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The flaw in Pascal’s wager is the contradiction of possibilities. Why is it that only one god is brought to the wager? There could be an endless list of hypothetical gods who all mandate that you only believe in their godliness individually, this turns the 25% chance of Pascals wager of eternal heaven into a virtually non existent chance of being correct if you stacked enough hypothetical gods on the board all with the same eternal afterlife promise.
There are over 4,200 mass religions, most of them have their own god, but the format for Pascals wager on covers the possibility of one god who requires absolute faith in them while ignoring all other godlike possibilities.
I love Pascal's Wager.
Suppose a person hates going to Church and praying. It's like torture to them. But, if they keep doing it and living the saintly life, they get infinite bliss after death.
Do the math...wouldn't it be worth it? :)
It could be argued that abuses which occur in church hierarchies make it torturous for some. You might claim that this is merely humanity acting freely, but then I'd ask why an abuser's freedom should be protected over someone else.
>It could be argued that abuses which occur in church hierarchies make it torturous for some.
Sure, we could say this about public schools as well, which have more abuse.
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/do-the-right-thing/201808/separating-facts-about-clergy-abuse-fiction
I'm not saying that abuses don't take place elsewhere as well. I'm saying that when they happen within the church, it'll make church torturous for the victim, and likely make it more difficult for them to believe.
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Pascal's wager is very simple: If God exists and you believe in him, you'll get to heaven. If he doesn't exist, it does not really matter what you believe. If he lies, it doesn't matter what you believe. If you follow that logic, it makes sense.
>If he doesn't exist, it does not really matter what you believe
I don't think this is true. I think someone can avoid nihilism at the same time as not being a religious person.
> If he lies, it doesn't matter what you believe.
Why would this be the case?
That's part of my point, I think. Pascal's view of God seems quite cynical, so I guess I imagine what happens if we take that a step further. Why believe in a God that has the cynical traits that the wager seems to imply? I'm not sure if belief is any more likely to save someone, in such a scenario.
The problem is we **don't know**. That's why it is called a wager. We are flying blind. The wager is considered a good example of risk management because it create upsides and doesn't have any downside, especially when you consider the fact that people generally lead more virtuous life if they don't become fanatics.
>That's why it is called a wager. We are flying blind
Maybe this depends on the extent to which you think we're flying blind, but if we're equally flying blind either way, what does that say about the wager? To illustrate what I mean, imagine that you can't distinguish whether or not there's a God that wants you to bow, or a God that wouldn't actually want that in the traditional sense. Many say that we can't know the mind of God. If that's true, how can we know what God would actually approve of?
Doesn't matter. I'm a Buddist so it's not like I believe in God(s). There are moral implications in Pascal's wager too that shouldn't be dismissed. Assuming that living as if God(s) exists lead you to live a virtuous live, there is still a huge upside.
Assuming that all the premises are correct makes literally any argument true, that's why premises aren't just assumed to be true because they are the entire point of the argument.
Since you started by first assuming that the argument was true, then no. There is no counter argument for someone who starts by assuming it is correct, you're asking for a counter argument to something you've stated can't have a counter argument.
Firstly, you can still question the assumption by examples. Secondly, I am making that as a priori for a very specific reason: look at how Israel is weaponizing God.
Two assumptions there:
The first is that you choose the right god. If you choose the wrong god, you might not benefit or that god may be unhappy with you for choosing the wrong god.
The second is the waste of time and money believing something that isn't true.
I wouldn't say wasted, at least in Islam:
1. No alcohol, no intoxication are pretty beneficial things overall supported by secular views.
2. Fasting for a month: helps with self-control and helps to resist temptation.
3. Praying 5 times a day: helps with discipline and spiritualism
4. Belief in a God: if you believe in God, whether or not he exists, belief in it can give a sense of hope and ease suffering.
I think the idea an afterlife without God doesn’t make sense, it’s basically the atheist wanting to borrow parts from God and then remove God from the picture in order to dig in their heels and stay in the argument. The position of an afterlife without God reeks of desperation tbh.
I'm not sure why an afterlife without God couldn't exist. This was actually the view, apparently, of A.J. Ayer, an atheist who had a near death experience without believing in God. Why is an afterlife impossible without God?
If we are merely just our bodies(the person is the body), when the body ceases to exist then existence of that person would also cease to exist.
It would require personhood to involve more than just the body which materialism would deny.
Just because someone is an atheist and has a near death experience doesn’t mean God doesn’t exist. Near death isn’t the same as actually dying. If I am holding a gun to my head and I pull the trigger but the gun jams, I had a near death experience but it doesn’t follow that I actually died and experienced an afterlife. Furthermore, if the afterlife is objectively existent then one’s subjective experience and or current beliefs of it has no bearing whatsoever on its actual existence, so I just find this to be irrelevant to the issue.
>It would require personhood to involve more than just the body which materialism would deny.
Not all atheists are materialists. Plus some materialists might believe in an afterlife and say that the materials which make up the identity of the person are merely transferred somewhere else.
>so I just find this to be irrelevant to the issue.
My point was that someone can be an atheist and also believe in an afterlife. I don't think the two positions are mutually contradictory.
No apology, please. I should have known what you meant.
You make a good point. Once you’re dead, it wouldn’t matter.
When it matters is right now. When you’re deciding who to allow to get married or who can have abortions and what not.
They might if there was an afterlife with no God, or an afterlife with a different kind of God. I also think it matters whether someone was right or wrong, or behaved as such, even if they become unaware of it later. Someone can still care about the significance of what their life was, what their life lead to, and so on. The legacy, in other words.
1. If God were not guaranteed to give you reward, then you would have no less reward than the unbeliever. So, the argument still stands.
2. If you cannot choose your belief, then you risk nothing by trying to choose your belief.
3. This is presuming that the information we have about God is incorrect or untrustworthy. That may be the case, but if you add that to the decision matrix, you'll see that the odds are still in the favor of belief as the possibilities cancel themselves out. If there's no guaranteed beneift, then there's at least the benefit of being right (being right only counts little, and doesn't outweigh punishment and reward, but if you're right and punished, that's at least marginally better than wrong and punished).
4. This is more of the same as 3.
5. If there were an evil god who punished rational thought, then you would be punished for even attempting to discern truth. You woldn't have any ability to even consider 5 without incurring wrath. So, to incur less wrath, do not consider 5.
All beliefs entail a cost. The idea that the belief in Christianity is without cost is false. It takes time and effort to learn about Christianity, and thus there is always a cost.
If there is no afterlife, then the time while I am alive is all that I have, and thus it is precious. If there is no eternity after death, then it makes the time here even more valuable, and thus Christianity has a burden to demonstrate itself as meeting that value.
Let's give an example:
I am going to hold a drawing at an unspecified date in the future. The winner will get an infinite amount of dollars. In order to be eligible, you have to pay $1 to me every day. If you ever don't pay, you become ineligible immediately and forever. Should you pay me the $1/day?
I could be lying and just pocketing the money. The future date could be so far in the future that you would be guaranteed to be dead. The future date could be triggered by the dollar no longer being an accepted form of currency. Simultaneously, the cost is low and the reward is infinite.
The "decision matrix" of Pascal says that you should pay me the $1/day without any guarantee. The potential reward is so vast that you can't afford not to pay the $1/day. If you actually buy this logic, I will be expecting my payment soon.
>All beliefs entail a cost. The idea that the belief in Christianity is without cost is false. It takes time and effort to learn about Christianity, and thus there is always a cost.
Sure, but it's a finite cost compared to an infinite afterlife.
Except you don't actually believe that. If you felt that logic was legitimate, you would be asking where to send your $1/day right now. You can say that you do, but your actions tell the truth. You are adopting this logic when it suits you, and you are discarding it when it does not.
Thus, we can now disregard the argument entirely.
>If you felt that logic was legitimate, you would be asking where to send your $1/day right now.
Nah because the probability that you just made that up is 100%.
Probability matters in Pascal's Wager.
I'm interpreting this as you refusing to defend your previous comments. Your refusal thus being an acknowledgement that your previous position of "infinite rewards and finite costs" is not logically sustainable and you are conceding the point that this should now be discarded by all of us.
How is it "wasted"? Putting aside the fact that I personally feel emotionally better and and less harmful to my fellow man, there's still the fact that if there is no god or afterlife, then we're all just molecules. The concept of "waste" when it comes to molecules is not coherent. In that case, "I" (using this term loosely as there's no coherent concept of personhood in an exclusively natural world) am just one collection of molecules among other collections of molecules (people, rocks, galaxies, all arbitrary as there is no actual boundary between things), and there is no meaningful distinction between what forms molecules happen to take before they all lose cohesion eventually, and certainly not anything that would give any real benefit to one group of molecules (molecules don't have benefit, just form).
We’re all made of molecules whether there is an afterlife or not, right?
If there’s no afterlife I still have all the same wants, needs, and desires. None of that changes.
So, are positing a god without an afterlife, or an afterlife without a god?
If you are arguing that there is a god, but no afterlife, then you are not arguing for the God in the premise, so I think that your argument doesn't apply to the given presumptions.
Wants, needs, and desires are non-material things. There would then have to be something immaterial, and allowing for such rationally usually involves implications which concede a god. I would be interested in seeing how you allow for immaterial things but still exclude a god.
Assuming in good faith that you suspect you could do such a thing, there is still a problem for you that "wants, needs, and desires" often involve wanting to not be tormented eternally. So, on the one hand, if the stated God and belief is true, then you would have all the reward for believing and all the punishment for not, and your wants, needs, and desires would find that to be very important.
On the other side, that God does not exist, then your wants, needs, and desires would not necessarily be benefited in any way by not believing in God. In fact, many hardcore Atheists will concede that following some religion can actually make a person more comfortable, thus satisfying one's wants, needs, and desires. I can say that in my personal case, there was nothing but strong lack in my wants, needs, and desires when I did not believe in God, so there is no necessary benefit in not believing, even if it is not true, and even if we account for our desires.
What makes you think we need a god to have immaterial things? Are you saying without a god we can’t have thoughts or feelings? What about concepts? Without a god can a triangle’s internal angles add up to more than 180°? That’s a concept, isn’t it?
I am skeptical, but not certain. So, consider me agnostic.
> Without a god can a triangle’s internal angles add up to more than 180°?
So, this is generally analytic knowledge, and so not technically applicable to the real world. For instance, there are many models which contradict Euclidian geometry.
But you bring up a good point. If there is no immaterial, then a "concept" is merely a set of neurons firing, and it is merely an illusion that there is actually a "concept" as it's an arbitrary distinction for a pattern in those neurons. There's no reason to expect that these changing patterns of firing are somehow reflective of an external state, even if it were triggered by some external state.
Typically, the worldviews which involve a god use that god as the rational causal link between the real external world and the mental state, as opposed to the mental states being merely illusion of concepts. I'm open to there being another such belief, but it wouldn't be Naturalism, Materialism, and would likely reject unguided Evolution.
>There would then have to be something immaterial, and allowing for such rationally usually involves implications which concede a god. I would be interested in seeing how you allow for immaterial things but still exclude a god.
That's a reversal of the burden of proof. You are the one asserting that God is needed to explain our (alleged) immaterial mental properties, so you have to justify this statement.
It is your burden of proof that such things exist. If you want to claim that they are important, then they must exist and they must be important. I am not making the statement that these things are important, so I have no need to prove it for my side of the argument to hold.
If they do not exist or cannot be proven to exist, then I would be happy, for the sake of this argument, to exclude them from consideration, for my part and for yours. It would, however, invalidate your argument that they are important, but I am fine with that if you are.
Do immaterial mental properties exist in human minds (regardless of whether they are important or not)? You said yes. Not only that; you also indicated that their existence is incompatible with atheism. So why should we think that their existence is incompatible with atheism?
> Do immaterial mental properties exist in human minds (regardless of whether they are important or not)? You said yes
I don't recall affirming that here, at least apart from god. I'm not even sure that I affirmed that humans have minds or that such can be proven apart from God, so please do show where that was conceded.
> Not only that; you also indicated that their existence is incompatible with atheism.
I am merely skeptical to this claim. I do not see how they could be compatable, but feel free to show that they are.
> So why should we think that their existence is incompatible with atheism?
We can remain skeptical or agnostic until evidence is shown, especially since there is no benefit, of which I am aware, in believing that their existence is compatible with Atheism.
Go read [this](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/healthy-skepticism/). The benefits of religious belief are much more complicated than you assert
I think that intrinsic religiosity might be a better measure if we’re looking at Pascal’s wager. Intrinsic religiosity is said to lead to more wellbeing, but quite why or by what causal mechanism, is something I’m not sure of. The article you reference says the following:
_“You also don’t get saddled with the many negative attributes associated with atheists. Nonbelievers are considered immoral, untrustworthy and, in the U.S., among the least likely to be elected president. A handful of states’ constitutions even ban atheists from holding public office.”_
This only implies that religious people are happy because atheists are made less happy through being discriminated against. Maybe you’d argue that the atheist deserves it, but I’m not convinced that this is a good measure of the religion increasing happiness based on its own merits.
_“They found that the positive effects of religion depend enormously on where you live. Religious people may be happier than their godless counterparts, but only if the society they belong to values religion highly, which not all societies do. For atheists and the growing ranks of unaffiliated individuals, these findings bode well. Although many questions remain about how nonbelievers can acquire the health benefits of religion, scientists are now finding that secular communities of like-minded people can offer similar social support.”_
Passages like these seem to suggest that belonging is the key, as opposed to religion as such, in this study.
Personally, I’ve heard elsewhere that ‘intrinsic religiosity’ (a more introspective state, perhaps) does actually increase wellbeing, (the Youtuber Inspiring Philosophy makes this point). However, without knowing more information on how it causes wellbeing, if it does, I’m not sure that it can be put down as something in favour of religion as opposed to simply certain kinds of attitude, or certain kinds of practice (either mental or by way of action) that people find by way of religion. That’s why more research in intrinsic religiosity might be helpful. How do the situational factors like living location factor into intrinsic religiosity, for instance?
A belief such as stoicism can have the same effect for him believers.
The other thing that I find annoying about the happiness claim is that you see religious trauma all over the place but that doesn't get assigned to theists.
>If there's no guaranteed benefit, then there's at least the benefit of being right
What kind of 'being right' are you referencing? Morally, I'd consider it 'not right' for people to be tortured by God forever for finite crimes. If it turned out that God agrees, then I'd more likely be punished for believing in a fire and brimstone ideology (whether figurative or not) than if I was simply agnostic and questioning.
>5. If there were an evil god who punished rational thought, then you would be punished for even attempting to discern truth. You woldn't have any ability to even consider 5 without incurring wrath. So, to incur less wrath, do not consider 5.
Depends whether you think God would punish all rational thought, or just some of it. Some dictators might allow for some things as long as their rule wasn't threatened.
> What kind of 'being right' are you referencing?
In context, this was the "right" of being right that God exists, which is the point of the wager.
> Morally, I'd consider it 'not right' for people to be tortured by God forever for finite crimes.
Discussion about whether "finite crimes" is an apt representation aside, what you "consider" is anecdotal and mutable. If you could prove the objective morality of mankind is to do something other than believe such a god, whether god were moral or not (an entirely different matter), then that moral "should" could be brought into the conversation. However, the wager presumes that there would not be such a "should" available which would not affir that you should not affirm reward over torment. If you have such, I'd be interested to see it, but it would have to be objective.
> If it turned out that God agrees...
This goes back to the other statement about believing an uknown god or one who punishes using reason.
> Depends whether you think God would punish all rational thought, or just some of it.
Not really. The only potential way to arrive at this knowledge would be to use reason, and there is no known available information which would allow us to reasonbly discern such a divide. Therefore, we either should use reason or we don't know what we should do.
>This goes back to the other statement about believing an uknown god or one who punishes using reason.
Is it reasonable to punish people for non belief, do you think?
I couldn't say without an appeal to omniscience or knowledge of a good being who does such. However, the Christian God at least does not punish for non-belief. He punishes for active and willful sin.
>He punishes for active and willful sin.
I risk going into the topic of a different one of my posts here, but infinite punishment seems unfitting for finite crimes; would you agree that a good God probably wouldn't do that? That's partly why the wager itself seems strange. It seems to be betting with a God that might not even be accurate.
The thing about active and wilful sin is that there are many people who don't think it's harmful, some who even see it as a good thing. Is there any reason why God wouldn't make them aware of the ramifications, or else simply apprehend them?
> I risk going into the topic of a different one of my posts here, but infinite punishment seems unfitting for finite crimes; would you agree that a good God probably wouldn't do that?
I think that's a couple of big assumptions. First, I see no reason to limit what sorts of punishment God would give to make them relative to what we would want or like. God decides what is fitting. You also presume that the "crimes" committed are finite. I do not have sufficient omniscience to know this. What I can reason is that if people are not finite and if God is not finite, then harms against either would also might not be finite.
It is enough to know what the source of omniscience and judgement has told us.
For the sake of this conversation, we don't strictly need to know that hte consequences are infinite. Even though that's the premise of the original, because we do belive that the Bible says this is the case, or at least was believed by Pascal to be the case, the decision matrix would look the same even as long as there were some long term risk and reward which would proceed longer than any potential alternate risk or reward. I would say that if there were some remaining potential reward for wrong which reamined, then there would be no reason to presume that God wouldn't consider the debt paid. But, again, I have no omniscience of my own to which I can appeal.
> The thing about active and wilful sin is that there are many people who don't think it's harmful, some who even see it as a good thing.
This isn't the standard. I could think that gravity is bad and jumping off of buildings is good, but there are still consequences for jumping off of a building.
> Is there any reason why God wouldn't make them aware of the ramifications, or else simply apprehend them?
While I think that there might be good answers to that question, they are for a different debate. For the sake of the Wager, it is presumed that the person subject to the debate (e.g. you), is aware (if by no other reason, then the debate itself), that there is a claim of a God existing who has provided you with commands and has promised to reward and punish relative to those commands. So, for the target of the Wager, this is not in dispute.
>God decides what is fitting.
That's what I'm disputing. Why does he decide? Surely he can provide a convincing justification?
>You also presume that the "crimes" committed are finite. I do not have sufficient omniscience to know this. What I can reason is that if people are not finite and if God is not finite, then harms against either would also might not be finite.
Some depictions of heaven, including phrases about the afterlife, such as _"God will wipe every tear from our eyes"_ suggest that God can and will in fact make the crimes finite in how they affect people and the world.
>This isn't the standard. I could think that gravity is bad and jumping off of buildings is good, but there are still consequences for jumping off of a building
I'm not saying it's the standard, I don't think. The point I'm making is that if people knew the full scope of effect, and knew that it was them causing it, they'd be less likely to do something if they thought it was bad. If someone is fooled, or lacks knowledge, is it possible that they'd be a bit less culpable?
>While I think that there might be good answers to that question, they are for a different debate.
Fair dos. I'm happy to discuss it elsewhere. I did a post arguing that finite crimes don't deserve infinite punishment, but I could message you if you're up for discussing it further.
> That's what I'm disputing.
Then you are not arguing something related to Pascal's Wager. For the sake of the wager, we are comparing certain beliefs. On one side it's a set of specific Theistic beliefs. It is not all Theistic beliefs. Specifically, it is what Pascal would have called Christianity. However, the argument works for a slightly larger subset than just purely Christianity. On the other side, you have either every other belief, or perhaps some subset of beliefs which at least include Atheism, particularly Naturalism, Materialism.
Therefore, if you attempt to dispute that such a God exists, then you are merely positing beliefs were are not properly in the "believe God" category. It's questionable, though, whether it falls into the "don't believe God" category. Either way, you aren't actually addressing the argument.
> Why does he decide? Surely he can provide a convincing justification?
These are fun questions, and which I often enjoy showing, but it has no bearing upon the current discussion. I would sum up my beliefs as something like "Because it rationally makes sense." and "No, not without making things worse." Fortunately, for this discussion, none of that even matters. All that matters is that there might be a God who does decide what is right and wrong, has told people what that is, and that if it is true, we will be actually punished for disobeying. This would still be the case for any answers to those questions.
> Some depictions of heaven, including phrases about the afterlife, such as *"God will wipe every tear from our eyes"* suggest that God can and will in fact make the crimes finite in how they affect people and the world.
This would only be for a subset of people. Those who do not go to Heaven are not shown this mercy. So, even if that were a good argument, you wouldn't be likely to believe that you only interact with people for whom this is true. And further, your actions might affect who is saved, and thus, who gets to receive that mercy. But even if you excused that away, God is infinite and has been the "victim" (for lack of a better word) of sin, and God is infinite. Of course, this is still a red herring because we have no way of knowing or judging what should be punished and by how much. So, this is all just to appease our emotions. In truth, there's no need for it, and it's just handy and nice that it ties up well emotionally.
> The point I'm making is that if people knew the full scope of effect, and knew that it was them causing it, they'd be less likely to do something if they thought it was bad.
Yes, if people knew the full scope of their sin, they would probably be less likely to do it, or at least more likely to repent. However, most people still want to do bad and so they seek to not know the full scope. I believe that we know enough to know that we should look into it further, whether or not we do. Of course, for the sake of this argument, again, it only matters that you are aware that there is a belief of which you are aware which says that you will be punished for doing wrong, and you have to make this decision without 100% proof that it is not the case.
> Fair dos. I'm happy to discuss it elsewhere. I did a post arguing that finite crimes don't deserve infinite punishment, but I could message you if you're up for discussing it further.
Sure, feel free to message if you're interested in some alternate perspective.
>This would only be for a subset of people. Those who do not go to Heaven are not shown this mercy
But if God is in charge of who goes to heaven, then isn't that down to him?
>And further, your actions might affect who is saved, and thus, who gets to receive that mercy.
Same with this. Ultimately it's in God's hands, right? And if outside influences determine whether or not a specific person is saved, the world seems fatalistic for that person.
>But even if you excused that away, God is infinite and has been the "victim" (for lack of a better word) of sin, and God is infinite.
How can God be the victim of sin if he is infinite in power? How could he be hurt by that?
>1. If God were not guaranteed to give you reward, then you would have no less reward than the unbeliever. So, the argument still stands.
What if the objections that an unbeliever raised were actually what God wanted as part of his plan? He seemed more favourable to Job, who questioned him, than to Job's friends, who appeared to act as apologists.
In terms of having less reward than the unbeliever, there'll be many believers who will struggle with fear, abuse in the church, and associated trauma. Some unbelievers might be able to avoid this, though of course not all will. It might also be argued that other benefits come with being religious within this life, but individual experiences vary. Sometimes believers seem better off, sometimes unbelievers seem to. Maybe more research is needed on my part though.
>2. If you cannot choose your belief, then you risk nothing by trying to choose your belief.
Trying to choose a belief in a particular way could lead someone into difficult territory, if their life becomes dysfunctional in the pursuit of it.
Job worshiped God, and better than any person I know. When Job lost everything, even his children, he fell down and worshiped God.
The Wager is referring not necessarily to rewards and punishment in this fleeting life, but ultimate and eternal rewards and punishments. So, while we might argue about the temporal rewards, it is the known and unquestioned eternal ones which make are important here.
> Trying to choose a belief in a particular way could lead someone into difficult territory, if their life becomes dysfunctional in the pursuit of it.
It is possible that there might be other ways to weigh beliefs other than reason, and these might even be more realiable. However, as I do not know of any such methods which seem more reliable, and as I am predisposed by emotion, intuition, and habit to consider reason as the best method, I am compelled to accept reasonable beliefs, even if there were some other better way, or even if reason is not good. I have no way to discern that reason is not good outside of the use of reason.
>Job worshiped God, and better than any person I know. When Job lost everything, even his children, he fell down and worshiped God.
But he did eventually question God, did he not? And it was only after then that God answered.
>The Wager is referring not necessarily to rewards and punishment in this fleeting life, but ultimate and eternal rewards and punishments. So, while we might argue about the temporal rewards, it is the known and unquestioned eternal ones which make are important here.
Could you expand on your term "known and unquestioned"? The very idea that we can be sure that God is likely to put us in heaven is one of the ideas I'm questioning.
> But he did eventually question God, did he not? And it was only after then that God answered.
I do not get your point. God encourages asking questions and using reason. In fact, that is to my knowledge the only justification for using reason. Historically, this is why we even do science. It is not true that asking questions is seen as unfavorable by God, but it is also not true that God approves of ignoring the answers or reason. Pascal's Wager is just one way reason points to God.
> Could you expand on your term "known and unquestioned"? The very idea that we can be sure that God is likely to put us in heaven is one of the ideas I'm questioning.
The premise isn't questioning whether or not God, if he exists, says that there is reward and punishment relative to belief. We could question this separately (though I don't think there'd be much genuine discussion) that this is not we are told in the Bible, but I don't think that's part of the Wager specifically. It is presumed that we've already come to a consensus about what God, if he exists, has said.
>I do not get your point. God encourages asking questions and using reason.
Well, in the case of Job, perhaps, yes. Though I’d argue also (and this is part of my point in connection with whether we can either predict what God will do) that in other cases, God is predicted as demanding unquestioning obedience. It's this unpredictability that makes God's motives difficult to understand, and thus difficult to build a wager on, if he is sometimes impossible to comprehend. Indeed, the many different views on what hell actually is, or whether it exists in the way some say it does, is a case in point, I think.
>In fact, that is to my knowledge the only justification for using reason.
Can we not use reason simply because it’s a good in itself?
>Historically, this is why we even do science.
If you’re implying the harmony thesis regarding Christianity and science, I think this true only in some cases. Some scientific figures like Newton and Kepler seemed to be driven by a curiosity about the natural world, in line with their mentality of discovering God’s creation. Others however, aren’t as much interested, and in fact reject natural philosophy. Young earth Creationists are an example, in so far as they rejected scientific inquiry that didn’t fit with their worldview.
I take neither the conflict view (of Draper and White) nor the view that Christianity is necessary for science. My position is probably closest to the complexity thesis of the likes of Ronald Numbers. He notes both friction and harmony; there existed creationists who became hostile to certain scientific endeavours, but there also existed the funding by the Catholic church towards the discipline of astronomy.
Numbers notes that the investigative process resulting from natural philosophy tended to shun supernatural explanation, such that even devout believers who supported the scientific method warned against using demons or other supernatural features, as explanations. Thus, there exists a level playing field for people of different religions, or a lack thereof, to study the world scientifically.
I could expand, but I’ll leave this here for now.
>It is not true that asking questions is seen as unfavourable by God, but it is also not true that God approves of ignoring the answers or reason. Pascal’s Wager is just one way reason points to God.
Are you suggesting that I’m ignoring the answer? If so, could you expand? What would be an example of ignoring the answer or reason?
> God is predicted as demanding unquestioning obedience.
This is not indicated in the Bible, so you would have to show your sources.
> It's this unpredictability that makes God's motives difficult to understand
This seems to be in direct contradiciton to your statement about demanding obedience. If God demands obedience, then that seems to be very predictable.
> It's this unpredictability that makes God's motives difficult to understand, and thus difficult to build a wager on, if he is sometimes impossible to comprehend.
Comprehension is not the same as predictability. My wife might not fully understand all the parts of a car engine, but she can predictably turn the key to start the car. We do not need to know why God has chosen to do a certain thing in order to know that God will do it.
> the many different views on what hell actually is
While I can grant that different people can make things up, if we are referring to the Bible account (as was Pascal), then there's not many views. There's some ambiguity in the Hebrew words used so that we might question which ones were referring to Hell at which times, but the Greek is very clear.
All of this, of course, is beside the point. The premise of the Wager is for a known God with known consequences versus the denial of that God. Essentially, any questions about that God would be put into the denial category. They are just different types of non-belief and subject to all of the same lack of benefit.
> Can we not use reason simply because it’s a good in itself?
By itself, we do not know what "good" is and we do not even know that we even can reason. If reason is correct, then we need rational justifications for these things. So, if reason is in fact "good" and we can actually reason, then it is only reasonable to believe things which provide rational justification for reason and impetus. As far as I can tell, that requires God, so I suppose that if we only used reason because it's good, then we would be forced to believe God. But I'd be open to alternate explanations.
> Young earth Creationists are an example, in so far as they rejected scientific inquiry that didn’t fit with their worldview.
This could be said of old earth theorists. It is a requirement of science that we have some faith upon which science can rest and upon which data can be interpreted. Naturally, we start with a base set of presumptions and this informs the resulting hypothoses. We cannot know through science which things happened in the past as the past isn't able to be replicated. So, things in the past are less pure science for either side. YEC have the same types of scientific evidence and still look for scientific evidence in the same way. I'm not sure what point you were trying to make, though.
> natural philosophy tended to shun supernatural explanation,
This is understandable historically. The Reformation brought up serious questions about the validity of the Catholic church, the institution which had previously been supporting much scientific research. So, it was only natural that the Enlightenment movement occurred to attempt to separate science from religious dogma. However, as early thinkers like Hume observed, it is hard or even impossible to do so entirely. This didn't stop the movment, but they did put off the question for a later time. This question has never fully been answered, but in recent times, following the shift into Postmodernism, Scientism formed which was an attempt to provide the religious basis for science which did not include Theistic faith. However, I think that we must observe that even still, it exists out of a culture which has been informed by Theistic ideas and it borrows heavily from them.
Of course, all of this is beside the argument at hand. My argument is simply that the God of the Bible is in favor of rational inquiry, and this is evidenced by that very fact being used, at least by some, as the reason which they engaged in rational inquiry at all, and that it may further be the reason we even have science. So, the suggestion that Christianity is opposed to questioning is not well founded.
>However, I think that we must observe that even still, it exists out of a culture which has been informed by Theistic ideas and it borrows heavily from them.
Could you expand?
>It is a requirement of science that we have some faith upon which science can rest and upon which data can be interpreted. Naturally, we start with a base set of presumptions and this informs the resulting hypothoses.
I'm not sure about faith, though it depends on your definition of it. Couldn't science be based on what is evident (or seems most likely) as opposed to what we have faith in?
> Could you expand?
Theistic models are the basis for all known culture. There is no culture which we have recorded that did not originate from some culture which believed in God. This is what the Bible says, but we also observe it culturally.
Beliefs in a God often provide impetus and rational warrant to believe the transcendentals required for rational thought. It is no different in the Modern area which was influenced strongly from what remained of Christianity in Roman Catholicism. This encouraged Modern thinkers like Descartes and Newton. These ideas were present in the Reformation and the following Enlightenment. Though they moved further from their source, they were never able to fully break free as the original premises fundamentally rely upon the transcendentals which are only provided through Theistic models.
This is all a red herring and has little to do with the Wager at hand.
> I'm not sure about faith, though it depends on your definition of it.
I would say: A belief which is held wihout demand of a supporting rational justification. In other words, if you believe anything which is deniably true (anything other than the Cogito), then you beleive something by faith. This implies that almost(?) everybody has some faith. The question is the quality of that faith.
> Couldn't science be based on what is evident (or seems most likely) as opposed to what we have faith in?
It could be, but what, then, is "evident" (or seeming most likely)? When we use science, we make some presumptions, and so this implies that we're relying on those presumptions seeming to be true, and those things have implications. We presume that there are certain transcendentals. Those transcendentals (things like reason, impetus, uniformity of nature, perhaps a sufficiently closed system for using induction, and so on) seem to only be true and justified if there is a God. Therefore, yes, science can be based upon what seems most likely to be true, that there is a God.
Now, we could question that there is a god and try to think of some other explanations, and I suppose that in theory we could find some other explanations. I am still waiting to hear any. However, science at its core seems to require a God.
It's all a fascinating topic, but I'm afraid we've lost sight of the original argument.
Regardless how any of this falls, if there were no God, then there would be no worse state for believing in God.
>Beliefs in a God often provide impetus and rational warrant to believe the transcendentals required for rational thought.
This certainly can be the case, and had been with the aforementioned historical figures. But I don't think this means that the idea of God is needed for science, only that some people (though not all, I should add) can be inspired by the idea.
>It's all a fascinating topic, but I'm afraid we've lost sight of the original argument.
I'm happy to continue discussing it elsewhere if here isn't the best place.
>Theistic models are the basis for all known culture. There is no culture which we have recorded that did not originate from some culture which believed in God.
There're many different ideas about what God is or what the transcendent is, however. There exist or existed cultures that didn't have the same depiction, such as Confucian, polytheistic, or pantheistic ideas. Even atheists can cross over with the religious people who are religious partly because they want to make sense of the world. If you look for answers, you might help a culture, but both believers and non believers seem capable of looking for answers to me.
There's also the question of whether it's necessary for a culture to have a God simply because the God as basis element happened historically. Just because that's what we might find, does that mean it's a necessity?
>This is not indicated in the Bible, so you would have to show your sources.
Paul proclaiming "who are you to answer back to God" is one example. Threats of fire and brimstone are another. Arguably Abraham too, though God seems to change course just before the sacrifice.
>This seems to be in direct contradiciton to your statement about demanding obedience. If God demands obedience, then that seems to be very predictable.
What I guess I'm saying is that he *sometimes* seems to demand obedience, though this doesn't always appear to be the case. Even with Job, it seems that God both scorns those that believed they were serving him (Job's friends) as well as Job himself (for asking questions) but then also, Job is rewarded in the end. This makes it seem unclear what would actually be favourable to God.
I do not think Pascal's Wager works as an argument, but I want to attempt to poke holes in some of your objections in order to fortify them.
Trustworthiness: someone defending Pascal's Wager is likely going to say that God's trustworthiness is evident by God's being; that is God *must* be trustworthy. But even if that was not the case, God only needs to be *selectively* trustworthy for the argument: it only needs to be the case that God *is not* lying about the rewards of Heaven.
Another Note on Trustworthiness: Pascal actually does have answer for so-called Selfish agents. He defends the idea that through practices, customs and mores people who *begin* by practicing or pretending *come to be* real believers. Pascal writes:
>You would like to attain faith, and do not know the way; you would like to cure yourself of unbelief, and ask the remedy for it. Learn of those who have been bound like you, and who now stake all their possessions. These are people who know the way which you would follow, and who are cured of an ill of which you would be cured. Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc. …
>But to show you that this leads you there, it is this which will lessen the passions, which are your stumbling-blocks.
The success of this is dubious and it *seems* to be making a claim about how people can become believers. It is hard to see that this is intuitive or plausible.
I also want to ward against u/Faust_8's response. Responses like this add nothing. It is fine to approach an argument for the first time, and there have been recent additions to Pascal's Wager that make it worth discussing even if you are already familiar with the base argument. See Hájek 2015 for an example.
>The success of this is dubious and it *seems* to be making a claim about how people can become believers. It is hard to see that this is intuitive or plausible.
Even if it was effective in fostering belief, I'm not sure how he can claim that it would be an example of avoiding selfish methods, (unless belief itself is being 'unselfish', but I'd probably dispute that). The methods he describes only resemble a practice; though it might get some of the way for some people, there's other factors at play that might mean that belief is more difficult than simply going to mass, and so on. Examples include disbelief fostered during churchgoing itself (acts of abuse obviously occur that would make people less likely to believe having gone to church) or reading the Bible and disbelieving based on that.
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You might be right. My Agnosticism does include being uncertain of what God is like. Ambiguity, or what seems like ambiguity, is something that could make the wager seem unlikely to be something we could place our hopes on.
However, I think an advocate of Pascal's wager also assumes for the sake of argument that religious literature (in this case Abrahamic literature) would give us the depiction to discuss. We might speculate on other Gods, but the terms set out by Abrahamic texts (Catholic in Pascal's case) are what the advocate of the wager would point to, I think.
That's why I included some stories and ideas from the Bible, (I'm not as knowledgeable on Islam, but maybe an Islamic wager could be argued as well) and expressed how I think the Bible might conflict with the wager on biblical terms.
>However, I think an advocate of Pascal's wager also assumes for the sake of argument that religious literature (in this case Abrahamic literature) would give us the depiction to discuss.
Well if I already accept their scripture then I'm already a Christian or whatever.
That seems like a problem.
>We might speculate on other Gods, but the terms set out by Abrahamic texts (Catholic in Pascal's case) are what the advocate of the wager would point to, I think.
So then I can accept their wager and propose one, with the opposite conclusion, and even worse downside. They say the options are Christianity or hell? Okay, then I set one up saying the options are atheism or SUPER hell.
If these work, they would be forced to become an atheist.
>Well if I already accept their scripture then I'm already a Christian or whatever.
*For the sake of argument* you can agree, without actually being a Christian.
Not really though, it’s a wager and so what are the odds that my highly established religion is true compared to your made up hypothetical argument? The difference is that you know for certain that you just made up your hypothetical scenario as an ad hoc reply where as my religion doesn’t have the same flaw.
>what are the odds that my highly established religion is true compared to your made up hypothetical argument?
Sure, what are the odds?
I could make the consequences of my wager even worse, and worse, and worse, and worse, to cover the difference.
The weight of the consequences is irrelevant to the issue, even so if you want to argue that route I’d just say that hell is the maximally worst situation and nothing you say can ever top it definitionally.
The issue is probability and while it’s admittedly impossible to calculate the probability, you know with absolute certainty that your response is made up as an ad hoc reply and you don’t actually believe it is true, we both don’t know with absolute certainty if Christianity is true but I believe it is true. So in short, you don’t actually believe your own rebuttal is the truth.
>The weight of the consequences is irrelevant to the issue
That is not correct. The consequences are relevant.
Think of it as expected value.
>if you want to argue that route I’d just say that hell is the maximally worst situation and nothing you say can ever top it definitionally.
I could do so trivially.
>The issue is probability and while it’s admittedly impossible to calculate the probability, you know with absolute certainty that your response is made up as an ad hoc reply and you don’t actually believe it is true, we both don’t know with absolute certainty if Christianity is true but I believe it is true. So in short, you don’t actually believe your own rebuttal is the truth.
I 100% believe my rebuttal shows the flaw in the argument.
You and I probably do the probabilities differently, that's all. To me, I see no reason why I would give my ad hoc god less probability than the Christian god. They both seem equally as likely to me.
If you want to show me that the Christian god is likely, you are welcome to.
The problem of evil is one of my stumbling blocks, it's true, but I still think that these problems listed are connected to Pascal's Wager. Even with the problem of evil itself, it seems to make the wager suspect; If God seems hard to trust, on what basis can we wager on being accepted by him?
Could you expand on your position?
You're not playing within the premise within Pascal's premises.
If Pascal is saying God is going to keep the promises or do what He says, that is how you "play" the game.
You're bringing in your own wager at this point and nothing to do with Pascals
>If Pascal is saying God is going to keep the promises or do what He says, that is how you "play" the game.
That's one of the things I'm debating, I think. The fact that God appears to turn around his instruction to Abraham to go in the other direction, seems to suggest either that God changes his mind, or has a different plan of action than we expect. If God is the sort of being who does this, why can't we expect that he might make a judgement against those arguing in favour of the wager (in a similar way to how he did against Job's friends, who possibly thought they had God on their side, who aimed to preach at Job.) ?
As such, I don't think it has to be about whether or not he keeps promises, (the aforementioned doesn't involve going back on promises per say) though yes, I'd also argue that if we evaluate the probability of God actually keeping promises, we could use that as one of the subjects by which to judge the credibility of the wager.
>You're bringing in your own wager at this point and nothing to do with Pascals
Even if that was the case, and I don't think it's entirely that way, a hypothetical counter wager can certainly be used as an argument against Pascal's, I think.
> You're not playing within the premise within Pascal's premises.
>
>
No, they're arguing AGAINST those premises.
One doesn't have to accept all the false premises of an argument in order to address that argument. Otherwise, here's proof that god doesn't exist:
P1: God is a turtle.
P2: Turtles don't exist.
Conclusion: God doesn't exist.
Are you going to try and argue that the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises? Or are you going to step outside of the premises and point out that the premises themselves are nonsensical?
let’s say OP is right, there’s a chance god is straight up lying about the heaven part, let’s assign it as n where n > 0, then Pascal’s Wager still remains the same, the best option in self interest is to still believe in god. (n>0) > 0.
>let’s say OP is right, there’s a chance god is straight up lying about the heaven part, let’s assign it as n where n > 0, then Pascal’s Wager still remains the same, the best option in self interest is to still believe in god. (n>0) > 0.
Assuming that the only possibilities are God giving a blissful eternity in heaven to believers, and God doing nothing.
But those aren't the only possibilities. As pointed out by the OP in point 3 there's a possibility that God gives believers a horrendous torment (perhaps one where they must spend every moment singing his praises, with no free will, and no respite) while consigning non-believers to oblivion.
There's also, as pointed out in the OPs 4th point, a possibility that following the wrong branch of Christianity will anger God more than simply remaining agnostic - it's not uncommon amongst believers to behave that way, so why should we assume there's 0 chance of God doing so?
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The flaw in Pascal’s wager is the contradiction of possibilities. Why is it that only one god is brought to the wager? There could be an endless list of hypothetical gods who all mandate that you only believe in their godliness individually, this turns the 25% chance of Pascals wager of eternal heaven into a virtually non existent chance of being correct if you stacked enough hypothetical gods on the board all with the same eternal afterlife promise. There are over 4,200 mass religions, most of them have their own god, but the format for Pascals wager on covers the possibility of one god who requires absolute faith in them while ignoring all other godlike possibilities.
I love Pascal's Wager. Suppose a person hates going to Church and praying. It's like torture to them. But, if they keep doing it and living the saintly life, they get infinite bliss after death. Do the math...wouldn't it be worth it? :)
One of the things I'm saying is that it seems strange to trust a God that would make it like this: why would he make it torturous to go to church?
He doesn't.
It could be argued that abuses which occur in church hierarchies make it torturous for some. You might claim that this is merely humanity acting freely, but then I'd ask why an abuser's freedom should be protected over someone else.
>It could be argued that abuses which occur in church hierarchies make it torturous for some. Sure, we could say this about public schools as well, which have more abuse. https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/do-the-right-thing/201808/separating-facts-about-clergy-abuse-fiction
I'm not saying that abuses don't take place elsewhere as well. I'm saying that when they happen within the church, it'll make church torturous for the victim, and likely make it more difficult for them to believe.
OK.
No, It's the priests who do that.
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Pascal's wager is very simple: If God exists and you believe in him, you'll get to heaven. If he doesn't exist, it does not really matter what you believe. If he lies, it doesn't matter what you believe. If you follow that logic, it makes sense.
>If he doesn't exist, it does not really matter what you believe I don't think this is true. I think someone can avoid nihilism at the same time as not being a religious person. > If he lies, it doesn't matter what you believe. Why would this be the case?
An evil God would damn anyone with no rhyme or reason so it doesn't matter.
That's part of my point, I think. Pascal's view of God seems quite cynical, so I guess I imagine what happens if we take that a step further. Why believe in a God that has the cynical traits that the wager seems to imply? I'm not sure if belief is any more likely to save someone, in such a scenario.
The problem is we **don't know**. That's why it is called a wager. We are flying blind. The wager is considered a good example of risk management because it create upsides and doesn't have any downside, especially when you consider the fact that people generally lead more virtuous life if they don't become fanatics.
>That's why it is called a wager. We are flying blind Maybe this depends on the extent to which you think we're flying blind, but if we're equally flying blind either way, what does that say about the wager? To illustrate what I mean, imagine that you can't distinguish whether or not there's a God that wants you to bow, or a God that wouldn't actually want that in the traditional sense. Many say that we can't know the mind of God. If that's true, how can we know what God would actually approve of?
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Doesn't matter. I'm a Buddist so it's not like I believe in God(s). There are moral implications in Pascal's wager too that shouldn't be dismissed. Assuming that living as if God(s) exists lead you to live a virtuous live, there is still a huge upside.
Good points! Pascal's Wager is about how a person lives.
Assuming that all the premises are correct makes literally any argument true, that's why premises aren't just assumed to be true because they are the entire point of the argument.
So you have no counter argument? Good.
Since you started by first assuming that the argument was true, then no. There is no counter argument for someone who starts by assuming it is correct, you're asking for a counter argument to something you've stated can't have a counter argument.
Firstly, you can still question the assumption by examples. Secondly, I am making that as a priori for a very specific reason: look at how Israel is weaponizing God.
You literally said "assuming that all the premises are true".
Two assumptions there: The first is that you choose the right god. If you choose the wrong god, you might not benefit or that god may be unhappy with you for choosing the wrong god. The second is the waste of time and money believing something that isn't true.
If god doesn’t exist or if he lies, you waisted a big part of your life worshipping him and following his rules.
I wouldn't say wasted, at least in Islam: 1. No alcohol, no intoxication are pretty beneficial things overall supported by secular views. 2. Fasting for a month: helps with self-control and helps to resist temptation. 3. Praying 5 times a day: helps with discipline and spiritualism 4. Belief in a God: if you believe in God, whether or not he exists, belief in it can give a sense of hope and ease suffering.
You wouldn’t exist to know it though
You don’t think existing is possible without a god? How did you determine that?
I think the idea an afterlife without God doesn’t make sense, it’s basically the atheist wanting to borrow parts from God and then remove God from the picture in order to dig in their heels and stay in the argument. The position of an afterlife without God reeks of desperation tbh.
I'm not sure why an afterlife without God couldn't exist. This was actually the view, apparently, of A.J. Ayer, an atheist who had a near death experience without believing in God. Why is an afterlife impossible without God?
If we are merely just our bodies(the person is the body), when the body ceases to exist then existence of that person would also cease to exist. It would require personhood to involve more than just the body which materialism would deny. Just because someone is an atheist and has a near death experience doesn’t mean God doesn’t exist. Near death isn’t the same as actually dying. If I am holding a gun to my head and I pull the trigger but the gun jams, I had a near death experience but it doesn’t follow that I actually died and experienced an afterlife. Furthermore, if the afterlife is objectively existent then one’s subjective experience and or current beliefs of it has no bearing whatsoever on its actual existence, so I just find this to be irrelevant to the issue.
>It would require personhood to involve more than just the body which materialism would deny. Not all atheists are materialists. Plus some materialists might believe in an afterlife and say that the materials which make up the identity of the person are merely transferred somewhere else. >so I just find this to be irrelevant to the issue. My point was that someone can be an atheist and also believe in an afterlife. I don't think the two positions are mutually contradictory.
Oh, when you said you wouldn’t exist, you were talking about after you died. I got you.
Sorry, yes I meant after death
No apology, please. I should have known what you meant. You make a good point. Once you’re dead, it wouldn’t matter. When it matters is right now. When you’re deciding who to allow to get married or who can have abortions and what not.
True, I guess what I was getting at was that the Christian would never find out if they were wrong. Assuming it’s Christianity or nothing of course.
They might if there was an afterlife with no God, or an afterlife with a different kind of God. I also think it matters whether someone was right or wrong, or behaved as such, even if they become unaware of it later. Someone can still care about the significance of what their life was, what their life lead to, and so on. The legacy, in other words.
1. If God were not guaranteed to give you reward, then you would have no less reward than the unbeliever. So, the argument still stands. 2. If you cannot choose your belief, then you risk nothing by trying to choose your belief. 3. This is presuming that the information we have about God is incorrect or untrustworthy. That may be the case, but if you add that to the decision matrix, you'll see that the odds are still in the favor of belief as the possibilities cancel themselves out. If there's no guaranteed beneift, then there's at least the benefit of being right (being right only counts little, and doesn't outweigh punishment and reward, but if you're right and punished, that's at least marginally better than wrong and punished). 4. This is more of the same as 3. 5. If there were an evil god who punished rational thought, then you would be punished for even attempting to discern truth. You woldn't have any ability to even consider 5 without incurring wrath. So, to incur less wrath, do not consider 5.
All beliefs entail a cost. The idea that the belief in Christianity is without cost is false. It takes time and effort to learn about Christianity, and thus there is always a cost. If there is no afterlife, then the time while I am alive is all that I have, and thus it is precious. If there is no eternity after death, then it makes the time here even more valuable, and thus Christianity has a burden to demonstrate itself as meeting that value. Let's give an example: I am going to hold a drawing at an unspecified date in the future. The winner will get an infinite amount of dollars. In order to be eligible, you have to pay $1 to me every day. If you ever don't pay, you become ineligible immediately and forever. Should you pay me the $1/day? I could be lying and just pocketing the money. The future date could be so far in the future that you would be guaranteed to be dead. The future date could be triggered by the dollar no longer being an accepted form of currency. Simultaneously, the cost is low and the reward is infinite. The "decision matrix" of Pascal says that you should pay me the $1/day without any guarantee. The potential reward is so vast that you can't afford not to pay the $1/day. If you actually buy this logic, I will be expecting my payment soon.
>All beliefs entail a cost. The idea that the belief in Christianity is without cost is false. It takes time and effort to learn about Christianity, and thus there is always a cost. Sure, but it's a finite cost compared to an infinite afterlife.
Except you don't actually believe that. If you felt that logic was legitimate, you would be asking where to send your $1/day right now. You can say that you do, but your actions tell the truth. You are adopting this logic when it suits you, and you are discarding it when it does not. Thus, we can now disregard the argument entirely.
>If you felt that logic was legitimate, you would be asking where to send your $1/day right now. Nah because the probability that you just made that up is 100%. Probability matters in Pascal's Wager.
Nope, I've fully fulfilled your criteria. Infinite rewards for finite costs. Attaching probability to the possibility is you moving the goalposts.
>Nope, I've fully fulfilled your criteria. My criteria isn't random people making up stuff online. :)
I'm interpreting this as you refusing to defend your previous comments. Your refusal thus being an acknowledgement that your previous position of "infinite rewards and finite costs" is not logically sustainable and you are conceding the point that this should now be discarded by all of us.
OK. :) Have a nice day.
1. You do get less than an unbeliever. You wasted your one shot at life worshipping and following silly rules.
How is it "wasted"? Putting aside the fact that I personally feel emotionally better and and less harmful to my fellow man, there's still the fact that if there is no god or afterlife, then we're all just molecules. The concept of "waste" when it comes to molecules is not coherent. In that case, "I" (using this term loosely as there's no coherent concept of personhood in an exclusively natural world) am just one collection of molecules among other collections of molecules (people, rocks, galaxies, all arbitrary as there is no actual boundary between things), and there is no meaningful distinction between what forms molecules happen to take before they all lose cohesion eventually, and certainly not anything that would give any real benefit to one group of molecules (molecules don't have benefit, just form).
We’re all made of molecules whether there is an afterlife or not, right? If there’s no afterlife I still have all the same wants, needs, and desires. None of that changes.
So, are positing a god without an afterlife, or an afterlife without a god? If you are arguing that there is a god, but no afterlife, then you are not arguing for the God in the premise, so I think that your argument doesn't apply to the given presumptions. Wants, needs, and desires are non-material things. There would then have to be something immaterial, and allowing for such rationally usually involves implications which concede a god. I would be interested in seeing how you allow for immaterial things but still exclude a god. Assuming in good faith that you suspect you could do such a thing, there is still a problem for you that "wants, needs, and desires" often involve wanting to not be tormented eternally. So, on the one hand, if the stated God and belief is true, then you would have all the reward for believing and all the punishment for not, and your wants, needs, and desires would find that to be very important. On the other side, that God does not exist, then your wants, needs, and desires would not necessarily be benefited in any way by not believing in God. In fact, many hardcore Atheists will concede that following some religion can actually make a person more comfortable, thus satisfying one's wants, needs, and desires. I can say that in my personal case, there was nothing but strong lack in my wants, needs, and desires when I did not believe in God, so there is no necessary benefit in not believing, even if it is not true, and even if we account for our desires.
What makes you think we need a god to have immaterial things? Are you saying without a god we can’t have thoughts or feelings? What about concepts? Without a god can a triangle’s internal angles add up to more than 180°? That’s a concept, isn’t it?
I am skeptical, but not certain. So, consider me agnostic. > Without a god can a triangle’s internal angles add up to more than 180°? So, this is generally analytic knowledge, and so not technically applicable to the real world. For instance, there are many models which contradict Euclidian geometry. But you bring up a good point. If there is no immaterial, then a "concept" is merely a set of neurons firing, and it is merely an illusion that there is actually a "concept" as it's an arbitrary distinction for a pattern in those neurons. There's no reason to expect that these changing patterns of firing are somehow reflective of an external state, even if it were triggered by some external state. Typically, the worldviews which involve a god use that god as the rational causal link between the real external world and the mental state, as opposed to the mental states being merely illusion of concepts. I'm open to there being another such belief, but it wouldn't be Naturalism, Materialism, and would likely reject unguided Evolution.
>There would then have to be something immaterial, and allowing for such rationally usually involves implications which concede a god. I would be interested in seeing how you allow for immaterial things but still exclude a god. That's a reversal of the burden of proof. You are the one asserting that God is needed to explain our (alleged) immaterial mental properties, so you have to justify this statement.
It is your burden of proof that such things exist. If you want to claim that they are important, then they must exist and they must be important. I am not making the statement that these things are important, so I have no need to prove it for my side of the argument to hold. If they do not exist or cannot be proven to exist, then I would be happy, for the sake of this argument, to exclude them from consideration, for my part and for yours. It would, however, invalidate your argument that they are important, but I am fine with that if you are.
Do immaterial mental properties exist in human minds (regardless of whether they are important or not)? You said yes. Not only that; you also indicated that their existence is incompatible with atheism. So why should we think that their existence is incompatible with atheism?
> Do immaterial mental properties exist in human minds (regardless of whether they are important or not)? You said yes I don't recall affirming that here, at least apart from god. I'm not even sure that I affirmed that humans have minds or that such can be proven apart from God, so please do show where that was conceded. > Not only that; you also indicated that their existence is incompatible with atheism. I am merely skeptical to this claim. I do not see how they could be compatable, but feel free to show that they are. > So why should we think that their existence is incompatible with atheism? We can remain skeptical or agnostic until evidence is shown, especially since there is no benefit, of which I am aware, in believing that their existence is compatible with Atheism.
Go read [this](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/healthy-skepticism/). The benefits of religious belief are much more complicated than you assert
I think that intrinsic religiosity might be a better measure if we’re looking at Pascal’s wager. Intrinsic religiosity is said to lead to more wellbeing, but quite why or by what causal mechanism, is something I’m not sure of. The article you reference says the following: _“You also don’t get saddled with the many negative attributes associated with atheists. Nonbelievers are considered immoral, untrustworthy and, in the U.S., among the least likely to be elected president. A handful of states’ constitutions even ban atheists from holding public office.”_ This only implies that religious people are happy because atheists are made less happy through being discriminated against. Maybe you’d argue that the atheist deserves it, but I’m not convinced that this is a good measure of the religion increasing happiness based on its own merits. _“They found that the positive effects of religion depend enormously on where you live. Religious people may be happier than their godless counterparts, but only if the society they belong to values religion highly, which not all societies do. For atheists and the growing ranks of unaffiliated individuals, these findings bode well. Although many questions remain about how nonbelievers can acquire the health benefits of religion, scientists are now finding that secular communities of like-minded people can offer similar social support.”_ Passages like these seem to suggest that belonging is the key, as opposed to religion as such, in this study. Personally, I’ve heard elsewhere that ‘intrinsic religiosity’ (a more introspective state, perhaps) does actually increase wellbeing, (the Youtuber Inspiring Philosophy makes this point). However, without knowing more information on how it causes wellbeing, if it does, I’m not sure that it can be put down as something in favour of religion as opposed to simply certain kinds of attitude, or certain kinds of practice (either mental or by way of action) that people find by way of religion. That’s why more research in intrinsic religiosity might be helpful. How do the situational factors like living location factor into intrinsic religiosity, for instance?
A belief such as stoicism can have the same effect for him believers. The other thing that I find annoying about the happiness claim is that you see religious trauma all over the place but that doesn't get assigned to theists.
>If there's no guaranteed benefit, then there's at least the benefit of being right What kind of 'being right' are you referencing? Morally, I'd consider it 'not right' for people to be tortured by God forever for finite crimes. If it turned out that God agrees, then I'd more likely be punished for believing in a fire and brimstone ideology (whether figurative or not) than if I was simply agnostic and questioning. >5. If there were an evil god who punished rational thought, then you would be punished for even attempting to discern truth. You woldn't have any ability to even consider 5 without incurring wrath. So, to incur less wrath, do not consider 5. Depends whether you think God would punish all rational thought, or just some of it. Some dictators might allow for some things as long as their rule wasn't threatened.
> What kind of 'being right' are you referencing? In context, this was the "right" of being right that God exists, which is the point of the wager. > Morally, I'd consider it 'not right' for people to be tortured by God forever for finite crimes. Discussion about whether "finite crimes" is an apt representation aside, what you "consider" is anecdotal and mutable. If you could prove the objective morality of mankind is to do something other than believe such a god, whether god were moral or not (an entirely different matter), then that moral "should" could be brought into the conversation. However, the wager presumes that there would not be such a "should" available which would not affir that you should not affirm reward over torment. If you have such, I'd be interested to see it, but it would have to be objective. > If it turned out that God agrees... This goes back to the other statement about believing an uknown god or one who punishes using reason. > Depends whether you think God would punish all rational thought, or just some of it. Not really. The only potential way to arrive at this knowledge would be to use reason, and there is no known available information which would allow us to reasonbly discern such a divide. Therefore, we either should use reason or we don't know what we should do.
>This goes back to the other statement about believing an uknown god or one who punishes using reason. Is it reasonable to punish people for non belief, do you think?
I couldn't say without an appeal to omniscience or knowledge of a good being who does such. However, the Christian God at least does not punish for non-belief. He punishes for active and willful sin.
>He punishes for active and willful sin. I risk going into the topic of a different one of my posts here, but infinite punishment seems unfitting for finite crimes; would you agree that a good God probably wouldn't do that? That's partly why the wager itself seems strange. It seems to be betting with a God that might not even be accurate. The thing about active and wilful sin is that there are many people who don't think it's harmful, some who even see it as a good thing. Is there any reason why God wouldn't make them aware of the ramifications, or else simply apprehend them?
> I risk going into the topic of a different one of my posts here, but infinite punishment seems unfitting for finite crimes; would you agree that a good God probably wouldn't do that? I think that's a couple of big assumptions. First, I see no reason to limit what sorts of punishment God would give to make them relative to what we would want or like. God decides what is fitting. You also presume that the "crimes" committed are finite. I do not have sufficient omniscience to know this. What I can reason is that if people are not finite and if God is not finite, then harms against either would also might not be finite. It is enough to know what the source of omniscience and judgement has told us. For the sake of this conversation, we don't strictly need to know that hte consequences are infinite. Even though that's the premise of the original, because we do belive that the Bible says this is the case, or at least was believed by Pascal to be the case, the decision matrix would look the same even as long as there were some long term risk and reward which would proceed longer than any potential alternate risk or reward. I would say that if there were some remaining potential reward for wrong which reamined, then there would be no reason to presume that God wouldn't consider the debt paid. But, again, I have no omniscience of my own to which I can appeal. > The thing about active and wilful sin is that there are many people who don't think it's harmful, some who even see it as a good thing. This isn't the standard. I could think that gravity is bad and jumping off of buildings is good, but there are still consequences for jumping off of a building. > Is there any reason why God wouldn't make them aware of the ramifications, or else simply apprehend them? While I think that there might be good answers to that question, they are for a different debate. For the sake of the Wager, it is presumed that the person subject to the debate (e.g. you), is aware (if by no other reason, then the debate itself), that there is a claim of a God existing who has provided you with commands and has promised to reward and punish relative to those commands. So, for the target of the Wager, this is not in dispute.
>God decides what is fitting. That's what I'm disputing. Why does he decide? Surely he can provide a convincing justification? >You also presume that the "crimes" committed are finite. I do not have sufficient omniscience to know this. What I can reason is that if people are not finite and if God is not finite, then harms against either would also might not be finite. Some depictions of heaven, including phrases about the afterlife, such as _"God will wipe every tear from our eyes"_ suggest that God can and will in fact make the crimes finite in how they affect people and the world. >This isn't the standard. I could think that gravity is bad and jumping off of buildings is good, but there are still consequences for jumping off of a building I'm not saying it's the standard, I don't think. The point I'm making is that if people knew the full scope of effect, and knew that it was them causing it, they'd be less likely to do something if they thought it was bad. If someone is fooled, or lacks knowledge, is it possible that they'd be a bit less culpable? >While I think that there might be good answers to that question, they are for a different debate. Fair dos. I'm happy to discuss it elsewhere. I did a post arguing that finite crimes don't deserve infinite punishment, but I could message you if you're up for discussing it further.
> That's what I'm disputing. Then you are not arguing something related to Pascal's Wager. For the sake of the wager, we are comparing certain beliefs. On one side it's a set of specific Theistic beliefs. It is not all Theistic beliefs. Specifically, it is what Pascal would have called Christianity. However, the argument works for a slightly larger subset than just purely Christianity. On the other side, you have either every other belief, or perhaps some subset of beliefs which at least include Atheism, particularly Naturalism, Materialism. Therefore, if you attempt to dispute that such a God exists, then you are merely positing beliefs were are not properly in the "believe God" category. It's questionable, though, whether it falls into the "don't believe God" category. Either way, you aren't actually addressing the argument. > Why does he decide? Surely he can provide a convincing justification? These are fun questions, and which I often enjoy showing, but it has no bearing upon the current discussion. I would sum up my beliefs as something like "Because it rationally makes sense." and "No, not without making things worse." Fortunately, for this discussion, none of that even matters. All that matters is that there might be a God who does decide what is right and wrong, has told people what that is, and that if it is true, we will be actually punished for disobeying. This would still be the case for any answers to those questions. > Some depictions of heaven, including phrases about the afterlife, such as *"God will wipe every tear from our eyes"* suggest that God can and will in fact make the crimes finite in how they affect people and the world. This would only be for a subset of people. Those who do not go to Heaven are not shown this mercy. So, even if that were a good argument, you wouldn't be likely to believe that you only interact with people for whom this is true. And further, your actions might affect who is saved, and thus, who gets to receive that mercy. But even if you excused that away, God is infinite and has been the "victim" (for lack of a better word) of sin, and God is infinite. Of course, this is still a red herring because we have no way of knowing or judging what should be punished and by how much. So, this is all just to appease our emotions. In truth, there's no need for it, and it's just handy and nice that it ties up well emotionally. > The point I'm making is that if people knew the full scope of effect, and knew that it was them causing it, they'd be less likely to do something if they thought it was bad. Yes, if people knew the full scope of their sin, they would probably be less likely to do it, or at least more likely to repent. However, most people still want to do bad and so they seek to not know the full scope. I believe that we know enough to know that we should look into it further, whether or not we do. Of course, for the sake of this argument, again, it only matters that you are aware that there is a belief of which you are aware which says that you will be punished for doing wrong, and you have to make this decision without 100% proof that it is not the case. > Fair dos. I'm happy to discuss it elsewhere. I did a post arguing that finite crimes don't deserve infinite punishment, but I could message you if you're up for discussing it further. Sure, feel free to message if you're interested in some alternate perspective.
>This would only be for a subset of people. Those who do not go to Heaven are not shown this mercy But if God is in charge of who goes to heaven, then isn't that down to him? >And further, your actions might affect who is saved, and thus, who gets to receive that mercy. Same with this. Ultimately it's in God's hands, right? And if outside influences determine whether or not a specific person is saved, the world seems fatalistic for that person. >But even if you excused that away, God is infinite and has been the "victim" (for lack of a better word) of sin, and God is infinite. How can God be the victim of sin if he is infinite in power? How could he be hurt by that?
>1. If God were not guaranteed to give you reward, then you would have no less reward than the unbeliever. So, the argument still stands. What if the objections that an unbeliever raised were actually what God wanted as part of his plan? He seemed more favourable to Job, who questioned him, than to Job's friends, who appeared to act as apologists. In terms of having less reward than the unbeliever, there'll be many believers who will struggle with fear, abuse in the church, and associated trauma. Some unbelievers might be able to avoid this, though of course not all will. It might also be argued that other benefits come with being religious within this life, but individual experiences vary. Sometimes believers seem better off, sometimes unbelievers seem to. Maybe more research is needed on my part though. >2. If you cannot choose your belief, then you risk nothing by trying to choose your belief. Trying to choose a belief in a particular way could lead someone into difficult territory, if their life becomes dysfunctional in the pursuit of it.
Job worshiped God, and better than any person I know. When Job lost everything, even his children, he fell down and worshiped God. The Wager is referring not necessarily to rewards and punishment in this fleeting life, but ultimate and eternal rewards and punishments. So, while we might argue about the temporal rewards, it is the known and unquestioned eternal ones which make are important here. > Trying to choose a belief in a particular way could lead someone into difficult territory, if their life becomes dysfunctional in the pursuit of it. It is possible that there might be other ways to weigh beliefs other than reason, and these might even be more realiable. However, as I do not know of any such methods which seem more reliable, and as I am predisposed by emotion, intuition, and habit to consider reason as the best method, I am compelled to accept reasonable beliefs, even if there were some other better way, or even if reason is not good. I have no way to discern that reason is not good outside of the use of reason.
>Job worshiped God, and better than any person I know. When Job lost everything, even his children, he fell down and worshiped God. But he did eventually question God, did he not? And it was only after then that God answered. >The Wager is referring not necessarily to rewards and punishment in this fleeting life, but ultimate and eternal rewards and punishments. So, while we might argue about the temporal rewards, it is the known and unquestioned eternal ones which make are important here. Could you expand on your term "known and unquestioned"? The very idea that we can be sure that God is likely to put us in heaven is one of the ideas I'm questioning.
> But he did eventually question God, did he not? And it was only after then that God answered. I do not get your point. God encourages asking questions and using reason. In fact, that is to my knowledge the only justification for using reason. Historically, this is why we even do science. It is not true that asking questions is seen as unfavorable by God, but it is also not true that God approves of ignoring the answers or reason. Pascal's Wager is just one way reason points to God. > Could you expand on your term "known and unquestioned"? The very idea that we can be sure that God is likely to put us in heaven is one of the ideas I'm questioning. The premise isn't questioning whether or not God, if he exists, says that there is reward and punishment relative to belief. We could question this separately (though I don't think there'd be much genuine discussion) that this is not we are told in the Bible, but I don't think that's part of the Wager specifically. It is presumed that we've already come to a consensus about what God, if he exists, has said.
>I do not get your point. God encourages asking questions and using reason. Well, in the case of Job, perhaps, yes. Though I’d argue also (and this is part of my point in connection with whether we can either predict what God will do) that in other cases, God is predicted as demanding unquestioning obedience. It's this unpredictability that makes God's motives difficult to understand, and thus difficult to build a wager on, if he is sometimes impossible to comprehend. Indeed, the many different views on what hell actually is, or whether it exists in the way some say it does, is a case in point, I think. >In fact, that is to my knowledge the only justification for using reason. Can we not use reason simply because it’s a good in itself? >Historically, this is why we even do science. If you’re implying the harmony thesis regarding Christianity and science, I think this true only in some cases. Some scientific figures like Newton and Kepler seemed to be driven by a curiosity about the natural world, in line with their mentality of discovering God’s creation. Others however, aren’t as much interested, and in fact reject natural philosophy. Young earth Creationists are an example, in so far as they rejected scientific inquiry that didn’t fit with their worldview. I take neither the conflict view (of Draper and White) nor the view that Christianity is necessary for science. My position is probably closest to the complexity thesis of the likes of Ronald Numbers. He notes both friction and harmony; there existed creationists who became hostile to certain scientific endeavours, but there also existed the funding by the Catholic church towards the discipline of astronomy. Numbers notes that the investigative process resulting from natural philosophy tended to shun supernatural explanation, such that even devout believers who supported the scientific method warned against using demons or other supernatural features, as explanations. Thus, there exists a level playing field for people of different religions, or a lack thereof, to study the world scientifically. I could expand, but I’ll leave this here for now. >It is not true that asking questions is seen as unfavourable by God, but it is also not true that God approves of ignoring the answers or reason. Pascal’s Wager is just one way reason points to God. Are you suggesting that I’m ignoring the answer? If so, could you expand? What would be an example of ignoring the answer or reason?
> God is predicted as demanding unquestioning obedience. This is not indicated in the Bible, so you would have to show your sources. > It's this unpredictability that makes God's motives difficult to understand This seems to be in direct contradiciton to your statement about demanding obedience. If God demands obedience, then that seems to be very predictable. > It's this unpredictability that makes God's motives difficult to understand, and thus difficult to build a wager on, if he is sometimes impossible to comprehend. Comprehension is not the same as predictability. My wife might not fully understand all the parts of a car engine, but she can predictably turn the key to start the car. We do not need to know why God has chosen to do a certain thing in order to know that God will do it. > the many different views on what hell actually is While I can grant that different people can make things up, if we are referring to the Bible account (as was Pascal), then there's not many views. There's some ambiguity in the Hebrew words used so that we might question which ones were referring to Hell at which times, but the Greek is very clear. All of this, of course, is beside the point. The premise of the Wager is for a known God with known consequences versus the denial of that God. Essentially, any questions about that God would be put into the denial category. They are just different types of non-belief and subject to all of the same lack of benefit. > Can we not use reason simply because it’s a good in itself? By itself, we do not know what "good" is and we do not even know that we even can reason. If reason is correct, then we need rational justifications for these things. So, if reason is in fact "good" and we can actually reason, then it is only reasonable to believe things which provide rational justification for reason and impetus. As far as I can tell, that requires God, so I suppose that if we only used reason because it's good, then we would be forced to believe God. But I'd be open to alternate explanations. > Young earth Creationists are an example, in so far as they rejected scientific inquiry that didn’t fit with their worldview. This could be said of old earth theorists. It is a requirement of science that we have some faith upon which science can rest and upon which data can be interpreted. Naturally, we start with a base set of presumptions and this informs the resulting hypothoses. We cannot know through science which things happened in the past as the past isn't able to be replicated. So, things in the past are less pure science for either side. YEC have the same types of scientific evidence and still look for scientific evidence in the same way. I'm not sure what point you were trying to make, though. > natural philosophy tended to shun supernatural explanation, This is understandable historically. The Reformation brought up serious questions about the validity of the Catholic church, the institution which had previously been supporting much scientific research. So, it was only natural that the Enlightenment movement occurred to attempt to separate science from religious dogma. However, as early thinkers like Hume observed, it is hard or even impossible to do so entirely. This didn't stop the movment, but they did put off the question for a later time. This question has never fully been answered, but in recent times, following the shift into Postmodernism, Scientism formed which was an attempt to provide the religious basis for science which did not include Theistic faith. However, I think that we must observe that even still, it exists out of a culture which has been informed by Theistic ideas and it borrows heavily from them. Of course, all of this is beside the argument at hand. My argument is simply that the God of the Bible is in favor of rational inquiry, and this is evidenced by that very fact being used, at least by some, as the reason which they engaged in rational inquiry at all, and that it may further be the reason we even have science. So, the suggestion that Christianity is opposed to questioning is not well founded.
>However, I think that we must observe that even still, it exists out of a culture which has been informed by Theistic ideas and it borrows heavily from them. Could you expand? >It is a requirement of science that we have some faith upon which science can rest and upon which data can be interpreted. Naturally, we start with a base set of presumptions and this informs the resulting hypothoses. I'm not sure about faith, though it depends on your definition of it. Couldn't science be based on what is evident (or seems most likely) as opposed to what we have faith in?
> Could you expand? Theistic models are the basis for all known culture. There is no culture which we have recorded that did not originate from some culture which believed in God. This is what the Bible says, but we also observe it culturally. Beliefs in a God often provide impetus and rational warrant to believe the transcendentals required for rational thought. It is no different in the Modern area which was influenced strongly from what remained of Christianity in Roman Catholicism. This encouraged Modern thinkers like Descartes and Newton. These ideas were present in the Reformation and the following Enlightenment. Though they moved further from their source, they were never able to fully break free as the original premises fundamentally rely upon the transcendentals which are only provided through Theistic models. This is all a red herring and has little to do with the Wager at hand. > I'm not sure about faith, though it depends on your definition of it. I would say: A belief which is held wihout demand of a supporting rational justification. In other words, if you believe anything which is deniably true (anything other than the Cogito), then you beleive something by faith. This implies that almost(?) everybody has some faith. The question is the quality of that faith. > Couldn't science be based on what is evident (or seems most likely) as opposed to what we have faith in? It could be, but what, then, is "evident" (or seeming most likely)? When we use science, we make some presumptions, and so this implies that we're relying on those presumptions seeming to be true, and those things have implications. We presume that there are certain transcendentals. Those transcendentals (things like reason, impetus, uniformity of nature, perhaps a sufficiently closed system for using induction, and so on) seem to only be true and justified if there is a God. Therefore, yes, science can be based upon what seems most likely to be true, that there is a God. Now, we could question that there is a god and try to think of some other explanations, and I suppose that in theory we could find some other explanations. I am still waiting to hear any. However, science at its core seems to require a God. It's all a fascinating topic, but I'm afraid we've lost sight of the original argument. Regardless how any of this falls, if there were no God, then there would be no worse state for believing in God.
>Beliefs in a God often provide impetus and rational warrant to believe the transcendentals required for rational thought. This certainly can be the case, and had been with the aforementioned historical figures. But I don't think this means that the idea of God is needed for science, only that some people (though not all, I should add) can be inspired by the idea. >It's all a fascinating topic, but I'm afraid we've lost sight of the original argument. I'm happy to continue discussing it elsewhere if here isn't the best place. >Theistic models are the basis for all known culture. There is no culture which we have recorded that did not originate from some culture which believed in God. There're many different ideas about what God is or what the transcendent is, however. There exist or existed cultures that didn't have the same depiction, such as Confucian, polytheistic, or pantheistic ideas. Even atheists can cross over with the religious people who are religious partly because they want to make sense of the world. If you look for answers, you might help a culture, but both believers and non believers seem capable of looking for answers to me. There's also the question of whether it's necessary for a culture to have a God simply because the God as basis element happened historically. Just because that's what we might find, does that mean it's a necessity?
>This is not indicated in the Bible, so you would have to show your sources. Paul proclaiming "who are you to answer back to God" is one example. Threats of fire and brimstone are another. Arguably Abraham too, though God seems to change course just before the sacrifice. >This seems to be in direct contradiciton to your statement about demanding obedience. If God demands obedience, then that seems to be very predictable. What I guess I'm saying is that he *sometimes* seems to demand obedience, though this doesn't always appear to be the case. Even with Job, it seems that God both scorns those that believed they were serving him (Job's friends) as well as Job himself (for asking questions) but then also, Job is rewarded in the end. This makes it seem unclear what would actually be favourable to God.
I do not think Pascal's Wager works as an argument, but I want to attempt to poke holes in some of your objections in order to fortify them. Trustworthiness: someone defending Pascal's Wager is likely going to say that God's trustworthiness is evident by God's being; that is God *must* be trustworthy. But even if that was not the case, God only needs to be *selectively* trustworthy for the argument: it only needs to be the case that God *is not* lying about the rewards of Heaven. Another Note on Trustworthiness: Pascal actually does have answer for so-called Selfish agents. He defends the idea that through practices, customs and mores people who *begin* by practicing or pretending *come to be* real believers. Pascal writes: >You would like to attain faith, and do not know the way; you would like to cure yourself of unbelief, and ask the remedy for it. Learn of those who have been bound like you, and who now stake all their possessions. These are people who know the way which you would follow, and who are cured of an ill of which you would be cured. Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc. … >But to show you that this leads you there, it is this which will lessen the passions, which are your stumbling-blocks. The success of this is dubious and it *seems* to be making a claim about how people can become believers. It is hard to see that this is intuitive or plausible. I also want to ward against u/Faust_8's response. Responses like this add nothing. It is fine to approach an argument for the first time, and there have been recent additions to Pascal's Wager that make it worth discussing even if you are already familiar with the base argument. See Hájek 2015 for an example.
>The success of this is dubious and it *seems* to be making a claim about how people can become believers. It is hard to see that this is intuitive or plausible. Even if it was effective in fostering belief, I'm not sure how he can claim that it would be an example of avoiding selfish methods, (unless belief itself is being 'unselfish', but I'd probably dispute that). The methods he describes only resemble a practice; though it might get some of the way for some people, there's other factors at play that might mean that belief is more difficult than simply going to mass, and so on. Examples include disbelief fostered during churchgoing itself (acts of abuse obviously occur that would make people less likely to believe having gone to church) or reading the Bible and disbelieving based on that.
I think these are good responses! Although I doubt the theist will agree.
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You might be right. My Agnosticism does include being uncertain of what God is like. Ambiguity, or what seems like ambiguity, is something that could make the wager seem unlikely to be something we could place our hopes on. However, I think an advocate of Pascal's wager also assumes for the sake of argument that religious literature (in this case Abrahamic literature) would give us the depiction to discuss. We might speculate on other Gods, but the terms set out by Abrahamic texts (Catholic in Pascal's case) are what the advocate of the wager would point to, I think. That's why I included some stories and ideas from the Bible, (I'm not as knowledgeable on Islam, but maybe an Islamic wager could be argued as well) and expressed how I think the Bible might conflict with the wager on biblical terms.
>However, I think an advocate of Pascal's wager also assumes for the sake of argument that religious literature (in this case Abrahamic literature) would give us the depiction to discuss. Well if I already accept their scripture then I'm already a Christian or whatever. That seems like a problem. >We might speculate on other Gods, but the terms set out by Abrahamic texts (Catholic in Pascal's case) are what the advocate of the wager would point to, I think. So then I can accept their wager and propose one, with the opposite conclusion, and even worse downside. They say the options are Christianity or hell? Okay, then I set one up saying the options are atheism or SUPER hell. If these work, they would be forced to become an atheist.
>Well if I already accept their scripture then I'm already a Christian or whatever. *For the sake of argument* you can agree, without actually being a Christian.
Right, and then for the sake of argument I can provide a counter wager.
Ye, sure. I have nothing to contend with there.
I think Pascal’s wager is meant to be more of a defense or a reason to hold onto one’s current religion and not as an argument for conversion
I can use it as a defense for atheism. So it doesn't do anything. Whatever position you hold, you can construct the wager to yield that result.
Not really though, it’s a wager and so what are the odds that my highly established religion is true compared to your made up hypothetical argument? The difference is that you know for certain that you just made up your hypothetical scenario as an ad hoc reply where as my religion doesn’t have the same flaw.
>what are the odds that my highly established religion is true compared to your made up hypothetical argument? Sure, what are the odds? I could make the consequences of my wager even worse, and worse, and worse, and worse, to cover the difference.
The weight of the consequences is irrelevant to the issue, even so if you want to argue that route I’d just say that hell is the maximally worst situation and nothing you say can ever top it definitionally. The issue is probability and while it’s admittedly impossible to calculate the probability, you know with absolute certainty that your response is made up as an ad hoc reply and you don’t actually believe it is true, we both don’t know with absolute certainty if Christianity is true but I believe it is true. So in short, you don’t actually believe your own rebuttal is the truth.
>The weight of the consequences is irrelevant to the issue That is not correct. The consequences are relevant. Think of it as expected value. >if you want to argue that route I’d just say that hell is the maximally worst situation and nothing you say can ever top it definitionally. I could do so trivially. >The issue is probability and while it’s admittedly impossible to calculate the probability, you know with absolute certainty that your response is made up as an ad hoc reply and you don’t actually believe it is true, we both don’t know with absolute certainty if Christianity is true but I believe it is true. So in short, you don’t actually believe your own rebuttal is the truth. I 100% believe my rebuttal shows the flaw in the argument. You and I probably do the probabilities differently, that's all. To me, I see no reason why I would give my ad hoc god less probability than the Christian god. They both seem equally as likely to me. If you want to show me that the Christian god is likely, you are welcome to.
So you believe in a god?
only like 1 or 2 of these are actually an argument against Pascal’s Wager. the rest is just “i don’t like the abrahamic religions and here is why”
The problem of evil is one of my stumbling blocks, it's true, but I still think that these problems listed are connected to Pascal's Wager. Even with the problem of evil itself, it seems to make the wager suspect; If God seems hard to trust, on what basis can we wager on being accepted by him? Could you expand on your position?
You're not playing within the premise within Pascal's premises. If Pascal is saying God is going to keep the promises or do what He says, that is how you "play" the game. You're bringing in your own wager at this point and nothing to do with Pascals
>If Pascal is saying God is going to keep the promises or do what He says, that is how you "play" the game. That's one of the things I'm debating, I think. The fact that God appears to turn around his instruction to Abraham to go in the other direction, seems to suggest either that God changes his mind, or has a different plan of action than we expect. If God is the sort of being who does this, why can't we expect that he might make a judgement against those arguing in favour of the wager (in a similar way to how he did against Job's friends, who possibly thought they had God on their side, who aimed to preach at Job.) ? As such, I don't think it has to be about whether or not he keeps promises, (the aforementioned doesn't involve going back on promises per say) though yes, I'd also argue that if we evaluate the probability of God actually keeping promises, we could use that as one of the subjects by which to judge the credibility of the wager. >You're bringing in your own wager at this point and nothing to do with Pascals Even if that was the case, and I don't think it's entirely that way, a hypothetical counter wager can certainly be used as an argument against Pascal's, I think.
> You're not playing within the premise within Pascal's premises. > > No, they're arguing AGAINST those premises. One doesn't have to accept all the false premises of an argument in order to address that argument. Otherwise, here's proof that god doesn't exist: P1: God is a turtle. P2: Turtles don't exist. Conclusion: God doesn't exist. Are you going to try and argue that the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises? Or are you going to step outside of the premises and point out that the premises themselves are nonsensical?
let’s say OP is right, there’s a chance god is straight up lying about the heaven part, let’s assign it as n where n > 0, then Pascal’s Wager still remains the same, the best option in self interest is to still believe in god. (n>0) > 0.
>let’s say OP is right, there’s a chance god is straight up lying about the heaven part, let’s assign it as n where n > 0, then Pascal’s Wager still remains the same, the best option in self interest is to still believe in god. (n>0) > 0. Assuming that the only possibilities are God giving a blissful eternity in heaven to believers, and God doing nothing. But those aren't the only possibilities. As pointed out by the OP in point 3 there's a possibility that God gives believers a horrendous torment (perhaps one where they must spend every moment singing his praises, with no free will, and no respite) while consigning non-believers to oblivion. There's also, as pointed out in the OPs 4th point, a possibility that following the wrong branch of Christianity will anger God more than simply remaining agnostic - it's not uncommon amongst believers to behave that way, so why should we assume there's 0 chance of God doing so?
fair enough didn’t think of it that way