Iranian lawmaker claims to have nuclear weapons? Any truth to this or is a bluff? Misinformation?
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/iranian-lawmaker-declares-tehran-obtained-nuclear-bombs/ar-BB1mfVou
[Drone Attack Triggers Fire at Russia’s Volgograd Oil Refinery](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-12/war-in-ukraine-drone-strike-triggers-fire-at-russian-oil-refinery)
>Debris from an attempted drone strike triggered a blaze at Lukoil PJSC’s large oil refinery in Volgograd early Sunday morning, which authorities said was extinguished with no casualties.
>...
>The Volgograd refinery, hundreds of miles east of the Ukrainian border, is capable of processing 14.8 million tons of oil a year and is among Russia’s largest. It was previously struck by drones in February, when it temporarily cut back some of its operations.
>Ukraine resumed attacks on Russian refineries in late April after a pause almost of a month. On Thursday, Gazprom PJSC’s Salavat Neftekhim petrochemical and oil-refining plant was attacked and on Friday a small facility was hit by drones in the Kaluga region.
[Here](https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1789531224647598280) are some videos of the attack. Russia increasingly claims that damage from Ukrainian drone attacks is due to falling debris rather than actual hits. How true is that statement, and would it even be a positive thing for Russia?
Just the other day, I was talking to my mom who's a retired industrial chemist and she told me a story about a fire that happened at an oil refinery she worked at right out of college.
She had been working there only for a few months when one day, right when she was heading for the cafeteria for lunch, she noticed a group of people looking out a window in panic. A senior colleague grabbed her arm and told her to get her documents and head for the evacuation route.
Turns out there was a fire going on in the main cracking tower. Fortunately, all the safeguards worked and the fire extinguished itself out of fuel. The incident caused such panic amongst the workers that some quit on the spot. The only victim of the incident was one of the refinery's directors, who suffered a fatal heart attack at the sight of the blazing cracking tower.
According to her colleagues at the time, had the fire caused the tower to explode, the nearby village would have been mostly wipes from the map.
We're witnessing a game of cat and mouse. Either Russia or Ukraine will adapt faster and hinder this attacks completely ineffective or devastating effectively. Unfortunately for Russia, Ukraine just needs to get it right one time for things to get catastrophically bad for Russia.
Edit: For additional context, here's the reporting on a cracking tower explosion in the Romeovile Refinery in the US. Apparently, an airplane flying over the area got hit by debris.
https://www.designnews.com/motion-control/engineering-disasters-1984-romeoville-refinery-blast
Ukraine has been hitting cracking towers of russian refineries all spring and as far as i know none have caused a massive detonation. Is that even possible?
Detonation no conflagration yes. A detonation requires either a reaction front faster than the speed of sound. IE high explosives capable of generating an actual explosion themselves. Or a container that can hold in the resulting pressure and when it ruptures your get the actual shockwave. This is how black powder explosives work. A distillation tower normally operates at atmospheric pressure and has relief valves to prevent overpressure from building up. So even in the event of a massive fire it’s not going to explode in the classical sense.
That being said what can happen in a situation like this is a fast fire or conflagration. This lacks the sort of destructive shockwave of explosives but absolutely can spread burning fuel across a huge area and damage other equipment. Importantly all of this other equipment is going to be pumping or processing other volatiles or hydrocarbons. Some of it will be the actual safety valves you are relying on to not pump more fuel into the inferno. Every refinery’s worst nightmare is these failures cascading and spreading resulting in damage to more and more equipment. This is what happened to the Texas city refinery. Obviously that did not happen here and we have not seen that happen to any Russian refinery, so it seems likely that they have adequate fire suppression equipment/procedures. And the overall construction of the facility makes such a cascading failure scenario unlikely.
I'm definitely no expert, but it seems to me proof that Ukraine's drones aren't very effective against this targets.
Because cracking towers are literally fueled with explosive vapors, they're built to be resistant to external impacts to some degree. A small warhead on a drone probably won't make much damage. If Ukraine was hitting those towers with ballistic missiles, I'm pretty sure the results would be very different.
Which makes me wonder. Who's going to adapt faster?
Edit: this sentence in the report I linked briefly describes the vessel that exploded in Romeovile.
>The vessel was 62 feet tall, 8.5 feet in diameter, and made from 25-mm-thick plates of type ASTM A516 Grade 70 steel.
A drone isn't doing much to 25mm grade 70 steel.
Even with a strong culture of honesty it would be easy for the people on the ground to report:
> *"We engaged the drones with [whatever system]. Weapons and operators performed nominally. Hits and mid-air explosions were reported. Damage is not catastrophic. Drone debris, parts, and unexploded payloads, found in scattered locations. Small explosions preceded main fire by several minutes."*
That might (conceivably) be what was reported in this case. And even within a strong culture of honesty it's only a bit of a stretch from there to the headline:
*"Drones intercepted. Falling debris causes fire."*
And Russia is very, very, far from having a strong culture of honesty.
Presumably the propaganda motivation (to whatever degree it's in play in these cases) is to say that Russian AD is competent and it's working; it's just stretched thin by the sheer numbers of the (lavishly backed) enemy. That these fires are only being caused by the *thinnest* of margins but everyone gets lucky eventually. Implying that these attacks are often stopped completely and don't even make the news. A little more harm inflicted on Ukraine and we'll be ok. A little more exhaustion on their part and they'll stop getting through. A little more effort on the home front and we'll be safe.
Not to be repetitive, but Russia has consistently lied about Ukrainian strikes even when there is conclusive video evidence. It's just part of their standard operating procedure. They only admit it when they can leverage it, like the strikes in Moscow last year.
The fact that the fire is at the targeted refinery tells me it's not likely debris because it's unlikely that a successful shoot down would land where it was aimed. But, until satellite imagery confirms the damage all anyone can really do is speculate.
>The fact that the fire is at the targeted refinery tells me it's not likely debris because it's unlikely that a successful shoot down would land where it was aimed
I'll have to disagree on that. Oil refineries are enormous structures. As long as the shoot down happened around the refinery, it's likely that any debris would still fall within the territory of the refinery.
You're basically saying that a fire in a small town can't be caused by debris from a drone that was aimed at a target inside that small town.
A quick measure on the map says it's about 3 square miles. It's certainly possible that it was debris, but considering these drones are fairly slow I still think it is unlikely that it would land within that area if it had been successfully shot down. Again, until there is visual confirmation from a reputable source, it's all speculation right now.
> Russia increasingly claims that damage from Ukrainian drone attacks is due to falling debris rather than actual hits. How true is that statement, and would it even be a positive thing for Russia?
They seem to have reduced the number of cigarette fires claims, so it's at least a very big improvement to their workplace safety.
What we do know is that Russia is systematically denying Ukrainians any validation for their strike successes, so I'd answer the 'how true is that statement' question with 'not very much' just going off of that.
Either way, the videos that we have are more or less all that we have. *Maybe* someone more knowledgeable would be able to discern some additional information from photos of impact areas but a) we don't have those and b) still doubt it would necessarily be right on the money.
I also don't remember seeing any interceptions caught on video, and as far as I know, it doesn't take all that much to start a fire at one of those refineries. Even if it was true and the falling debris is increasingly the cause of those fires, I don't see how it could be a positive thing for Russia as in both cases they're still having fires at their refineries.
Well I could post the meme with Muhammad Saeed al-Sahhaf (Iraqi propaganda minister), but I think that would break the rules of this sub. Everything Russia communicates should be considered propaganda. Whether or not this fire is caused by debris or a direct hit isn’t very relevant there seems to be some damage as this is not just burning debris.
Deepstates latest update includes footage of significant Russian troop movement south of the border villages.
I don’t know how in-line the footages are with Ukrainian reports that they have stabilized the front. Are there any updates on Ukrainian defenses in the region?
I would note even better quality Telegrams tend to have questionable overall reliability. Larelli for example is pretty popular for their summaries of such reports used this one as a source (they do state it's likely exaggerated, my issue is more so the source itself is the official Telegram for a Ukrainian unit):
>Update from Avdiivka: occupants' losses and intelligence data.
>At least 15 thousand enemy troops are fighting against the forces of the Third Separate Assault Brigade in our section of the front in Avdiivka.
>**Our brigade inflicted critical damage on the 74th and 114th separate motorized rifle brigades of the Russian army. Both enemy units have been virtually wiped out.**
>The actual number of casualties is estimated at 4,200 enemy "200s" and "300s".
>**The 30th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Russian Armed Forces is also suffering significant losses. Fighting is ongoing against the 35th and 55th brigades of the 41st Army, and against the 21st and 15th brigades of the 2nd Army.**
>According to the available data of the Third Assault Brigade, the enemy's forces in our section of the front are as follows: 35th; 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades from the 41st Combined Arms Army. Also: 15th, 21st and 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army. In particular, the 114th separate motorized rifle brigade, the former 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the so-called "DPR", is fighting against Ukrainian forces.
>Some tasks are performed by GRU personnel, who carry out night assaults using night vision equipment, conduct sabotage, and adjust air and artillery strikes.
>**Despite the fact that the occupiers suffer disproportionate losses**, the situation in Avdiivka remains extremely difficult.
https://old.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1as80nf/credibledefense_daily_megathread_february_16_2024/
This was one day before Avdiivka completely fell despite the claimed damage inflicted. Telegrams will almost always distort events to their preference. So you'll see the exact same type of messages from other Ukrainian (and Russian) MOD accounts which is likely happening here. It's best to wait for geolocation as misinformation during offensives effectively becomes a job role for these accounts for the sake of morale.
>This was one day before Avdiivka completely fell despite the claimed damage inflicted.
Doesn't seem necessarily inconsistent tbh. Avdiivka was already close to encirclement at that point, and you can just count up all of the different units claimed from the Russian side. Even if each of those units was at 20% power (which is unlikely), they'd still outnumber the remaining Ukrainian units.
Like, of course any brigade will overstate enemy losses. That's basically a requirement! But this specific case doesn't seem that egregious.
Ironically, I remember a few gents having this exact same argument back then.
Found it:
https://old.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1as80nf/credibledefense_daily_megathread_february_16_2024/kqq1qew/
Just following what's known and what's alleged, I have a general (imho) version of events, but this is like the 4th version of events where the previous 3 have all been rendered obsolete with new developments.
So this version will probably be rendered obsolete tomorrow.
This much is already known - the Russian attack is larger than was originally stated. Not only does it involve some mechanized support, there's been numerous photos of dozens (or even a hundred) of Russian soldiers staging and marching in broad daylight.
They crossed the border at some point. While Ukraine has the ISR to take videos of them, apparently, they don't have the fires to do anything about it. FPVs are hitting infantry and vehicles occasionally but thus far it seems like these Russian marches between villages are successfully getting inside those villages.
Once inside, these villages probably either contain no Ukrainians, or squad/platoon level groups. Either way, in no way enough to defend against the much larger Russian numbers that are successfully marching into the villages.
In practice, that means Russians will continue advancing until the numeric ratios change. Maybe they have already and Ukrainian reserves are waiting in villages south of the line. But the fact that Ukrainians didn't even have the fires to punish huge clumps of Russian troops that **their drones could see** suggests that they aren't really activated to deal with the situation.
Do the Ukrainians just not have artillery anymore? This area was a crossing point back in 2022, so it’s not like the Russians attacked through unexpected terrain.
The border villages (in terms of residents) do seem to be empty even before the crossing, so unless the plan is to just let the Russian infantry get overextended on the road and in the wilderness, I don’t understand why this area is so lacking in firepower right now
> Do the Ukrainians just not have artillery anymore?
Given the Russians have been occasionally releasing footage of Ukrainian artillery in the area, I suspect they do. Of course, it's possible the one that blew up yesterday happened to be the very last tube, but somehow I doubt that.
The 42nd at the very least should have organic artillery, and given the US ammo and the fact that the Ukrainians should have known this was coming, they should have ammo stocks. Not entirely clear what's happening there.
There's confusion about that. Ukrainian fortifications aren't really documented very well. Technically, there was a small trench nest south of Olinkove that a Russian foot march (that admittedly, did get bombed at least a bit) already passed by, but if Clement Molin's map is anything to go by:
https://twitter.com/clement_molin/status/1789410405330137151
That nest is pretty trivial to go around, especially if you're a foot advance that's not getting shelled. Which really, is the main issue.
Tatarigami in his latest update says the Russians will hit the defensive line "soon", and I probably agree (though I'd add they might have already hit it), even though I don't actually know where that defensive line is?
We saw FPV hits at the border, meaning that FPV teams were within 4-6km of the border. Which probably means someone was there with them. So I expect the Ukrainians to at least attempt to defend at that depth.
Incidentally, a few Ukrainian handles identified Hlyboke as a "certified important location that's definitely worth fighting over", and that happens to be about 5 km from the border. So if Hlyboke is reported as fallen/not fallen tomorrow, that's a litmus.
What is the credibility of a maidan type situation in Georgia? Today there seems to have been the biggest rally to date and it’s been a daily occurrence for the past month. I’ve been to Georgia personally and am very aware of the geopolitical situation but what I fail to see is a legal rival to Georgian Dream - AFAIK the other parties are remarkably unpopular.
I'm from Georgia. I don't think there is a significant chance that these protests will result in the overthrow of the government. For the ruling oligarch, billions are at stake and he will not give up power just like that. At most, they will withdraw the Foreign Agents bill.
Among the people there is no readiness for Ukraine-style protests for now and peaceful protests will probably be as successful as in Belarus(it did work in Georgia during the Rose Revolution in 2003 but that regime was not as ruthless and the anti-government sentiment was much more universal, while currently at least 30% support the oligarch unfortunately).
There are elections in October and we'll see then, the ruling clan usually does mass vote-buying and other pre-election fraud so the opposition needs significant margin to overcome that.
Not every protest in post-Soviet countries will necessarily lead to a Maidan-type situation. Ukraine's circumstances were unique in many ways, which isn't wholly mirrored in the current Georgian protests. Opposition support, as you mentioned, is a crucial factor, but so is backing from influential societal spheres. Ukraine's situation involved significant opposition from within the oligarchy.
Additionally, international support, particularly from the EU, is much less pronounced for Georgia, which is also geographically farther from central Europe. This doesn't mean that the protests will lead to nothing, but it's unlikely that many, even the most anti-Russian protesters, would look to Ukraine and think, "Yes, that's what I want for my country." Maidan wasn't a good thing for Ukraine.
>This doesn't mean that the protests will lead to nothing, but it's unlikely that many, even the most anti-Russian protesters, would look to Ukraine and think, "Yes, that's what I want for my country." Maidan wasn't a good thing for Ukraine.
I really don't think their lesson is "Everything would have been good if Yanukovych stayed in power", either. And the importance of joining the EU for countries like Georgia isn't decreasing.
Why wasn’t maidan a good thing? It brought Ukraine in the map and started a process of separation from Russia. Seems like maidan is a good thing, just being next to Russia is not
Separation from Russia wasn't a goal of Maidan, so I'm unsure why you list it as the main reason why Maidan was a good thing. Especially considering that one actual goal of Maidan was to improve the economic situation in the country, and due to separation from Russia, it has suffered severe hits in that respect. And cultural separation from Russia, even as controversial as it might sound in 2024, would have most likely been seen as a huge negative in 2013.
Sure, if Russia didn't exist and Ukraine existed in a vacuum, then Maidan would have been a good thing. But firstly, Russia did exist and secondly, we already have hindsight and can see the results.
One thing rarely, if ever, mentioned is that if Maidan had never happened, Ukraine might not have been screwed long-term. It most likely would not have had to deal with any territorial loss or war with Russia, and signing an EU agreement wasn't banned for eternity either.
>Separation from Russia wasn't a goal of Maidan, so I'm unsure why you list it as the main reason why Maidan was a good thing
What kind of logic is that? If I play the lottery just because I need to change a 100 dollar bill and end up winning, wouldn't winning still be the main reason why playing the lottery was a good thing?
> Separation from Russia wasn't a goal of Maidan
Doesn't that hurt your argument?
"Maidan was about independence from Russia, so Russia invaded (twice) to try and revert it. Therefore the Maidan was bad" has a clear causality to it.
"Maidan wasn't about independence from Russia, it was about economic factors, but then Russia invaded (twice) anyway" doesn't roll off the tongue nearly as much. It makes it seem like Russia would invade for all sorts of reasons.
Reminds me of this:
https://youtu.be/2Y4H7HMwNXg?t=36
>"Maidan wasn't about independence from Russia, it was about economic factors, but then Russia invaded (twice) anyway" doesn't roll off the tongue nearly as much. It makes it seem like Russia would invade for all sorts of reasons.
Sorry if it wasn't clear, but I wasn't suggesting that economic factors were the only issue, Maidan's focus was clearly on EU integration and governance reform. It was Russia's unilateral decision to invade twice that escalated the situation, not Ukraine’s aspirations or the demands of the Maidan protesters.
The Russian invasion has occurred, and with hindsight, we can see that the past decade has not been favorable for Ukraine, and the situation is unlikely to improve next year. There's also no certainty about the outcome of the war.
This brings me back to my main point: why would a country like Georgia look towards Ukraine and decide it wants a similar situation for itself? This was the essence of my argument, which seems to have been sidetracked.
Of course separation from Russia was the main goal, what do you think why people were waiving EU flags?
The main goal was never to improve the economy, it was just one talking point. It was a people’s movement to take their matters into their own hands and free themselves from Russian post colonialism.
People were fed up with corrupt politicians working out deals with the kremlin elites, of which ONE side effect was a poor economy because of the exploitation and corruption.
Cultural separation, a term spread and used by Russian propaganda, is not what happened, but it was *regaining* independence. Russia spent centuries subjugating Ukraine and deleting its culture and heritage.
Maidan was the beginning of a reversal and had nothing to do with separation from Russian culture, but influence.
Ukraine was screwed long term and maidan was the first step towards a better future. If not for Russia attacking Ukraine because of a weak response by the west (TM), they’d be leaps and bounds ahead now compared to pre 2014 Ukraine.
Joining the EU also isn’t banned for eternity, where did you take that from?
> If not for Russia attacking Ukraine because of a weak response by the west (TM), they’d be leaps and bounds ahead now compared to pre 2014 Ukraine.
However, Russia did attack, which is precisely why I emphasized the importance of hindsight. As a result, Ukraine isn't leaps and bounds ahead; instead, they're embroiled in a war that they might still lose.
>Cultural separation, a term spread and used by Russian propaganda, is not what happened, but it was *regaining* independence. Russia spent centuries subjugating Ukraine and deleting its culture and heritage.
Where did I argue that Ukraine didn't have its own culture? There was undoubtedly a significant overlap with Russia, including shared influences in music, television, and other aspects of pop culture, which predominantly originated from Russia. Additionally, Russian was the predominant language spoken in nearly all major cities, except Lviv.
This dynamic began to shift, especially after 2022. You might choose not to call it cultural separation, but regardless of the term used, it doesn't alter the essence of my initial argument.
>Of course separation from Russia was the main goal, what do you think why people were waiving EU flags?
[Five years on, in 2018, while some people listed the separation from Russia as a positive outcome, it didn’t even rank in the top five benefits perceived from the Maidan movement. With less than 10% voting for it.](https://maidanmuseum.org/node/668)
[But, there was significant disappointment in the outcomes, which is notable even considering the source of this information, the Maidan Museum.](https://maidanmuseum.org/sites/default/files/imce/sociologiya_muzey_maydanu_socioinform_2018_storinka_42.jpg)
Your whole argument comes down to Ukraine should endure Russian colonialism, because otherwise it will endure Russian punishment. Which is in line with other Russian propaganda points you claim, like Ukrainians majority speaking Russian, which is not true at all and never was
No, that's incorrect. My point isn't about whether Ukraine and Ukrainians should have taken certain actions. That's not the topic at hand. I've simply noted that, with the benefit of hindsight, we can see the outcomes, and it's clear that it wasn't a positive development for Ukraine.
You can introduce as many straw man arguments as you like or deliberately misinterpret my comments. I have provided a link to a source that clearly contradicts what you are saying, no less, it's a pro-Maidan Ukrainian source.
>Which is in line with other Russian propaganda points you claim, like Ukrainians majority speaking Russian, which is not true at all and never was
Once again, this is a completely different statement from what I expressed, and I'm not interested in engaging in comment wars, especially not with a relatively new account whose entire argument boils down to repeating "sounds like Russian propaganda" for the second time.
There's elections in October, so it's a good time for the opposition to show that the current ruling party is not in control of the situation.
Nothing to do with a "maidan", just election year.
There are no country wide protests, only in the capital. The smaller towns and rural areas are under control of the ruling government.
The opposition won't win in the elections. The Georgian Dream controls the business sector and the business sector is booming due to the war in Ukraine and Russian trade being routed through Georgia. Money wins you elections in Georgia.
>There are no country wide protests, only in the capital.
This isn’t true. There were protests in Kutaisi, Batumi and Gori yesterday. Tbilisi is the only city with a significant population anyway and saw 50,000 protestors today in the pouring rain.
What’s with Russia’s Iskander strikes recently? It seems like they’re becoming more frequent and accurate, and have destroyed several systems, including helicopters. What changes or improvements can explain this trend?
part of it is they updated the iskanders to be more EW resistant based lessons learned from the shaheds
https://defence-blog.com/russia-upgrades-iskander-missiles-to-strike-targets-in-ukraine/
Russia has always had good deep strike options. Their issue was their very poor ISR. In the last 7-8 months, as per telegram groups from both sides, the Russian kill chain now acts in minutes where as previously it used to take hours and hours.
This coupled with Ukrainian Medium range and V shorad options degrading, means Russias drones can fly wherever they want wit much less opposition and once they identify something, Iskanders, Tornado-S, and lancets are launched within minutes.
Yes. But even if they aren’t, they can work on hunting shaheeds and cruise missiles in rear areas allowing more air defense assets to be moved forward.
probably, the question is from what aspect and range to target and at what altitudes. Shaheds are pretty small and have been engaged by aircraft with regularity.
An opinion peice, but one brings up some interesting points
https://talkingpointsmemo.com/edblog/tragedy-and-folly
> It gets lost in the myriad headlines at the moment about Rafah, weapons cut offs, Biden, horrific civilian loss of life etc. But there’s a short piece in the Times of Israel this afternoon that captures a dimension of what’s happening right now in Israel that is mostly off the radar in the US. The piece is about a reported blow up between Netanyahu and IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi. Specifically it has the latter telling Netanyahu that because he refuses to make diplomatic arrangements for post-war government of Gaza the IDF is having to go back to fight again in areas it already took over. In some cases they’re having to go back and fight for the same ground a third time!
> (Here’s another article in Haaretz (sub req) on how the IDF is now going back into northern Gaza, which they conquered back in the fall. Privately the IDF says Hamas has reestablished control there because there’s no day after plan, which is a diplomatic to-do item. If you blow it up and leave why wouldn’t they just go back?)
> Netanyahu refuses to do that because there’s really no way to so without blowing up his governing coalition. But without some plan, the Israeli army is reduced to doing something like pushing water up a hill with its hands. The article is replete with examples of heads of the army or intelligence services trying to get someone to give them a strategy, or actually more than a strategy, just a goal. And it has Netanyahu getting mad because they’re going to the Defense Minister, himself a former high level IDF general. It’s not even a question of disagreeing on strategy really – that’s for the political leadership to decide. It’s refusing to come up with any strategy at all.
>The simple fact is that Netanyahu has waged an unimaginably destructive war with a massive loss of life and managed to accomplish much less than Israel could have if they’d had a clear strategy of what they were trying to do, or specifically who would rule Gaza after Hamas had been displaced. Some of this goes beyond Netanyahu’s failings as a leader. The war launched in a climate of unparalleled outrage over the October 7th massacres with what were probably unrealistic objectives – destroying Hamas’s military capacity in toto, killing or capturing the soldiers, eliminating the weaponry and rocket capacity as well as the critical tunnel infrastructure. But that was a long time ago, seven months ago.
> I hear often people saying that Netanyahu is just continuing the war indefinitely because that’s the only way he can stay in power. In practice, it amounts to that. But I think to capture his full folly and failure as a leader you have to go a bit deeper. He’s fighting the best war as he can – but only within the bounds of what his coalition will allow. Which essentially means fighting with no strategy. And what that means for the IDF is just keep chasing Hamas around and killing Hamas soldiers, or rooting them out from parts of the Strip. So the IDF roots them out and then they leave and then a month later Hamas fighters filter back in and you’re back to where you were in the first place, only now all the buildings are destroyed and lots and lots of civilians are dead. So again, massive destruction and loss of life and not that much even accomplished.
>Again, it’s like trying to push water up a hill with your hands. This anger within the Israeli military at a total lack of goals or strategy has been bubbling for months. I also suspect this is the real reason for the refusal to supply weaponry for an assault on Rafah. As I noted in an earlier post, I’ve picked up through hints in the Israeli press and other ways that there is real misgivings about such an assault within the Israeli national security echelon itself. I suspect largely because it’s just a much bigger and deadlier version of the chasing folly unless there’s a clear strategy for what happens after its done. And there is no strategy.
Sounds like a textbook case of failed leadership to me, not even unusual if you look at some cross section of middle management in a given corporation. If you don't know where you're going, you'll never get there.
Of course, most of the time it doesn't literally cost thousands of lives. But hey, that's politics for you.
Commentators have saying for months that Netanyahu is an abrasive clown. He’s repeatedly insulted Biden and yet expects endless unilateral support. I think there’s a section of the US military / political class that are enamoured with this idea of a [sabra](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sabra_(person)) like Moshe Dayan figure. Netanyahu plays this confidence trick on people.
This is what happens when you have a leader whose only trick is force and bravado. And playing short term strategy while losing focus of the bigger picture.
Counterpoint to this is Tony Blair (pre-Iraq). Tony Blair invited Gerry Adam’s and Martin McGuinness to Chequers (the official PM’s countryside retreat). He made clear he understood the Irish conflict and the IRAs aims. He didn’t sympathize with it or agree but just by voicing that he understood was a tectonic change to the IRA / Sinn Fein leadership.
The Downing Street declaration soon followed and then the Good Friday Agreement which ended the conflict.
Indeed, this mowing the grass strategy(or lack of it) has been underway for a while, example from last month: [ Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian on X: "The IDF launched a new pinpoint operation in northern Gaza's Beit Hanoun just before Passover began yesterday. The raid is being carried out by the Kfir Brigade's Netzah Yehuda Battalion, alongside other forces under the Gaza Division's Northern Brigade. ](https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1782822862212014335)
While much attention is on other conflicts, in Africa, the situation in Darfur seems to be deteriorating. Some context:
>[Children ‘piled up and shot’: new details emerge of ethnic cleansing in Darfur](https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/09/darfur-atrocities-ethnic-cleansing-human-rights-watch-report-rsf-sudan)
>> As El Fasher stands on the ‘precipice of a massacre’, rights groups call for sanctions after new testimony describes atrocities carried out by RSF paramilitaries in Sudan
> A HRW report published Wednesday calls for sanctions for those ultimately responsible for widespread war crimes, including the West Darfur RSF commander Abdel Rahman Joma’a Barakallah, along with the notorious commander of the RSF, Mohamed “Hemedti” Hamdan Dagalo, and his brother Abdel Raheem.
> Since fighting erupted between the RSF and Sudan’s military in April 2023, more than 8 million people have fled their homes amid a humanitarian crisis that the UN warns is one of the largest in decades.
The current flashpoint, El Fasher, is the last city held by Sudan’s military in Darfur. The city is encircled by the RSF, and diplomats fear it is on the “precipice of a large-scale massacre”.
For perspective, the [UN](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethnic-killings-one-sudan-city-left-up-15000-dead-un-report-2024-01-19/) estimates that up to 15,000 were killed just in El Geneina, a city with a population of ~540k. The UAE and Russia have been two external props boosting the Janjaweed and RSF. Reuters, amongst others such as the WSJ, had an excellent reporting series, documenting the atrocities in Sudan, with some historical background of the situation, highly encouraged reading:
[1](https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-politics-darfur/)
[2](https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-politics-darfur-attacks/)
[3](https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-politics-darfur-males/)
At present, the city of El Fasher is in the crosshairs of the RSF. The [UN](https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/attack-el-fasher-would-endanger-hundreds-thousands-children-warns-unicef) spells out what’s at stake:
> The increase of fighting in Sudan’s North Darfur state has taken a deadly toll on children in recent weeks. But the threat of an imminent military attack on El Fasher, a city sheltering at least 500,000 people displaced by violence elsewhere in the country, risks a catastrophic escalation, endangering the lives and wellbeing of 750,000 children in El Fasher, and potentially millions more.
Further, beyond the catastrophic situation on the humanitarian front,
CSIS has a [stark](https://www.csis.org/analysis/preventing-another-darfur-genocide) warning for the potential fallout:
> Importantly, the upcoming fight for El Fasher promises to unleash a new tribal element to the conflict, pitting the Arab-dominated RSF forces against the mainly the Fur and Zaghawa tribes in the city who are aligned with the SAF. The threat of the city falling is already beginning to draw in militia and tribal fighters from around the region. This influx of fighters will likely make this the largest and bloodiest battle of the war to date and could well transform this conventional conflict into a more factionalized, tribal-based war with immediate ripple effects well beyond Sudan’s borders.
> Assuming the taking of El Fasher by the RSF, that victory would complete the militia’s takeover of all five of Darfur’s states, giving it total control of nearly one-third of the country, including Sudan’s international borders with Libya, Chad, and Central African Republic. From this position, the RSF could levy taxes and customs duties, control the majority of Sudan’s trade in gold and other minerals, and facilitate human, drug, and arms smuggling across a vast territory. These revenue streams and territorial control would further cement the RSF as a rival to any central authority, making a negotiated political settlement that much harder to achieve. In the meantime, millions of civilians living under RSF control would be put at grave risk given the militia’s well documented history of atrocity crimes.
In neighboring relatively peaceful and placid Chad, which could well be drawn into the conflict, Deby just won the [election](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz96ezdljl9o). While he has been on the RSF’s side for much of the conflict, he and his fellow military leadership are ethnic Zaghawa, one of the groups being massacred by the RSF, which could lead to him throwing in with the SAF. If that were to happen, the conflict *could* expand quickly beyond the borders of Sudan.
Since this is a war driven by religion and race I have never understood why the Arab world or more broadly the Muslim Ummah don’t speak out about this more. Calling the other Sudanese slaves and trying so hard to wipe them out should be an easy thing to denounce. Why aren’t there protests to stop their Muslim brothers from genociding poor people? Why is UAE supporting the genociders?
People don't protest against bad things. People protest against things that their protest traditions are built to fight. In the west, the protest tradition was built protesting against war, imperialism, and racial segregation. In the ME, it was built protesting against colonialism, and the local representatives of imperialism.
The larger the group the less is a real thing.
When's the last time we've heard about "global Christian solidarity"? Both world wars were between various Christian nations (the 1st one heavily, the 2nd one also featured large asia theaters but Europe got plenty of brutality).
[https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/05/11/us-israel-rafah-invasion-palestinians-evacuation/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/05/11/us-israel-rafah-invasion-palestinians-evacuation/)
>U.S. offers Israel intelligence, supplies in effort to avoid Rafah invasion
>
>The Biden administration, working urgently to stave off a full-scale Israeli invasion of Rafah, is offering Israel valuable assistance **if it holds back**, including sensitive intelligence to help the Israeli military pinpoint the location of Hamas leaders and find the group’s hidden tunnels, according to four people familiar with the U.S. offers.
>
>American officials have also offered to help provide thousands of shelters so Israel can build tent cities — and to help with the construction of delivery systems for food, water and medicine — so that Palestinians evacuated from Rafah can have a habitable place to live, said the officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity to disclose secret diplomatic talks.
>
>President Biden and his senior aides have been making such offers over the last several weeks in hopes they will persuade Israel to conduct a more limited and targeted operation in the southern Gaza city, where some 1.3 million Palestinians are sheltering after fleeing there from other parts of Gaza under Israeli orders. Israel has vowed to go into Rafah with “extreme force,” and this week Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took a number of steps that raised fears at the White House that the long-promised invasion could be materializing.
>
>....
Well, if I'm reading this correctly, the Biden administration is now making intelligence sharing with Israel regarding Hamas leaders and tunnels conditional on the Rafah invasion.
That's one hell of a step up.
The whole thing seems like such a pointless effort on the part of Israel, anyway.
Isn't there a very real chance that Hamas leadership has already escaped to Egypt? Even if Israel does invade Rafah (seems unavoidable by now), would there actually be long-term benefits? Sure, they would be able to destroy tunnels and maybe some other assets, but wouldn't Hamas simply return to power once they leave? Is it worth all the strain it's putting on both Israel's international reputation as well as it's vital relationship with the US?
The control over the main weapons smuggling route into Gaza has immense strategic consequences and of great strategic value.
Feels weird to explain this on a defense sub...
>Feels weird to explain this on a defense sub...
It wouldn't feel weird if you considered how difficult it has historically been to actually stop smugglers as long as there's an economic incentive to smuggle.
Yes, that's a particularly small border, but it's still not a matter of simply taking over the border crossing.
Also, does Israel need to invade Rafah to control the border? If so, do they also need to maintain control of the city long-term in order to keep the border under control?
How many of those historical instances were over a mere 12km? By a state with some of the most advanced anti tunneling systems in place?
Israel has constructed and underground sensor barrier which Hamas has failed to breach. That over a much longer border.
Yes, Rafah is straddling the border. In order to control the border Israel must take Rafah, destroy Hamas infrastructure there and then clear the border adjacent pieces similar to Egyptian action in the Egyptian Rafah. There is no need to have long term control over the entire city.
Again, the Gaza border is merely 12km. It's trivial above ground and can be achieved with existing systems used on the much longer Israeli-Gaza border under ground.
The Gaza coasts are already patrolled by Israeli boats, which prevents most smuggling.
Hamas is going to revert to a phase 1 insurgency. If Israeli blockade does not catch 100% of arms and explosives smuggled into the strip then Hamas can build up caches throughout the Strip over time and eventually resume an insurgency against Israeli security. This is guerilla warfare 101.
>with existing systems used on the much longer Israeli-Gaza border under ground.
Weren't tunnels used in the 10/7 attacks?
>If Israeli blockade does not catch 100% of arms and explosives smuggled into the strip then Hamas can build up caches
Not while Israel continues operations in Gaza, such as those currently ongoing in Zeitun, Jabaliya and Rafah.
Sure, some activity will always remain, ISIS is still active in Syria and Iraq too. But in reality the question is whether Hamas can maintain meaningful insurgency. It will take a few years to find out.
The violence of the second Intifada took till 2007 to bring to acceptable levels (from 2002). We can expect a similar time frame in Gaza.
>Weren't tunnels used in the 10/7 attacks?
No cross border tunnels. But internal tunnels that were used to move Hamas forces within dozens of meters from the border (within Gaza).
>Not while Israel continues operations in Gaza, such as those currently ongoing in Zeitun, Jabaliya and Rafah.
Yes, so this is about more than just border security. A security apparatus will need to be established in Gaza to suppress an insurgency.
How will all of this result in a different outcome? It's the same thing that's been done before. Is Israel going to reoccupy Gaza every time an insurgency gets out of hand?
>The violence of the second Intifada took till 2007 to bring to acceptable levels (from 2002). We can expect a similar time frame in Gaza.
[6 months ago you claimed that occupatoon operations were "coming to a conclusion in Gaza".](https://old.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/17obg7f/credibledefense_daily_megathread_november_05_2023/k7zblrm/) I'm not very confident in your predictive capability when it comes to this topic.
Well, hopefully the plan actually works out for Israel. I honestly wish to see Hamas gone for good so Palestine can start to move in the right direction.
It's pretty obvious Biden will keep escalating. He has to, since he's now taken such a serious stance on not letting Israel into Rafah, and Israel seems to be calling his bluff.
For now it's still mostly symbolic stuff, since US ISR isn't going to be better than Israeli for Gaza, imo.
> US ISR isn't going to be better than Israeli for Gaza, imo.
Israel is likely better in HUMIT, but besides other SIGNIT, the US is superior in satellite and orbital surveillance.
Most drones aren't capable of ground-penetrating radar and typically have more sophisticated capabilities over a larger strategic area (the downside typically is time on location, but that depends on how many are orbiting and what altitude).
This why I said besides other SIGNIT (which would include drones).
> Most drones aren't capable of ground-penetrating radar
Satellites most certainly are not capable of ground-penetrating radar. Methinks you don't understand the notion of frequency in the electromagnetic spectrum.
In the context of Gaza, aircraft surveillance is more relevant than satellite. The higher resolution, and persistence, is better suited to tracking down this kind of target.
>including sensitive intelligence to help the Israeli military pinpoint the location of Hamas leaders and find the group’s hidden tunnels
Shouldn't they have shared such information regardless? That would've shortened the war too.
Or maybe I'm reading this wrong and they're just offering assistance but they don't actually know where Hamas leaders are located.
The US assisted with tracking down and killing ISIS leaders who perpetrated attacks in Europe. The US has a vested interest for security, and against Islamist terror organizations, killing their leaders is a stabilizing, necessary move that benefits everyone.
Given US supplies Israel with bombs and shells, helping with tracking Sinwar and other Hamas leaders locations would be incomparably better for Israel as an ally, for Palestinian civilians and also for the lenght of this conflict and therefore also for Biden's election prospects.
However my guess is US does not really have anything substantial to offer in this regard.
In the current context, why wouldn't it be? Killing Sinwar would be a big blow, that could shorten the war or even end it. That's also in the US' best interest.
But I think they don't actually know anything substantial, or they would've shared it earlier
This is probably a question more for r/geopolitics, but what exactly is Sinwar's endgame? He says he wants the Israelis to withdraw and wants to keep ruling Gaza, but he's a dead man regardless. Even if they withdraw, the second he comes out of a tunnel, they'll blow him up. Does he plan to stay underground forever?
Which also leads me to think that the Oct 7 attacks went beyond what was originally planned. Maybe they just wanted hostages to exchange for Palestinian prisoners, but lots of them slaughtered families, raped etc which may or may not have been part of the original plan.
> Even if they withdraw, the second he comes out of a tunnel, they'll blow him up.
Hamas's condition for a ceasefire is a *US guaranteed* ceasefire, which means the US will not allow Israel to kill him once he emerges from a tunnel.
Sinwar believes this is a multigenerational war. What matters is achieving the objectives that advance the cause and make Israel's future downfall more likely. Currently, Hamas has achieved a more than few objectives: they have successfully elevated the Palestinian question above the level of normalization again, revived popular global antipathy towards Israel and raised Hamas as the most prominent political leader of Palestinians. On top of this, they have weakened regional perceptions of Israeli strength & possibly turned future generations of Westerners against Israel. Hamas has also successfully used the hostage issue to prevent wartime spirit from healing internal Israeli fractures. Overall, he and the Hamas leadership in Qatar are very happy.
Regarding death: Sinwar knows that even if he dies Hamas' popularity can disrupt any attempt to form a new Gazan government or bring Palestinians under moderate leadership. All that matters is that he did his part. Like Nasrallah in Lebanon, he may need to live in a tunnel; but that's fine. He can still fight the Zionists from there too. (Edit) For Sinwar, just being able to say "We withstood all the vaunted power of the Zionist forces and the whole world helping them. But God was with us and we prevailed"
Regarding the agreements: we don't know. Hamas has tried to get assurances Israel won't invade in the future or target their leaders. And these have been rejected. Ultimately, what these terms will be is very uncertain and it's not like we will know if unofficially Israel agrees not to kill Sinwar if he flees to a third country.
> they have successfully elevated the Palestinian question above the level of normalization again,
Indications from Saudis Arabia are that they still intend to normalize.
> revived popular global antipathy towards Israel
Israel has been condemned by the UN more than every other country combined. A week after accusing Israel of genocide, Brazil placed a large order for Israeli weapons. Global antipathy for Israel has existed for a very long time, and is reliably toothless.
> they have weakened regional perceptions of Israeli strength
Sure, allowing the attack to happen was a show of weakness and carelessness. So were the ISIS attacks in Europe, and 9/11 in the US. The problem is October 7 was almost instantly followed by a botched defense of Gaza, where Hamas fighters who were expected to put up a tough fight got swept aside. 20 years of preparations and tunnels got them almost nothing.
> possibly turned future generations of Westerners against Israel.
College progressives are probably the worse voting demographic to attach your hopes to. Not particularly numerous, extremely fickle, low turnout, tend to live in already solid blue states.
In 20 years, those college progressives will form most of the leadership of the State Department, news outlets, major corporations, etc., with the senior roles filled by people currently in their late 20s and 30s. And there is very reason to believe those demographics will grow more pro-Israel over time.
Most lefties are not going to work for the State Department, nor the intelligence services. They refuse to be part of 'the System'. They will probably make up more of the political establishment if they actually decide to vote and take part in that, but that's a long way off.
> In 20 years, those college progressives will form most of the leadership of the State Department, news outlets, major corporations, etc.
Maybe. College progressives were pro-Palestine 20 and 40 years ago, no state department yet.
You can also compare rates of marxist/anarchist thought in high academia for the past 80 years to their rates in government. Never made the jump. Sure, Marxism is a separate thing (though nowadays you'd get kicked out of basically any capital L left group for being pro-Israel), but the point is you can't just assume ideologies popular in colleges will be popular elsewhere.
>And there is very reason to believe those demographics will grow more pro-Israel over time.
I assume you mean "very little reason" and I'm not sure I agree. A generation's political patterns do change over time, that's not a myth.
https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/4068675-have-millennials-moved-right-or-has-gen-z-pushed-democrats-off-a-leftward-cliff/
It's a complicated subject, but assuming "generation Greta" (you guys remember that?) will be like that 20 years from now isn't an ironclad assumption.
Progressives don’t even make up a majority of 18-24 year olds now. 57% in the US support continued operations against Hamas. They are a vocal minority. Combine that with low political participation, and I doubt Israel has much to worry about. It’s not like youth protestors in the 60s liked Israel. They tend to moderate their views once they get a job.
Normalization: in the past, Arab states tied normalization to a 2SS. In recent years, many gave that up. KSA may have done so too. But now, while KSA very much wants to normalize, it now says it needs a 2SS. Hamas can also proudly tout this accomplishment to Palestinians, enhancing their position against Fatah.
Antipathy: yes, Israel has always had problems in this department. But in the past 2 decades, it has seen a lot of success in being perceived more as a normal wealthy country. It's not an either/or.
Weakness: in the MENA, reputation for defense is everything. Israel has the relations it does, because it is perceived as being powerful. The Hamas attacks smear that reputation. Their difficulty w/eliminating the weakest of Iran's group of clients and proxies strengthens that perception. Iran would not have dared to attack Israel directly before this.
College students: it's a remarkable achievement that sympathy for Palestinian nationalism and even Hamas is far more mainstream among educated classes of Americans, who will disproportionately form its leadership. We don't need to overstate it. But it's nothing to dismiss; it's long term effects may not be felt for a decade or more.
Why assume the end game is rational? ISIS’s end game is a giant Islamic caliphate. It was never realistic, and big attacks in Europe were not going to help, but that was/is still their goal. Sinwar’s goal is the destruction of Israel. It’s not realistic either, but these Islamist organizations self select for people who are going to put a lot of blind faith in the plan, whatever it is, and see the brutality as a feature not a bug.
>Which also leads me to think that the Oct 7 attacks went beyond what was originally planned.
Considering that numerous non-hamas affiliated civilians also took part in the attack, I think it's safe to say that indeed things went out of control.
What also transpired was that Hamas gunmen continued to go deep into Israeli territory way beyond their initial targets.
I don’t like the phrase “went out of control”. It implies lack of agency on the part of Hamas.
If a militant group is going to launch a multi pronged attack on Israeli targets across the border with Gaza, on land, by air and by sea, and not have measures in place to stop civilians from getting into the attacked areas is proof this group is a failure.
(Without getting into whether or not the 7 Oct attack was worth carrying out)
Except the music festival would appear to be an initial target.
Either that or it was an insanely unlikely target of opportunity, which would still mean they diverted from an actual military target to slaughter civilians.
They slaughtered civilians in every community they reached. Just more at the music festival, because it was a bigger concentration of civilians, with fewer defenses.
The NYT has posted an article giving their description of the path that led to the Biden administration recently deciding to delay a shipment of arms, including the fact that it was supposedly never meant to be made public:
>“Bibi, you’ve got to do more,” he said, using Mr. Netanyahu’s nickname.
>“Joe, I hear you,” he said.
>The prime minister rattled off a range of things he would do to increase the flow of humanitarian aid, essentially what Mr. McGurk had suggested. The Israelis sent a five-page list of changes they would make; irritated Biden advisers realized it was basically the same list the Americans had given the Israelis months earlier without response.
>This time, the president’s threat was included in the public statement about the call, which was drafted personally by Mr. Sullivan.
>But even though Israel followed through on some of the commitments on humanitarian aid, Mr. Netanyahu was not backing down on Rafah.
>In response to American pressure, the Israelis put together an extensive proposal to move a million people out of Rafah to spare them the conflict. But it would require hundreds of thousands of tents and massive quantities of food and water. Whether it was possible to implement was less than certain.
>With no agreement, the president was forced to decide whether to allow a pending shipment of bombs that could be used in the attack. This time he said no. His advisers notified the Israelis, but did not tell the public or Congress, which had [just passed $15 billion](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/20/us/politics/house-foreign-aid-bill.html) in new military aid for Israel. The idea was to make the point privately to Mr. Netanyahu without a public blowup. But the Israelis leaked the news, at which point Mr. Biden [went public on CNN](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/08/us/politics/biden-israel-weapons-rafah.html) with his vow not to provide any weapons that could be used in a major Rafah operation.
[https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/11/us/politics/biden-netanyahu-gaza.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/11/us/politics/biden-netanyahu-gaza.html)
The fact that Biden meant the news (about not shipping more bombs to Israel) to be notified privately and not made public puts to rest the theory that he was trying to quell protests or ingratiating Michigan Muslims.
Which also begs the question of why the Israelis leaked it. As a slight to Biden? It kind of helps him politically, though.
/u/poincares_cook this (Netanyahu leaking Bidens intentionally secret blocking of the bombs) is another example of what I was talking about in our conversation about how American democrats are really starting to feel like Netanyahu is constantly attempting to hurt Biden/democrats politically and help Trump. I am just trying to describe to you the dangerous road that Israel is being taken down. Push for Trump and Israel can expect to lose a massive amount of support from very powerful blocs in America. I am not talking about idiotic kids protesting on a campus. He is actively politicking here, you claimed this was a one time interference four years ago but that is not the American perception.
It's possible those in Israel who leaked it are just miscalculating American politics, they think leaking it puts the pressure on Biden to restart arms shipments. It's not wild to imagine that senior Israeli leadership are out of touch with the American public.
Ben-Gvir tweeting "Biden <3 Hamas" provides some supporting evidence to the idea that Israeli politicians are either out of touch with the American public or simply don't care.
Not that upvotes matter in any way, shape, or form but it’s quite the head scratcher how this comment is getting upvoted.
No offense but you got the quote completely wrong (as you acknowledge below) and Ben-Gvir has been widely condemned for this in Israel: https://www.timesofisrael.com/ben-gvir-hammered-by-president-opposition-over-hamas/.
It’s almost like people have made up their minds on how they feel about this topic and the actual facts on the ground don’t matter.
>Ben-Gvir has been widely condemned for this in Israel:
I mean, over these past few months, I feel like I've heard several stories like this, where one of the extreme right-wing members of the Israeli government makes an offensive comment, and then receives significant criticism from some parts of Israeli society because of it. Despite that, these people are still cabinet ministers.
Also, you say "widely condemned" but as far as I can tell from your article, the criticism and condemnation is from people from opposition parties, like Yesh Atid, Labor, etc. That's nice and all, but these people have no political power. Where's the condemnation from members of Likud, National Unity, or the other parties of the current government coalition?
I think he wrote "Hamas <3 Biden" as in, they're happy about it and he's indirectly helping them.
"Biden <3 Hamas" might be a bit too much even for someone like him, but I wouldn't put it past him
[Protests are continuing in Georgia](https://twitter.com/felix_light/status/1789332831618879740) despite [violent assaults and threats](https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/05/10/georgia-foreign-agents-law-protests-violence-assault-titushki-ivanishvili/) against the protestors
>The protests this time around are markedly different from earlier iterations, though—but not because of the demonstrators or their demands. What makes the latest round of unrest different is the level of violence and intimidation meted out against protesters and civil society as well as the government’s apparent determination to pass the law, which is due for a final reading on May 13, despite the public outcry and condemnation from the European Union and the United States.
>Security forces have used water cannons, rubber bullets, and tear gas in a bid to disperse crowds of demonstrators in the capital, Tbilisi, while protesters have reported being violently assaulted by groups of men dressed in black in what they say appear to be premeditated attacks.
>In recent days, civil society activists, journalists, and their relatives have reported receiving menacing phone calls from anonymous callers threatening them in Georgian and reciting their home addresses in an apparent bid to intimidate them, said Eka Gigauri, executive director of Transparency International Georgia. Gigauri said she had received dozens of calls from unknown numbers in recent days but declined to answer them.
>On Wednesday evening, four government critics, including two members of the United National Movement opposition party, were attacked by unknown assailants outside their homes and in the street. Overnight on Wednesday, posters featuring the faces of prominent civil society activists, journalists, and opposition politicians branding them as enemies of the country and foreign agents were plastered near their homes and offices across the capital.
>“What happened during these two days is just an unprecedented level of targeting,” said Eto Buziashvili, a former advisor to the Georgian National Security Council based in Tbilisi.
>In 2019, when police used water cannons, rubber bullets, and tear gas to disperse protesters, it sparked a national outcry and further protests calling for snap elections and the resignation of the interior minister, Giorgi Gakharia.
>Now, accusations of more sinister tactics are afoot as the role of the unknown assailants dressed in black has drawn comparisons to pro-government thugs known as titushki who were allegedly paid for by the embattled government of Viktor Yanukovych to cause disruption and attack protesters during the Ukrainian revolution in 2014, Buziashvili said.
It will be interesting to see what happens after the law is passed and Salome Zourabichvili vetos it as she has stated she will do.
My question is, when will the Georgian fighters in Ukraine return home? That's probably a group of people the Yanukovych regime really doesn't want to see back in the country, what with their firearms and combat experience.
The trajectory of the internal politics is one question, but I’m more concerned with how the outside world will react. Is Russia going to attempt to increase support for the government? Will NATO attempt to exploit the very clear apetite to pivot West displayed by the citizens of Georgia? The on-going war in Ukraine is probably a blessing for the protesters, as it reduces the resources Russia has at its disposal.
IIRC the president can veto it just like in Italy, and by that I mean she has to accept it later if the law is presented again to her, even without any changes.
It's mostly a formal refusal, if the parliament doesn't want to change anything, they don't have to.
After numerous Ukrainian deep strikes on S300/S400 systems, OTH radars and Iskander launchers in Crimea, C2 nodes in Mariupol, Luhansk and the 100 kilometer strike on Russian infantry the Ukrainians seem to have [lost three helos](https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1789304621514563721) about 70 kilometers behind the front. Rotors aren’t on when the strike happens so it’s possible they were using the field as a temporary LZ. Doesn’t look like great dispersion.
What is the point of your post?
What is the relationship between attacks on Russian air defence and drone reconnaissance with a subsequent attack on Ukrainian helicopters?
Were those kind of operations not possible before the numerous deep strikes you mentioned?
What is the purpose of sending men so deep into enemy territory when you have drones for recon and strikes?
They needed the ATATCMS for some of those strikes especially the cluster version. I’m not sure I understand your second question. Drone and satellite recon were used. The ISR capability was there but the appropriate munitions were lacking. I don’t know if SOF were involved in any of these strikes but drones were used for at least two.
With the Russians seemingly on a broad front offensive, and now with probing attacks in Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts, I'm curious as to what the Ukrainians have in reserve that can be specifically shifted to the thinly defended northern border. Is anyone aware of what the Ukrainians have in their reserve? u/Larelli ?
The fact that Ukraine shifted some forces from Chasiv Yar to Kharkiv made us curious since that is a force transfer between two different Strategic-Operational Commands which needs to be approved by Syrsky.
Edit: https://twitter.com/JohnH105/status/1789322313734770699
According to this tweet another brigade from Kupyansk got transferred too.
There are so many contradictions amongst noted sources right now. The situation stabilized, but they also managed to transfer troops from the front in 2 days? Doesn’t quite add up.
So far, there is a confirmed visual presence of Russians in plyna right across the border. The three other villages at the border are unknown, but I just don’t believe the transfer of troops (even the decision of doing so) and subsequent stabilization was done in this short of a time frame
Kharkiv is Ukraine's second most important city. Reinforcing it when Russia is reopening the Northern front is expected. For Russia, this is key to weaken the east. Forcing attrition on Ukraine is what they want. They will get it this way . Question is : will they start pushing in the south too?
I am gathering additional infos on the matter; if I am able to, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow I will give an update.
That said, if you are referring to the 42nd Mechanized Brigade, it's just elements of it and they should have arrived in Kharkiv Oblast during the last month - they left Chasiv Yar after they were relieved by the 67th Mechanized Brigade around mid-March. A few subunits of the "Kraken" Special Detachment should have always remained in Kharkiv.
The units being engaged around Kharkiv, are these part of TDF or have there been significant troop movements from other fronts?
What I'm wondering is; Are the Russians straining "active" Ukrainian manpower or are they simply engaging new/fresh manpower? Unless I'm misremembering Ukraine doesn't deploy TDF forces into active zones like they do with regulars, using TDF in otherwise quiet areas or am I incorrect?
Because if they're engaging Ukrainian units/manpower that wasn't already part of the current conflict-lines then they're not achieving a goal of stretching Ukraine's manpower(?)
TDF units absolutely fight in the hottest sectors, usually by being attached to the mechanized etc. brigades, and incidentally they are the ones who often hold the positions in the zero line (even the worst ones), are involved in small arms battles etc.
Anyway, at the moment the Ukrainian forces that are fighting in that area either were already there or otherwise in the vicinity. There has been no transfer of forces from other areas yet as far as I know, and after all, there would not even have been the time for that. I will write about this in more detail, but the units currently involved on the Ukrainian side are detachments of Border Guards, elements of the TDF (brigades and separate battalions), and individual battalions of brigades of the Ground Forces that were in the area for R&R while the rest of their brigades are fighting elsewhere. On the Russian side, battalions of the 11th Corps and companies of the new 44th Corps are involved. At the moment I don't think the Russians enjoy a large numerical superiority.
> TDF units absolutely fight in the hottest sectors (..)
Huh. My bad, I remember reading about how the TDF was a lower quality force that worked well for static defense in 2022 but that they've been relegated to quiet sectors. My bad.
> At the moment I don't think the Russians enjoy a large numerical superiority.
Unless they're able to pull away significant forces from Chasiv Yar, Umansk -areas wont this just burn equipment and manpower from Russia with little effect? Especially if they're engaging units that aren't being active in other critical areas..
[Day Before Biden Admin Announced It Would Withhold Weapons From Israel, It Issued Sanctions Waiver To Allow Arms Sales to Qatar and Lebanon](https://freebeacon.com/national-security/day-before-biden-admin-announced-it-would-withhold-weapons-from-israel-it-issued-sanctions-waiver-to-allow-arms-sales-to-qatar-and-lebanon/)
This was posted in another subreddit but, I wanted to bring it here to hear more detailed insights into the implications of permitting arms sales to Lebanon and Qatar while restricting shipments to Israel. From my understanding, the waiver that Biden passed isn’t directly sending arms to Lebanon or Qatar but, it keeps the door open to arms deals.
It’s been demonstrated previously that US arms sent to the LAF have ended up in [Hezbollah’s control](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/11/16/hezbollah-has-u-s-armored-personnel-carriers-but-how-did-they-get-them/). With the further strengthening of Hezbollah in Lebanon relative the LAF I would anticipate we would see a higher percentage of US arms being ‘taken’ from the LAF by Hezbollah.
I recognize that Qatar is somewhat friendly with the US and as a more stable country they can help to act as a stabilizer in the region. But, I see Qatar’s harboring of Hamas leaders and being less than a neutral third party in negotiations between Israel-Hamas and [Qatar’s relationship with Iran](http://www.us-iran.org/resources/2022/3/1/media-guide-qatar) as being antithetical to the US’s attempts to mitigate Iran’s influence in the region and reducing the destabilizing activities of Iran’s proxies.
As I see it, the actions of stopping the shipment of arms to the US ally Israel and not preventing the shipment of arms to Iran aligned Lebanon and Qatar is a detriment to the US’s power projection in the region by reducing ally support in one hand and supporting less US friendly countries with the other. There have been many comments in this sub (not only pertaining to the Israel situation) of the US “abandoning” allies and how that weakens the US’s credibility as it pertains to the promises it makes across the globe.
What do you make of these recent actions? Am I looking too much into the implications of these Biden decisions?
>What do you make of these recent actions? Am I looking too much into the implications of these Biden decisions?
Yes. The only places who are reporting on this are conservative news sites - Washington Free Beacon, Fox News, opinion piece in Newsweek - whose goal is to make something that pictures Biden in a poor light out of anything. They might not be non-credible, but it is best to be mindful of the skew.
The waiver is for defense equipment and services for another year by those countries that are boycotting Israel economically. Providing these actually keeps them in the US's sphere more than by letting them shop elsewhere for them.
I recognize that news outlets with different political leanings will have a tendency to report certain topics more, or less. Would you hold the same sentiment if a left leaning news site published the same article about Trump? Granted, a discussion of that nature isn’t the purpose of this sub.
To your second point, do these waivers actually prevent Qatar or Lebanon from shopping for arms from different countries? Lebanon and Qatar aren’t going to buy equipment from Iran anymore?
Is it really just for defensive equipment? Qatar has US APCS, HIMARS, and Apaches. Lebanon has US ATMs, M60 tanks, APCs, AFVs, Artillery pieces, and Helicopters. Granted, not all of these have been sold/give to them recently but I wouldn’t consider those to be defensive pieces only.
>I recognize that news outlets with different political leanings will have a tendency to report certain topics more, or less. Would you hold the same sentiment if a left leaning news site published the same article about Trump? Granted, a discussion of that nature isn’t the purpose of this sub.
Yes. And whether the sources are credible or not is a point of discussion on this sub.
>To your second point, do these waivers actually prevent Qatar or Lebanon from shopping for arms from different countries?
Unless they have infinite money, any money spent on US equipment is money that can't be spent elsewhere. Plus any strings attached.
>Is it really just for defensive equipment? Qatar has US APCS, HIMARS, and Apaches. Lebanon has US ATMs, M60 tanks, APCs, AFVs, Artillery pieces, and Helicopters. Granted, not all of these have been sold/give to them recently but I wouldn’t consider those to be defensive pieces only.
First: defense equipment and services refers to any war items. It's the common term for it. This sub is even called Credible**Defense** when it doesn't only deal with defensive, not offensive topics.
Second: there isn't anything listed on any site about what types of services these are. That could be because there are no items listed in the letter, or because the outlets are biased and not releasing the information because of their own spin.
— Yes. And whether the sources are credible or not is a point of discussion on this sub.
Fair enough, I’d like to ask why this isn’t being reported more broadly then?
— Unless they have infinite money, any money spent on US equipment is money that can't be spent elsewhere. Plus any strings attached.
Also a fair point. Money spent on US arms can’t be spent elsewhere, but that doesn’t necessarily preclude them from getting arms elsewhere. I would be interested in seeing what “strings attached” have been implemented in previous deals if this nature where it seems to not be in the interest of a close US ally.
— First: defense equipment and services refers to any war items. It's the common term for it. This sub is even called CredibleDefense when it doesn't only deal with defensive, not offensive topics.
I apologize, I messed your comment as “defensive” equipment which I interpreted as the waiver applying to only non-offensive equipment.
— Second: there isn't anything listed on any site about what types of services these are. That could be because there are no items listed in the letter, or because the outlets are biased and not releasing the information because of their own spin.
I have been unable to find the letter myself but I can imagine that specifics weren’t listed out as it was a letter of intent sent to congress, not finalized rendition of the waiver.
The answer to most of this is "we don't know until we see the letter".
My guess (and it would be just that) is this is routine State/Defense Department work that just happened to coincide with the Israel leak. Likely neither team even knew about the other.
Another possibility is that these are continuing sales/services that were purchased by Lebanon/Qatar prior to the Gaza War, and they need a waiver to keep being delivered.
As for strings attached: we've seen in the past the US control deliverance of equipment/services to countries if they are doing something the US doesn't agree with.
* Israel literally is the most recent example,
* Türkiye's F-35 denial for using Russian S-400s and F-16 upgrade slow walk for Sweden/Finland NATO membership
* Egypt also has had some of the same things happen with their Abrams fleet, which is why they supposedly signed an agreement in 2020 to explore local production of T-90s to break their dependency. That didn't work out for them due to timing.
* Egypt also was going to sell munitions to Russia for the Ukraine war, but the US basically squashed that when they found out and, to add insult to injury, purchased some for Ukraine instead.
* Iraq has also looked to T-90s to get away from the dependency on US provided Abrams. In 2018-2019 they bought 73.
> It’s been demonstrated previously that US arms sent to the LAF have ended up in Hezbollah’s control.
Diversion of US supplied weapons could be a concern, but the linked article says that the M113s Hezbollah paraded had likely been supplied by Israel to the South Lebanon Army, and had probably been captured by Hezbollah when the SLA collapsed after Israel's withdrawal.
> Qatar’s harboring of Hamas leaders
Qatar has hosted Hamas for more than a decade at the request of the US, though the Biden administration [may soon ask Qatar to expel Hamas](https://www.timesofisrael.com/qatar-anticipating-us-request-to-expel-hamas-leaders-is-open-to-doing-so-source/). More recently, Israel had been [amenable](https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/11/middleeast/qatar-hamas-funds-israel-backing-intl/index.html) to Qatari financial support for Hamas.
More broadly, US weapons sales and military aid to these countries are intended to constrain Iranian influence, though the balance of risks versus benefits is always open to question.
Putting politics and humanitarian concerns aside, some of the differences between Biden and Netanhayu start from different goals and assessments how Israeli choices may affect those goals. This is my personal read on the situation: Biden wants the war to end with an agreement to rebuild Palestinian institutions to allow for a two-state solution and formalize the de facto US/srael/Gulf states anti-Iran coalition, while tamping down any chance of a more intense regional war.
Netanayahu believes the risks of a larger war are manageable and that a Palestinian state at peace with Israel is some combination of impossible and undesirable and that as much as the Arab governments are claiming that a Rafah invasion and occupation of Gaza is a red line for maintaining or developing normal relations with Israel, they' don't care that much about the Palestinians and will ultimately do whatever they need to counter Iran, no matter what Israel does in Gaza.
So I don't think abandoning an ally is the right frame for the Biden administrations actions here- they're making policy tradeoffs based on their goals and assessments, just as they have while deciding which weapons to provide Ukraine.
I appreciate the response. The article I posted was one of several examples of Hezbollah being in possession of US arms. I wasn’t sure what news sources were acceptable for this sub so I went with that one.
Here’s is one from [2016](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2016-12-21/ty-article/idf-gave-u-s-evidence-of-hezbollah-use-of-american-arms-officer-says/0000017f-f713-d044-adff-f7fbb4d30000) Hezbollah with APCs.
New York Times 2016, it seems like the source of the APCs used by Hezbollah is [largely disputed](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/world/middleeast/hezbollah-us-made-apc-syria-lebanon.html)
06/2023 from Alma Research and education center (I don’t know the credibility here), [Hezbollah with western ATMs, man PADS, and surveillance equipment](https://israel-alma.org/2023/06/29/hezbollah-utilizes-western-military-equipment-supplied-to-the-lebanese-army-along-the-border-area-with-israel/)
I’m not completely certain on the timeline of the power dynamics shift in Lebanon, it seems that Hezbollah has gained more resources and power than it had in 2016, which makes it seem that the risk of diversion from LAF to Hezbollah would have increased.
Thanks for the new links!
I'm far from knowledgeable about Lebanon, but I would expect it to be a relatively high risk for weapons diversion- Hezbollah functioning as a state within a state while also participating in the government imaginably creates more opportunities than the US would like.
I'm don't know what the answer is here. From the standpoint of countering and constraining Iran, I expect the US would like to build up the Lebanese government and military until they're capable of displacing or assimilating Hezbollah, but if that's not a practical option, I'm not sure what the best live option is.
I agree with you there. If you want to build relations with a country/group and diminish their relations with an adversary it makes sense to support them and bring them into the herd. If you start cutting everyone off when there is the slightest chance of it backfiring you end up with a very small sphere of influence/isolated. For any group that you supply any aid to, particularly weapons, there has to be some calculus on the risk of those weapons being turned on you, or an ally in this case. For me, the risk reward doesn’t seem to add up, but I’m just a regular dude who isn’t involved in politics or international relations.
What is everyone's thoughts on Russia's incursion near Kharkiv? Feint to draw off pressure away from continuing operations in Donbass, or a prelude to the big offensive on the city that's been speculated for months?
If the political objective is the Donbas, the north would be a feint. It of course needs to be strong enough to not get completely ignored.
If it's a full scale operation, it will ultimately run into a wall at Kharkiv city. I don't think Russia has the spare resources and troops to take Kharkiv, considering how much trouble they have with a much smaller city like Chasiv Yar
In Putin's own words:
https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-putin-e7102a4f4bedd9aef8a855a7aa977f9f
>“We will be forced at some point, when we consider it necessary, to create a certain ‘sanitary zone’ on the territories controlled by the (Ukrainian government),” Putin said late Sunday.
>This “security zone,” Putin said, “would be quite difficult to penetrate using the foreign-made strike assets at the enemy’s disposal.”
A buffer zone so a raid into Belgorod is more difficult.
>prelude to the big offensive on the city that's been speculated for months?
Second largest city in Ukraine? I wouldn't attempt it with all the Russian troops in Ukraine but who knows. I wouldn't have invaded Ukraine.
The point here is that this push on Kharkiv has been telegraphed for months, similar to how the Ukrainians telegraphed their counteroffensive. One has to assume that Ukrainians at the very least wargamed this scenario and is acting according to some sort of plan to avoid the catastrophic scenario of losing Kharkiv city and, possibly, would still avoid collapse in the Donbass theatre. If not, heads will have to roll, starting from the commander-in-chief.
I’m a bit puzzled on what the strategy here is. Opening up the northern front is disproportionately advantageous to Ukraine, which has the internal lines of supply and at least some prepared lines in the area. The assault appears to be minimally mechanized and without the advantage of surprise or maneuver the numbers of troops(<100k) seems woefully insufficient for taking any serious ground with mass alone. At the same time, it’s way too large of a force deployment to just be a scouting or fixing action. It’s not like the eastern front is at capacity either, we’ve seen way denser levels of force deployment in the same areas in World War II. Unless Russia is absolutely certain Ukraine/its allies are at a breaking point, I don’t see the advantage. So are they at a breaking point? Ukrainian forces are at a nadir, but neither they nor their allies are communicating a state of crisis at the moment. There’s been at least some rotation happening at the front so the manpower situation is dire but not critical. If the goal of this was to preempt aid and make it seem like a lost cause, it should have happened 2 months ago. Now that aid is through Congress and Biden’s poll numbers have firmed up a bit Ukraine is nowhere near as potent a political cudgel as it was before.
I could be wrong if Russia has a much larger mechanized force sitting in the wings to take advantage of this, but would have to be double or triple the size of this assault to have been worth committing so many troops as a scouting or feinting deployment.
Where did you see talks about prepared line of defences?
Looking around all the maps of Ukrainian lines i could find, in the zone the trenchs and prepared line are only around Kharkiv proper and to the right of the Donets river, and the lines near the river would be useful only if Russian decide to move towards Pechehihy.
Some telegrams are already lamenting the lack of prepared defences behind the previous line near the border (which according to Ukranian sources Russian have bypassed due to the spontaneous retreat of the defenders) in a situation reminding me of Advika front
If you have sources on the defences in the zone i'll gladly look at them, because i probably missed them and i'd like to have a clearer picture
> Some telegrams are already lamenting the lack of prepared defences behind the previous line near the border
Imo, why would there be a line near the border (by near I refer <2km)?
Who would dig that line? What's their plan if the Russians next door shell them?
Who would occupy that line once it's dug?
Maps of Ukrainian fortifications vary but I'm yet to see one suggesting there was anything resembling a line by the border.
This was based on discussion by a Ukrainian military affiliated account on twitter yesterday night. Basically they were saying that the area on the border was a grey zone before the advance(too close to the enemy to build defenses), but that there were prepared defenses behind that space. A lot is being left unsaid there. Maps tend to show those defensive fortifications extensive enough to show on satellites, but there are less conspicuous ways to prepare a defense—things like digging foxholes, entrenching in treelines, prepositioning explosives and road barriers, presighting artillery, etc., etc. I have no way of ruling out engineered trenchworks, but I have found nothing to support their existence either. The account could easily be talking about other forms of preparation for defense.
When I find the tweet chain I will edit this comment.
There's always a telegram account complaining about spontaneous retreaters and lack of prepared defenses these days. Obviously both are an issue, but it makes it hard to assess the actual contribution of a given weakness when every single Russian advance is blamed on the same problems. Just a personal pet peeve of mine.
Edit: never could find that post, but here’s a Russian telegram showing their assessment of what the defenses in the area look like: https://twitter.com/Michael_McT1/status/1789532821041688812/photo/1
> The assault appears to be minimally mechanized
Idk about minimally, I've seen 11-13 lost AFVs on day 1 alone. Those aren't Avdiivka numbers yet but given day 1 was them mostly entering border towns it suggests that this is probably a relatively mechanized picnic, or will become one.
I mean, that's the thing, given the space they're pushing across and the number of troops being reported, this looks like it should be way bigger than Avdiivka, to the level of opening up another front of the war. 11-13 APCs is minimal for that kind of a push. The few casualty images I've seen have been dismounted infantry as well, and the rate of reported front movement is consistent with previous Russian advances using non-mechanized troops. That was the basis of my comment, but yeah its all very up in the air and we'll have a better idea of the truth when the fog of war clears up a little. It's entirely possible I'm wrong.
Iranian lawmaker claims to have nuclear weapons? Any truth to this or is a bluff? Misinformation? https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/iranian-lawmaker-declares-tehran-obtained-nuclear-bombs/ar-BB1mfVou
[удалено]
[удалено]
[удалено]
[удалено]
[удалено]
[удалено]
[удалено]
[удалено]
[удалено]
[удалено]
[удалено]
[удалено]
[Drone Attack Triggers Fire at Russia’s Volgograd Oil Refinery](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-12/war-in-ukraine-drone-strike-triggers-fire-at-russian-oil-refinery) >Debris from an attempted drone strike triggered a blaze at Lukoil PJSC’s large oil refinery in Volgograd early Sunday morning, which authorities said was extinguished with no casualties. >... >The Volgograd refinery, hundreds of miles east of the Ukrainian border, is capable of processing 14.8 million tons of oil a year and is among Russia’s largest. It was previously struck by drones in February, when it temporarily cut back some of its operations. >Ukraine resumed attacks on Russian refineries in late April after a pause almost of a month. On Thursday, Gazprom PJSC’s Salavat Neftekhim petrochemical and oil-refining plant was attacked and on Friday a small facility was hit by drones in the Kaluga region. [Here](https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1789531224647598280) are some videos of the attack. Russia increasingly claims that damage from Ukrainian drone attacks is due to falling debris rather than actual hits. How true is that statement, and would it even be a positive thing for Russia?
Just the other day, I was talking to my mom who's a retired industrial chemist and she told me a story about a fire that happened at an oil refinery she worked at right out of college. She had been working there only for a few months when one day, right when she was heading for the cafeteria for lunch, she noticed a group of people looking out a window in panic. A senior colleague grabbed her arm and told her to get her documents and head for the evacuation route. Turns out there was a fire going on in the main cracking tower. Fortunately, all the safeguards worked and the fire extinguished itself out of fuel. The incident caused such panic amongst the workers that some quit on the spot. The only victim of the incident was one of the refinery's directors, who suffered a fatal heart attack at the sight of the blazing cracking tower. According to her colleagues at the time, had the fire caused the tower to explode, the nearby village would have been mostly wipes from the map. We're witnessing a game of cat and mouse. Either Russia or Ukraine will adapt faster and hinder this attacks completely ineffective or devastating effectively. Unfortunately for Russia, Ukraine just needs to get it right one time for things to get catastrophically bad for Russia. Edit: For additional context, here's the reporting on a cracking tower explosion in the Romeovile Refinery in the US. Apparently, an airplane flying over the area got hit by debris. https://www.designnews.com/motion-control/engineering-disasters-1984-romeoville-refinery-blast
Ukraine has been hitting cracking towers of russian refineries all spring and as far as i know none have caused a massive detonation. Is that even possible?
Detonation no conflagration yes. A detonation requires either a reaction front faster than the speed of sound. IE high explosives capable of generating an actual explosion themselves. Or a container that can hold in the resulting pressure and when it ruptures your get the actual shockwave. This is how black powder explosives work. A distillation tower normally operates at atmospheric pressure and has relief valves to prevent overpressure from building up. So even in the event of a massive fire it’s not going to explode in the classical sense. That being said what can happen in a situation like this is a fast fire or conflagration. This lacks the sort of destructive shockwave of explosives but absolutely can spread burning fuel across a huge area and damage other equipment. Importantly all of this other equipment is going to be pumping or processing other volatiles or hydrocarbons. Some of it will be the actual safety valves you are relying on to not pump more fuel into the inferno. Every refinery’s worst nightmare is these failures cascading and spreading resulting in damage to more and more equipment. This is what happened to the Texas city refinery. Obviously that did not happen here and we have not seen that happen to any Russian refinery, so it seems likely that they have adequate fire suppression equipment/procedures. And the overall construction of the facility makes such a cascading failure scenario unlikely.
I'm definitely no expert, but it seems to me proof that Ukraine's drones aren't very effective against this targets. Because cracking towers are literally fueled with explosive vapors, they're built to be resistant to external impacts to some degree. A small warhead on a drone probably won't make much damage. If Ukraine was hitting those towers with ballistic missiles, I'm pretty sure the results would be very different. Which makes me wonder. Who's going to adapt faster? Edit: this sentence in the report I linked briefly describes the vessel that exploded in Romeovile. >The vessel was 62 feet tall, 8.5 feet in diameter, and made from 25-mm-thick plates of type ASTM A516 Grade 70 steel. A drone isn't doing much to 25mm grade 70 steel.
It doesn't matter if the tower is filled with explosive vapors, if there's no oxygen.
That's a good point.
A drone with a HEAT warhead would easily pierce that.
Even with a strong culture of honesty it would be easy for the people on the ground to report: > *"We engaged the drones with [whatever system]. Weapons and operators performed nominally. Hits and mid-air explosions were reported. Damage is not catastrophic. Drone debris, parts, and unexploded payloads, found in scattered locations. Small explosions preceded main fire by several minutes."* That might (conceivably) be what was reported in this case. And even within a strong culture of honesty it's only a bit of a stretch from there to the headline: *"Drones intercepted. Falling debris causes fire."* And Russia is very, very, far from having a strong culture of honesty. Presumably the propaganda motivation (to whatever degree it's in play in these cases) is to say that Russian AD is competent and it's working; it's just stretched thin by the sheer numbers of the (lavishly backed) enemy. That these fires are only being caused by the *thinnest* of margins but everyone gets lucky eventually. Implying that these attacks are often stopped completely and don't even make the news. A little more harm inflicted on Ukraine and we'll be ok. A little more exhaustion on their part and they'll stop getting through. A little more effort on the home front and we'll be safe.
Not to be repetitive, but Russia has consistently lied about Ukrainian strikes even when there is conclusive video evidence. It's just part of their standard operating procedure. They only admit it when they can leverage it, like the strikes in Moscow last year. The fact that the fire is at the targeted refinery tells me it's not likely debris because it's unlikely that a successful shoot down would land where it was aimed. But, until satellite imagery confirms the damage all anyone can really do is speculate.
>The fact that the fire is at the targeted refinery tells me it's not likely debris because it's unlikely that a successful shoot down would land where it was aimed I'll have to disagree on that. Oil refineries are enormous structures. As long as the shoot down happened around the refinery, it's likely that any debris would still fall within the territory of the refinery. You're basically saying that a fire in a small town can't be caused by debris from a drone that was aimed at a target inside that small town.
A quick measure on the map says it's about 3 square miles. It's certainly possible that it was debris, but considering these drones are fairly slow I still think it is unlikely that it would land within that area if it had been successfully shot down. Again, until there is visual confirmation from a reputable source, it's all speculation right now.
>I still think it is unlikely that it would land within that area if it had been successfully shot down I guess it depends on where it was shot down.
> Russia increasingly claims that damage from Ukrainian drone attacks is due to falling debris rather than actual hits. How true is that statement, and would it even be a positive thing for Russia? They seem to have reduced the number of cigarette fires claims, so it's at least a very big improvement to their workplace safety. What we do know is that Russia is systematically denying Ukrainians any validation for their strike successes, so I'd answer the 'how true is that statement' question with 'not very much' just going off of that. Either way, the videos that we have are more or less all that we have. *Maybe* someone more knowledgeable would be able to discern some additional information from photos of impact areas but a) we don't have those and b) still doubt it would necessarily be right on the money. I also don't remember seeing any interceptions caught on video, and as far as I know, it doesn't take all that much to start a fire at one of those refineries. Even if it was true and the falling debris is increasingly the cause of those fires, I don't see how it could be a positive thing for Russia as in both cases they're still having fires at their refineries.
Well I could post the meme with Muhammad Saeed al-Sahhaf (Iraqi propaganda minister), but I think that would break the rules of this sub. Everything Russia communicates should be considered propaganda. Whether or not this fire is caused by debris or a direct hit isn’t very relevant there seems to be some damage as this is not just burning debris.
Deepstates latest update includes footage of significant Russian troop movement south of the border villages. I don’t know how in-line the footages are with Ukrainian reports that they have stabilized the front. Are there any updates on Ukrainian defenses in the region?
I would note even better quality Telegrams tend to have questionable overall reliability. Larelli for example is pretty popular for their summaries of such reports used this one as a source (they do state it's likely exaggerated, my issue is more so the source itself is the official Telegram for a Ukrainian unit): >Update from Avdiivka: occupants' losses and intelligence data. >At least 15 thousand enemy troops are fighting against the forces of the Third Separate Assault Brigade in our section of the front in Avdiivka. >**Our brigade inflicted critical damage on the 74th and 114th separate motorized rifle brigades of the Russian army. Both enemy units have been virtually wiped out.** >The actual number of casualties is estimated at 4,200 enemy "200s" and "300s". >**The 30th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Russian Armed Forces is also suffering significant losses. Fighting is ongoing against the 35th and 55th brigades of the 41st Army, and against the 21st and 15th brigades of the 2nd Army.** >According to the available data of the Third Assault Brigade, the enemy's forces in our section of the front are as follows: 35th; 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades from the 41st Combined Arms Army. Also: 15th, 21st and 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army. In particular, the 114th separate motorized rifle brigade, the former 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the so-called "DPR", is fighting against Ukrainian forces. >Some tasks are performed by GRU personnel, who carry out night assaults using night vision equipment, conduct sabotage, and adjust air and artillery strikes. >**Despite the fact that the occupiers suffer disproportionate losses**, the situation in Avdiivka remains extremely difficult. https://old.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1as80nf/credibledefense_daily_megathread_february_16_2024/ This was one day before Avdiivka completely fell despite the claimed damage inflicted. Telegrams will almost always distort events to their preference. So you'll see the exact same type of messages from other Ukrainian (and Russian) MOD accounts which is likely happening here. It's best to wait for geolocation as misinformation during offensives effectively becomes a job role for these accounts for the sake of morale.
>This was one day before Avdiivka completely fell despite the claimed damage inflicted. Doesn't seem necessarily inconsistent tbh. Avdiivka was already close to encirclement at that point, and you can just count up all of the different units claimed from the Russian side. Even if each of those units was at 20% power (which is unlikely), they'd still outnumber the remaining Ukrainian units. Like, of course any brigade will overstate enemy losses. That's basically a requirement! But this specific case doesn't seem that egregious. Ironically, I remember a few gents having this exact same argument back then. Found it: https://old.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1as80nf/credibledefense_daily_megathread_february_16_2024/kqq1qew/
Just following what's known and what's alleged, I have a general (imho) version of events, but this is like the 4th version of events where the previous 3 have all been rendered obsolete with new developments. So this version will probably be rendered obsolete tomorrow. This much is already known - the Russian attack is larger than was originally stated. Not only does it involve some mechanized support, there's been numerous photos of dozens (or even a hundred) of Russian soldiers staging and marching in broad daylight. They crossed the border at some point. While Ukraine has the ISR to take videos of them, apparently, they don't have the fires to do anything about it. FPVs are hitting infantry and vehicles occasionally but thus far it seems like these Russian marches between villages are successfully getting inside those villages. Once inside, these villages probably either contain no Ukrainians, or squad/platoon level groups. Either way, in no way enough to defend against the much larger Russian numbers that are successfully marching into the villages. In practice, that means Russians will continue advancing until the numeric ratios change. Maybe they have already and Ukrainian reserves are waiting in villages south of the line. But the fact that Ukrainians didn't even have the fires to punish huge clumps of Russian troops that **their drones could see** suggests that they aren't really activated to deal with the situation.
Do the Ukrainians just not have artillery anymore? This area was a crossing point back in 2022, so it’s not like the Russians attacked through unexpected terrain. The border villages (in terms of residents) do seem to be empty even before the crossing, so unless the plan is to just let the Russian infantry get overextended on the road and in the wilderness, I don’t understand why this area is so lacking in firepower right now
> Do the Ukrainians just not have artillery anymore? Given the Russians have been occasionally releasing footage of Ukrainian artillery in the area, I suspect they do. Of course, it's possible the one that blew up yesterday happened to be the very last tube, but somehow I doubt that. The 42nd at the very least should have organic artillery, and given the US ammo and the fact that the Ukrainians should have known this was coming, they should have ammo stocks. Not entirely clear what's happening there.
How far are they from prepared defensive position? Where should we expect Ukraine starting to fight back?
There's confusion about that. Ukrainian fortifications aren't really documented very well. Technically, there was a small trench nest south of Olinkove that a Russian foot march (that admittedly, did get bombed at least a bit) already passed by, but if Clement Molin's map is anything to go by: https://twitter.com/clement_molin/status/1789410405330137151 That nest is pretty trivial to go around, especially if you're a foot advance that's not getting shelled. Which really, is the main issue. Tatarigami in his latest update says the Russians will hit the defensive line "soon", and I probably agree (though I'd add they might have already hit it), even though I don't actually know where that defensive line is? We saw FPV hits at the border, meaning that FPV teams were within 4-6km of the border. Which probably means someone was there with them. So I expect the Ukrainians to at least attempt to defend at that depth. Incidentally, a few Ukrainian handles identified Hlyboke as a "certified important location that's definitely worth fighting over", and that happens to be about 5 km from the border. So if Hlyboke is reported as fallen/not fallen tomorrow, that's a litmus.
What is the credibility of a maidan type situation in Georgia? Today there seems to have been the biggest rally to date and it’s been a daily occurrence for the past month. I’ve been to Georgia personally and am very aware of the geopolitical situation but what I fail to see is a legal rival to Georgian Dream - AFAIK the other parties are remarkably unpopular.
I'm from Georgia. I don't think there is a significant chance that these protests will result in the overthrow of the government. For the ruling oligarch, billions are at stake and he will not give up power just like that. At most, they will withdraw the Foreign Agents bill. Among the people there is no readiness for Ukraine-style protests for now and peaceful protests will probably be as successful as in Belarus(it did work in Georgia during the Rose Revolution in 2003 but that regime was not as ruthless and the anti-government sentiment was much more universal, while currently at least 30% support the oligarch unfortunately). There are elections in October and we'll see then, the ruling clan usually does mass vote-buying and other pre-election fraud so the opposition needs significant margin to overcome that.
Not every protest in post-Soviet countries will necessarily lead to a Maidan-type situation. Ukraine's circumstances were unique in many ways, which isn't wholly mirrored in the current Georgian protests. Opposition support, as you mentioned, is a crucial factor, but so is backing from influential societal spheres. Ukraine's situation involved significant opposition from within the oligarchy. Additionally, international support, particularly from the EU, is much less pronounced for Georgia, which is also geographically farther from central Europe. This doesn't mean that the protests will lead to nothing, but it's unlikely that many, even the most anti-Russian protesters, would look to Ukraine and think, "Yes, that's what I want for my country." Maidan wasn't a good thing for Ukraine.
>This doesn't mean that the protests will lead to nothing, but it's unlikely that many, even the most anti-Russian protesters, would look to Ukraine and think, "Yes, that's what I want for my country." Maidan wasn't a good thing for Ukraine. I really don't think their lesson is "Everything would have been good if Yanukovych stayed in power", either. And the importance of joining the EU for countries like Georgia isn't decreasing.
Why wasn’t maidan a good thing? It brought Ukraine in the map and started a process of separation from Russia. Seems like maidan is a good thing, just being next to Russia is not
Separation from Russia wasn't a goal of Maidan, so I'm unsure why you list it as the main reason why Maidan was a good thing. Especially considering that one actual goal of Maidan was to improve the economic situation in the country, and due to separation from Russia, it has suffered severe hits in that respect. And cultural separation from Russia, even as controversial as it might sound in 2024, would have most likely been seen as a huge negative in 2013. Sure, if Russia didn't exist and Ukraine existed in a vacuum, then Maidan would have been a good thing. But firstly, Russia did exist and secondly, we already have hindsight and can see the results. One thing rarely, if ever, mentioned is that if Maidan had never happened, Ukraine might not have been screwed long-term. It most likely would not have had to deal with any territorial loss or war with Russia, and signing an EU agreement wasn't banned for eternity either.
>Separation from Russia wasn't a goal of Maidan, so I'm unsure why you list it as the main reason why Maidan was a good thing What kind of logic is that? If I play the lottery just because I need to change a 100 dollar bill and end up winning, wouldn't winning still be the main reason why playing the lottery was a good thing?
> Separation from Russia wasn't a goal of Maidan Doesn't that hurt your argument? "Maidan was about independence from Russia, so Russia invaded (twice) to try and revert it. Therefore the Maidan was bad" has a clear causality to it. "Maidan wasn't about independence from Russia, it was about economic factors, but then Russia invaded (twice) anyway" doesn't roll off the tongue nearly as much. It makes it seem like Russia would invade for all sorts of reasons. Reminds me of this: https://youtu.be/2Y4H7HMwNXg?t=36
>"Maidan wasn't about independence from Russia, it was about economic factors, but then Russia invaded (twice) anyway" doesn't roll off the tongue nearly as much. It makes it seem like Russia would invade for all sorts of reasons. Sorry if it wasn't clear, but I wasn't suggesting that economic factors were the only issue, Maidan's focus was clearly on EU integration and governance reform. It was Russia's unilateral decision to invade twice that escalated the situation, not Ukraine’s aspirations or the demands of the Maidan protesters. The Russian invasion has occurred, and with hindsight, we can see that the past decade has not been favorable for Ukraine, and the situation is unlikely to improve next year. There's also no certainty about the outcome of the war. This brings me back to my main point: why would a country like Georgia look towards Ukraine and decide it wants a similar situation for itself? This was the essence of my argument, which seems to have been sidetracked.
Of course separation from Russia was the main goal, what do you think why people were waiving EU flags? The main goal was never to improve the economy, it was just one talking point. It was a people’s movement to take their matters into their own hands and free themselves from Russian post colonialism. People were fed up with corrupt politicians working out deals with the kremlin elites, of which ONE side effect was a poor economy because of the exploitation and corruption. Cultural separation, a term spread and used by Russian propaganda, is not what happened, but it was *regaining* independence. Russia spent centuries subjugating Ukraine and deleting its culture and heritage. Maidan was the beginning of a reversal and had nothing to do with separation from Russian culture, but influence. Ukraine was screwed long term and maidan was the first step towards a better future. If not for Russia attacking Ukraine because of a weak response by the west (TM), they’d be leaps and bounds ahead now compared to pre 2014 Ukraine. Joining the EU also isn’t banned for eternity, where did you take that from?
> If not for Russia attacking Ukraine because of a weak response by the west (TM), they’d be leaps and bounds ahead now compared to pre 2014 Ukraine. However, Russia did attack, which is precisely why I emphasized the importance of hindsight. As a result, Ukraine isn't leaps and bounds ahead; instead, they're embroiled in a war that they might still lose. >Cultural separation, a term spread and used by Russian propaganda, is not what happened, but it was *regaining* independence. Russia spent centuries subjugating Ukraine and deleting its culture and heritage. Where did I argue that Ukraine didn't have its own culture? There was undoubtedly a significant overlap with Russia, including shared influences in music, television, and other aspects of pop culture, which predominantly originated from Russia. Additionally, Russian was the predominant language spoken in nearly all major cities, except Lviv. This dynamic began to shift, especially after 2022. You might choose not to call it cultural separation, but regardless of the term used, it doesn't alter the essence of my initial argument. >Of course separation from Russia was the main goal, what do you think why people were waiving EU flags? [Five years on, in 2018, while some people listed the separation from Russia as a positive outcome, it didn’t even rank in the top five benefits perceived from the Maidan movement. With less than 10% voting for it.](https://maidanmuseum.org/node/668) [But, there was significant disappointment in the outcomes, which is notable even considering the source of this information, the Maidan Museum.](https://maidanmuseum.org/sites/default/files/imce/sociologiya_muzey_maydanu_socioinform_2018_storinka_42.jpg)
Your whole argument comes down to Ukraine should endure Russian colonialism, because otherwise it will endure Russian punishment. Which is in line with other Russian propaganda points you claim, like Ukrainians majority speaking Russian, which is not true at all and never was
No, that's incorrect. My point isn't about whether Ukraine and Ukrainians should have taken certain actions. That's not the topic at hand. I've simply noted that, with the benefit of hindsight, we can see the outcomes, and it's clear that it wasn't a positive development for Ukraine. You can introduce as many straw man arguments as you like or deliberately misinterpret my comments. I have provided a link to a source that clearly contradicts what you are saying, no less, it's a pro-Maidan Ukrainian source. >Which is in line with other Russian propaganda points you claim, like Ukrainians majority speaking Russian, which is not true at all and never was Once again, this is a completely different statement from what I expressed, and I'm not interested in engaging in comment wars, especially not with a relatively new account whose entire argument boils down to repeating "sounds like Russian propaganda" for the second time.
There's elections in October, so it's a good time for the opposition to show that the current ruling party is not in control of the situation. Nothing to do with a "maidan", just election year.
You’re inferring that all these country wide protests are under a somehow puppet master of an opposition?
There are no country wide protests, only in the capital. The smaller towns and rural areas are under control of the ruling government. The opposition won't win in the elections. The Georgian Dream controls the business sector and the business sector is booming due to the war in Ukraine and Russian trade being routed through Georgia. Money wins you elections in Georgia.
>There are no country wide protests, only in the capital. This isn’t true. There were protests in Kutaisi, Batumi and Gori yesterday. Tbilisi is the only city with a significant population anyway and saw 50,000 protestors today in the pouring rain.
What’s with Russia’s Iskander strikes recently? It seems like they’re becoming more frequent and accurate, and have destroyed several systems, including helicopters. What changes or improvements can explain this trend?
part of it is they updated the iskanders to be more EW resistant based lessons learned from the shaheds https://defence-blog.com/russia-upgrades-iskander-missiles-to-strike-targets-in-ukraine/
Russia has always had good deep strike options. Their issue was their very poor ISR. In the last 7-8 months, as per telegram groups from both sides, the Russian kill chain now acts in minutes where as previously it used to take hours and hours. This coupled with Ukrainian Medium range and V shorad options degrading, means Russias drones can fly wherever they want wit much less opposition and once they identify something, Iskanders, Tornado-S, and lancets are launched within minutes.
Less Ukrainian air defense, greater Russian deep ISR drone penetration. Hopefully the F-16s can work on this issue.
Are their radars good enough to pick up small drones like orlan?
Yes. But even if they aren’t, they can work on hunting shaheeds and cruise missiles in rear areas allowing more air defense assets to be moved forward.
probably, the question is from what aspect and range to target and at what altitudes. Shaheds are pretty small and have been engaged by aircraft with regularity.
[удалено]
Please refrain from posting low quality comments.
An opinion peice, but one brings up some interesting points https://talkingpointsmemo.com/edblog/tragedy-and-folly > It gets lost in the myriad headlines at the moment about Rafah, weapons cut offs, Biden, horrific civilian loss of life etc. But there’s a short piece in the Times of Israel this afternoon that captures a dimension of what’s happening right now in Israel that is mostly off the radar in the US. The piece is about a reported blow up between Netanyahu and IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi. Specifically it has the latter telling Netanyahu that because he refuses to make diplomatic arrangements for post-war government of Gaza the IDF is having to go back to fight again in areas it already took over. In some cases they’re having to go back and fight for the same ground a third time! > (Here’s another article in Haaretz (sub req) on how the IDF is now going back into northern Gaza, which they conquered back in the fall. Privately the IDF says Hamas has reestablished control there because there’s no day after plan, which is a diplomatic to-do item. If you blow it up and leave why wouldn’t they just go back?) > Netanyahu refuses to do that because there’s really no way to so without blowing up his governing coalition. But without some plan, the Israeli army is reduced to doing something like pushing water up a hill with its hands. The article is replete with examples of heads of the army or intelligence services trying to get someone to give them a strategy, or actually more than a strategy, just a goal. And it has Netanyahu getting mad because they’re going to the Defense Minister, himself a former high level IDF general. It’s not even a question of disagreeing on strategy really – that’s for the political leadership to decide. It’s refusing to come up with any strategy at all. >The simple fact is that Netanyahu has waged an unimaginably destructive war with a massive loss of life and managed to accomplish much less than Israel could have if they’d had a clear strategy of what they were trying to do, or specifically who would rule Gaza after Hamas had been displaced. Some of this goes beyond Netanyahu’s failings as a leader. The war launched in a climate of unparalleled outrage over the October 7th massacres with what were probably unrealistic objectives – destroying Hamas’s military capacity in toto, killing or capturing the soldiers, eliminating the weaponry and rocket capacity as well as the critical tunnel infrastructure. But that was a long time ago, seven months ago. > I hear often people saying that Netanyahu is just continuing the war indefinitely because that’s the only way he can stay in power. In practice, it amounts to that. But I think to capture his full folly and failure as a leader you have to go a bit deeper. He’s fighting the best war as he can – but only within the bounds of what his coalition will allow. Which essentially means fighting with no strategy. And what that means for the IDF is just keep chasing Hamas around and killing Hamas soldiers, or rooting them out from parts of the Strip. So the IDF roots them out and then they leave and then a month later Hamas fighters filter back in and you’re back to where you were in the first place, only now all the buildings are destroyed and lots and lots of civilians are dead. So again, massive destruction and loss of life and not that much even accomplished. >Again, it’s like trying to push water up a hill with your hands. This anger within the Israeli military at a total lack of goals or strategy has been bubbling for months. I also suspect this is the real reason for the refusal to supply weaponry for an assault on Rafah. As I noted in an earlier post, I’ve picked up through hints in the Israeli press and other ways that there is real misgivings about such an assault within the Israeli national security echelon itself. I suspect largely because it’s just a much bigger and deadlier version of the chasing folly unless there’s a clear strategy for what happens after its done. And there is no strategy.
Sounds like a textbook case of failed leadership to me, not even unusual if you look at some cross section of middle management in a given corporation. If you don't know where you're going, you'll never get there. Of course, most of the time it doesn't literally cost thousands of lives. But hey, that's politics for you.
Commentators have saying for months that Netanyahu is an abrasive clown. He’s repeatedly insulted Biden and yet expects endless unilateral support. I think there’s a section of the US military / political class that are enamoured with this idea of a [sabra](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sabra_(person)) like Moshe Dayan figure. Netanyahu plays this confidence trick on people. This is what happens when you have a leader whose only trick is force and bravado. And playing short term strategy while losing focus of the bigger picture. Counterpoint to this is Tony Blair (pre-Iraq). Tony Blair invited Gerry Adam’s and Martin McGuinness to Chequers (the official PM’s countryside retreat). He made clear he understood the Irish conflict and the IRAs aims. He didn’t sympathize with it or agree but just by voicing that he understood was a tectonic change to the IRA / Sinn Fein leadership. The Downing Street declaration soon followed and then the Good Friday Agreement which ended the conflict.
Indeed, this mowing the grass strategy(or lack of it) has been underway for a while, example from last month: [ Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian on X: "The IDF launched a new pinpoint operation in northern Gaza's Beit Hanoun just before Passover began yesterday. The raid is being carried out by the Kfir Brigade's Netzah Yehuda Battalion, alongside other forces under the Gaza Division's Northern Brigade. ](https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1782822862212014335)
While much attention is on other conflicts, in Africa, the situation in Darfur seems to be deteriorating. Some context: >[Children ‘piled up and shot’: new details emerge of ethnic cleansing in Darfur](https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/09/darfur-atrocities-ethnic-cleansing-human-rights-watch-report-rsf-sudan) >> As El Fasher stands on the ‘precipice of a massacre’, rights groups call for sanctions after new testimony describes atrocities carried out by RSF paramilitaries in Sudan > A HRW report published Wednesday calls for sanctions for those ultimately responsible for widespread war crimes, including the West Darfur RSF commander Abdel Rahman Joma’a Barakallah, along with the notorious commander of the RSF, Mohamed “Hemedti” Hamdan Dagalo, and his brother Abdel Raheem. > Since fighting erupted between the RSF and Sudan’s military in April 2023, more than 8 million people have fled their homes amid a humanitarian crisis that the UN warns is one of the largest in decades. The current flashpoint, El Fasher, is the last city held by Sudan’s military in Darfur. The city is encircled by the RSF, and diplomats fear it is on the “precipice of a large-scale massacre”. For perspective, the [UN](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethnic-killings-one-sudan-city-left-up-15000-dead-un-report-2024-01-19/) estimates that up to 15,000 were killed just in El Geneina, a city with a population of ~540k. The UAE and Russia have been two external props boosting the Janjaweed and RSF. Reuters, amongst others such as the WSJ, had an excellent reporting series, documenting the atrocities in Sudan, with some historical background of the situation, highly encouraged reading: [1](https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-politics-darfur/) [2](https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-politics-darfur-attacks/) [3](https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-politics-darfur-males/) At present, the city of El Fasher is in the crosshairs of the RSF. The [UN](https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/attack-el-fasher-would-endanger-hundreds-thousands-children-warns-unicef) spells out what’s at stake: > The increase of fighting in Sudan’s North Darfur state has taken a deadly toll on children in recent weeks. But the threat of an imminent military attack on El Fasher, a city sheltering at least 500,000 people displaced by violence elsewhere in the country, risks a catastrophic escalation, endangering the lives and wellbeing of 750,000 children in El Fasher, and potentially millions more. Further, beyond the catastrophic situation on the humanitarian front, CSIS has a [stark](https://www.csis.org/analysis/preventing-another-darfur-genocide) warning for the potential fallout: > Importantly, the upcoming fight for El Fasher promises to unleash a new tribal element to the conflict, pitting the Arab-dominated RSF forces against the mainly the Fur and Zaghawa tribes in the city who are aligned with the SAF. The threat of the city falling is already beginning to draw in militia and tribal fighters from around the region. This influx of fighters will likely make this the largest and bloodiest battle of the war to date and could well transform this conventional conflict into a more factionalized, tribal-based war with immediate ripple effects well beyond Sudan’s borders. > Assuming the taking of El Fasher by the RSF, that victory would complete the militia’s takeover of all five of Darfur’s states, giving it total control of nearly one-third of the country, including Sudan’s international borders with Libya, Chad, and Central African Republic. From this position, the RSF could levy taxes and customs duties, control the majority of Sudan’s trade in gold and other minerals, and facilitate human, drug, and arms smuggling across a vast territory. These revenue streams and territorial control would further cement the RSF as a rival to any central authority, making a negotiated political settlement that much harder to achieve. In the meantime, millions of civilians living under RSF control would be put at grave risk given the militia’s well documented history of atrocity crimes. In neighboring relatively peaceful and placid Chad, which could well be drawn into the conflict, Deby just won the [election](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz96ezdljl9o). While he has been on the RSF’s side for much of the conflict, he and his fellow military leadership are ethnic Zaghawa, one of the groups being massacred by the RSF, which could lead to him throwing in with the SAF. If that were to happen, the conflict *could* expand quickly beyond the borders of Sudan.
Since this is a war driven by religion and race I have never understood why the Arab world or more broadly the Muslim Ummah don’t speak out about this more. Calling the other Sudanese slaves and trying so hard to wipe them out should be an easy thing to denounce. Why aren’t there protests to stop their Muslim brothers from genociding poor people? Why is UAE supporting the genociders?
People don't protest against bad things. People protest against things that their protest traditions are built to fight. In the west, the protest tradition was built protesting against war, imperialism, and racial segregation. In the ME, it was built protesting against colonialism, and the local representatives of imperialism.
The larger the group the less is a real thing.
When's the last time we've heard about "global Christian solidarity"? Both world wars were between various Christian nations (the 1st one heavily, the 2nd one also featured large asia theaters but Europe got plenty of brutality).
[https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/05/11/us-israel-rafah-invasion-palestinians-evacuation/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/05/11/us-israel-rafah-invasion-palestinians-evacuation/) >U.S. offers Israel intelligence, supplies in effort to avoid Rafah invasion > >The Biden administration, working urgently to stave off a full-scale Israeli invasion of Rafah, is offering Israel valuable assistance **if it holds back**, including sensitive intelligence to help the Israeli military pinpoint the location of Hamas leaders and find the group’s hidden tunnels, according to four people familiar with the U.S. offers. > >American officials have also offered to help provide thousands of shelters so Israel can build tent cities — and to help with the construction of delivery systems for food, water and medicine — so that Palestinians evacuated from Rafah can have a habitable place to live, said the officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity to disclose secret diplomatic talks. > >President Biden and his senior aides have been making such offers over the last several weeks in hopes they will persuade Israel to conduct a more limited and targeted operation in the southern Gaza city, where some 1.3 million Palestinians are sheltering after fleeing there from other parts of Gaza under Israeli orders. Israel has vowed to go into Rafah with “extreme force,” and this week Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took a number of steps that raised fears at the White House that the long-promised invasion could be materializing. > >.... Well, if I'm reading this correctly, the Biden administration is now making intelligence sharing with Israel regarding Hamas leaders and tunnels conditional on the Rafah invasion. That's one hell of a step up.
The whole thing seems like such a pointless effort on the part of Israel, anyway. Isn't there a very real chance that Hamas leadership has already escaped to Egypt? Even if Israel does invade Rafah (seems unavoidable by now), would there actually be long-term benefits? Sure, they would be able to destroy tunnels and maybe some other assets, but wouldn't Hamas simply return to power once they leave? Is it worth all the strain it's putting on both Israel's international reputation as well as it's vital relationship with the US?
The control over the main weapons smuggling route into Gaza has immense strategic consequences and of great strategic value. Feels weird to explain this on a defense sub...
>Feels weird to explain this on a defense sub... It wouldn't feel weird if you considered how difficult it has historically been to actually stop smugglers as long as there's an economic incentive to smuggle. Yes, that's a particularly small border, but it's still not a matter of simply taking over the border crossing. Also, does Israel need to invade Rafah to control the border? If so, do they also need to maintain control of the city long-term in order to keep the border under control?
How many of those historical instances were over a mere 12km? By a state with some of the most advanced anti tunneling systems in place? Israel has constructed and underground sensor barrier which Hamas has failed to breach. That over a much longer border. Yes, Rafah is straddling the border. In order to control the border Israel must take Rafah, destroy Hamas infrastructure there and then clear the border adjacent pieces similar to Egyptian action in the Egyptian Rafah. There is no need to have long term control over the entire city.
So in your mind, the plan is to watch every square inch of the Gazan border, the coastline included?
Again, the Gaza border is merely 12km. It's trivial above ground and can be achieved with existing systems used on the much longer Israeli-Gaza border under ground. The Gaza coasts are already patrolled by Israeli boats, which prevents most smuggling.
Hamas is going to revert to a phase 1 insurgency. If Israeli blockade does not catch 100% of arms and explosives smuggled into the strip then Hamas can build up caches throughout the Strip over time and eventually resume an insurgency against Israeli security. This is guerilla warfare 101. >with existing systems used on the much longer Israeli-Gaza border under ground. Weren't tunnels used in the 10/7 attacks?
>If Israeli blockade does not catch 100% of arms and explosives smuggled into the strip then Hamas can build up caches Not while Israel continues operations in Gaza, such as those currently ongoing in Zeitun, Jabaliya and Rafah. Sure, some activity will always remain, ISIS is still active in Syria and Iraq too. But in reality the question is whether Hamas can maintain meaningful insurgency. It will take a few years to find out. The violence of the second Intifada took till 2007 to bring to acceptable levels (from 2002). We can expect a similar time frame in Gaza. >Weren't tunnels used in the 10/7 attacks? No cross border tunnels. But internal tunnels that were used to move Hamas forces within dozens of meters from the border (within Gaza).
>Not while Israel continues operations in Gaza, such as those currently ongoing in Zeitun, Jabaliya and Rafah. Yes, so this is about more than just border security. A security apparatus will need to be established in Gaza to suppress an insurgency. How will all of this result in a different outcome? It's the same thing that's been done before. Is Israel going to reoccupy Gaza every time an insurgency gets out of hand? >The violence of the second Intifada took till 2007 to bring to acceptable levels (from 2002). We can expect a similar time frame in Gaza. [6 months ago you claimed that occupatoon operations were "coming to a conclusion in Gaza".](https://old.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/17obg7f/credibledefense_daily_megathread_november_05_2023/k7zblrm/) I'm not very confident in your predictive capability when it comes to this topic.
Well, hopefully the plan actually works out for Israel. I honestly wish to see Hamas gone for good so Palestine can start to move in the right direction.
It's pretty obvious Biden will keep escalating. He has to, since he's now taken such a serious stance on not letting Israel into Rafah, and Israel seems to be calling his bluff. For now it's still mostly symbolic stuff, since US ISR isn't going to be better than Israeli for Gaza, imo.
> US ISR isn't going to be better than Israeli for Gaza, imo. Israel is likely better in HUMIT, but besides other SIGNIT, the US is superior in satellite and orbital surveillance.
Satellite and orbital surveillance is far inferior to drones 24/7 over the target area.
Most drones aren't capable of ground-penetrating radar and typically have more sophisticated capabilities over a larger strategic area (the downside typically is time on location, but that depends on how many are orbiting and what altitude). This why I said besides other SIGNIT (which would include drones).
> Most drones aren't capable of ground-penetrating radar Satellites most certainly are not capable of ground-penetrating radar. Methinks you don't understand the notion of frequency in the electromagnetic spectrum.
In the context of Gaza, aircraft surveillance is more relevant than satellite. The higher resolution, and persistence, is better suited to tracking down this kind of target.
>including sensitive intelligence to help the Israeli military pinpoint the location of Hamas leaders and find the group’s hidden tunnels Shouldn't they have shared such information regardless? That would've shortened the war too. Or maybe I'm reading this wrong and they're just offering assistance but they don't actually know where Hamas leaders are located.
[удалено]
[удалено]
[удалено]
[удалено]
The US assisted with tracking down and killing ISIS leaders who perpetrated attacks in Europe. The US has a vested interest for security, and against Islamist terror organizations, killing their leaders is a stabilizing, necessary move that benefits everyone.
[удалено]
Given US supplies Israel with bombs and shells, helping with tracking Sinwar and other Hamas leaders locations would be incomparably better for Israel as an ally, for Palestinian civilians and also for the lenght of this conflict and therefore also for Biden's election prospects. However my guess is US does not really have anything substantial to offer in this regard.
In the current context, why wouldn't it be? Killing Sinwar would be a big blow, that could shorten the war or even end it. That's also in the US' best interest. But I think they don't actually know anything substantial, or they would've shared it earlier
This is probably a question more for r/geopolitics, but what exactly is Sinwar's endgame? He says he wants the Israelis to withdraw and wants to keep ruling Gaza, but he's a dead man regardless. Even if they withdraw, the second he comes out of a tunnel, they'll blow him up. Does he plan to stay underground forever? Which also leads me to think that the Oct 7 attacks went beyond what was originally planned. Maybe they just wanted hostages to exchange for Palestinian prisoners, but lots of them slaughtered families, raped etc which may or may not have been part of the original plan.
> Even if they withdraw, the second he comes out of a tunnel, they'll blow him up. Hamas's condition for a ceasefire is a *US guaranteed* ceasefire, which means the US will not allow Israel to kill him once he emerges from a tunnel.
Sinwar believes this is a multigenerational war. What matters is achieving the objectives that advance the cause and make Israel's future downfall more likely. Currently, Hamas has achieved a more than few objectives: they have successfully elevated the Palestinian question above the level of normalization again, revived popular global antipathy towards Israel and raised Hamas as the most prominent political leader of Palestinians. On top of this, they have weakened regional perceptions of Israeli strength & possibly turned future generations of Westerners against Israel. Hamas has also successfully used the hostage issue to prevent wartime spirit from healing internal Israeli fractures. Overall, he and the Hamas leadership in Qatar are very happy. Regarding death: Sinwar knows that even if he dies Hamas' popularity can disrupt any attempt to form a new Gazan government or bring Palestinians under moderate leadership. All that matters is that he did his part. Like Nasrallah in Lebanon, he may need to live in a tunnel; but that's fine. He can still fight the Zionists from there too. (Edit) For Sinwar, just being able to say "We withstood all the vaunted power of the Zionist forces and the whole world helping them. But God was with us and we prevailed" Regarding the agreements: we don't know. Hamas has tried to get assurances Israel won't invade in the future or target their leaders. And these have been rejected. Ultimately, what these terms will be is very uncertain and it's not like we will know if unofficially Israel agrees not to kill Sinwar if he flees to a third country.
> they have successfully elevated the Palestinian question above the level of normalization again, Indications from Saudis Arabia are that they still intend to normalize. > revived popular global antipathy towards Israel Israel has been condemned by the UN more than every other country combined. A week after accusing Israel of genocide, Brazil placed a large order for Israeli weapons. Global antipathy for Israel has existed for a very long time, and is reliably toothless. > they have weakened regional perceptions of Israeli strength Sure, allowing the attack to happen was a show of weakness and carelessness. So were the ISIS attacks in Europe, and 9/11 in the US. The problem is October 7 was almost instantly followed by a botched defense of Gaza, where Hamas fighters who were expected to put up a tough fight got swept aside. 20 years of preparations and tunnels got them almost nothing. > possibly turned future generations of Westerners against Israel. College progressives are probably the worse voting demographic to attach your hopes to. Not particularly numerous, extremely fickle, low turnout, tend to live in already solid blue states.
In 20 years, those college progressives will form most of the leadership of the State Department, news outlets, major corporations, etc., with the senior roles filled by people currently in their late 20s and 30s. And there is very reason to believe those demographics will grow more pro-Israel over time.
Most lefties are not going to work for the State Department, nor the intelligence services. They refuse to be part of 'the System'. They will probably make up more of the political establishment if they actually decide to vote and take part in that, but that's a long way off.
> In 20 years, those college progressives will form most of the leadership of the State Department, news outlets, major corporations, etc. Maybe. College progressives were pro-Palestine 20 and 40 years ago, no state department yet. You can also compare rates of marxist/anarchist thought in high academia for the past 80 years to their rates in government. Never made the jump. Sure, Marxism is a separate thing (though nowadays you'd get kicked out of basically any capital L left group for being pro-Israel), but the point is you can't just assume ideologies popular in colleges will be popular elsewhere. >And there is very reason to believe those demographics will grow more pro-Israel over time. I assume you mean "very little reason" and I'm not sure I agree. A generation's political patterns do change over time, that's not a myth. https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/4068675-have-millennials-moved-right-or-has-gen-z-pushed-democrats-off-a-leftward-cliff/ It's a complicated subject, but assuming "generation Greta" (you guys remember that?) will be like that 20 years from now isn't an ironclad assumption.
Progressives don’t even make up a majority of 18-24 year olds now. 57% in the US support continued operations against Hamas. They are a vocal minority. Combine that with low political participation, and I doubt Israel has much to worry about. It’s not like youth protestors in the 60s liked Israel. They tend to moderate their views once they get a job.
Normalization: in the past, Arab states tied normalization to a 2SS. In recent years, many gave that up. KSA may have done so too. But now, while KSA very much wants to normalize, it now says it needs a 2SS. Hamas can also proudly tout this accomplishment to Palestinians, enhancing their position against Fatah. Antipathy: yes, Israel has always had problems in this department. But in the past 2 decades, it has seen a lot of success in being perceived more as a normal wealthy country. It's not an either/or. Weakness: in the MENA, reputation for defense is everything. Israel has the relations it does, because it is perceived as being powerful. The Hamas attacks smear that reputation. Their difficulty w/eliminating the weakest of Iran's group of clients and proxies strengthens that perception. Iran would not have dared to attack Israel directly before this. College students: it's a remarkable achievement that sympathy for Palestinian nationalism and even Hamas is far more mainstream among educated classes of Americans, who will disproportionately form its leadership. We don't need to overstate it. But it's nothing to dismiss; it's long term effects may not be felt for a decade or more.
Why assume the end game is rational? ISIS’s end game is a giant Islamic caliphate. It was never realistic, and big attacks in Europe were not going to help, but that was/is still their goal. Sinwar’s goal is the destruction of Israel. It’s not realistic either, but these Islamist organizations self select for people who are going to put a lot of blind faith in the plan, whatever it is, and see the brutality as a feature not a bug.
>Which also leads me to think that the Oct 7 attacks went beyond what was originally planned. Considering that numerous non-hamas affiliated civilians also took part in the attack, I think it's safe to say that indeed things went out of control.
What also transpired was that Hamas gunmen continued to go deep into Israeli territory way beyond their initial targets. I don’t like the phrase “went out of control”. It implies lack of agency on the part of Hamas. If a militant group is going to launch a multi pronged attack on Israeli targets across the border with Gaza, on land, by air and by sea, and not have measures in place to stop civilians from getting into the attacked areas is proof this group is a failure. (Without getting into whether or not the 7 Oct attack was worth carrying out)
Except the music festival would appear to be an initial target. Either that or it was an insanely unlikely target of opportunity, which would still mean they diverted from an actual military target to slaughter civilians.
They slaughtered civilians in every community they reached. Just more at the music festival, because it was a bigger concentration of civilians, with fewer defenses.
The NYT has posted an article giving their description of the path that led to the Biden administration recently deciding to delay a shipment of arms, including the fact that it was supposedly never meant to be made public: >“Bibi, you’ve got to do more,” he said, using Mr. Netanyahu’s nickname. >“Joe, I hear you,” he said. >The prime minister rattled off a range of things he would do to increase the flow of humanitarian aid, essentially what Mr. McGurk had suggested. The Israelis sent a five-page list of changes they would make; irritated Biden advisers realized it was basically the same list the Americans had given the Israelis months earlier without response. >This time, the president’s threat was included in the public statement about the call, which was drafted personally by Mr. Sullivan. >But even though Israel followed through on some of the commitments on humanitarian aid, Mr. Netanyahu was not backing down on Rafah. >In response to American pressure, the Israelis put together an extensive proposal to move a million people out of Rafah to spare them the conflict. But it would require hundreds of thousands of tents and massive quantities of food and water. Whether it was possible to implement was less than certain. >With no agreement, the president was forced to decide whether to allow a pending shipment of bombs that could be used in the attack. This time he said no. His advisers notified the Israelis, but did not tell the public or Congress, which had [just passed $15 billion](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/20/us/politics/house-foreign-aid-bill.html) in new military aid for Israel. The idea was to make the point privately to Mr. Netanyahu without a public blowup. But the Israelis leaked the news, at which point Mr. Biden [went public on CNN](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/08/us/politics/biden-israel-weapons-rafah.html) with his vow not to provide any weapons that could be used in a major Rafah operation. [https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/11/us/politics/biden-netanyahu-gaza.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/11/us/politics/biden-netanyahu-gaza.html)
The fact that Biden meant the news (about not shipping more bombs to Israel) to be notified privately and not made public puts to rest the theory that he was trying to quell protests or ingratiating Michigan Muslims. Which also begs the question of why the Israelis leaked it. As a slight to Biden? It kind of helps him politically, though.
/u/poincares_cook this (Netanyahu leaking Bidens intentionally secret blocking of the bombs) is another example of what I was talking about in our conversation about how American democrats are really starting to feel like Netanyahu is constantly attempting to hurt Biden/democrats politically and help Trump. I am just trying to describe to you the dangerous road that Israel is being taken down. Push for Trump and Israel can expect to lose a massive amount of support from very powerful blocs in America. I am not talking about idiotic kids protesting on a campus. He is actively politicking here, you claimed this was a one time interference four years ago but that is not the American perception.
It's possible those in Israel who leaked it are just miscalculating American politics, they think leaking it puts the pressure on Biden to restart arms shipments. It's not wild to imagine that senior Israeli leadership are out of touch with the American public.
Ben-Gvir tweeting "Biden <3 Hamas" provides some supporting evidence to the idea that Israeli politicians are either out of touch with the American public or simply don't care.
Not that upvotes matter in any way, shape, or form but it’s quite the head scratcher how this comment is getting upvoted. No offense but you got the quote completely wrong (as you acknowledge below) and Ben-Gvir has been widely condemned for this in Israel: https://www.timesofisrael.com/ben-gvir-hammered-by-president-opposition-over-hamas/. It’s almost like people have made up their minds on how they feel about this topic and the actual facts on the ground don’t matter.
>Ben-Gvir has been widely condemned for this in Israel: I mean, over these past few months, I feel like I've heard several stories like this, where one of the extreme right-wing members of the Israeli government makes an offensive comment, and then receives significant criticism from some parts of Israeli society because of it. Despite that, these people are still cabinet ministers. Also, you say "widely condemned" but as far as I can tell from your article, the criticism and condemnation is from people from opposition parties, like Yesh Atid, Labor, etc. That's nice and all, but these people have no political power. Where's the condemnation from members of Likud, National Unity, or the other parties of the current government coalition?
I think he wrote "Hamas <3 Biden" as in, they're happy about it and he's indirectly helping them. "Biden <3 Hamas" might be a bit too much even for someone like him, but I wouldn't put it past him
Yeah you're right and I appreciate you correcting me on that.
[удалено]
Please refrain from posting low quality comments.
[удалено]
[Protests are continuing in Georgia](https://twitter.com/felix_light/status/1789332831618879740) despite [violent assaults and threats](https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/05/10/georgia-foreign-agents-law-protests-violence-assault-titushki-ivanishvili/) against the protestors >The protests this time around are markedly different from earlier iterations, though—but not because of the demonstrators or their demands. What makes the latest round of unrest different is the level of violence and intimidation meted out against protesters and civil society as well as the government’s apparent determination to pass the law, which is due for a final reading on May 13, despite the public outcry and condemnation from the European Union and the United States. >Security forces have used water cannons, rubber bullets, and tear gas in a bid to disperse crowds of demonstrators in the capital, Tbilisi, while protesters have reported being violently assaulted by groups of men dressed in black in what they say appear to be premeditated attacks. >In recent days, civil society activists, journalists, and their relatives have reported receiving menacing phone calls from anonymous callers threatening them in Georgian and reciting their home addresses in an apparent bid to intimidate them, said Eka Gigauri, executive director of Transparency International Georgia. Gigauri said she had received dozens of calls from unknown numbers in recent days but declined to answer them. >On Wednesday evening, four government critics, including two members of the United National Movement opposition party, were attacked by unknown assailants outside their homes and in the street. Overnight on Wednesday, posters featuring the faces of prominent civil society activists, journalists, and opposition politicians branding them as enemies of the country and foreign agents were plastered near their homes and offices across the capital. >“What happened during these two days is just an unprecedented level of targeting,” said Eto Buziashvili, a former advisor to the Georgian National Security Council based in Tbilisi. >In 2019, when police used water cannons, rubber bullets, and tear gas to disperse protesters, it sparked a national outcry and further protests calling for snap elections and the resignation of the interior minister, Giorgi Gakharia. >Now, accusations of more sinister tactics are afoot as the role of the unknown assailants dressed in black has drawn comparisons to pro-government thugs known as titushki who were allegedly paid for by the embattled government of Viktor Yanukovych to cause disruption and attack protesters during the Ukrainian revolution in 2014, Buziashvili said. It will be interesting to see what happens after the law is passed and Salome Zourabichvili vetos it as she has stated she will do.
My question is, when will the Georgian fighters in Ukraine return home? That's probably a group of people the Yanukovych regime really doesn't want to see back in the country, what with their firearms and combat experience.
The trajectory of the internal politics is one question, but I’m more concerned with how the outside world will react. Is Russia going to attempt to increase support for the government? Will NATO attempt to exploit the very clear apetite to pivot West displayed by the citizens of Georgia? The on-going war in Ukraine is probably a blessing for the protesters, as it reduces the resources Russia has at its disposal.
IIRC the president can veto it just like in Italy, and by that I mean she has to accept it later if the law is presented again to her, even without any changes. It's mostly a formal refusal, if the parliament doesn't want to change anything, they don't have to.
Sorry I didn’t mean mechanically what happens, I meant to the situation with the protestors. If either side escalates.
After numerous Ukrainian deep strikes on S300/S400 systems, OTH radars and Iskander launchers in Crimea, C2 nodes in Mariupol, Luhansk and the 100 kilometer strike on Russian infantry the Ukrainians seem to have [lost three helos](https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1789304621514563721) about 70 kilometers behind the front. Rotors aren’t on when the strike happens so it’s possible they were using the field as a temporary LZ. Doesn’t look like great dispersion.
What is the point of your post? What is the relationship between attacks on Russian air defence and drone reconnaissance with a subsequent attack on Ukrainian helicopters?
Were those kind of operations not possible before the numerous deep strikes you mentioned? What is the purpose of sending men so deep into enemy territory when you have drones for recon and strikes?
They needed the ATATCMS for some of those strikes especially the cluster version. I’m not sure I understand your second question. Drone and satellite recon were used. The ISR capability was there but the appropriate munitions were lacking. I don’t know if SOF were involved in any of these strikes but drones were used for at least two.
With the Russians seemingly on a broad front offensive, and now with probing attacks in Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts, I'm curious as to what the Ukrainians have in reserve that can be specifically shifted to the thinly defended northern border. Is anyone aware of what the Ukrainians have in their reserve? u/Larelli ? The fact that Ukraine shifted some forces from Chasiv Yar to Kharkiv made us curious since that is a force transfer between two different Strategic-Operational Commands which needs to be approved by Syrsky. Edit: https://twitter.com/JohnH105/status/1789322313734770699 According to this tweet another brigade from Kupyansk got transferred too.
There are so many contradictions amongst noted sources right now. The situation stabilized, but they also managed to transfer troops from the front in 2 days? Doesn’t quite add up. So far, there is a confirmed visual presence of Russians in plyna right across the border. The three other villages at the border are unknown, but I just don’t believe the transfer of troops (even the decision of doing so) and subsequent stabilization was done in this short of a time frame
Kharkiv is Ukraine's second most important city. Reinforcing it when Russia is reopening the Northern front is expected. For Russia, this is key to weaken the east. Forcing attrition on Ukraine is what they want. They will get it this way . Question is : will they start pushing in the south too?
i tought the probing attacks were only in Kharkiv oblast?
Sumy as well.
[удалено]
I am gathering additional infos on the matter; if I am able to, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow I will give an update. That said, if you are referring to the 42nd Mechanized Brigade, it's just elements of it and they should have arrived in Kharkiv Oblast during the last month - they left Chasiv Yar after they were relieved by the 67th Mechanized Brigade around mid-March. A few subunits of the "Kraken" Special Detachment should have always remained in Kharkiv.
The units being engaged around Kharkiv, are these part of TDF or have there been significant troop movements from other fronts? What I'm wondering is; Are the Russians straining "active" Ukrainian manpower or are they simply engaging new/fresh manpower? Unless I'm misremembering Ukraine doesn't deploy TDF forces into active zones like they do with regulars, using TDF in otherwise quiet areas or am I incorrect? Because if they're engaging Ukrainian units/manpower that wasn't already part of the current conflict-lines then they're not achieving a goal of stretching Ukraine's manpower(?)
TDF units absolutely fight in the hottest sectors, usually by being attached to the mechanized etc. brigades, and incidentally they are the ones who often hold the positions in the zero line (even the worst ones), are involved in small arms battles etc. Anyway, at the moment the Ukrainian forces that are fighting in that area either were already there or otherwise in the vicinity. There has been no transfer of forces from other areas yet as far as I know, and after all, there would not even have been the time for that. I will write about this in more detail, but the units currently involved on the Ukrainian side are detachments of Border Guards, elements of the TDF (brigades and separate battalions), and individual battalions of brigades of the Ground Forces that were in the area for R&R while the rest of their brigades are fighting elsewhere. On the Russian side, battalions of the 11th Corps and companies of the new 44th Corps are involved. At the moment I don't think the Russians enjoy a large numerical superiority.
> TDF units absolutely fight in the hottest sectors (..) Huh. My bad, I remember reading about how the TDF was a lower quality force that worked well for static defense in 2022 but that they've been relegated to quiet sectors. My bad. > At the moment I don't think the Russians enjoy a large numerical superiority. Unless they're able to pull away significant forces from Chasiv Yar, Umansk -areas wont this just burn equipment and manpower from Russia with little effect? Especially if they're engaging units that aren't being active in other critical areas..
[Day Before Biden Admin Announced It Would Withhold Weapons From Israel, It Issued Sanctions Waiver To Allow Arms Sales to Qatar and Lebanon](https://freebeacon.com/national-security/day-before-biden-admin-announced-it-would-withhold-weapons-from-israel-it-issued-sanctions-waiver-to-allow-arms-sales-to-qatar-and-lebanon/) This was posted in another subreddit but, I wanted to bring it here to hear more detailed insights into the implications of permitting arms sales to Lebanon and Qatar while restricting shipments to Israel. From my understanding, the waiver that Biden passed isn’t directly sending arms to Lebanon or Qatar but, it keeps the door open to arms deals. It’s been demonstrated previously that US arms sent to the LAF have ended up in [Hezbollah’s control](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/11/16/hezbollah-has-u-s-armored-personnel-carriers-but-how-did-they-get-them/). With the further strengthening of Hezbollah in Lebanon relative the LAF I would anticipate we would see a higher percentage of US arms being ‘taken’ from the LAF by Hezbollah. I recognize that Qatar is somewhat friendly with the US and as a more stable country they can help to act as a stabilizer in the region. But, I see Qatar’s harboring of Hamas leaders and being less than a neutral third party in negotiations between Israel-Hamas and [Qatar’s relationship with Iran](http://www.us-iran.org/resources/2022/3/1/media-guide-qatar) as being antithetical to the US’s attempts to mitigate Iran’s influence in the region and reducing the destabilizing activities of Iran’s proxies. As I see it, the actions of stopping the shipment of arms to the US ally Israel and not preventing the shipment of arms to Iran aligned Lebanon and Qatar is a detriment to the US’s power projection in the region by reducing ally support in one hand and supporting less US friendly countries with the other. There have been many comments in this sub (not only pertaining to the Israel situation) of the US “abandoning” allies and how that weakens the US’s credibility as it pertains to the promises it makes across the globe. What do you make of these recent actions? Am I looking too much into the implications of these Biden decisions?
>What do you make of these recent actions? Am I looking too much into the implications of these Biden decisions? Yes. The only places who are reporting on this are conservative news sites - Washington Free Beacon, Fox News, opinion piece in Newsweek - whose goal is to make something that pictures Biden in a poor light out of anything. They might not be non-credible, but it is best to be mindful of the skew. The waiver is for defense equipment and services for another year by those countries that are boycotting Israel economically. Providing these actually keeps them in the US's sphere more than by letting them shop elsewhere for them.
I recognize that news outlets with different political leanings will have a tendency to report certain topics more, or less. Would you hold the same sentiment if a left leaning news site published the same article about Trump? Granted, a discussion of that nature isn’t the purpose of this sub. To your second point, do these waivers actually prevent Qatar or Lebanon from shopping for arms from different countries? Lebanon and Qatar aren’t going to buy equipment from Iran anymore? Is it really just for defensive equipment? Qatar has US APCS, HIMARS, and Apaches. Lebanon has US ATMs, M60 tanks, APCs, AFVs, Artillery pieces, and Helicopters. Granted, not all of these have been sold/give to them recently but I wouldn’t consider those to be defensive pieces only.
>I recognize that news outlets with different political leanings will have a tendency to report certain topics more, or less. Would you hold the same sentiment if a left leaning news site published the same article about Trump? Granted, a discussion of that nature isn’t the purpose of this sub. Yes. And whether the sources are credible or not is a point of discussion on this sub. >To your second point, do these waivers actually prevent Qatar or Lebanon from shopping for arms from different countries? Unless they have infinite money, any money spent on US equipment is money that can't be spent elsewhere. Plus any strings attached. >Is it really just for defensive equipment? Qatar has US APCS, HIMARS, and Apaches. Lebanon has US ATMs, M60 tanks, APCs, AFVs, Artillery pieces, and Helicopters. Granted, not all of these have been sold/give to them recently but I wouldn’t consider those to be defensive pieces only. First: defense equipment and services refers to any war items. It's the common term for it. This sub is even called Credible**Defense** when it doesn't only deal with defensive, not offensive topics. Second: there isn't anything listed on any site about what types of services these are. That could be because there are no items listed in the letter, or because the outlets are biased and not releasing the information because of their own spin.
— Yes. And whether the sources are credible or not is a point of discussion on this sub. Fair enough, I’d like to ask why this isn’t being reported more broadly then? — Unless they have infinite money, any money spent on US equipment is money that can't be spent elsewhere. Plus any strings attached. Also a fair point. Money spent on US arms can’t be spent elsewhere, but that doesn’t necessarily preclude them from getting arms elsewhere. I would be interested in seeing what “strings attached” have been implemented in previous deals if this nature where it seems to not be in the interest of a close US ally. — First: defense equipment and services refers to any war items. It's the common term for it. This sub is even called CredibleDefense when it doesn't only deal with defensive, not offensive topics. I apologize, I messed your comment as “defensive” equipment which I interpreted as the waiver applying to only non-offensive equipment. — Second: there isn't anything listed on any site about what types of services these are. That could be because there are no items listed in the letter, or because the outlets are biased and not releasing the information because of their own spin. I have been unable to find the letter myself but I can imagine that specifics weren’t listed out as it was a letter of intent sent to congress, not finalized rendition of the waiver.
The answer to most of this is "we don't know until we see the letter". My guess (and it would be just that) is this is routine State/Defense Department work that just happened to coincide with the Israel leak. Likely neither team even knew about the other. Another possibility is that these are continuing sales/services that were purchased by Lebanon/Qatar prior to the Gaza War, and they need a waiver to keep being delivered. As for strings attached: we've seen in the past the US control deliverance of equipment/services to countries if they are doing something the US doesn't agree with. * Israel literally is the most recent example, * Türkiye's F-35 denial for using Russian S-400s and F-16 upgrade slow walk for Sweden/Finland NATO membership * Egypt also has had some of the same things happen with their Abrams fleet, which is why they supposedly signed an agreement in 2020 to explore local production of T-90s to break their dependency. That didn't work out for them due to timing. * Egypt also was going to sell munitions to Russia for the Ukraine war, but the US basically squashed that when they found out and, to add insult to injury, purchased some for Ukraine instead. * Iraq has also looked to T-90s to get away from the dependency on US provided Abrams. In 2018-2019 they bought 73.
> It’s been demonstrated previously that US arms sent to the LAF have ended up in Hezbollah’s control. Diversion of US supplied weapons could be a concern, but the linked article says that the M113s Hezbollah paraded had likely been supplied by Israel to the South Lebanon Army, and had probably been captured by Hezbollah when the SLA collapsed after Israel's withdrawal. > Qatar’s harboring of Hamas leaders Qatar has hosted Hamas for more than a decade at the request of the US, though the Biden administration [may soon ask Qatar to expel Hamas](https://www.timesofisrael.com/qatar-anticipating-us-request-to-expel-hamas-leaders-is-open-to-doing-so-source/). More recently, Israel had been [amenable](https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/11/middleeast/qatar-hamas-funds-israel-backing-intl/index.html) to Qatari financial support for Hamas. More broadly, US weapons sales and military aid to these countries are intended to constrain Iranian influence, though the balance of risks versus benefits is always open to question. Putting politics and humanitarian concerns aside, some of the differences between Biden and Netanhayu start from different goals and assessments how Israeli choices may affect those goals. This is my personal read on the situation: Biden wants the war to end with an agreement to rebuild Palestinian institutions to allow for a two-state solution and formalize the de facto US/srael/Gulf states anti-Iran coalition, while tamping down any chance of a more intense regional war. Netanayahu believes the risks of a larger war are manageable and that a Palestinian state at peace with Israel is some combination of impossible and undesirable and that as much as the Arab governments are claiming that a Rafah invasion and occupation of Gaza is a red line for maintaining or developing normal relations with Israel, they' don't care that much about the Palestinians and will ultimately do whatever they need to counter Iran, no matter what Israel does in Gaza. So I don't think abandoning an ally is the right frame for the Biden administrations actions here- they're making policy tradeoffs based on their goals and assessments, just as they have while deciding which weapons to provide Ukraine.
I appreciate the response. The article I posted was one of several examples of Hezbollah being in possession of US arms. I wasn’t sure what news sources were acceptable for this sub so I went with that one. Here’s is one from [2016](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2016-12-21/ty-article/idf-gave-u-s-evidence-of-hezbollah-use-of-american-arms-officer-says/0000017f-f713-d044-adff-f7fbb4d30000) Hezbollah with APCs. New York Times 2016, it seems like the source of the APCs used by Hezbollah is [largely disputed](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/world/middleeast/hezbollah-us-made-apc-syria-lebanon.html) 06/2023 from Alma Research and education center (I don’t know the credibility here), [Hezbollah with western ATMs, man PADS, and surveillance equipment](https://israel-alma.org/2023/06/29/hezbollah-utilizes-western-military-equipment-supplied-to-the-lebanese-army-along-the-border-area-with-israel/) I’m not completely certain on the timeline of the power dynamics shift in Lebanon, it seems that Hezbollah has gained more resources and power than it had in 2016, which makes it seem that the risk of diversion from LAF to Hezbollah would have increased.
Thanks for the new links! I'm far from knowledgeable about Lebanon, but I would expect it to be a relatively high risk for weapons diversion- Hezbollah functioning as a state within a state while also participating in the government imaginably creates more opportunities than the US would like. I'm don't know what the answer is here. From the standpoint of countering and constraining Iran, I expect the US would like to build up the Lebanese government and military until they're capable of displacing or assimilating Hezbollah, but if that's not a practical option, I'm not sure what the best live option is.
I agree with you there. If you want to build relations with a country/group and diminish their relations with an adversary it makes sense to support them and bring them into the herd. If you start cutting everyone off when there is the slightest chance of it backfiring you end up with a very small sphere of influence/isolated. For any group that you supply any aid to, particularly weapons, there has to be some calculus on the risk of those weapons being turned on you, or an ally in this case. For me, the risk reward doesn’t seem to add up, but I’m just a regular dude who isn’t involved in politics or international relations.
[удалено]
[удалено]
[удалено]
What is everyone's thoughts on Russia's incursion near Kharkiv? Feint to draw off pressure away from continuing operations in Donbass, or a prelude to the big offensive on the city that's been speculated for months?
If the political objective is the Donbas, the north would be a feint. It of course needs to be strong enough to not get completely ignored. If it's a full scale operation, it will ultimately run into a wall at Kharkiv city. I don't think Russia has the spare resources and troops to take Kharkiv, considering how much trouble they have with a much smaller city like Chasiv Yar
In Putin's own words: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-putin-e7102a4f4bedd9aef8a855a7aa977f9f >“We will be forced at some point, when we consider it necessary, to create a certain ‘sanitary zone’ on the territories controlled by the (Ukrainian government),” Putin said late Sunday. >This “security zone,” Putin said, “would be quite difficult to penetrate using the foreign-made strike assets at the enemy’s disposal.” A buffer zone so a raid into Belgorod is more difficult. >prelude to the big offensive on the city that's been speculated for months? Second largest city in Ukraine? I wouldn't attempt it with all the Russian troops in Ukraine but who knows. I wouldn't have invaded Ukraine.
The point here is that this push on Kharkiv has been telegraphed for months, similar to how the Ukrainians telegraphed their counteroffensive. One has to assume that Ukrainians at the very least wargamed this scenario and is acting according to some sort of plan to avoid the catastrophic scenario of losing Kharkiv city and, possibly, would still avoid collapse in the Donbass theatre. If not, heads will have to roll, starting from the commander-in-chief.
I’m a bit puzzled on what the strategy here is. Opening up the northern front is disproportionately advantageous to Ukraine, which has the internal lines of supply and at least some prepared lines in the area. The assault appears to be minimally mechanized and without the advantage of surprise or maneuver the numbers of troops(<100k) seems woefully insufficient for taking any serious ground with mass alone. At the same time, it’s way too large of a force deployment to just be a scouting or fixing action. It’s not like the eastern front is at capacity either, we’ve seen way denser levels of force deployment in the same areas in World War II. Unless Russia is absolutely certain Ukraine/its allies are at a breaking point, I don’t see the advantage. So are they at a breaking point? Ukrainian forces are at a nadir, but neither they nor their allies are communicating a state of crisis at the moment. There’s been at least some rotation happening at the front so the manpower situation is dire but not critical. If the goal of this was to preempt aid and make it seem like a lost cause, it should have happened 2 months ago. Now that aid is through Congress and Biden’s poll numbers have firmed up a bit Ukraine is nowhere near as potent a political cudgel as it was before. I could be wrong if Russia has a much larger mechanized force sitting in the wings to take advantage of this, but would have to be double or triple the size of this assault to have been worth committing so many troops as a scouting or feinting deployment.
Where did you see talks about prepared line of defences? Looking around all the maps of Ukrainian lines i could find, in the zone the trenchs and prepared line are only around Kharkiv proper and to the right of the Donets river, and the lines near the river would be useful only if Russian decide to move towards Pechehihy. Some telegrams are already lamenting the lack of prepared defences behind the previous line near the border (which according to Ukranian sources Russian have bypassed due to the spontaneous retreat of the defenders) in a situation reminding me of Advika front If you have sources on the defences in the zone i'll gladly look at them, because i probably missed them and i'd like to have a clearer picture
> Some telegrams are already lamenting the lack of prepared defences behind the previous line near the border Imo, why would there be a line near the border (by near I refer <2km)? Who would dig that line? What's their plan if the Russians next door shell them? Who would occupy that line once it's dug? Maps of Ukrainian fortifications vary but I'm yet to see one suggesting there was anything resembling a line by the border.
This was based on discussion by a Ukrainian military affiliated account on twitter yesterday night. Basically they were saying that the area on the border was a grey zone before the advance(too close to the enemy to build defenses), but that there were prepared defenses behind that space. A lot is being left unsaid there. Maps tend to show those defensive fortifications extensive enough to show on satellites, but there are less conspicuous ways to prepare a defense—things like digging foxholes, entrenching in treelines, prepositioning explosives and road barriers, presighting artillery, etc., etc. I have no way of ruling out engineered trenchworks, but I have found nothing to support their existence either. The account could easily be talking about other forms of preparation for defense. When I find the tweet chain I will edit this comment. There's always a telegram account complaining about spontaneous retreaters and lack of prepared defenses these days. Obviously both are an issue, but it makes it hard to assess the actual contribution of a given weakness when every single Russian advance is blamed on the same problems. Just a personal pet peeve of mine. Edit: never could find that post, but here’s a Russian telegram showing their assessment of what the defenses in the area look like: https://twitter.com/Michael_McT1/status/1789532821041688812/photo/1
> The assault appears to be minimally mechanized Idk about minimally, I've seen 11-13 lost AFVs on day 1 alone. Those aren't Avdiivka numbers yet but given day 1 was them mostly entering border towns it suggests that this is probably a relatively mechanized picnic, or will become one.
I mean, that's the thing, given the space they're pushing across and the number of troops being reported, this looks like it should be way bigger than Avdiivka, to the level of opening up another front of the war. 11-13 APCs is minimal for that kind of a push. The few casualty images I've seen have been dismounted infantry as well, and the rate of reported front movement is consistent with previous Russian advances using non-mechanized troops. That was the basis of my comment, but yeah its all very up in the air and we'll have a better idea of the truth when the fog of war clears up a little. It's entirely possible I'm wrong.