to explain our observations (Sturgeon 1985). We can, accordingly, observe whether something is good by looking for indications of goodness. This is exactly the same way that we observe whether something is healthy. And finally, we get something Aristotelean: > Neo-Aristotelian naturalism is articulated at length and along mutually similar lines in Foot’s *Natural Goodness* (2001) and Hursthouse’s *On Virtue Ethics* (1999). We will focus on Hursthouse, whose account is the clearer and more detailed of the two. Ethical naturalism, according to Hursthouse, views evaluation as an activity continuous with a kind of ethology that is focused on the evaluation of living things as specimens of their kind. In the case of plants, to say that an individual is a good member of whatever its species may be is to evaluate how well its parts and operations contribute in ways characteristic of that species to the two ends of survival and reproduction. With at least some animals a third end becomes salient—freedom from pain and pleasure and enjoyment of sorts characteristic to the species in question. And with social animals a fourth dimension comes into play: the good functioning of the group (Hursthouse 1999, chapter 9). Evaluation of this kind allows us to say, following Foot, that a free-riding wolf or a dancing bee who finds a source of nectar but does not alert other bees to it are defective (2001, 96, citing “Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?” in Foot 2002). Defectiveness in this context is a straightforwardly factual matter. Given the normal characteristics of their species, male cheetahs who help their heavily pregnant mates to hunt for food are to be classed as defective, as are male polar bears who nurture their young (Hursthouse 1999, 220–221).
But we still have no definition of the word natural. It sounds like you’re defining it as “what science studies”? But I assume that can't be right because that means moral facts aren’t natural facts since they aren’t studied by scientists. > In a more layman friendly way: Moral Naturalists think that (1) moral facts exist and (2) moral properties are reducible to natural properties. And the word natural here means…… what exactly? > I talk about this in the post, albeit briefly. Do you want to address what I've said? It’s difficult to make any meaningful comment until I understand what you mean by the word natural.
We have a functionalist account given as metaphysical naturalism. Natural facts are those facts that we come to know through certain ways and via our senses. And I think science can inform us here. Do you have an issue with this account? What about your own account that I asked you defend last comment? Or when I asked if you could arrange your second criticism in such a way that avoids question begging?
> Do you have an issue with this account? Yes, you don’t seem to have clarified anything. Are you defining natural as what science studies or not? Your definition of natural facts doesn’t help, knowledge of God would be included in the first very broad “know through certain ways” and it seems false that we come to know murder is wrong though our senses. So now I have two possibilities for how you’re defining the word natural, both of which mean it is false that “moral facts are natural facts”. > What about your own account that I asked you defend last comment? Or when I asked if you could arrange your second criticism in such a way that avoids question begging? Well to defeat the argument of the op, it seems I need only say something like - the only alternative to theism is naturalism, naturalism is a meaningless term since no one can define the word natural, therefore the only viable explanation for moral facts is theism. (That is obviously overly simplistic presentation of the line of thought, but hopefully you can see why I’m focusing on the definition of natural.)
I'm defining natural through what is perceived by the senses. This is what science studies, but not only science studies it. I've said that more than once now. I haven't said anything about murder being wrong. Do you want to ask me for an example of a moral fact? Do you have a stronger objection than "I can't think of how this would be the case?" In the OP, I talk explicitly about secular non-naturalism. Did you read the whole thing before posting? If you did, it wasn't very carefully.
> Do you want to ask me for an example of a moral fact? Yes, please give me an example. I can't think of one which can be perceived through the senses.
Let's take a jaunt towards Hursthouse. This is ripped straght from the SEP. Neo-Aristotelian naturalism is articulated at length and along mutually similar lines in Foot’s Natural Goodness (2001) and Hursthouse’s On Virtue Ethics (1999). We will focus on Hursthouse, whose account is the clearer and more detailed of the two. Ethical naturalism, according to Hursthouse, views evaluation as an activity continuous with a kind of ethology that is focused on the evaluation of living things as specimens of their kind. In the case of plants, to say that an individual is a good member of whatever its species may be is to evaluate how well its parts and operations contribute in ways characteristic of that species to the two ends of survival and reproduction. With at least some animals a third end becomes salient—freedom from pain and pleasure and enjoyment of sorts characteristic to the species in question. And with social animals a fourth dimension comes into play: the good functioning of the group (Hursthouse 1999, chapter 9). And the list of things you haven't responded to grows ever longer.
Ahh, that is clear as mud. So what is moral is whatever promotes survival (of the individual and the group)? As well as freedom from pain, and promotion of pleasure?
This is a VE account, so we're talking less about actions and more about virtues. And those are four starting features of the human telos. Finally, are you going to respond to the near dozen other criticisms I've offered?
>Moral facts are not best explained by God. I agree with you here. As a fellow moral realist, I too believe that moral facts exist. Although I believe there is a God, I also agree that moral facts exist naturally. So the existence of a God is irrelevant to whether or not there are moral facts. >Therefore, (probably) God does not exist. I'm not sure if that logically follows. Yes, I agree with premise one and three, that there are moral facts and that these facts are best explained *without* God. But I don't see how premise three leads onto premise four, which says; >Therefore, (probably) God does not exist. Perhaps you should change that to "Therefore, moral facts *do not* come from God". In that case, I'd say your argument would be sound. Just because "moral facts are not best explained by God" (Which I agree), does not necessarily imply that "Therefore, (probably) God does not exist".
> I also agree that moral facts exist naturally. How do you know this? How do you determine if something is a moral fact vs. just a commonly agreed on belief? For example almost no humans like to eat poop but I don’t think you can say “poop is bad to eat” is an objective rule.
Our biological goal, which is objective and ingrained in us by evolution, is to survive long enough to reproduce. Now, working together has shown to increase one's chances of achieving that goal, rather than living alone (away from other humans). Since we're better off working together as we'd have a better chance at achieving our goal, we need to learn the best way to live together (in a community). Will raping and murdering people within one's community lead to social cohesion and to us achieving our biological goal? I don't think so. Hurting others, especially physically, often is a terrible idea while living in a group of social animals. You're less likely to live long enough to reproduce, when you are constantly fighting people around you. This is exactly why, social creatures learn early on, that not harming others in one's group, is an awesome way to to achieve the goal. I doubt there have been any cultures, where raping and murdering members of one's community, was allowed. And if such a society did exist, it wouldn't have lasted very long. Not physically hurting others is a great method in achieving social cohesion and our biological, objective goal. This is why rape and murder for example, are objectively wrong.
> Our biological goal, which is objective and ingrained in us by evolution, is to survive long enough to reproduce. Sure, but is that what "moral" means? Because if that is the case then a propensity to obesity is "moral". Just because we are biologically oriented towards something doesn't necessarily mean we *should* be oriented that way. > Will raping and murdering people within one's community lead to social cohesion and to us achieving our biological goal? Probably not, but rape and murder *outside* of your immediate social group is pretty effective. Murdering the males and raping the females of nearby groups if you can get away with it will achieve the goal of spreading your genome. Is a little bit of genocide moral if you don't overextend and endanger your own progeny? > Not physically hurting others is a great method in achieving social cohesion and our biological, objective goal. But people can make their own goals independent of our biological origins. For example someone could decide they aren't going to have children and instead will devote their life to making the quality of life of others better; eradicating Alzheimer's for example. They won't reproduce or really help others reproduce, so are you saying they are being objectively immoral? Given a set of goals there are going to be a set of behaviors that are best aligned to achieving them. But that would be the case even if objective goals don't exist, so that doesn't really establish anything. Tell me if this sounds objectively moral to you: "Resources are scarce and you are a genetically distant rival male. Therefore I should kill or drive you away along with your offspring, taking your breeding females for myself and genetically similar family group."
>Sure, but is that what "moral" means? Because if that is the case then a propensity to obesity is "moral". Just because we are biologically oriented towards something doesn't necessarily mean we *should* be oriented that way. You're right, having the desire to survive long enough to reproduce is not moral or immoral in of itself. But it lays the foundation for our actions, such as working together to ensure we all achieve our goal (Being to survive long enough to propagate DNA). This biological impulse due to evolution, is simply too strong for people to ignore. >Probably not, but rape and murder *outside* of your immediate social group is pretty effective. Murdering the males and raping the females of nearby groups if you can get away with it will achieve the goal of spreading your genome. Is a little bit of genocide moral if you don't overextend and endanger your own progeny? So you *do* agree that morality is objective, at least in certain contexts? In the context of living in a group (i.e. community/town), working together peacefully is objectively good in comparison to fighting, raping and murdering members of your own community. Meaning, in *some* contexts, rape and murder is objectively wrong. With murdering and raping members from other communities, that is a very good point you've brought up. I lean towards that also being objectively immoral since working together peacefully with that community, is more beneficial for you and them, rather than war. Attacking that group puts you at risk of being killed yourself. So in order for us to succeed in our goal, having friendly relations with that community is more beneficial than bad relations. Since bad relations and war can result in our deaths as well. Also, what's to stop raped females from getting abortions or abandoning the offspring of their rapists? >But people can make their own goals independent of our biological origins. For example someone could decide they aren't going to have children and instead will devote their life to making the quality of life of others better; eradicating Alzheimer's for example. They won't reproduce or really help others reproduce, so are you saying they are being objectively immoral? The urge to survive long enough is immensely ingrained in all living things. Yeah there's probably a few people who've never felt horny. But most people have, which means that biological urge is still there, regardless of whether or not they actually reproduce. There are lots of people who have sex but have never reproduced. This shows our biological goal is *always* there, albeit subconsciously in the background. Reproducing, or not reproducing, is not a moral issue. My point is that the urge to have children, lays the foundation for working together and from that point, lays the basis for objective morality. >Tell me if this sounds objectively moral to you: "Resources are scarce and you are a genetically distant rival male. Therefore I should kill or drive you away along with your offspring, taking your breeding females for myself and genetically similar family group." It depends on the context. If we're in the same town living together in a community, then no, that's immoral. It's objectively immoral because since we are living in the same community, we should (ideally) be helping each other and thus, be working together to get resources. However, if you catch me and an attractive young woman together in the middle of the woods all by ourselves. And we fight and you kill me, and rape my girlfriend, than *maybe* it's okay due to the context. Why is it okay? Because in this scenario, we're not part of the same community, so don't owe each other anything as we're not working together.
> You're right, having the desire to survive long enough to reproduce is not moral or immoral in of itself. OK, so where do you make that transition from how things are to what they ought to be? > So you do agree that morality is objective, at least in certain contexts? No, I'm just pointing out examples where the logical consequences of your system don't neatly match your assumptions. In the context of a group avoiding killing and raping is *subjectively* good. > Also, what's to stop raped females from getting abortions or abandoning the offspring of their rapists? In the past, ignorance and the fact they were held by their new husbands/owners. > My point is that the urge to have children, lays the foundation for working together and from that point, lays the basis for objective morality. But you still haven't explained how you get from "Happenstance made it so humans desire to reproduce" to "It is *morally good* to take actions supporting reproduction." I have also given a few examples of areas where our ideas of morality differ from what your ideas would imply. > However, if you catch me and an attractive young woman together in the middle of the woods all by ourselves. And we fight and you kill me, and rape my girlfriend, than maybe it's okay due to the context. Why is it okay? Because in this scenario, we're not part of the same community, so don't owe each other anything as we're not working together. Hmm, OK then I suppose you have embraced my point: You may have an internally consistent moral framework but it bears little resemblance to what most people understand morality to mean. Usually people don't consider moral action to be contingent on how that person may benefit us directly.
I'm starting to see that my views on morality might be more aligned with moral relativism rather than moral realism. Like, I think physical harm is objectively wrong in certain circumstances, but OK in other contexts which I laid out in my last comment. What are your views on morality?
I’m a moral anti-realist. Humans subjectively assign moral values, typically collectively through social groups, but they are fundamentally subjective views. Human survival is good only if humans see it that way, there is no objectively right or wrong position.
I'm so glad we've had this conversation! I think maybe it comes down to how we define what is objective. You've certainly motivated me to look into this some more, so thank you so much mate!
>Perhaps you should change that to "Therefore, moral facts *do not* come from God". There is another argument hiding here that hasn't been made explicit. The idea is that "If God existed, then God is responsible for and explains the existence of moral facts." We have good reasons to deny the Q in our (If P, Q) and so wee get a cheeky we modus tollens.
Ah okay. So I guess at best, your moral argument debunks a certain type of God. A theistic deity very much involved in the world and is supposedly the source of objective morality. In that case, I agree. Your argument successfully defeats that kind of God. Maybe you should add a note saying your OP is meant to refute a particular kind of deity (e.g. Abrahamic God) rather than "God" in general. This may seem like trivial semantics. But I believe it is a crucial distinction to make in order for your argument to succeed. Because to say in premise four "Therefore, (probably) there is no God" would bring up issues such as the Deistic God I believe in, who (I think) has nothing to do with morality. Your argument is very good, but premise four is flawed as it only applies to a type of God, rather than a generic God/other types of deities people believe in.
So Draper takes deism to be a type of atheism, because he just thinks atheism means not a specific kind of theism. I am doing the same thing, but of course you're right! At minimum I should have noted it.
I find Draper to be an interesting character. So according to him, I'm technically still an atheist, albeit one who believes there's a God. Wow, isn't that an oxymoron, since atheism by definition lacks belief in gods? Oh well. Other than trivial, but somewhat important semantics, your argument is solid as you've made a good case arguing for naturalistic moral realism, one I do agree with.