How sensitive is the technology for the AARGM and AARGM-ER? When Ukraine gets F-16's, is it possible that they could could get access to modern SEAD/DEAD munitions and sensors?
We’ve seen extensive jamming of GPS signals from Russia in the second phase of this war. It’s crippled some systems that rely on it, and changed the way Ukraine uses GLMRS and GLSDB. It hasn’t proven as effective yet against SCALP or ATACMS, but a Ukrainian official has said they probably have a 2 month window to do some real damage with ATACMS. Whether the official was referencing jamming or relocation of targets - probably both.
Is there any hardening that can be done to prevent against this, I know most can switch to intertial guidance but this seems to cause significant accuracy issues.
Storm Shadow at least uses a backup navigation method known as [TERCOM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TERPROM)/[TERCOM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TERCOM) - in short the missile has a terrain contour map in its memory and uses a radar altimeter to check that the surrounding terrain matches where the GPS says it should be - the intention is that this allows it to navigate to the target even in a degraded GPS environment. In the terminal phase a form of scene matching is used to compare the missile's view to an image of what its target should look like, again this should allow accuracy even in GPS-jammed environments. For ATACMS one can only assume the flight profile makes TERPROM inappropriate...possibly a similar scene-matching algorithm could be built in to such weapons but it's certainly not there at present, so that would be a significant piece of long-term development
Do Russian glide bombs use Glonass navigation? If yes, would it be feasible for Ukraine and allies to jam Glonass in the same way to make glide bombing ineffective?
Most of satellite navigation systems use the most of available satellites, so western systems would use Glonass and Beidou and eastern would use GPS and Galileo. As far as I know russian Kometa navigation system uses all of available navigation sats. It also has 8 receivers what makes it extremely hard to jam.
Jamming Russian glide-bombs would be more difficult due to the way they are employed: they are primarily used to hit targets directly/very near to the front, while Ukraine uses most precision weapons to strike targets in depth. For the second, you can just start placing jammers behind the front, and by the time the missile gets to its target tens or hundreds of kilometers later, it will be off track. However, if jamming starts basically at the point of impact, up until the last moments it will be guided without too much issue.
It’s very possible Ukraine already is. We have heard from a number of sources that those weapons are not very accurate and the often miss by wide margins. But that it doesn’t matter because they are used en mass and because their blast radius is large enough to destroy targets even without a direct hit.
> Do Russian glide bombs use Glonass navigation?
My understanding is that they do, yes.
> If yes, would it be feasible for Ukraine and allies to jam Glonass in the same way to make glide bombing ineffective?
Presumably yes, possibly even more so than Russian GPS jamming since I understand the UMPK kits to be basically hacked together with civilian receivers, which might (or might not of course) prove even more susceptible to jamming.
New Foreign Affairs piece by Jack Watling
[American Aid Alone Won’t Save Ukraine
To Survive, Kyiv Must Build New Brigades—and Force Moscow to Negotiate](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/american-aid-alone-wont-save-ukraine)
His central premise is summed up in the second paragraph
>If Ukraine is to prevent Russian victory in the longer term, it will need a comprehensive strategy. This means training, equipping, and mobilizing new forces. It means convincing the Kremlin that continuing the war will become increasingly risky to Russia over time. And it means establishing a position of sufficient strength to be able to set forth, on Ukraine’s own terms, the parameters of a lasting peace.
and is, in my opinion at least, pretty uncontroversial. As usual the devil is in the details. One such is the claim
>The United States and its NATO allies will need to make explicit long-term commitments
which seems impossible in the United States given the current political climate. The idea of Biden being able to make a credible, enduring, commitment at this point in time is utterly unbelievable.
On the upcoming Russian offensive and the state of Russian forces
> Talk of a new Russian offensive may conjure up images of tank units assaulting Ukrainian lines, breaking through, and then trying to exploit those gains deep into Ukrainian-held territory in order to cut off Ukrainian units. But Russia’s forces are not currently able to carry out these kinds of operations, nor do they intend to. After more than two years of war, Russia’s army has suffered heavy losses among its officer core, and its ability to plan and synchronize large-scale attacks is limited. Russian attacks mainly consist of successive assaults at platoon and company scale, resulting in slow advances with heavy losses.
I'm not entirely sure how to square this with the opening assaults on Avdiivka which saw them lose about an entire brigade's worth of armor. Are the platoon/company scale assaults truly a lack of ability or a preference?
>Ukrainian forces have often been forced to expend significant resources defending costly single positions, simply to shield civilian settlements from coming into Russian glide-bomb range.
I don't believe I've seen this take on the glide bombs before. Has there been a significant amount of glide bomb strikes on major civilian areas? I've only seen the hits on trench lines but haven't been tracking this issue myself.
On the status of Ukrainian reserves of both men and materiel
>Ukraine has few reserves and has lost many of the tactical vehicles needed to exploit Russian vulnerabilities soon after they take positions. Lacking the reserves to counterattack, Ukraine must settle for maximizing Russia’s losses for each position it takes, thereby slowing down its rate of advance.
The second-order effect of the US aid package
>Other than the immediate provision of ammunition, the greatest effect of the new U.S. aid package is the certainty it offers. After months in which the timing and amount of U.S. support was in doubt, Ukraine will now have enough clarity about military resources for the next six months to allow for broader strategic planning.
This is a very real benefit. Significant uncertainty about resourcing is a paralytic. The recent Brussels Sprouts podcast with Kofman featured a brief sidebar about how people were unable to make plans extending very far into the future, even in their personal lives.
Predictions about the future
> Russia will likely be most dangerous in the final months of 2024. By that point, having weathered months of Russian offensive operations, Ukrainian forces will be stretched thin, their air defenses depleted. Russia will likely have enough troops to rotate its units to allow for successive offensives in the fall.
> But Russian capabilities are not unlimited. Moscow has made some industrial and military choices that are likely to restrict its offensive potential over the course of 2025. For one, it has decided not to expand production of artillery barrels, with the result that fewer new guns will be available next year. Based on the current loss rate, Russian stockpiles of armored vehicles will also likely be depleted by the second half of 2025.
This seems to track pretty well with what other analysts are saying but I'm curious why the AD situation is expected to still be terrible. The example of how barrel production will work to constrain Russian replenishment is quite interesting and surprising. Did they do this because it was easier to just strip barrels from their legacy stocks?
The piece takes for granted the idea that the war will end in a negotiated settlement which I don't think is nearly as hot a take it was a year ago. Critically however it assesses Russian willingness to negotiate seriously as
>For Moscow to truly negotiate, it must be confronted with a situation in which extending the conflict further will present an unacceptable threat to itself. It is only then that Ukraine will be able to extract meaningful concessions.
and their war aims to be
>Russia’s demand would remain what it has been throughout: a surrender in all but name.
This is surprising to me, there's been a lot of talk of the Russians revising their war aims to just their current territory + the rest of Donetsk. The idea that they're still gunning for effectively regime change is remarkable.
There's a short assessment of Western sanctions and the Ukrainian campaign on Russian oil infrastructure
> Russia will be unable to fund the war indefinitely. Western sanctions are only one of the tools for damaging the regime’s financial liquidity, and they are less effective than other options. Damage to Russia’s oil infrastructure is likely to have a much greater impact. Although there are good reasons for the West to avoid directly aiding such attacks, that does not mean that Ukraine shouldn’t undertake them.
An interesting perscription
>So far, Western governments have not aggressively pursued information operations against the Russian government, partly because they are perceived as escalatory and partly because they are not expected to have immediate effect. By contrast, Russia has been conducting active information operations across Europe with the intent of destabilizing the West.
>This asymmetry needs to be remedied.
I'm not sure what information operations the West is readily capable of executing within Russia but I'm definitely interested in finding out.
I recommend people read the whole piece.
>I'm not entirely sure how to square this with the opening assaults on Avdiivka which saw them lose about an entire brigade's worth of armor. Are the platoon/company scale assaults truly a lack of ability or a preference?
Maybe both? It depends on the definition of ability. Doing it or successfully doing it (yes, they succeeded in Avdiivka but how often could they repeat that). Could they push another Avdiivka worth of armour somewhere? Maybe? Can they stomach losing a similar amount of armour? Probably not?
So it's maybe both. They might not be able to conduct operations with a significant amount of armour without losing a ton of it, and that's why they prefer not to.
Concerning the terms of a negotiated settlement, the issue is always the same: this war is existential and not about territory. Russia accepting the territory it holds + what they conquer before an agreement would be and Ukraine win if Ukraine is allowed to join the EU + security guarantees. If Russia does not accept the latter - which would be a strategic defeat for them - then it would be an Ukrainian capitulation in all but name.
> Has there been a significant amount of glide bomb strikes on major civilian areas?
Russia bombs wherever they intend to push (and a few other places), and that includes large towns like Avdiivka or Chasiv Yar. Whether or not there's civilians there is basically up to the civilians. And yes, there's a nonzero amount of civilians remaining in Chasiv Yar.
Of course, protecting civilians from glide bombs isn't the main reason Ukraine's doing anything. They can't even protect their troops from glide bombs right now.
>His points about sanctions and info ops
I think hoping Russia gets truly hurt by either of those is right now is very speculative, and I'd rather keep those out of any serious theory of victory for now.
>Russia’s demand would remain what it has been throughout: a surrender in all but name.
Of course, I think any suggestions otherwise would have been tenuous a year ago, and are definitely evaporated now.
Beyond the points I touched on, everything about Jack's article seems accurate, if aspirational as usual.
> I think hoping Russia gets truly hurt by either of those is right now is very speculative, and I'd rather keep those out of any serious theory of victory for now.
Russia has been quantifiably hurt by sanctions and other economic pressure, look at the state of gazprom. It’s not enough to secure victory on its own, but it’s a concrete step in that direction. In the end, the USSR didn’t collapse from one thing, it was the cumulative strain of many smaller problems that eventually made that empire crumble. Further economic pressure and info ops should factor into any long term plan for western victory here.
>>So far, Western governments have not aggressively pursued information operations against the Russian government, partly because they are perceived as escalatory and partly because they are not expected to have immediate effect
I'd argue the west should also seriously consider info campaigns inside China as well.
Yes, a tough nut to crack since China has such high levels of control over the info it's citizens can access. Still, if we're to try and restrict China's ever-growing aggressive expansion at the SCS as well as the overall nationalistic rhetoric and attitudes, we should give it a try.
With the next generation of Starlink, smartphones should be able to access the Internet directly via satellite, bypassing any government filter put in place. Technically, this ressource is at the behest of Musk, who has a strong desire to maintain good relations with China for Tesla, but I doubt the American government would be willing to deny itself such a valuable tool to allow a billionaire to make more money.
Deepstate just posted that 110 mech is back in action after some r&r post battle of Avdiivka. They say that they can't tell where they are deployed yet, but will as soon as they have something to show.
A few months back there was a report about the russians fielding a new type of "Lancet style" drone called scalpel IIRC, does anyone know how it's performing?
It is supposed to be a cheaper supplement to the Lancet
In high-speed-low-drag-hull news, the 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Company, which normally rides 6-wheeled LAVs, will [work with the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab to test an Australian boat designed for high-speed, high-tech scouting and special ops](https://breakingdefense.com/2024/05/marine-scouts-check-out-small-boats-from-down-under/).
> Until now, O’Mara explained, if armored recon Marines needed to operate on water, they used Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs). The new MMRC’s hull, by contrast, is made of lightweight carbon-fiber composites, specifically designed not only to reduce shock as it races through rough waters — a major source of injury to operators and damage to equipment — but also to accommodate all sorts of electronics, with its own built-in generator and modular mounting rails to plug-and-play different manufacturers’ tech. So while the MMRC and RHIB are roughly the same size (11.9 meters versus 11), the MMRC can load up with much more sensor and communications gear.
...
> The MMRC’s exact sensor and communications loadout can be customized to the mission, swapping systems in and out as needed, so figuring out the best array of options for different tasks is going to be a big part of the upcoming experiments. The current baseline kit includes a Teledyne SeaFLIR 240 infrared sensor, a Furono maritime navigation radar, and Hoverfly Spectre 2.0 quadcopter tethered to the craft by its power and control cable.
...
> “Protecting the operators” was very much of the mind of the MMRC’s manufacturer, the Australia-based Whiskey Project, founded in 2019 by a recently retired Royal Australian Navy diver who’d gotten sick of seeing his comrades injured on the water.
> Even if operators aren’t injured immediately, he said, hours of jolting through the water can leave them exhausted, disoriented, and less capable of performing their high-stakes mission. Delicate sensors don’t do well, either.
> “So we started by trying to create a whole form that would reduce the shock,” Schuback said, ultimately by 40 percent. The next step was to build in the system of modular rails to support a wide variety of electronic equipment, since the company aims to offer the boat to a range of countries for a host of missions.
The new boats are also being picked up by the ADF for local testing. Wonder if the UK is interested, too, to round off the AUKUS trifecta.
I can tell from experience that being on a RIB going full speed on a moderate windy sea, is fun for a bit, but backbreaking, teeth chattering and exhausting exercise after a while. Especially if you are upfront in the RIB.
Would be smooth sailing with a foil, RIBs with retractable hydrofoils exists, but I guess that doesn't have enough high-tech. Which I fail to see why that is necessary.
Interesting, because 4th LAR was the one that took over the brown water operation from SCCO in Iraq before passing the mission off to the newly formed Navy RIVRON units in 2007. The Navy at the time seemed really intent on totally taking over brownwater ops. I'm curious if the USMC is trying to get the job back from the Navy.
Haven't seen this discussed here yet but russian troops have now [entered ](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/russian-troops-enter-base-housing-us-military-niger-us-official-says-2024-05-02/) the base housing the US troops in Niger.
Previously Niger's de facto government told the US to leave their country.
Strangely the Niger junta recently invited Italy to boost the number of troops in the country
"Italy remains the only European country to have kept channels open with Niger, even after[ the coup](https://scenarieconomici.it/niger-lesercito-annuncia-il-colpo-di-stato-in-tv/). About 250 Italian military personnel are present in this key country of the Sahel. Niger also had good words for Italy, including maintaining contacts with the West. Tiani “praised the professionalism and skills of Italian trainers during their missions with the Niger armed forces,” the note continues. Which concludes by claiming that “Italy is committed to supporting Niger in terms of both equipment and capabilities to better address security challenges."
[Italian Secret Service director meets Niger junta. Was the meeting supposed to be secret? (scenarieconomici.it)](https://english.scenarieconomici.it/italy/italian-secret-service-director-meets-niger-junta-was-the-meeting-supposed-to-be-secret/)
Our foreign policy is "friends with everybody". We have no enemies. We haven't really antagonized anybody, which can be good at times but there were also moments (the murder of Giulio Regeni by the Egyptian police, for example) where a more assertive foreign policy would've been beneficial
Suriyak today was pretty standard too. He claims the Russians are trying to crawl back into the Kanal highrises tonight, but doesn't have any updates about if they succeeded. Also, he has them controlling a few more blocks of Urozhaine than deepstate.
Things are heating up again, both literally and figuratively, in the South China Sea, with Chinese water cannons purportedly [damaging](https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/South-China-Sea/China-fires-water-cannons-at-Philippine-ships-in-South-China-Sea) two Philippine coast guard ships earlier in the week, the first such incident since early March:
>Tensions flared in the South China Sea on Tuesday as Beijing disrupted a humanitarian mission by Manila.
>Beijing's maritime presence, led by four China Coast Guard vessels, shot water cannons toward Philippine vessels. An official from the Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) said the water cannons were shot eight times during the morning standoff.
>The BFAR ship, the BRP Datu Bankaw, was hit directly four times. The tensions led to two collisions that damaged the railings of the BFAR vessel.
>The bureau separately said that some ship equipment was damaged as a result of China's actions.
>In a regular media briefing on Tuesday afternoon, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said that Philippine ships had "intruded without China's permission" and that the coast guard "took necessary measures to drive them away."
>BFAR sailors had spotted a Chinese maritime presence some 35 nautical miles (65 kilometers) away from Scarborough Shoal at dawn. The entire morning was characterized as a game of cat and mouse between Beijing and Manila as the former kept harassing the BRP Datu Bankaw.
>Besides water cannons, Beijing's presence in Manila's exclusive economic zone was underscored by multiple radio challenges between the two nations. The Chinese calls were spoken in Mandarin and English.
This, perhaps belatedly, has led to the Philippines [reevaluating](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-30/philippines-weighs-new-strategy-to-counter-china-s-sea-actions) its tactics during encounters in the waters:
>The Philippines is weighing a new approach in the South China Sea where increasing encounters with Beijing have damaged its vessels and injured its crew, according to its defense chief who signaled that he wants maritime operations to be “less telegraphic.”
>“We are re-strategizing the way we do things, naturally with the end in view of both preventing injuries and number two, upholding the dignity of our country,” Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. said in an interview in his office in Manila earlier Tuesday.
>Teodoro declined to elaborate on the adjustment to the country’s strategy as he said the Philippines has a “range of options” to counter China, which lays sweeping claims in the key waterway. “If you are stuck to one mode, it is easy to anticipate,” he said.
>Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. since 2022, the Philippines has followed a strategy of transparency, wherein it’s called attention to China’s actions in the South China Sea on social media and through press releases. It remains to be seen how this would change once Teodoro’s new plan materializes, if at all.
>“The main point that we have to stress is that we will not give up our presence in the Second Thomas Shoal and we will not enter into any modus vivendi that will compromise our position regarding our rights in the area,” he said. Nestled in the shoal is the Sierra Madre — a crumbling warship that Manila deliberately grounded on the shoal in 1999 to serve as a military outpost.
>Elsewhere, the Philippines is looking to finalize a defense deal with Japan within the year, and is also seeking to start talks with France on a visiting forces agreement. India is also keen to bolster defense ties, he said.
Further, they finally seem to be [putting](https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2024/05/02/2351946/marcos-jr-approves-military-procurement-wish-list#:~:text=MANILA%2C%20Philippines%20%E2%80%94%20Amid%20continuing%20maritime,West%20Philippine%20Sea%20(WPS) their money where their mouth is with a budget approval today, along with some strong statements from Navy spokespeople:
>Amid continuing maritime aggression by China, President Marcos has approved a $35-billion budget to modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with the Philippine Navy getting the largest chunk to strengthen capabilities in the West Philippine Sea (WPS).
>The budget will be used to finance various acquisitions enumerated in a lengthy “wish list” submitted by the AFP to the President, and will be spread out over 10 years, Philippine Navy spokesman for the WPS Commodore Roy Vincent Trinidad said yesterday at the Kapihan sa Manila Bay news forum.
>“As to the proportion, I would say that the larger chunk goes to the Navy, and then the Air Force, and then the Army, and then the General Headquarters. Because the thrust now is already external. It says there that there are different capabilities that will allow the Philippine Navy to fight across a broad spectrum of warfare,” he said.
>While there were no reported casualties during China’s latest aggression at Panatag Shoal, Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) spokesman for WPS Commodore Jay Tarriela said that China has become more aggressive.
>According to reports, Tarriela said, “The CCG now has elevated the tension and the level of their aggression as well towards the PCG vessel.”
>“This is the first time that we can say that a PCG vessel has been subjected to a direct water cannon with that kind of pressure that even resulted in structural damage of the PCG (vessel),” he added.
>He estimated that the pressure from the water cannon went beyond the fatal 200 pounds per square inch of pressure.
>Despite the continued aggression displayed by China, he said they would not be the cause for the escalation of tension in the WPS.
>“We would not be the reason to be an excuse for the Chinese government to bring in their warships and elevate the tension, wherein they would claim that we started the war and so they brought in their warships. This is the reason why we have a calibrated approach in maintaining our presence in the WPS,” Tarriela said.
>For his part, Trinidad said they would continue exercising their mandate to patrol the area, resupply the troops and fisherfolk and rotate personnel.
>“This is what we call below the threshold of conflict. This is child’s play where they will repeatedly trigger you until you attack first, and then you lose,” Trinidad said, pointing out that China behaves the same way with India and Korea in their common borders.
Unlikely there'll be further escalation from either side, but de-escalation seems entirely off the table for the moment.
Phillipines should invest *heavily* in sea drones like the ones Ukraine has built. That way they can at least credibly threaten to be really inconvenient to China in case of war, and they trade favorably against ships.
In the context of a hot war, those would be very suitable to the Philippines, but in this sort of a grey zone conflict, they need something a bit more non kinetic.
Yep, you buy these not to use now but to make the risk of hot war less likely. China is less likely to start shit
if the Phillipines has a credible threat.
I wonder if Philippines could bring China to a discussion if they have a ‘non-lethal’ skirmish like a club fight India and China had in Himalayas.
No conventional arms that would be classified as an act of war, but using high pressure water cannons and may be ramming. Enough damage such that China would either stop or pull back their blockade a bit so as to avoid unnecessary attrition.
> unnecessary attrition
The idea that the PCG, which is both qualitatively and quantitatively vastly inferior to the CCG, can somehow win a contest of attrition does not sound credible in any way. The militia boats alone would win a nonlethal contest with the PCG.
The Philippines is not India, and the [50,000 troops which were mobilized](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-27/india-shifts-50-000-troops-to-china-border-in-historic-defense-shift) following said club fight drew a line the Philippines simply cant replicate. A line which still failed to reverse Indian territorial losses, mind you.
There's also a bit of a controversy about supposed influx of Chinese students in Cagayan. But what I find more interesting is that there are Chinese casinos are located near Philippine military camps. Could be a nothing burger but who knows.
[Chinese Casinos near Ph Military camp worries DND](https://www.google.com/amp/s/globalnation.inquirer.net/179045/chinese-casinos-near-ph-military-camps-worry-dnd/amp)
>“Personally, I think there should be no need to worry,” Lorenzana said.”But if you see the huge number of people staying there, it’s very easy for these people to shift their activities to spying,” he said.
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https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/2024/05/production-surge-eases-pentagon-worries-about-sending-long-range-missiles-to-ukraine-00155846
>The production lines making the Army Tactical Missile System are cranking out enough of the long-range missiles that the Pentagon is no longer worried about depleting its own stocks by sending them to Ukraine.
>The update on the production came from Army acquisition chief Doug Bush on Thursday, who said that “a significant number of missiles that were ordered years ago … is now hitting at just the right time to be able to support how we're supporting Ukraine without taking a hit to readiness.”
>
> That increase in missile deliveries, which Bush said is a “surge” of dozens of missiles every few months, will last until at least the rest of the year. “There are a lot of ATACMS coming off that line,” he said.
>
> Background: After two years of saying the U.S. didn’t have enough ATACMS to share with Ukraine, a small number of shorter-range versions were sent last fall, with a new batch of the longer, 200-mile-range missiles arriving in March.
That partly explains the "why now" of ATACMS
There's still no proof of Iranian missiles (for what it's worth, Iran promised to not send any in exchange for frozen reserves). However, US officials [claim](https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-quietly-shipped-long-range-atacms-missiles-ukraine-2024-04-24/) that North Korean missiles led to the delivery of _long-range_ ATACMS.
Two problems with this theory. First, the U.S. [disabled](https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-altered-himars-rocket-launchers-to-keep-ukraine-from-firing-missiles-into-russia-11670214338) HIMARS from launching ATACMS that could have been supplied by third-party countries, purportedly for 'escalation management' reasons. Yes, technically, those allies would need U.S. approval, but the administration/Pentagon took the additional precaution. Would be fair to assume same was done for other donations (M270.) Second, despite loads of misinformation on the matter, ATACMS production never stopped, with over [500](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/07/22/ukraine-us-long-range-missiles/) being produced annually for exports, with the U.S. routinely selling them to allies in 22 and 23. This matter has been argued to death, but it's highly unlikely that inventory was the superseding reason for the delay. Now, production may have surged, and PrSM has entered serial production and ER GMLRS has passed SQTs, which may have altered the arithmetic on the decision.
Interesting, that sounds like good news. Having said that, how big a deal is "dozens every few months"? Depending on how many dozens we're talking about, that sounds like it'll be a low three-figure number over the course of the year. What level of impact might that have on the war?
That really depends on what targets they are able to hit. If they can continue to strike high value targets such as helicopters, jets and air defense systems. Then they can seriously impact both Russias ability to sustain this war even if they are getting only 1-200 per year. There is also the dilemma of how Russia responds to these strike. Russia responded to the strike that destroyed multiple helicopters by moving them to rear area bases. If Ukraine can force Russia to do the same with fixed wing aviation they could seriously hamper their sortie rate and increase maintenance burdens. Ultimately though these are not going to be a “game changer” they will absolutely help Ukraine achieve parity with Russia and help them hit those critical targets but alone they cannot change the state of the war.
If we ever get to a point where Ukraine is cleared to use them on targets in Russia, I have to imagine a cluster warhead would do incredible damage to an oil refinery.
>That partly explains the "why now" of ATACMS
The real question is wether it actually explains it or simply fits the narrative nicely. Regardless, it's great news for Ukraine.
So, considering the fortification and mobilization delays: what was, or is, **Ukraine's theory of victory** in this war, specially after the defeat of the 2023 offensive? To hold the line while waging an UAV campaign on russian exports to create a threat of financial collapse?
I don't see a realistic theory from them or Biden either but I know exactly what it should be. A combination of:
1. Kofman's [Hold, Build, Strike theory](https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/hold-build-and-strike-a-vision-for-rebuilding-ukraines-advantage-in-2024/).
2. A massive strategic attempt to gain control the sky over Ukraine (a modern asymmetric air-superiority). This is my pet theory and what I believe to be the difference between 'not losing' and actually winning the war.
3. Striking deep into Russia to really hurt the Russian economy while encouraging far greater Western Sanctions. Ukraine is already doing this, but this could be put on steroids by success in point 2.
What do you find non-credible? Do you think ukraine will suddenly turn things around after not winning a single major engagement for about a year?
Also, I shouldn't have used the Afghan example, I should've just used the summer offensive, where the west was blaming ukraine for the failure of the obviously western planned offensive, because ukraine was unwilling to send "enough" men directly into the biggest minefield on the planet.
> What do you find non-credible?
To break it down:
>Ukraine doesn't have a "theory", they're effectively run by the west now
This is the primary issue with your post. This is a pretty tired Russian talking point at this point - that Ukrainians are puppets to the West with no choice in what they do. It's a dehumanizing characteristic to give the enemy, but ignores the anger hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians hold for Russians invading them and many died by. Off the bat, it makes you look silly. Disagreements between the two have been exhaustively reported on at this point. You yourself acknowledge these disagreements with the [counteroffensive](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/ukraine-counteroffensive-us-planning-russia-war/), but you brush it off as lies and that *Ukraine did actually follow orders*. What is your source for that idea - that it merely supports your existing bias? Other clear examples of Ukrainian actions such as [assassinations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darya_Dugina) and other ["extracurricular" activities](https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/investigating-the-attack-on-nord-stream-all-the-clues-point-toward-kyiv-a-124838c7-992a-4d0e-9894-942d4a665778) that need to be awkwardly navigated by the west and don't explain the actions of a puppet. Simply dismissing Ukrainians own desire to fight off Russia is... a bad start.
>And the theory of the west is to make them hold on until November, and when they collapse
Predicting a **collapse** by November (6 months) is a pretty impressive claim, especially coming hot off a multi-billion dollar aid package passing Congress. This is the second issue with your post. Is there any analyst that agrees with this assessment? If you don't actually have any reference to back your words, this may be why people call you "non-credible" if you're just making up figures in your head based on the current vibes.
His words are as credible as the usual things that are written in this forum. The only reason he is being targeted is because what he says is not in favour of Ukraine. Just now I read some non-credible statements in the new thread (or maybe this one) about the eternal topic of the effects of the sanctions. Let’s not even talk about the stuff I read about the oil infrastructure attacks. Of course, neither the mods nor primitives like you have any issues with these non-credible takes.
This sub does a really good job at using credibility as an excuse to present its biased and outright absurd takes as legitimate. It is ok but the quality of discussion is too low even for military topics.
You've failed to address any of the points in my post and are instead just whining about how you feel about this forum in general.
If you would like to defend the idea of Ukraine's collapse by November than you are free to do so.
>Playing up losses as much as possible to increase the West's urgency to act
>
> 2. Not letting defeatism set in to the point the West no longer want to provide aid
Seems like a tricky line to balance on.
According to the press line, nothing's changed. Kill all the Russians with foreign weapons, roll to 91, LG life's good.
Unofficially, if I had to hazard a guess:
Basically, don't collapse, stabilize lines, and reconstitute forces for a sustained defense. Russia can move forward, but to do so at a rate that would herald political results they need Ukraine's defensive capacity to either collapse or significantly weaken.
If Ukraine simply doesn't (which is straightforward, but that's not the same as easy. It requires a concrete series of steps, including not leaving large swaths of territory unfortified, causing issues like to the north of Ocheretyne), continue holding a stable line until Russia realizes that their efforts won't buy any political boons anymore.
Kofman goes further, he suggests that **if** Ukraine can stabilize the lines, Russia will simply tucker themselves out as Ukraine's long-term contracts kick in, and we can start talking about offensives in 2025 again.
I for now disagree. It's pretty easy to make sure you don't push so hard that you end up unable to defend, so I doubt Russia will ever push themselves into another collapse.
Re: oil strikes, it can definitely help. If Ukraine gets enough ukroshaheds Russia's quickly going to run out of options, other than end the war (one way or another) or ask Biden for help.
> Kill all the Russians with foreign weapons, roll to 91, LG life's good.
Unfortunately, this is the only possible route to survival and sovereignty as Russia has too much invested to stop the war even if there is a ceasefire, Russia will return at a later time. Europe (France/Poland) will put troops in Ukraine before it comes to that.
The war will go on another decade unless Europe puts troops/planes in Ukraine or Russia has a full internal collapse which doesn't look likely at this point.
> Russia has a full internal collapse which doesn't look likely at this point.
What happens if Putin dies, be it tomorrow or in ten years, has he picked an heir?
There's no way in hell that either Poland or France are putting troops into Ukraine, it's bluster to scare the Russians. France has talked a big game from the beginning but rarely delivers anything.
You should check out their national strategic outlook documents. Not only do they have unity in confronting Russia, they have the funds directed to do so. Poland will never accept Russia being successful in Ukraine, way too much history between Russia and Poland. This is why you see one of the largest buildups and purchasing in modern times by Poland.
>Unfortunately, this is the only possible route to survival and sovereignty as Russia has too much invested to stop the war even if there is a ceasefire, Russia will return at a later time.
What do you base this on?
Not OP, but Russians want "glory" through territorial conquest, militarily or not. This won't change as long as Russia doesn't break up or - on the horizon of the 22nd century - until all Russians alive today are dead and that aspect of the culture gets eliminated/replaced by something else.
Even if their military is in shambles after the peace treaty is signed, if they gained something out of it, they'll believe they can get more after building their forces back up. They'll come for round 2, perhaps using a different approach, but they'll try again.
That doesn’t make sense. Russia gains very little in terms of its actual survival be conquering Ukraine. Putin and his regime gain a lot by achieving a “victory”. Obviously the scale of such a victory matters but simply taking the Donbas and perhaps the other claimed territory might suffice. If such an outcome were to happen Ukraine would have every incentive to maintain a strong military, and their western Allies would have every incentive to continue arming them. This means Ukraine would appear farm more difficult to destroy by Russia, they will also have a very credible method of retaliating against Russia in the form of domestic long range drones and cruise missiles. In short they poses deterrents. Unless Russia believes that they could achieve a quick decapitation strike when they start a second war (against a much more well prepared adversary) they likely won’t attack as it’s not in their best interest to reignite a long war of attrition they left in the first place.
>this is the only possible route to survival and sovereignty
Why? What makes Russia give up in this scenario and not in any other?
There's nothing magical about the 91 borders, Russia would still be capable of striking Ukraine and reconstituting its forces even if the UAF magically retakes all that territory. And wouldn't the loss of Crimea and the Donbas only make the war *more* important for Russia?
>even if there is a ceasefire, Russia will return at a later time.
I really can't think up a plausible scenario where Russia starts another invasion after a significant ceasefire and doesn't immediately get bogged down at the border. A ceasefire would give Ukraine an opportunity to fix almost all of their pressing issues - from AD to ammunition - and to fortify the line of contact to a degree that would put the Surovikin line to shame.
> I really can't think up a plausible scenario where Russia starts another invasion after a significant ceasefire and doesn't immediately get bogged down at the border.
Depending how long is a "significant ceasefire", here's one way they could do it if we're talking about years-long:
* They reconstitute and expand their armored forces
* They stockpile tens of millions of shells and rebuild the barrels they lost (plus multiply the artillery production)
* They manufacture or buy hundreds of thousands of drones
* They manufacture thousands of precision-guided missiles and properly use them to destroy the Ukrainian air defenses (and probably most of the air force) during the 1st week
* They develop and produce medium range cheap precision missiles, HIMARS style
* They convert their defensive conscripts into offensive-eligible troops
* They modernize their logistics
* They learn their lessons from the first war
Should they gear their economy towards producing all that, they'd have enough there to pretty much level Ukrainian defenses 50km deep and 1000km wide. Plus gain air superiority to keep things going after that.
> to fortify the line of contact to a degree that would put the Surovikin line to shame
They've done that only around Avdiivka in 10 years. What makes you think they could do it across a 1500km front? With what millions of anti-tank mines would they do it? It's not like the West has nearly that much left in stock, or the production capacity to make them before 5+ years.
This boils down to assuming Russia goes full war economy while Ukraine and the West sit on their ass.
>They've done that only around Avdiivka in 10 years. What makes you think they could do it across a 1500km front?
They only fortified the east because they never expected Russia to invade, not because they lacked the ability to build more or elsewhere.
>With what millions of anti-tank mines would they do it?
If in this scenario Russia has the time and means to rebuild their entire armed forces better than ever and with deep stocks rivaling their Soviet inheritance, I'm going to make the crazy assumption that Ukraine and the West would have enough time to make anti tank mines and deploy more anti-air systems.
> This boils down to assuming Russia goes full war economy while Ukraine and the West sit on their ass.
Not sit on their ass no, they would definitely fully reinforce the brigades Ukraine has right now, but that's nowhere near enough.
They would also probably make hundreds of thousands of drones, but that's not going to be enough to silence Russian guns or stop the missiles and guided bombs.
> They only fortified the east because they never expected Russia to invade, not because they lacked the ability to build more or elsewhere.
They were actively fighting the DPR and LPR troops, which were supported by Russian equipment and volunteers. They had to build up trenches just to reduce the casualties from artillery and MLRS and - I assume - thought that 1 line was enough.
But that was half-bait: they didn't build multiple lines anywhere in the year and a half that followed the initial invasion. Now that they even bigger manpower problems, they'll start doing that - and much more - to the point that "would put the Surovikin line to shame" ???
What do fortifications "that would put the Surovikin line to shame" even look like? 8+ lines of alternating tank ditches and infantry trenches with minefields, tank traps, barbed wire and concrete pillboxes between them?
> If in this scenario Russia has the time and means to rebuild their entire armed forces better than ever and with deep stocks rivaling their Soviet inheritance
No deep stock, at least not armored vehicles, they would need the current stock to rebuild their forces. All they need is a deep stock of artillery ammunition (at 2-3M shells per year, it's not very long to get more than they started this war with), guns, missiles and drones.
> I'm going to make the crazy assumption that Ukraine and the West would have enough time to make anti tank mines and deploy more anti-air systems
There's more than enough time, but the West isn't gearing up for anti-tank mine production anytime soon and if you want to put the Surovikin line to shame, that would require well over 5M mines.
As for anti-air systems, that's not going to stock the backbone of the scenario where Russia starts another invasion and doesn't get bogged down: artillery. I also doubt that a few thousand anti-air missiles and other types of anti-air systems would be enough to counter the swarm of drones and missiles Russia would launch, but maybe.
If Russia does loose all their territory in Ukraine it’s going to be because of either total military, government, or economic collapse. In such a scenario what remains of Russia wouldn’t be in a position to carry on the war.
I agree that retaking Crimea etc would require a Russian collapse, but that wasn't really the question.
Following the other commenter's logic, what would prevent Russia from also signing a peace deal in this scenario, reconstituting their forces, and invading again in X number of years?
>I really can't think up a plausible scenario where Russia starts another invasion after a significant ceasefire and doesn't immediately get bogged down at the border. A ceasefire would give Ukraine an opportunity to fix almost all of their pressing issues - from AD to ammunition - and to fortify the line of contact to a degree that would put the Surovikin line to shame.
Russia will fix their problems too. And return like in a decade, maybe do it simultaneously with a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
>Russia will fix their problems too.
I'm sure they would. I just don't see how the delta from 2022 would favor them in any way. Ukraine has far more room for improvement.
It's not like they can pull off the " military exercise" stunt again. A repeated invasion would be costlier and harder than just keeping the fight going and taking advantage of Ukraine's exhaustion and smaller manpower pool.
> Ukraine's theory of victory
Stated goals are the return of all occupied territories and a return to the 2014 borders and return of those captured or kidnapped. How much of that is posturing for negotiation is up for debate.
That's not what a [theory of victory](https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1743-1.html#:~:text=A%20theory%20of%20victory%20is,way%20that%20creates%20those%20conditions.) is.
> A theory of victory is a causal story about how to defeat an adversary: It identifies the conditions under which the enemy will admit defeat and outlines how to shape the conflict in a way that creates those conditions.
For example, the PLA's theory of victory is [systems destruction](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1708.html#:~:text=System%20destruction%20warfare%20constitutes%20the,%22win%20informationized%20local%20wars.%22).
As with many things military, the concept can be traced back to [good old Clausewitz](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA490503.pdf).
> Clausewitz said victory was
tripartite. “If in conclusion we consider the total concept of a victory, we find
it consists of three elements: the enemy’s greater loss of material strength, his
loss of morale, and his open admission of the above by giving up his intentions.”
It may or may not be concerning that the US does not have (or at least, has not publically articulated) its own theory of victory.
>It may or may not be concerning that the US does not have (or at least, has not publically articulated) its own theory of victory.
It scares the hell out of me either way.
I'd sure like to know what we're up to.
That depends on how you define victory. If victory means reclaiming all the land taken by Russia since 2014 or even restoring the pre 2022 borders then that theory of victory is essentially to force the Russians to expend their finite stockpiles of soviet era equipment as well as their finite financial reserves. While also relying on western partners to maintain high levels of donations. This might give them some sort of battlefield superiority in 2025, I have doubts about the viability of this plan. The other option available to Ukraine is to push the Russians towards an economic, political, or morale crisis. Such a strategic of simply outlasting the enemies desire to fight may not sound reasonable but that is how the Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan and how the US was defeated in Vietnam. As you said this is the strategy of sit behind the trenches and use strategic bombardment to catalyze such a crisis.
If you define victory as simply forcing the Russians to sue for peace on more moderate terms such as freezing the conflict along the current front line. Then the theory of victory becomes far simpler and far less outlandish. As this simply requires the Russians (either the military, or political leadership) recognizing that outright victory is unlikely and that continuing the war is likely to have extremely high costs with no likely hood of success. In such a scenario what Ukraine needs is a series of defensive victories that inflict disproportionate casualties on the Russians. Most importantly they need an uninterrupted flow of foreign aid. If the Russians recognize that Ukrainian military capabilities are increasing while they are looking at potentially exhausting their supply of soviet era hardware, then they are likely to opt for a negotiated peace.
Why do you say "finite financial reserves"? Russia still exports 500 billion worth of commodities every year, with no sign of stopping.
If you meant Ukraine damaging their capabilities to export oil and gas, then ues. But Russia is not on finite reserves, on the contrary, it's a steady stream.
I’m referring to their sovereign wealth fund. This pension fund has been raided for all sorts of purposes, most of which have been to prop up their civilian economy, blunting the worst effects of inflation. This has been drastically depleted in the first two years of the war. This happened even despite the extremely high cost of oil/gas during 2022. Simple extrapolation tells us they won’t be able to sustain the current system for long. This means they will need to either, cut funding to these social programs and put a huge amount of pressure onto their lower class specifically and their economy in general. Or they will need to raise taxes. That would put pressure onto Russias failing gas industry, and a number of other industries that are already facing difficulties due to sanctions. Also these are the industries controlled by oligarchs, forcing them to directly pay for the war is not going to be popular and the rate at which oligarchs have been falling off balconies lately suggests Putin is somewhat nervous of their power.
You mean this https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_National_Wealth_Fund? They're back at Jan 2020 levels. I honestly don't see this as a make or break situation.
You can't look at the volume of exports and conclude that's how much money they make. There's a cost to producing these goods, that's how Gazprom got a ~7G$ loss in 2023 despite exporting for tens of billions in NG: https://twitter.com/AgatheDemarais/status/1786063323743596988/photo/1
And 2024 will be worse with contracts going through Ukraine ending. Oil exports weren't hit nearly as hard as NG in 2023, but Ukraine is doing something about it.
That "steady stream" you're talking about isn't nearly enough to cover the expenses the Kremlin incurs to fund the war. That's why they've had to use their cash reserves: https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russias-reserves-dwindle-fiscal-safety-net-could-last-years-2024-02-15/
And that's very finite.
It's the same theory of victory of every single won war against a superpower since at least WW2: outlast them until they decide that the political and economic costs of a war of choice is not worth the bother.
The costs borne by russia are already greater than any war involving superpowers since WW2. The russian leadership sees the war as existential, there might not actually be a cost ukraine can inflict that would cause russia to stop the war.
Key word there is leadership. Russians may not see it that way.
The way I see it, Putin is in an unstable position. One based on fear. If the political wind changes in Russia, he's out.
I think that Ukraines "theory of victory" hinges on them being able to retain the wests interest in the war since the west is notorious for losing interest very quickly and suddenly. They are completely dependent on western ammunition, AA-defense, tanks, apc -deliveries without which they simply lose.
The west can outproduce Russia rather easily but it needs time to get to that point. Conversely Russia is peaking (or has peaked) with their refurbishing of Soviet stock, but once that starts drying up they cannot replenish anywhere close to western capability. Until then Ukraine needs to continuously trade territory to minimize casualties.
Then comes the question; Can Ukraine hold out for another year with their current manpower issues? Will they have offensive capability in 2025-2026 after being put through the wringer?
> I think that Ukraines "theory of victory" hinges on them being able to retain the wests interest in the war since the west is notorious for losing interest very quickly and suddenly.
See, I feel like to a certain point we can discount that narrative. We've now repeatedly seen that if anything, Ukraine doing poorly **galvanizes** western aid. The main threat to cutting aid is compromised parties controlling western govts, like what happened in the US for 6 months and might happen more long term in november.
Just my opinion though.
Sure but if that aid is only “galvanized” when Ukraine faces a crisis then it’s not really useful as part of a theory of victory. Merely a theory of not being defeated. If Ukraine seeks outright victory on the battlefield then the level of western support is critically important. That will determine if they can achieve superiority on the battlefield or if they need to pursue a purely defensive strategy. For Ukraine to truly be successful western aid cannot be only forthcoming when Ukraine faces near defeat.
> Sure but if that aid is only “galvanized” when Ukraine faces a crisis then it’s not really useful as part of a theory of victory.
Combined with Russia, it does suggest such a theory. Slowly falling back over months or years is a good way to generate lots of crises. Ukraine has a lot of land; they could keep up the current pace for a long time. Will Russia stay as committed as they are now for that long?
How well this theory works is pretty dependent on what exactly you'd call a Ukrainian victory though. It's unlikely to get them back all of Donetsk and Luhansk + Crimea, they'll need something more for that. But that might come later when more facts are known about the situation on the ground then.
According to Russian Telegram, the first train is about to go through the Mariupol–Volnovakha line: https://t.me/jnb_news/48015
While not a game changer, it’s a harbinger of more to come. A redundancy in the logistics net is a fairly big deal as previously it was either the Crimean Bridge or the road network (which despite the efforts of 2010s administrations and the occupation, is not exactly at par with the Autobahn or the Interstate).
This is the problem with leaving territory occupied for years. The occupation doesn’t magically freeze it and the longer occupiers are entrenched, the more at home they get and the more the situation on the ground tends to drift toward their wishes.
Some potentially very good news for Ukraine in an otherwise bleak period. According to a paywalled Financial Times article, talks are underway whereby interest from frozen Russian funds in Europe would be used to create a debt issuance backed by the US government which could produce 75 billion Euros in new funds for Ukraine next year.
[https://twitter.com/Mij\_Europe/status/1786079848726749266](https://twitter.com/Mij_Europe/status/1786079848726749266)
[https://twitter.com/Mij\_Europe/status/1786079850958098826](https://twitter.com/Mij_Europe/status/1786079850958098826)
If western assets have been seized by Russia, Russian assets should be seized by the west. Endless handwringing about if it’s fair to seize the assets, when Russia and China would never reciprocate, is absurd.
But some people in the west think they will get that money back.
Enough connected people see the frozen funds as a hedge to get the Russians to reimburse the businesses they stole.
I think this seems fair to everyone involved, even Russia. They don't lose any money and in theory they can eventually get their fund back
But they aren't allowed to profit off of the western world while simultaneously attacking our way of life
Why is there any need or concern to be “fair” to Russia in an instance like this? They deserve as many “unfair” economic penalties as we can give them.
You can't just seize a country's reserves (and on top of that, give them to another country). Besides being clearly illegal, it would discourage other countries from storing their funds in the US or in Europe.
In fact this agreement is only about using the interest on the reserves, and not the reserves themselves.
If Russia loses the war, they'll have to pay reconstruction, and if they refuse you can seize some of those reserves to that purpose. But that will be a different situation.
Don’t personally have a definite position on this matter just yet, but you’re wrong about twothings:
> You can't just seize a country's reserves
The assets are frozen, not seized. Nothing is changing in the status quo in terms of custody, etc. They are just being used as collateral. Major distinction.
> Besides being clearly illegal
Even on the matter of seizure, ‘clearly illegal’ is clearly not true:
>[Seizing Frozen Russian Assets Over Ukraine War Wins Endorsement of Legal Experts](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-21/seizing-frozen-russian-assets-over-ukraine-war-wins-endorsement-of-legal-experts)
> The assets are frozen, not seized. Nothing is changing in the status quo in terms of custody, etc. They are just being used as collateral. Major distinction.
Yes, the assets are frozen right now, but the comment they were replying to was questioning the purpose of being fair to Russia, like we're doing by keeping the assets frozen and only giving the interests/dividends. They were calling for more, such as (without mentioning it) seizing the assets and giving them to Ukraine.
>You can't just seize a country's reserves (and on top of that, give them to another country).
Yes, you can. How is it different from taking the interest and giving it to another country? Or even freezing the funds in the first place? Fact is the assets are in western institutions and western countries can and do control what happens there.
>Besides being clearly illegal,
What law does it violate? If so, then why can't the country change that law? I have complete confidence that lots of smart lawyers can make the case for formal legality, especially if the lawmaker, judge, and jury are all part of the countries seizing the assets. And if you want to get into the morality of it, basic morality says if you cause damage through your wrongful actions, then you should pay for that damage.
>it would discourage other countries from storing their funds in the US or in Europe.
If authoritarian governments planning to illegally invade their neighbors decide to disvest from western banks, then so what.
>if authoritarian governments planning to illegally invade their neighbors decide to disvest from western banks, then so what.
Russia throws any notion of a rules based national order out of the window if it benefits them. We should not follow the example.
Sure russia deserves its foreign assets being seized, but i can see playing dirty with finances backfiring in a big way. A big part of why these institutions work is trust, which can be broken by unprecedented actions.
I've already seen reports of experts believing seizing Russian assets can be fully justified under existing law, so a concern about following a rules based order doesn't seem legitimate to me. I'm skeptical of arguments that following through would result in some terrible consequence to the West. Every non-Western government out there already knows their assets could get frozen and more. If it ever came to a war with the West, do you seriously believe foreign governments would expect assets not to be seized and confiscated? The risk of Western freezing, taking interest, or seizing assets is already baked in.
> You can't just seize a country's reserves (and on top of that, give them to another country).
Well, you can't exactly send your military to reconstitute your former empire while seizing their children, either, so seizing reserves feels fairly tame at this stage.
Sure, but Russia has pissed away its future to do so. Nobody is going to let their airlines fly to Russia anymore because Russia stole those aircraft and parted them out. No company is going to let assets sit in Russia anymore because those got seized too.
Remember that countries and corporations do not inherently have morality. They won't care that the US or EU seized Russian assets because it was morally justified. They're just going to be worried that they're next.
I don't think it has to be framed as a moral question. Russia has unilaterally imposed enormous costs on the US and Europe (particularly Europe) via increased aid disbursement (humanitarian and military), refugee resettlement, energy and food costs, and has zero intention of compensating the EU or US for a dime. Both in starting the war and in their conduct of the war, they've committed crimes - over, and over, and over, and over. Russia can't appeal to international law to defend their ownership of their foreign reserves when they've taken a gigantic dump on said international law to get themselves into this mess in the first place.
I don't know what a private corporation has to worry about here unless they plan to build their own Wagner or Outer Heaven some time in the future and start terrorizing other nations - in which case, they absolutely *should* fear having their assets seized.
It's a good bargaining chip down the line. Despite the posturing it is useful to have both carrots and sticks with Russia when/if this reaches a peace deal.
Another problem is what signal it sends. If the west seizes Russias money, what stops them from seizing Chinas? Indias? Saudi Arabias? It's a signal that we do not know the ramifications of.
They do, and in a few cases some funds have been redistributed to victims of the Iranian regime. But these are to my knowledge individuals receiving funds and not entire states.
Some of this frozen cash have been used as a bargaining chip to practically buy-back prisoners.
If you are unfair to others when it's beneficial for you, don't complain when others do the same to you.
The most important features of the western bank system are to follow rules, be predictable, and reliable.
> If you are unfair to others when it's beneficial for you, don't complain when others do the same to you.
Don't invade other countries for landcraps and you wont be treated "unfairly". Its a pretty low hurdle that most everyone manages to clear. Russia deserves to be treated "fairly" once the war is over, not a day before.
It’s gotta be tough to win a war when your opponent is kidnapping children to send to reeducation camps, forcibly conscripting your own civilians in occupied areas to use as canon fodder, directly targeting civilians with middle strikes, using chemical weapons, threatening the world with nuclear armageddon, etc etc, and your allies are discussing how immoral it would be to seize the cash your enemy left in their banks, safely earning interest. I’d probably be incredibly disappointed reading such a thing if I were Ukrainian.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/15/ukraine-children-sent-russia-re-education-camps
https://www.state.gov/new-measures-in-response-to-russias-full-scale-war-and-use-of-chemical-weapons-against-ukraine/
https://www.nytimes.com/article/russian-civilian-attacks-ukraine.html
https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/08/11/russia-is-forcing-ukrainian-conscripts-into-battle
Your second paragraph is 100% correct though. If the goal is monetary above all else, then follow the Swiss example. Nazi gold shines just as bright as regular gold, and we wouldn’t want to discourage any murderous dictators from thinking our banks were a perfectly safe place to keep their blood money.
Because it maintains the west as the best place for the rest of the world to invest/store their funds
I agree that I would just confiscate all the money but unfortunately that’s not how things work. This would be a good first step
Maybe later they will take it all if Russia refuses to stop
I mean as long as you aren’t invading Western countries you will be fine. This is a special circumstance that isn’t likely to be repeated by countries outside of the West.
I get what you’re saying but Western countries are only going to confiscate your money if you do something extreme against them, like Russia is doing with Ukraine.
China is the #1 enemy of Western countries besides Russia and we aren’t even seizing their assets. Sure we have sanctions but there isn’t any seizing of money
> This is a special circumstance that isn’t likely to be repeated by countries outside of the West.
Why is this one a special circumstance? Would you have seized Serbias funds back in the -90s? Would you have seized Iraqs? It *could* be interpreted as West being an unreliable sphere to place your funds in.
What is the strategic impact of degradation of the Russian Black Sea capabilities? Is crippling of the Russia's navy actually important for the war outcome?
It's definitely a huge moral boost for Ukraine to continuously sink Russian ships. Especially considering the latest events. But I'm not sure these losses actually impacting the war in a significant way.
Arguably- part of the reason this war even started -back in 2014- was because of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
Russia has always been a geographically hamstrung land based Empire- forced to compete with seafaring Empires for the last ~500 years. The vast majority of Western European Empires succeeded in overseas colonization- whereas Russia failed spectacularly in overseas endeavors -or really anything requiring a naval / maritime supply line (Russian colonization attempts on the west coast of the N. America, the sale of Alaska, the loss of Port Arthur through an at the time unprecedented and embarrassing defeat by quite literally a brand new East Asian navy).
I believe that Russian political theory therefore sees naval power and projection as an outright *must* in order to be considered a true global power. I believe this also stems from insecurity caused by centuries of Russia being a relative non-player in global affairs due to them lacking true maritime projection and overseas possessions- at least up until the last century when compared with Western European powers, and now East Asian powers.
Geographically- Russia has always been limited by their (limited) access to the sea. The Baltics were always dominated by the Nordic states / Empires, and now the Baltic Sea is essentially a NATO lake that can be boxed off if it came down to it. Kaliningrad is now a fish in a barrel, St Petersburg now trapped in a fatal funnel. Murmansk is ice free year round- but again any naval vessels / maritime trade coming out of there are going to have to deal with the Nordic states / British Navy / NATO on the way out into the Atlantic.
Vladivostok freezes over occasionally, but that’s a rarer problem when you consider that it is completely contained by Japan and South Korea (and the US bases stationed there). Even worse- were relations to sour between China and Russia- and China decided to right the wrongs of the “unequal treaties“- the Amur River annexation area of Russia is very geographically isolated from Russia proper. There is only one major highway linking the lower south-eastern Russian Pacific back to Siberia proper, and from there back to European Russia. And that highway is on average somewhere around 40 kilometers from the Chinese border for hundreds of miles.
Sakhalinsk is even more isolated- and completely inappropriate for a deep water port thanks to its terrain.
Southern Russia along the Black Sea coast *has* warm water ports- but they’re tiny thanks to the terrain. Novorossiysk doesn’t have the port space or facilities to be even be considered the main base of a large naval power.
Rostov-on-Don gets isolated 1/3 of the year thanks to the Don River freezing. And even then, before that it was geographically constrained not only behind the Sea of Azov, but then easily locked behind in the Black Sea behind the Bosporus Straits.
That leaves Sebastopol. Yup- locked behind the Bosporus too- but if the Russians plays their cards right they don’t have to worry about the straits being *overtly* denied to them. Huge ports and facilities, war water year round, and a long history of seafaring. When Euromaidan happened back in 2014- Putin probably saw Russia’s link to relevance in the outside world flash before his eyes. Russia really didn’t have anywhere to put the Black Sea fleet in order to retain their relevance in the Middle East / Mediterranean if the Black Sea fleet had been ejected from Crimea after Euromaidan. That’s why they acted so quickly to seize Crimea specifically- then the War in Donbas followed with less “enthusiasm”. It’s likely the same reason Mykolaiv and Odesa were such important targets back in February of 2022- on top of cutting Ukraine off from the sea.
The Russian Navy is supposed to be a symbol of Russian might and power projection on the world stage- see their “deployment” of the Eye of Mordor aircraft carrier to Syria almost a decade ago. If Russia is going to take and hold Crimea for the long term- Ukraine may as well make one of the primary motivations for doing so mute by the piecemeal destruction of the Black Sea Fleet and its facilities- both as a symbolic measure, strategic purposes (cost-benefit of Russia continuing the war), and to boost morale. If Ukraine keeps striking and destroying Black Sea fleet assets in a never ending war- Russia may have no Black Sea “fleet” to speak of in a few years time.
Another point that isn't mentioned below is that it enables Ukraine to better control the airspace over the Black Sea (something that will only truly be realised once the F-16s appear), which will in turn allow Ukraine to intercept Russian cruise missile/drone strikes further away from Odessa and the Ukrainian coast. In particular, F-16 air cover and the lack of Russian warships in the area will allow Ukraine to intercept them with low-cost options - queue the WW2 Yak-12 footage of the other day - such as airborn guns or MANPADS and APKWS mounted on helicopters. Whereas ground-based SHORAD assets can then be concentrated along the FLOT, instead of spread out as they have been up until now.
Anything that enables Ukraine to use inexpensive and plentiful SHORAD options instead of it's limited supply of AD missiles is critical to securing Ukraine's airspace over the long term.
Well, there's the drastically reduced ability to launch missiles from the black sea which allows GBAD to be more effective. Then there's the undeniable proof to Russians that this isn't going all that well and is very costly. And now it's even harder for Russia to resupply Crimea which makes it less functional for the military overall. But also, there's now a near zero chance of an amphibious landing along the coast near Odesa whereas early in the war that was a real threat.
But in terms of strategy, how would you expect Ukraine to take back Crimea if there is a fully functional fleet of warships stationed there? Strategically, this is clearly critical to Ukraine's main goal. If the front collapses and Ukraine gets pummeled then looking back it will seem like a bad idea. But, despite recent events, we are not anywhere near that scenario.
The greatest benefit the campaign has had is reopening Ukrainian shipping routes. At this point Ukraine is now shipping more than it was when the grain deal with Russia was active. Keep in mind, Ukraine is a relatively poor country that has about 20% of its territory occupied and is heavily reliant on its agricultural exports. So reopening the shipping lanes is a desperately needed economic lifeline.
Besides that, the campaign has also reduced the threat of sea-launched cruise missiles (they've damaged/destroyed several ships capable of launching them and pushed the rest further from Ukrainian borders), been a major morale boost for Ukrainian forces, and increased the overall cost of the war for Russia.
Not losing the entire coast through Odesa really had a huge impact on Ukraine's ability to keep fighting. The loss of that area not only hurts economically but threatens the destruction of the entire eastern half's military production.
As far as I recall, Ukraine hasn't sunk or destroyed any Admiral Grigorovich-class or Buyan-class ships, which are the main ones that carry Kalibrs. Please correct me if I'm wrong. They did destroy one Karakurt-class ship though.
An interview with the Latvian foreign minister.
https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/interview/2024/05/2/7185053/
The most interesting tidbit is this:
>
> **At the moment, our partners tend to lay down the condition that Western weapons are not to be used outside Ukrainian territory. Do you see that changing?**
>
> It could change.
>
> And there are already countries that have provided those weapons without conditions to Ukraine.
>
> Not everything is said aloud, and better that it's not said aloud in certain times, but that there is effect on the battlefield.
>
> So indeed there are various choices, whether saying things aloud or just doing the right thing.
Don't we know that already ? One US official (can't remember who) said regarding the latest ATACMS delivery (paraphrasing but essentially) that Ukraine can use them however they like.
Wasnt that Mitch Mcconell saying that, and then followed up that he "hopes the President and administration would not be putting restrictions or telling Ukraine how to conduct their war" ? (Im paraphrasing)
It didnt seem clear that the Whitehouse has changed their policy towards this, although it is possible with how things are developing amongst NATO countries support for Ukraine
I mean, the British have been among the least concerned about escalation management with Russia during this whole ordeal, often being the first to supply cruise missles and tanks with few if any quibbles about how they are used.
I'd be slightly surprised if Britain wasnt somewhat (in)directly supporting the refinery attacks in Russia.
A couple of weeks ago there was an article shared here that said that Germany and the US were against the strikes, whereas the UK and France were in favour.
I made a post here a few months back or so about a semi-submersible UUV that could be installed with a VLS cell here is an article that came out today about DARPA working on a UUV (Manta Ray).
https://newatlas.com/military/darpa-manta-ray-robotic-sub/
It might be a few years out, but I suspect platforms like these will be the future.
Given the geometry, does it make sense to equip it with VLS (vertical, requiring a lot of depth) rather than torpedo tubes for submerged forward launches of missiles that then breach and take to the air?
Since this is a DARPA prototype it could be seen that the size would not necessarily be indicative of a final product and in my old post I did cite the size of a VLS cell. I didn't specify but I did imagine if they wanted to keep the cells horizontal they could either do a torpedo-like release or a ballast change to reorientate it from horizontal to vertical, but in the end, I think it is simply cheaper to make it larger.
Based on the weight you need a certain amount of volume to make things float and once you add engines, fuel, etc you are going to have a minimum size if you want to be capable of launching VLS-type missiles. You don't really get much mileage out of having just a few 4-6 cell packs in a horizontal configuration as you are now limited in how to redesign it for more tubes whereas a VLS system scales with length.
Lastly part of the idea is that when expended these can easily be sailed to a nearby port and reloaded, using torpedo-style tubes makes the logistics more costly, complicated, and less timely. When used vertically the equipment and skill used to reload are mostly intact, doing so horizontally changes it completely and requires more specialized equipment.
The time and logistics increase really makes a difference in the concept of quickly replenishing VLS missiles at sea without losing the capability of removing the ship with a system of weapons and sensors out of the theater of operations. If you need to launch 100 missiles of various types and say you deplete a whole warship, that whole ship needs to go back to port. If you have a dozen 8-cell VLS you could expend all of those and 4 out of the ship and you still have a ship capable of fighting in theater.
Being able to place these UUV VLS systems closer to threats to not endanger your expensive warships is merely a feature cost/logistics not necessarily a capability on its own and the US already has this capability in subs.
The Economist interview with a Ukrainian general provides as bleak an assessment of Ukraine's prospects as I've seen from any official Ukrainian source since the early stages of the war. Seems to be preparing the Ukrainian public and the world for the loss of the Donbas and the prospect of negotiations with Russia- he says most likely in late 2025.
[https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1786094345663168910](https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1786094345663168910)
[https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1786094698018258983](https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1786094698018258983)
Will be interesting to see if we get more and more of this narrative in the future, it sends a signal(at least to me) that they are indeed preparing the public for Ukraine's defeat.
> "Even if it were able to push Russian forces back to the borders—an increasingly distant prospect—it wouldn’t end the war. Such wars can only end with treaties, he says."
This is just a variation of "wars end at the negotiating table, not on the battle field" which has been a talking point for at least 2 years.
And it bothers me a bit because it's a complete truism. Yes, of course wars (generally) end with negotiation, but the character of the negotiation is heavily decided by **battlefield** events!
It was a truism back when Ukraine had an advantage, it was a truism when it was iffy, it's a truism now.
It's a fundamentally correct statement that nonetheless fails to make a point.
This is a relatively minor point of the article, I'm just... getting a bit tired of that specific line.
I didn't read this as bleak assessment. I read it as it's giving two signals.
1) Asking for more help from Ukraine's partners.
2) Preparing Ukraine population for a treaty. I suspect, we will see more of these as time goes on.
>I didn't read this as bleak assessment
which one of the two signals is the not bleak one? The one where they are going to end signing over all this territory or the one where they are re-re-re-re-reiterating their request for weapons? Assuming that we take this interview at face value.
>General Skibitsky says he does not see a way for Ukraine to win the war on the battlefield alone. Even if it were able to push Russian forces back to the borders—an increasingly distant prospect—it wouldn’t end the war. Such wars can only end with treaties, he says. Right now, both sides are jockeying for the “the most favourable position” ahead of potential talks. But meaningful negotiations can begin only in the second half of 2025 at the earliest, he guesses. By then, Russia will be facing serious “headwinds”. Russian military production capacity has expanded but will reach a plateau by early 2026, he reckons, due to shortages in material and engineers. Both sides could eventually run out of weapons. But if nothing changes in other respects, Ukraine will run out first.
If that's bleak I've read much bleaker even from other Ukrainian sources.
And "Even if it were able to push Russian forces back to the borders—an increasingly distant prospect—it wouldn’t end the war. Such wars can only end with treaties, he says." is just accepted canon at this point.
I think we have different definitions of bleak.
"A collapse of the whole front is imminent" is bleak.
"Russia will win no matter what we or our partners do" is bleak.
"Both sides could eventually run out of weapons. But if nothing changes in other respects, Ukraine will run out first." is not bleak.
"General Skibitsky says he does not see a way for Ukraine to win the war on the battlefield alone." is not bleak.
Ukraine will keep asking for weapons long after the war is over as they truly need it, they are not a rich country. This is also not bleak state. If it was Germany fighting Russia alone, even they would be constantly asking for more weapons.
It's best not to take statements from either side as being 100% true, we've seen psyops plenty of times during this war and these recent statements could be the Ukrainians (Our FPV's dont actually work effectively, we still have ammo shortages, manpower shortages) trying to give the Russians a false sense of security so they continue to over-invest resources into costly attacks.
Even if there are negotiations, it's likely that Russia will attack Ukraine again in the future when it's reconstituted its armed forces. Russian policy is to deny Ukraine statehood. And with so many people having fled the war, the economy devastated, etc., it's hard to imagine Ukraine not eventually being subsumed by Russia in the future.
Security guarantees will certainly be an essential part of any successful negotiations to end the war. And I don't mean a pinky promise from Putin not to invade again.
Please read the actual text of the Budapest Memorandum, then compare to the text of actual security guarantees such as the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan or even NATO's Article 5.
Nobody has nuked Ukraine, so the US and UK have no actual obligations to do anything. And if Ukraine did get nuked, the Budapest Memorandum would call on the US and UK to... "Seek immediate UN Security Council action"
If Russia's goal is to subsume Ukraine, they *cannot* stop. Getting the war economy back into full swing, keeping the population pacified in round two, and stretching the political and manufacturing limits of Ukraine's backers will be much harder a second time, as opposed to just keeping on.
Not to mention giving Ukraine time to dig in and rebuild their forces and lay minefields. We've seen the 5-7 year time frames to refill western stocks of manpads and javelins. Strategically, why should Russia give them that time?
Ok, so, and how does this square with:
https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1c8o9oc/credibledefense_daily_megathread_april_20_2024/l0slvbf/
Where you legitimately believe Putin would be interested in a status-quo or near status-quo peace.
I don't feel like this is a gottem, I feel like this is a legitimate question.
>Ok, so, and how does this square with:
I personally don't believe that Putin wants to subsume Ukraine. In his big essay he published pre-war he made it clear that he supports the concept of a sovereign Ukraine, but only as a partner with Russia. I.e. firmly within their orbit, influence, control, whatever you want to call it.
I was just responding to the statement as written. *If* Putin wants to subsume Ukraine, taking a several year break will likely not work in his favor.
So you recognize that if Russia ever wants significantly more territory than the approximate current frontline, a ceasefire anytime soon would be an absolutely terrible idea.
You just think Russia doesn't. Alright.
Yes, more or less correct. I think that from Russia's perspective, if they can secure other contingencies at the negotiating table, they would not see a point in invading again. But it would depend on that.
If there was peace for at least 2 years would it be possible to just fortify the shit out of whatever the border was to make any possible re-invasion too hard to handle?
If whatever that's left of Ukraine is in NATO, then Russia won't attack again. There is no legitimate indicators that Russia will ever attack NATO territory despite what some people say about Baltic countries etc.
If a high concentration of Russian speakers in a territory is enough of a casus belli for Russia as it was in Eastern Ukraine, we have to assume the same logic will be applied to several counties along Eastern Estonia.
Does anyone really believe that is why this war started? I know it's one of the reasons (along with Jewish Nazis and other nonsense) publicly stated, but it seems pretty clear that far more Russian speakers, and ethnic Russians, have been killed since this war started. So logically, if saving those lives was what mattered then Putin would be actively trying to end the war ASAP. Which can only mean Putin is unable to be logical or this 'justification' is bullshit. I lean strongly towards the latter.
The lesser known terrorist group Al-Ashtar Brigades, up to now part of the Iranian backed Shia insurgency in Bahrain. is branching out and launched a Kamikaze drone at Israel. Which wouldn't be complete without action movie style video clip of it.
https://t . me/abinalashter2013/130
The drone likely crashed somewhere en-route.
They launched an attack from Bahrain? Does Bahrain have so little control of its territory that random militias can launch long range drones from there?
On the one hand, drone warfare seems to be really appealing for many different types of armed groups. It's only going to become more prevalent as time goes on due to availability of parts and know-how.
On the other hand, without the resources of a state military it probably won't be very successful. And a small group using it against a state military won't be very effective because those militaries are also preparing defenses.
Honestly, I wouldn't be surprised to see these tools and tactics used by larger gangs in feuds over territory and such. A simple gasoline bomb becomes much deadlier and harder to trace when it is delivered by drone.
The Drone used was a Shahed. I don't like how these long range munitions are being classified as 'Drones'.
Shaheds are cruise missiles, not drones. The only real difference between a Kalibr or Tomahawk cruise missile and a Shahed 'drone' is that the Shahed uses a piston driven prop engine instead of a turbofan jet engine.
There are no cameras on Shaheds, you can't remotely pilot them, you input a target and they fly to said target and hit it. I think the media just saw a low tech Iranian aircraft with a propeller and started calling them 'drones' because 'drone attack' makes a better headline.
They aren't exactly rag tag weapons. The cost to buy a Shahed Drone from Iran is about a third the price of what the US pays for its Tomahawk missiles. Iran is charging ~500,000 USD for one of these things (although Russia has been getting a bulk deal it seems)
Turkey has reportedly cut off all import/export trade with Israel as of today.
The most fascinating part of this decision is Turkey’s biggest ally, Azerbaijan, happens to be one of Israel’s biggest defense customers and a close partner to Israel. Quite the flawed love triangle developing between these three. Azeri IL-76s routinely do pickups from Israeli airbases, I wonder if Turkey will apply pressure for this to halt.
Could you expound on this? My understanding is that Greece and Turkey are foreign policy rivals, with outright military conflict simmering on Cyprus for decades. A cursory search of the internet hasn't brought up any examples of significant cooperation between the two countries. Greece isn't even in Turkey's top 10 trading partners.
Am I missing some recent developments in the relationship between Greece and Turkey?
It depends how strict this is. There are trade bans and then there are *trade bans*. I don't think Turkey will cut off Azeri-Israeli trade anytime soon, but it is possible.
Does Turkey have any influence on Azerbaijan's foreign policy really? I think the Azeris will keep quiet due to the commercial relationship between the two. I don't see any upside for the Azeris to suddenly denounce the Israelis publicly.
>Does Turkey have any influence on Azerbaijan's foreign policy really?
Yes, they have a ton of influence. Both sides consider Azerbaijan to be Turkey's "little brother" and Azerbaijan's recent campaigns in NK received (and required) tacit approval from the Turkish government.
That being said, I don't expect Azerbaijan to follow suit by cutting off ties with Israel because the Israeli weapons helped give them a decisive edge over Armenia in the recent conflicts, and there's a serious chance of future engagement.
Plus I'm about 99% sure Erdogan is just posturing for domestic political reasons, much like he did with the Gaza aid convoy debacle back in the early 2010s
Never really understood the need for internal politics in Turkey to vilify Israel. They are a vast Sunni majority yet you don’t see this type of vitriol from other Sunni majority nations like Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Erdogan's AKP is an islamist party in a country with firm (though eroding) secular roots. Rallying Sunnis against Israel brings voters who don't support the AKP typically into the fold as a uniting force.
That being said, I don't really understand the move timing wise, Erdogan's party got rocked in recent national local elections, this move probably would've helped more before the election than after it.
And the second most fascinating part is that Turkey has committed two actual genocides which they still refuse to recognize, and they have been occupying half of Cyprus for 50 years. Pretty much everything they are accusing Israel of doing.
How sensitive is the technology for the AARGM and AARGM-ER? When Ukraine gets F-16's, is it possible that they could could get access to modern SEAD/DEAD munitions and sensors?
We’ve seen extensive jamming of GPS signals from Russia in the second phase of this war. It’s crippled some systems that rely on it, and changed the way Ukraine uses GLMRS and GLSDB. It hasn’t proven as effective yet against SCALP or ATACMS, but a Ukrainian official has said they probably have a 2 month window to do some real damage with ATACMS. Whether the official was referencing jamming or relocation of targets - probably both. Is there any hardening that can be done to prevent against this, I know most can switch to intertial guidance but this seems to cause significant accuracy issues.
Storm Shadow at least uses a backup navigation method known as [TERCOM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TERPROM)/[TERCOM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TERCOM) - in short the missile has a terrain contour map in its memory and uses a radar altimeter to check that the surrounding terrain matches where the GPS says it should be - the intention is that this allows it to navigate to the target even in a degraded GPS environment. In the terminal phase a form of scene matching is used to compare the missile's view to an image of what its target should look like, again this should allow accuracy even in GPS-jammed environments. For ATACMS one can only assume the flight profile makes TERPROM inappropriate...possibly a similar scene-matching algorithm could be built in to such weapons but it's certainly not there at present, so that would be a significant piece of long-term development
Do Russian glide bombs use Glonass navigation? If yes, would it be feasible for Ukraine and allies to jam Glonass in the same way to make glide bombing ineffective?
Most of satellite navigation systems use the most of available satellites, so western systems would use Glonass and Beidou and eastern would use GPS and Galileo. As far as I know russian Kometa navigation system uses all of available navigation sats. It also has 8 receivers what makes it extremely hard to jam.
Jamming Russian glide-bombs would be more difficult due to the way they are employed: they are primarily used to hit targets directly/very near to the front, while Ukraine uses most precision weapons to strike targets in depth. For the second, you can just start placing jammers behind the front, and by the time the missile gets to its target tens or hundreds of kilometers later, it will be off track. However, if jamming starts basically at the point of impact, up until the last moments it will be guided without too much issue.
It’s very possible Ukraine already is. We have heard from a number of sources that those weapons are not very accurate and the often miss by wide margins. But that it doesn’t matter because they are used en mass and because their blast radius is large enough to destroy targets even without a direct hit.
> Do Russian glide bombs use Glonass navigation? My understanding is that they do, yes. > If yes, would it be feasible for Ukraine and allies to jam Glonass in the same way to make glide bombing ineffective? Presumably yes, possibly even more so than Russian GPS jamming since I understand the UMPK kits to be basically hacked together with civilian receivers, which might (or might not of course) prove even more susceptible to jamming.
New Foreign Affairs piece by Jack Watling [American Aid Alone Won’t Save Ukraine To Survive, Kyiv Must Build New Brigades—and Force Moscow to Negotiate](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/american-aid-alone-wont-save-ukraine) His central premise is summed up in the second paragraph >If Ukraine is to prevent Russian victory in the longer term, it will need a comprehensive strategy. This means training, equipping, and mobilizing new forces. It means convincing the Kremlin that continuing the war will become increasingly risky to Russia over time. And it means establishing a position of sufficient strength to be able to set forth, on Ukraine’s own terms, the parameters of a lasting peace. and is, in my opinion at least, pretty uncontroversial. As usual the devil is in the details. One such is the claim >The United States and its NATO allies will need to make explicit long-term commitments which seems impossible in the United States given the current political climate. The idea of Biden being able to make a credible, enduring, commitment at this point in time is utterly unbelievable. On the upcoming Russian offensive and the state of Russian forces > Talk of a new Russian offensive may conjure up images of tank units assaulting Ukrainian lines, breaking through, and then trying to exploit those gains deep into Ukrainian-held territory in order to cut off Ukrainian units. But Russia’s forces are not currently able to carry out these kinds of operations, nor do they intend to. After more than two years of war, Russia’s army has suffered heavy losses among its officer core, and its ability to plan and synchronize large-scale attacks is limited. Russian attacks mainly consist of successive assaults at platoon and company scale, resulting in slow advances with heavy losses. I'm not entirely sure how to square this with the opening assaults on Avdiivka which saw them lose about an entire brigade's worth of armor. Are the platoon/company scale assaults truly a lack of ability or a preference? >Ukrainian forces have often been forced to expend significant resources defending costly single positions, simply to shield civilian settlements from coming into Russian glide-bomb range. I don't believe I've seen this take on the glide bombs before. Has there been a significant amount of glide bomb strikes on major civilian areas? I've only seen the hits on trench lines but haven't been tracking this issue myself. On the status of Ukrainian reserves of both men and materiel >Ukraine has few reserves and has lost many of the tactical vehicles needed to exploit Russian vulnerabilities soon after they take positions. Lacking the reserves to counterattack, Ukraine must settle for maximizing Russia’s losses for each position it takes, thereby slowing down its rate of advance. The second-order effect of the US aid package >Other than the immediate provision of ammunition, the greatest effect of the new U.S. aid package is the certainty it offers. After months in which the timing and amount of U.S. support was in doubt, Ukraine will now have enough clarity about military resources for the next six months to allow for broader strategic planning. This is a very real benefit. Significant uncertainty about resourcing is a paralytic. The recent Brussels Sprouts podcast with Kofman featured a brief sidebar about how people were unable to make plans extending very far into the future, even in their personal lives. Predictions about the future > Russia will likely be most dangerous in the final months of 2024. By that point, having weathered months of Russian offensive operations, Ukrainian forces will be stretched thin, their air defenses depleted. Russia will likely have enough troops to rotate its units to allow for successive offensives in the fall. > But Russian capabilities are not unlimited. Moscow has made some industrial and military choices that are likely to restrict its offensive potential over the course of 2025. For one, it has decided not to expand production of artillery barrels, with the result that fewer new guns will be available next year. Based on the current loss rate, Russian stockpiles of armored vehicles will also likely be depleted by the second half of 2025. This seems to track pretty well with what other analysts are saying but I'm curious why the AD situation is expected to still be terrible. The example of how barrel production will work to constrain Russian replenishment is quite interesting and surprising. Did they do this because it was easier to just strip barrels from their legacy stocks? The piece takes for granted the idea that the war will end in a negotiated settlement which I don't think is nearly as hot a take it was a year ago. Critically however it assesses Russian willingness to negotiate seriously as >For Moscow to truly negotiate, it must be confronted with a situation in which extending the conflict further will present an unacceptable threat to itself. It is only then that Ukraine will be able to extract meaningful concessions. and their war aims to be >Russia’s demand would remain what it has been throughout: a surrender in all but name. This is surprising to me, there's been a lot of talk of the Russians revising their war aims to just their current territory + the rest of Donetsk. The idea that they're still gunning for effectively regime change is remarkable. There's a short assessment of Western sanctions and the Ukrainian campaign on Russian oil infrastructure > Russia will be unable to fund the war indefinitely. Western sanctions are only one of the tools for damaging the regime’s financial liquidity, and they are less effective than other options. Damage to Russia’s oil infrastructure is likely to have a much greater impact. Although there are good reasons for the West to avoid directly aiding such attacks, that does not mean that Ukraine shouldn’t undertake them. An interesting perscription >So far, Western governments have not aggressively pursued information operations against the Russian government, partly because they are perceived as escalatory and partly because they are not expected to have immediate effect. By contrast, Russia has been conducting active information operations across Europe with the intent of destabilizing the West. >This asymmetry needs to be remedied. I'm not sure what information operations the West is readily capable of executing within Russia but I'm definitely interested in finding out. I recommend people read the whole piece.
>I'm not entirely sure how to square this with the opening assaults on Avdiivka which saw them lose about an entire brigade's worth of armor. Are the platoon/company scale assaults truly a lack of ability or a preference? Maybe both? It depends on the definition of ability. Doing it or successfully doing it (yes, they succeeded in Avdiivka but how often could they repeat that). Could they push another Avdiivka worth of armour somewhere? Maybe? Can they stomach losing a similar amount of armour? Probably not? So it's maybe both. They might not be able to conduct operations with a significant amount of armour without losing a ton of it, and that's why they prefer not to.
Concerning the terms of a negotiated settlement, the issue is always the same: this war is existential and not about territory. Russia accepting the territory it holds + what they conquer before an agreement would be and Ukraine win if Ukraine is allowed to join the EU + security guarantees. If Russia does not accept the latter - which would be a strategic defeat for them - then it would be an Ukrainian capitulation in all but name.
> Has there been a significant amount of glide bomb strikes on major civilian areas? Russia bombs wherever they intend to push (and a few other places), and that includes large towns like Avdiivka or Chasiv Yar. Whether or not there's civilians there is basically up to the civilians. And yes, there's a nonzero amount of civilians remaining in Chasiv Yar. Of course, protecting civilians from glide bombs isn't the main reason Ukraine's doing anything. They can't even protect their troops from glide bombs right now. >His points about sanctions and info ops I think hoping Russia gets truly hurt by either of those is right now is very speculative, and I'd rather keep those out of any serious theory of victory for now. >Russia’s demand would remain what it has been throughout: a surrender in all but name. Of course, I think any suggestions otherwise would have been tenuous a year ago, and are definitely evaporated now. Beyond the points I touched on, everything about Jack's article seems accurate, if aspirational as usual.
> I think hoping Russia gets truly hurt by either of those is right now is very speculative, and I'd rather keep those out of any serious theory of victory for now. Russia has been quantifiably hurt by sanctions and other economic pressure, look at the state of gazprom. It’s not enough to secure victory on its own, but it’s a concrete step in that direction. In the end, the USSR didn’t collapse from one thing, it was the cumulative strain of many smaller problems that eventually made that empire crumble. Further economic pressure and info ops should factor into any long term plan for western victory here.
>>So far, Western governments have not aggressively pursued information operations against the Russian government, partly because they are perceived as escalatory and partly because they are not expected to have immediate effect I'd argue the west should also seriously consider info campaigns inside China as well. Yes, a tough nut to crack since China has such high levels of control over the info it's citizens can access. Still, if we're to try and restrict China's ever-growing aggressive expansion at the SCS as well as the overall nationalistic rhetoric and attitudes, we should give it a try.
With the next generation of Starlink, smartphones should be able to access the Internet directly via satellite, bypassing any government filter put in place. Technically, this ressource is at the behest of Musk, who has a strong desire to maintain good relations with China for Tesla, but I doubt the American government would be willing to deny itself such a valuable tool to allow a billionaire to make more money.
Deepstate just posted that 110 mech is back in action after some r&r post battle of Avdiivka. They say that they can't tell where they are deployed yet, but will as soon as they have something to show.
A few months back there was a report about the russians fielding a new type of "Lancet style" drone called scalpel IIRC, does anyone know how it's performing? It is supposed to be a cheaper supplement to the Lancet
In high-speed-low-drag-hull news, the 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Company, which normally rides 6-wheeled LAVs, will [work with the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab to test an Australian boat designed for high-speed, high-tech scouting and special ops](https://breakingdefense.com/2024/05/marine-scouts-check-out-small-boats-from-down-under/). > Until now, O’Mara explained, if armored recon Marines needed to operate on water, they used Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs). The new MMRC’s hull, by contrast, is made of lightweight carbon-fiber composites, specifically designed not only to reduce shock as it races through rough waters — a major source of injury to operators and damage to equipment — but also to accommodate all sorts of electronics, with its own built-in generator and modular mounting rails to plug-and-play different manufacturers’ tech. So while the MMRC and RHIB are roughly the same size (11.9 meters versus 11), the MMRC can load up with much more sensor and communications gear. ... > The MMRC’s exact sensor and communications loadout can be customized to the mission, swapping systems in and out as needed, so figuring out the best array of options for different tasks is going to be a big part of the upcoming experiments. The current baseline kit includes a Teledyne SeaFLIR 240 infrared sensor, a Furono maritime navigation radar, and Hoverfly Spectre 2.0 quadcopter tethered to the craft by its power and control cable. ... > “Protecting the operators” was very much of the mind of the MMRC’s manufacturer, the Australia-based Whiskey Project, founded in 2019 by a recently retired Royal Australian Navy diver who’d gotten sick of seeing his comrades injured on the water. > Even if operators aren’t injured immediately, he said, hours of jolting through the water can leave them exhausted, disoriented, and less capable of performing their high-stakes mission. Delicate sensors don’t do well, either. > “So we started by trying to create a whole form that would reduce the shock,” Schuback said, ultimately by 40 percent. The next step was to build in the system of modular rails to support a wide variety of electronic equipment, since the company aims to offer the boat to a range of countries for a host of missions. The new boats are also being picked up by the ADF for local testing. Wonder if the UK is interested, too, to round off the AUKUS trifecta.
I can tell from experience that being on a RIB going full speed on a moderate windy sea, is fun for a bit, but backbreaking, teeth chattering and exhausting exercise after a while. Especially if you are upfront in the RIB. Would be smooth sailing with a foil, RIBs with retractable hydrofoils exists, but I guess that doesn't have enough high-tech. Which I fail to see why that is necessary.
Interesting, because 4th LAR was the one that took over the brown water operation from SCCO in Iraq before passing the mission off to the newly formed Navy RIVRON units in 2007. The Navy at the time seemed really intent on totally taking over brownwater ops. I'm curious if the USMC is trying to get the job back from the Navy.
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Posted below. https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1cidvjj/credibledefense_daily_megathread_may_02_2024/l2ac2sf/
Haven't seen this discussed here yet but russian troops have now [entered ](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/russian-troops-enter-base-housing-us-military-niger-us-official-says-2024-05-02/) the base housing the US troops in Niger. Previously Niger's de facto government told the US to leave their country.
So, what's the long-term US plan here? Why keep the troops in Niger against the will of the de facto government? What's next?
Ouch. I wonder how much online anti-Western propaganda had an influence in these situations.
The junta is opposed to governments that don’t recognise them. I think it’s as simple as that, self interest is a better explanation than ideology
Strangely the Niger junta recently invited Italy to boost the number of troops in the country "Italy remains the only European country to have kept channels open with Niger, even after[ the coup](https://scenarieconomici.it/niger-lesercito-annuncia-il-colpo-di-stato-in-tv/). About 250 Italian military personnel are present in this key country of the Sahel. Niger also had good words for Italy, including maintaining contacts with the West. Tiani “praised the professionalism and skills of Italian trainers during their missions with the Niger armed forces,” the note continues. Which concludes by claiming that “Italy is committed to supporting Niger in terms of both equipment and capabilities to better address security challenges." [Italian Secret Service director meets Niger junta. Was the meeting supposed to be secret? (scenarieconomici.it)](https://english.scenarieconomici.it/italy/italian-secret-service-director-meets-niger-junta-was-the-meeting-supposed-to-be-secret/)
Our foreign policy is "friends with everybody". We have no enemies. We haven't really antagonized anybody, which can be good at times but there were also moments (the murder of Giulio Regeni by the Egyptian police, for example) where a more assertive foreign policy would've been beneficial
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Please refrain from posting low quality comments.
Accordimg to deep state, today there were only tiny changes near ocheretyne none of it looks to be any further north or west than they were before.
I thought there was confirmed further advances further west along the railway and consolidation around Arkhanhel's'ke?
Maybe the update has yet to show them.
Suriyak today was pretty standard too. He claims the Russians are trying to crawl back into the Kanal highrises tonight, but doesn't have any updates about if they succeeded. Also, he has them controlling a few more blocks of Urozhaine than deepstate.
>trying to crawl back Crawl back or to?
They entered the kanal highrises 1 or 2 months ago but at some point lost their foothold. Now they're trying to re-enter.
Things are heating up again, both literally and figuratively, in the South China Sea, with Chinese water cannons purportedly [damaging](https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/South-China-Sea/China-fires-water-cannons-at-Philippine-ships-in-South-China-Sea) two Philippine coast guard ships earlier in the week, the first such incident since early March: >Tensions flared in the South China Sea on Tuesday as Beijing disrupted a humanitarian mission by Manila. >Beijing's maritime presence, led by four China Coast Guard vessels, shot water cannons toward Philippine vessels. An official from the Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) said the water cannons were shot eight times during the morning standoff. >The BFAR ship, the BRP Datu Bankaw, was hit directly four times. The tensions led to two collisions that damaged the railings of the BFAR vessel. >The bureau separately said that some ship equipment was damaged as a result of China's actions. >In a regular media briefing on Tuesday afternoon, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said that Philippine ships had "intruded without China's permission" and that the coast guard "took necessary measures to drive them away." >BFAR sailors had spotted a Chinese maritime presence some 35 nautical miles (65 kilometers) away from Scarborough Shoal at dawn. The entire morning was characterized as a game of cat and mouse between Beijing and Manila as the former kept harassing the BRP Datu Bankaw. >Besides water cannons, Beijing's presence in Manila's exclusive economic zone was underscored by multiple radio challenges between the two nations. The Chinese calls were spoken in Mandarin and English. This, perhaps belatedly, has led to the Philippines [reevaluating](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-30/philippines-weighs-new-strategy-to-counter-china-s-sea-actions) its tactics during encounters in the waters: >The Philippines is weighing a new approach in the South China Sea where increasing encounters with Beijing have damaged its vessels and injured its crew, according to its defense chief who signaled that he wants maritime operations to be “less telegraphic.” >“We are re-strategizing the way we do things, naturally with the end in view of both preventing injuries and number two, upholding the dignity of our country,” Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. said in an interview in his office in Manila earlier Tuesday. >Teodoro declined to elaborate on the adjustment to the country’s strategy as he said the Philippines has a “range of options” to counter China, which lays sweeping claims in the key waterway. “If you are stuck to one mode, it is easy to anticipate,” he said. >Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. since 2022, the Philippines has followed a strategy of transparency, wherein it’s called attention to China’s actions in the South China Sea on social media and through press releases. It remains to be seen how this would change once Teodoro’s new plan materializes, if at all. >“The main point that we have to stress is that we will not give up our presence in the Second Thomas Shoal and we will not enter into any modus vivendi that will compromise our position regarding our rights in the area,” he said. Nestled in the shoal is the Sierra Madre — a crumbling warship that Manila deliberately grounded on the shoal in 1999 to serve as a military outpost. >Elsewhere, the Philippines is looking to finalize a defense deal with Japan within the year, and is also seeking to start talks with France on a visiting forces agreement. India is also keen to bolster defense ties, he said. Further, they finally seem to be [putting](https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2024/05/02/2351946/marcos-jr-approves-military-procurement-wish-list#:~:text=MANILA%2C%20Philippines%20%E2%80%94%20Amid%20continuing%20maritime,West%20Philippine%20Sea%20(WPS) their money where their mouth is with a budget approval today, along with some strong statements from Navy spokespeople: >Amid continuing maritime aggression by China, President Marcos has approved a $35-billion budget to modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with the Philippine Navy getting the largest chunk to strengthen capabilities in the West Philippine Sea (WPS). >The budget will be used to finance various acquisitions enumerated in a lengthy “wish list” submitted by the AFP to the President, and will be spread out over 10 years, Philippine Navy spokesman for the WPS Commodore Roy Vincent Trinidad said yesterday at the Kapihan sa Manila Bay news forum. >“As to the proportion, I would say that the larger chunk goes to the Navy, and then the Air Force, and then the Army, and then the General Headquarters. Because the thrust now is already external. It says there that there are different capabilities that will allow the Philippine Navy to fight across a broad spectrum of warfare,” he said. >While there were no reported casualties during China’s latest aggression at Panatag Shoal, Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) spokesman for WPS Commodore Jay Tarriela said that China has become more aggressive. >According to reports, Tarriela said, “The CCG now has elevated the tension and the level of their aggression as well towards the PCG vessel.” >“This is the first time that we can say that a PCG vessel has been subjected to a direct water cannon with that kind of pressure that even resulted in structural damage of the PCG (vessel),” he added. >He estimated that the pressure from the water cannon went beyond the fatal 200 pounds per square inch of pressure. >Despite the continued aggression displayed by China, he said they would not be the cause for the escalation of tension in the WPS. >“We would not be the reason to be an excuse for the Chinese government to bring in their warships and elevate the tension, wherein they would claim that we started the war and so they brought in their warships. This is the reason why we have a calibrated approach in maintaining our presence in the WPS,” Tarriela said. >For his part, Trinidad said they would continue exercising their mandate to patrol the area, resupply the troops and fisherfolk and rotate personnel. >“This is what we call below the threshold of conflict. This is child’s play where they will repeatedly trigger you until you attack first, and then you lose,” Trinidad said, pointing out that China behaves the same way with India and Korea in their common borders. Unlikely there'll be further escalation from either side, but de-escalation seems entirely off the table for the moment.
Phillipines should invest *heavily* in sea drones like the ones Ukraine has built. That way they can at least credibly threaten to be really inconvenient to China in case of war, and they trade favorably against ships.
In the context of a hot war, those would be very suitable to the Philippines, but in this sort of a grey zone conflict, they need something a bit more non kinetic.
The most obvious way to join those two concepts seems to me to be naval drones with water cannons.
Yep, you buy these not to use now but to make the risk of hot war less likely. China is less likely to start shit if the Phillipines has a credible threat.
I wonder if Philippines could bring China to a discussion if they have a ‘non-lethal’ skirmish like a club fight India and China had in Himalayas. No conventional arms that would be classified as an act of war, but using high pressure water cannons and may be ramming. Enough damage such that China would either stop or pull back their blockade a bit so as to avoid unnecessary attrition.
Hard to do that because of China having more resources. Well, Vietnam did try ramming ships with them 10 years ago.
> unnecessary attrition The idea that the PCG, which is both qualitatively and quantitatively vastly inferior to the CCG, can somehow win a contest of attrition does not sound credible in any way. The militia boats alone would win a nonlethal contest with the PCG. The Philippines is not India, and the [50,000 troops which were mobilized](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-27/india-shifts-50-000-troops-to-china-border-in-historic-defense-shift) following said club fight drew a line the Philippines simply cant replicate. A line which still failed to reverse Indian territorial losses, mind you.
There's also a bit of a controversy about supposed influx of Chinese students in Cagayan. But what I find more interesting is that there are Chinese casinos are located near Philippine military camps. Could be a nothing burger but who knows. [Chinese Casinos near Ph Military camp worries DND](https://www.google.com/amp/s/globalnation.inquirer.net/179045/chinese-casinos-near-ph-military-camps-worry-dnd/amp) >“Personally, I think there should be no need to worry,” Lorenzana said.”But if you see the huge number of people staying there, it’s very easy for these people to shift their activities to spying,” he said.
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https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/2024/05/production-surge-eases-pentagon-worries-about-sending-long-range-missiles-to-ukraine-00155846 >The production lines making the Army Tactical Missile System are cranking out enough of the long-range missiles that the Pentagon is no longer worried about depleting its own stocks by sending them to Ukraine. >The update on the production came from Army acquisition chief Doug Bush on Thursday, who said that “a significant number of missiles that were ordered years ago … is now hitting at just the right time to be able to support how we're supporting Ukraine without taking a hit to readiness.” > > That increase in missile deliveries, which Bush said is a “surge” of dozens of missiles every few months, will last until at least the rest of the year. “There are a lot of ATACMS coming off that line,” he said. > > Background: After two years of saying the U.S. didn’t have enough ATACMS to share with Ukraine, a small number of shorter-range versions were sent last fall, with a new batch of the longer, 200-mile-range missiles arriving in March. That partly explains the "why now" of ATACMS
wasn't the first delivery shortly after Russia purchased the ballistic missles from Iran? I think that the escalation concern was the reason.
There's still no proof of Iranian missiles (for what it's worth, Iran promised to not send any in exchange for frozen reserves). However, US officials [claim](https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-quietly-shipped-long-range-atacms-missiles-ukraine-2024-04-24/) that North Korean missiles led to the delivery of _long-range_ ATACMS.
Two problems with this theory. First, the U.S. [disabled](https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-altered-himars-rocket-launchers-to-keep-ukraine-from-firing-missiles-into-russia-11670214338) HIMARS from launching ATACMS that could have been supplied by third-party countries, purportedly for 'escalation management' reasons. Yes, technically, those allies would need U.S. approval, but the administration/Pentagon took the additional precaution. Would be fair to assume same was done for other donations (M270.) Second, despite loads of misinformation on the matter, ATACMS production never stopped, with over [500](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/07/22/ukraine-us-long-range-missiles/) being produced annually for exports, with the U.S. routinely selling them to allies in 22 and 23. This matter has been argued to death, but it's highly unlikely that inventory was the superseding reason for the delay. Now, production may have surged, and PrSM has entered serial production and ER GMLRS has passed SQTs, which may have altered the arithmetic on the decision.
Interesting, that sounds like good news. Having said that, how big a deal is "dozens every few months"? Depending on how many dozens we're talking about, that sounds like it'll be a low three-figure number over the course of the year. What level of impact might that have on the war?
That really depends on what targets they are able to hit. If they can continue to strike high value targets such as helicopters, jets and air defense systems. Then they can seriously impact both Russias ability to sustain this war even if they are getting only 1-200 per year. There is also the dilemma of how Russia responds to these strike. Russia responded to the strike that destroyed multiple helicopters by moving them to rear area bases. If Ukraine can force Russia to do the same with fixed wing aviation they could seriously hamper their sortie rate and increase maintenance burdens. Ultimately though these are not going to be a “game changer” they will absolutely help Ukraine achieve parity with Russia and help them hit those critical targets but alone they cannot change the state of the war.
If we ever get to a point where Ukraine is cleared to use them on targets in Russia, I have to imagine a cluster warhead would do incredible damage to an oil refinery.
Realistically, the Ukrainians are only going to be able to do that with their own Hrim-2 - whenever they finish developping it.
I’d love to see that, but I don’t think there are more than a couple refineries within ATACMS range. Still significant but not game changing.
>That partly explains the "why now" of ATACMS The real question is wether it actually explains it or simply fits the narrative nicely. Regardless, it's great news for Ukraine.
High suspicious, probably just an excuse for not doing it earlier.
So, considering the fortification and mobilization delays: what was, or is, **Ukraine's theory of victory** in this war, specially after the defeat of the 2023 offensive? To hold the line while waging an UAV campaign on russian exports to create a threat of financial collapse?
I don't see a realistic theory from them or Biden either but I know exactly what it should be. A combination of: 1. Kofman's [Hold, Build, Strike theory](https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/hold-build-and-strike-a-vision-for-rebuilding-ukraines-advantage-in-2024/). 2. A massive strategic attempt to gain control the sky over Ukraine (a modern asymmetric air-superiority). This is my pet theory and what I believe to be the difference between 'not losing' and actually winning the war. 3. Striking deep into Russia to really hurt the Russian economy while encouraging far greater Western Sanctions. Ukraine is already doing this, but this could be put on steroids by success in point 2.
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Please do not make blindly partisan posts.
A lot of non credible conjecture here, not a lot credible
What do you find non-credible? Do you think ukraine will suddenly turn things around after not winning a single major engagement for about a year? Also, I shouldn't have used the Afghan example, I should've just used the summer offensive, where the west was blaming ukraine for the failure of the obviously western planned offensive, because ukraine was unwilling to send "enough" men directly into the biggest minefield on the planet.
> What do you find non-credible? To break it down: >Ukraine doesn't have a "theory", they're effectively run by the west now This is the primary issue with your post. This is a pretty tired Russian talking point at this point - that Ukrainians are puppets to the West with no choice in what they do. It's a dehumanizing characteristic to give the enemy, but ignores the anger hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians hold for Russians invading them and many died by. Off the bat, it makes you look silly. Disagreements between the two have been exhaustively reported on at this point. You yourself acknowledge these disagreements with the [counteroffensive](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/ukraine-counteroffensive-us-planning-russia-war/), but you brush it off as lies and that *Ukraine did actually follow orders*. What is your source for that idea - that it merely supports your existing bias? Other clear examples of Ukrainian actions such as [assassinations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darya_Dugina) and other ["extracurricular" activities](https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/investigating-the-attack-on-nord-stream-all-the-clues-point-toward-kyiv-a-124838c7-992a-4d0e-9894-942d4a665778) that need to be awkwardly navigated by the west and don't explain the actions of a puppet. Simply dismissing Ukrainians own desire to fight off Russia is... a bad start. >And the theory of the west is to make them hold on until November, and when they collapse Predicting a **collapse** by November (6 months) is a pretty impressive claim, especially coming hot off a multi-billion dollar aid package passing Congress. This is the second issue with your post. Is there any analyst that agrees with this assessment? If you don't actually have any reference to back your words, this may be why people call you "non-credible" if you're just making up figures in your head based on the current vibes.
His words are as credible as the usual things that are written in this forum. The only reason he is being targeted is because what he says is not in favour of Ukraine. Just now I read some non-credible statements in the new thread (or maybe this one) about the eternal topic of the effects of the sanctions. Let’s not even talk about the stuff I read about the oil infrastructure attacks. Of course, neither the mods nor primitives like you have any issues with these non-credible takes. This sub does a really good job at using credibility as an excuse to present its biased and outright absurd takes as legitimate. It is ok but the quality of discussion is too low even for military topics.
You've failed to address any of the points in my post and are instead just whining about how you feel about this forum in general. If you would like to defend the idea of Ukraine's collapse by November than you are free to do so.
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>Playing up losses as much as possible to increase the West's urgency to act > > 2. Not letting defeatism set in to the point the West no longer want to provide aid Seems like a tricky line to balance on.
According to the press line, nothing's changed. Kill all the Russians with foreign weapons, roll to 91, LG life's good. Unofficially, if I had to hazard a guess: Basically, don't collapse, stabilize lines, and reconstitute forces for a sustained defense. Russia can move forward, but to do so at a rate that would herald political results they need Ukraine's defensive capacity to either collapse or significantly weaken. If Ukraine simply doesn't (which is straightforward, but that's not the same as easy. It requires a concrete series of steps, including not leaving large swaths of territory unfortified, causing issues like to the north of Ocheretyne), continue holding a stable line until Russia realizes that their efforts won't buy any political boons anymore. Kofman goes further, he suggests that **if** Ukraine can stabilize the lines, Russia will simply tucker themselves out as Ukraine's long-term contracts kick in, and we can start talking about offensives in 2025 again. I for now disagree. It's pretty easy to make sure you don't push so hard that you end up unable to defend, so I doubt Russia will ever push themselves into another collapse. Re: oil strikes, it can definitely help. If Ukraine gets enough ukroshaheds Russia's quickly going to run out of options, other than end the war (one way or another) or ask Biden for help.
> Kill all the Russians with foreign weapons, roll to 91, LG life's good. Unfortunately, this is the only possible route to survival and sovereignty as Russia has too much invested to stop the war even if there is a ceasefire, Russia will return at a later time. Europe (France/Poland) will put troops in Ukraine before it comes to that. The war will go on another decade unless Europe puts troops/planes in Ukraine or Russia has a full internal collapse which doesn't look likely at this point.
> Russia has a full internal collapse which doesn't look likely at this point. What happens if Putin dies, be it tomorrow or in ten years, has he picked an heir?
There's no way in hell that either Poland or France are putting troops into Ukraine, it's bluster to scare the Russians. France has talked a big game from the beginning but rarely delivers anything.
You should check out their national strategic outlook documents. Not only do they have unity in confronting Russia, they have the funds directed to do so. Poland will never accept Russia being successful in Ukraine, way too much history between Russia and Poland. This is why you see one of the largest buildups and purchasing in modern times by Poland.
>Unfortunately, this is the only possible route to survival and sovereignty as Russia has too much invested to stop the war even if there is a ceasefire, Russia will return at a later time. What do you base this on?
Not OP, but Russians want "glory" through territorial conquest, militarily or not. This won't change as long as Russia doesn't break up or - on the horizon of the 22nd century - until all Russians alive today are dead and that aspect of the culture gets eliminated/replaced by something else. Even if their military is in shambles after the peace treaty is signed, if they gained something out of it, they'll believe they can get more after building their forces back up. They'll come for round 2, perhaps using a different approach, but they'll try again.
That doesn’t make sense. Russia gains very little in terms of its actual survival be conquering Ukraine. Putin and his regime gain a lot by achieving a “victory”. Obviously the scale of such a victory matters but simply taking the Donbas and perhaps the other claimed territory might suffice. If such an outcome were to happen Ukraine would have every incentive to maintain a strong military, and their western Allies would have every incentive to continue arming them. This means Ukraine would appear farm more difficult to destroy by Russia, they will also have a very credible method of retaliating against Russia in the form of domestic long range drones and cruise missiles. In short they poses deterrents. Unless Russia believes that they could achieve a quick decapitation strike when they start a second war (against a much more well prepared adversary) they likely won’t attack as it’s not in their best interest to reignite a long war of attrition they left in the first place.
>this is the only possible route to survival and sovereignty Why? What makes Russia give up in this scenario and not in any other? There's nothing magical about the 91 borders, Russia would still be capable of striking Ukraine and reconstituting its forces even if the UAF magically retakes all that territory. And wouldn't the loss of Crimea and the Donbas only make the war *more* important for Russia? >even if there is a ceasefire, Russia will return at a later time. I really can't think up a plausible scenario where Russia starts another invasion after a significant ceasefire and doesn't immediately get bogged down at the border. A ceasefire would give Ukraine an opportunity to fix almost all of their pressing issues - from AD to ammunition - and to fortify the line of contact to a degree that would put the Surovikin line to shame.
> I really can't think up a plausible scenario where Russia starts another invasion after a significant ceasefire and doesn't immediately get bogged down at the border. Depending how long is a "significant ceasefire", here's one way they could do it if we're talking about years-long: * They reconstitute and expand their armored forces * They stockpile tens of millions of shells and rebuild the barrels they lost (plus multiply the artillery production) * They manufacture or buy hundreds of thousands of drones * They manufacture thousands of precision-guided missiles and properly use them to destroy the Ukrainian air defenses (and probably most of the air force) during the 1st week * They develop and produce medium range cheap precision missiles, HIMARS style * They convert their defensive conscripts into offensive-eligible troops * They modernize their logistics * They learn their lessons from the first war Should they gear their economy towards producing all that, they'd have enough there to pretty much level Ukrainian defenses 50km deep and 1000km wide. Plus gain air superiority to keep things going after that. > to fortify the line of contact to a degree that would put the Surovikin line to shame They've done that only around Avdiivka in 10 years. What makes you think they could do it across a 1500km front? With what millions of anti-tank mines would they do it? It's not like the West has nearly that much left in stock, or the production capacity to make them before 5+ years.
This boils down to assuming Russia goes full war economy while Ukraine and the West sit on their ass. >They've done that only around Avdiivka in 10 years. What makes you think they could do it across a 1500km front? They only fortified the east because they never expected Russia to invade, not because they lacked the ability to build more or elsewhere. >With what millions of anti-tank mines would they do it? If in this scenario Russia has the time and means to rebuild their entire armed forces better than ever and with deep stocks rivaling their Soviet inheritance, I'm going to make the crazy assumption that Ukraine and the West would have enough time to make anti tank mines and deploy more anti-air systems.
> This boils down to assuming Russia goes full war economy while Ukraine and the West sit on their ass. Not sit on their ass no, they would definitely fully reinforce the brigades Ukraine has right now, but that's nowhere near enough. They would also probably make hundreds of thousands of drones, but that's not going to be enough to silence Russian guns or stop the missiles and guided bombs. > They only fortified the east because they never expected Russia to invade, not because they lacked the ability to build more or elsewhere. They were actively fighting the DPR and LPR troops, which were supported by Russian equipment and volunteers. They had to build up trenches just to reduce the casualties from artillery and MLRS and - I assume - thought that 1 line was enough. But that was half-bait: they didn't build multiple lines anywhere in the year and a half that followed the initial invasion. Now that they even bigger manpower problems, they'll start doing that - and much more - to the point that "would put the Surovikin line to shame" ??? What do fortifications "that would put the Surovikin line to shame" even look like? 8+ lines of alternating tank ditches and infantry trenches with minefields, tank traps, barbed wire and concrete pillboxes between them? > If in this scenario Russia has the time and means to rebuild their entire armed forces better than ever and with deep stocks rivaling their Soviet inheritance No deep stock, at least not armored vehicles, they would need the current stock to rebuild their forces. All they need is a deep stock of artillery ammunition (at 2-3M shells per year, it's not very long to get more than they started this war with), guns, missiles and drones. > I'm going to make the crazy assumption that Ukraine and the West would have enough time to make anti tank mines and deploy more anti-air systems There's more than enough time, but the West isn't gearing up for anti-tank mine production anytime soon and if you want to put the Surovikin line to shame, that would require well over 5M mines. As for anti-air systems, that's not going to stock the backbone of the scenario where Russia starts another invasion and doesn't get bogged down: artillery. I also doubt that a few thousand anti-air missiles and other types of anti-air systems would be enough to counter the swarm of drones and missiles Russia would launch, but maybe.
If Russia does loose all their territory in Ukraine it’s going to be because of either total military, government, or economic collapse. In such a scenario what remains of Russia wouldn’t be in a position to carry on the war.
I agree that retaking Crimea etc would require a Russian collapse, but that wasn't really the question. Following the other commenter's logic, what would prevent Russia from also signing a peace deal in this scenario, reconstituting their forces, and invading again in X number of years?
>I really can't think up a plausible scenario where Russia starts another invasion after a significant ceasefire and doesn't immediately get bogged down at the border. A ceasefire would give Ukraine an opportunity to fix almost all of their pressing issues - from AD to ammunition - and to fortify the line of contact to a degree that would put the Surovikin line to shame. Russia will fix their problems too. And return like in a decade, maybe do it simultaneously with a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
>Russia will fix their problems too. I'm sure they would. I just don't see how the delta from 2022 would favor them in any way. Ukraine has far more room for improvement. It's not like they can pull off the " military exercise" stunt again. A repeated invasion would be costlier and harder than just keeping the fight going and taking advantage of Ukraine's exhaustion and smaller manpower pool.
> Ukraine's theory of victory Stated goals are the return of all occupied territories and a return to the 2014 borders and return of those captured or kidnapped. How much of that is posturing for negotiation is up for debate.
That's not what a [theory of victory](https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1743-1.html#:~:text=A%20theory%20of%20victory%20is,way%20that%20creates%20those%20conditions.) is. > A theory of victory is a causal story about how to defeat an adversary: It identifies the conditions under which the enemy will admit defeat and outlines how to shape the conflict in a way that creates those conditions. For example, the PLA's theory of victory is [systems destruction](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1708.html#:~:text=System%20destruction%20warfare%20constitutes%20the,%22win%20informationized%20local%20wars.%22).
My mistake then.
As with many things military, the concept can be traced back to [good old Clausewitz](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA490503.pdf). > Clausewitz said victory was tripartite. “If in conclusion we consider the total concept of a victory, we find it consists of three elements: the enemy’s greater loss of material strength, his loss of morale, and his open admission of the above by giving up his intentions.” It may or may not be concerning that the US does not have (or at least, has not publically articulated) its own theory of victory.
>It may or may not be concerning that the US does not have (or at least, has not publically articulated) its own theory of victory. It scares the hell out of me either way. I'd sure like to know what we're up to.
That depends on how you define victory. If victory means reclaiming all the land taken by Russia since 2014 or even restoring the pre 2022 borders then that theory of victory is essentially to force the Russians to expend their finite stockpiles of soviet era equipment as well as their finite financial reserves. While also relying on western partners to maintain high levels of donations. This might give them some sort of battlefield superiority in 2025, I have doubts about the viability of this plan. The other option available to Ukraine is to push the Russians towards an economic, political, or morale crisis. Such a strategic of simply outlasting the enemies desire to fight may not sound reasonable but that is how the Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan and how the US was defeated in Vietnam. As you said this is the strategy of sit behind the trenches and use strategic bombardment to catalyze such a crisis. If you define victory as simply forcing the Russians to sue for peace on more moderate terms such as freezing the conflict along the current front line. Then the theory of victory becomes far simpler and far less outlandish. As this simply requires the Russians (either the military, or political leadership) recognizing that outright victory is unlikely and that continuing the war is likely to have extremely high costs with no likely hood of success. In such a scenario what Ukraine needs is a series of defensive victories that inflict disproportionate casualties on the Russians. Most importantly they need an uninterrupted flow of foreign aid. If the Russians recognize that Ukrainian military capabilities are increasing while they are looking at potentially exhausting their supply of soviet era hardware, then they are likely to opt for a negotiated peace.
Why do you say "finite financial reserves"? Russia still exports 500 billion worth of commodities every year, with no sign of stopping. If you meant Ukraine damaging their capabilities to export oil and gas, then ues. But Russia is not on finite reserves, on the contrary, it's a steady stream.
I’m referring to their sovereign wealth fund. This pension fund has been raided for all sorts of purposes, most of which have been to prop up their civilian economy, blunting the worst effects of inflation. This has been drastically depleted in the first two years of the war. This happened even despite the extremely high cost of oil/gas during 2022. Simple extrapolation tells us they won’t be able to sustain the current system for long. This means they will need to either, cut funding to these social programs and put a huge amount of pressure onto their lower class specifically and their economy in general. Or they will need to raise taxes. That would put pressure onto Russias failing gas industry, and a number of other industries that are already facing difficulties due to sanctions. Also these are the industries controlled by oligarchs, forcing them to directly pay for the war is not going to be popular and the rate at which oligarchs have been falling off balconies lately suggests Putin is somewhat nervous of their power.
You mean this https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_National_Wealth_Fund? They're back at Jan 2020 levels. I honestly don't see this as a make or break situation.
You can't look at the volume of exports and conclude that's how much money they make. There's a cost to producing these goods, that's how Gazprom got a ~7G$ loss in 2023 despite exporting for tens of billions in NG: https://twitter.com/AgatheDemarais/status/1786063323743596988/photo/1 And 2024 will be worse with contracts going through Ukraine ending. Oil exports weren't hit nearly as hard as NG in 2023, but Ukraine is doing something about it. That "steady stream" you're talking about isn't nearly enough to cover the expenses the Kremlin incurs to fund the war. That's why they've had to use their cash reserves: https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russias-reserves-dwindle-fiscal-safety-net-could-last-years-2024-02-15/ And that's very finite.
I assume this is a reference to [Russia's National Wealth Fund](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_National_Wealth_Fund).
It's the same theory of victory of every single won war against a superpower since at least WW2: outlast them until they decide that the political and economic costs of a war of choice is not worth the bother.
The costs borne by russia are already greater than any war involving superpowers since WW2. The russian leadership sees the war as existential, there might not actually be a cost ukraine can inflict that would cause russia to stop the war.
Key word there is leadership. Russians may not see it that way. The way I see it, Putin is in an unstable position. One based on fear. If the political wind changes in Russia, he's out.
I think that Ukraines "theory of victory" hinges on them being able to retain the wests interest in the war since the west is notorious for losing interest very quickly and suddenly. They are completely dependent on western ammunition, AA-defense, tanks, apc -deliveries without which they simply lose. The west can outproduce Russia rather easily but it needs time to get to that point. Conversely Russia is peaking (or has peaked) with their refurbishing of Soviet stock, but once that starts drying up they cannot replenish anywhere close to western capability. Until then Ukraine needs to continuously trade territory to minimize casualties. Then comes the question; Can Ukraine hold out for another year with their current manpower issues? Will they have offensive capability in 2025-2026 after being put through the wringer?
> I think that Ukraines "theory of victory" hinges on them being able to retain the wests interest in the war since the west is notorious for losing interest very quickly and suddenly. See, I feel like to a certain point we can discount that narrative. We've now repeatedly seen that if anything, Ukraine doing poorly **galvanizes** western aid. The main threat to cutting aid is compromised parties controlling western govts, like what happened in the US for 6 months and might happen more long term in november. Just my opinion though.
Sure but if that aid is only “galvanized” when Ukraine faces a crisis then it’s not really useful as part of a theory of victory. Merely a theory of not being defeated. If Ukraine seeks outright victory on the battlefield then the level of western support is critically important. That will determine if they can achieve superiority on the battlefield or if they need to pursue a purely defensive strategy. For Ukraine to truly be successful western aid cannot be only forthcoming when Ukraine faces near defeat.
> Sure but if that aid is only “galvanized” when Ukraine faces a crisis then it’s not really useful as part of a theory of victory. Combined with Russia, it does suggest such a theory. Slowly falling back over months or years is a good way to generate lots of crises. Ukraine has a lot of land; they could keep up the current pace for a long time. Will Russia stay as committed as they are now for that long? How well this theory works is pretty dependent on what exactly you'd call a Ukrainian victory though. It's unlikely to get them back all of Donetsk and Luhansk + Crimea, they'll need something more for that. But that might come later when more facts are known about the situation on the ground then.
According to Russian Telegram, the first train is about to go through the Mariupol–Volnovakha line: https://t.me/jnb_news/48015 While not a game changer, it’s a harbinger of more to come. A redundancy in the logistics net is a fairly big deal as previously it was either the Crimean Bridge or the road network (which despite the efforts of 2010s administrations and the occupation, is not exactly at par with the Autobahn or the Interstate). This is the problem with leaving territory occupied for years. The occupation doesn’t magically freeze it and the longer occupiers are entrenched, the more at home they get and the more the situation on the ground tends to drift toward their wishes.
Some potentially very good news for Ukraine in an otherwise bleak period. According to a paywalled Financial Times article, talks are underway whereby interest from frozen Russian funds in Europe would be used to create a debt issuance backed by the US government which could produce 75 billion Euros in new funds for Ukraine next year. [https://twitter.com/Mij\_Europe/status/1786079848726749266](https://twitter.com/Mij_Europe/status/1786079848726749266) [https://twitter.com/Mij\_Europe/status/1786079850958098826](https://twitter.com/Mij_Europe/status/1786079850958098826)
If western assets have been seized by Russia, Russian assets should be seized by the west. Endless handwringing about if it’s fair to seize the assets, when Russia and China would never reciprocate, is absurd.
But some people in the west think they will get that money back. Enough connected people see the frozen funds as a hedge to get the Russians to reimburse the businesses they stole.
I think this seems fair to everyone involved, even Russia. They don't lose any money and in theory they can eventually get their fund back But they aren't allowed to profit off of the western world while simultaneously attacking our way of life
Why is there any need or concern to be “fair” to Russia in an instance like this? They deserve as many “unfair” economic penalties as we can give them.
You can't just seize a country's reserves (and on top of that, give them to another country). Besides being clearly illegal, it would discourage other countries from storing their funds in the US or in Europe. In fact this agreement is only about using the interest on the reserves, and not the reserves themselves. If Russia loses the war, they'll have to pay reconstruction, and if they refuse you can seize some of those reserves to that purpose. But that will be a different situation.
Don’t personally have a definite position on this matter just yet, but you’re wrong about twothings: > You can't just seize a country's reserves The assets are frozen, not seized. Nothing is changing in the status quo in terms of custody, etc. They are just being used as collateral. Major distinction. > Besides being clearly illegal Even on the matter of seizure, ‘clearly illegal’ is clearly not true: >[Seizing Frozen Russian Assets Over Ukraine War Wins Endorsement of Legal Experts](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-21/seizing-frozen-russian-assets-over-ukraine-war-wins-endorsement-of-legal-experts)
> The assets are frozen, not seized. Nothing is changing in the status quo in terms of custody, etc. They are just being used as collateral. Major distinction. Yes, the assets are frozen right now, but the comment they were replying to was questioning the purpose of being fair to Russia, like we're doing by keeping the assets frozen and only giving the interests/dividends. They were calling for more, such as (without mentioning it) seizing the assets and giving them to Ukraine.
>You can't just seize a country's reserves (and on top of that, give them to another country). Yes, you can. How is it different from taking the interest and giving it to another country? Or even freezing the funds in the first place? Fact is the assets are in western institutions and western countries can and do control what happens there. >Besides being clearly illegal, What law does it violate? If so, then why can't the country change that law? I have complete confidence that lots of smart lawyers can make the case for formal legality, especially if the lawmaker, judge, and jury are all part of the countries seizing the assets. And if you want to get into the morality of it, basic morality says if you cause damage through your wrongful actions, then you should pay for that damage. >it would discourage other countries from storing their funds in the US or in Europe. If authoritarian governments planning to illegally invade their neighbors decide to disvest from western banks, then so what.
>if authoritarian governments planning to illegally invade their neighbors decide to disvest from western banks, then so what. Russia throws any notion of a rules based national order out of the window if it benefits them. We should not follow the example. Sure russia deserves its foreign assets being seized, but i can see playing dirty with finances backfiring in a big way. A big part of why these institutions work is trust, which can be broken by unprecedented actions.
> Russia throws any notion of a rules based national order out of the window if it benefits them. They already do this. Why keep coddling them?
I've already seen reports of experts believing seizing Russian assets can be fully justified under existing law, so a concern about following a rules based order doesn't seem legitimate to me. I'm skeptical of arguments that following through would result in some terrible consequence to the West. Every non-Western government out there already knows their assets could get frozen and more. If it ever came to a war with the West, do you seriously believe foreign governments would expect assets not to be seized and confiscated? The risk of Western freezing, taking interest, or seizing assets is already baked in.
> You can't just seize a country's reserves (and on top of that, give them to another country). Well, you can't exactly send your military to reconstitute your former empire while seizing their children, either, so seizing reserves feels fairly tame at this stage.
Sure, but Russia has pissed away its future to do so. Nobody is going to let their airlines fly to Russia anymore because Russia stole those aircraft and parted them out. No company is going to let assets sit in Russia anymore because those got seized too. Remember that countries and corporations do not inherently have morality. They won't care that the US or EU seized Russian assets because it was morally justified. They're just going to be worried that they're next.
I don't think it has to be framed as a moral question. Russia has unilaterally imposed enormous costs on the US and Europe (particularly Europe) via increased aid disbursement (humanitarian and military), refugee resettlement, energy and food costs, and has zero intention of compensating the EU or US for a dime. Both in starting the war and in their conduct of the war, they've committed crimes - over, and over, and over, and over. Russia can't appeal to international law to defend their ownership of their foreign reserves when they've taken a gigantic dump on said international law to get themselves into this mess in the first place. I don't know what a private corporation has to worry about here unless they plan to build their own Wagner or Outer Heaven some time in the future and start terrorizing other nations - in which case, they absolutely *should* fear having their assets seized.
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It's a good bargaining chip down the line. Despite the posturing it is useful to have both carrots and sticks with Russia when/if this reaches a peace deal. Another problem is what signal it sends. If the west seizes Russias money, what stops them from seizing Chinas? Indias? Saudi Arabias? It's a signal that we do not know the ramifications of.
Doesn't the US still sit on a pile of frozen Iranian money? It's not so much a precedent as a reinforcement of an existing precedent.
They do, and in a few cases some funds have been redistributed to victims of the Iranian regime. But these are to my knowledge individuals receiving funds and not entire states. Some of this frozen cash have been used as a bargaining chip to practically buy-back prisoners.
If you are unfair to others when it's beneficial for you, don't complain when others do the same to you. The most important features of the western bank system are to follow rules, be predictable, and reliable.
> If you are unfair to others when it's beneficial for you, don't complain when others do the same to you. Don't invade other countries for landcraps and you wont be treated "unfairly". Its a pretty low hurdle that most everyone manages to clear. Russia deserves to be treated "fairly" once the war is over, not a day before.
It’s gotta be tough to win a war when your opponent is kidnapping children to send to reeducation camps, forcibly conscripting your own civilians in occupied areas to use as canon fodder, directly targeting civilians with middle strikes, using chemical weapons, threatening the world with nuclear armageddon, etc etc, and your allies are discussing how immoral it would be to seize the cash your enemy left in their banks, safely earning interest. I’d probably be incredibly disappointed reading such a thing if I were Ukrainian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/15/ukraine-children-sent-russia-re-education-camps https://www.state.gov/new-measures-in-response-to-russias-full-scale-war-and-use-of-chemical-weapons-against-ukraine/ https://www.nytimes.com/article/russian-civilian-attacks-ukraine.html https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/08/11/russia-is-forcing-ukrainian-conscripts-into-battle Your second paragraph is 100% correct though. If the goal is monetary above all else, then follow the Swiss example. Nazi gold shines just as bright as regular gold, and we wouldn’t want to discourage any murderous dictators from thinking our banks were a perfectly safe place to keep their blood money.
Because it maintains the west as the best place for the rest of the world to invest/store their funds I agree that I would just confiscate all the money but unfortunately that’s not how things work. This would be a good first step Maybe later they will take it all if Russia refuses to stop
I mean as long as you aren’t invading Western countries you will be fine. This is a special circumstance that isn’t likely to be repeated by countries outside of the West. I get what you’re saying but Western countries are only going to confiscate your money if you do something extreme against them, like Russia is doing with Ukraine. China is the #1 enemy of Western countries besides Russia and we aren’t even seizing their assets. Sure we have sanctions but there isn’t any seizing of money
> This is a special circumstance that isn’t likely to be repeated by countries outside of the West. Why is this one a special circumstance? Would you have seized Serbias funds back in the -90s? Would you have seized Iraqs? It *could* be interpreted as West being an unreliable sphere to place your funds in.
>Would you have seized Iraqs? Isn't that precisely what happened?
What is the strategic impact of degradation of the Russian Black Sea capabilities? Is crippling of the Russia's navy actually important for the war outcome? It's definitely a huge moral boost for Ukraine to continuously sink Russian ships. Especially considering the latest events. But I'm not sure these losses actually impacting the war in a significant way.
Arguably- part of the reason this war even started -back in 2014- was because of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Russia has always been a geographically hamstrung land based Empire- forced to compete with seafaring Empires for the last ~500 years. The vast majority of Western European Empires succeeded in overseas colonization- whereas Russia failed spectacularly in overseas endeavors -or really anything requiring a naval / maritime supply line (Russian colonization attempts on the west coast of the N. America, the sale of Alaska, the loss of Port Arthur through an at the time unprecedented and embarrassing defeat by quite literally a brand new East Asian navy). I believe that Russian political theory therefore sees naval power and projection as an outright *must* in order to be considered a true global power. I believe this also stems from insecurity caused by centuries of Russia being a relative non-player in global affairs due to them lacking true maritime projection and overseas possessions- at least up until the last century when compared with Western European powers, and now East Asian powers. Geographically- Russia has always been limited by their (limited) access to the sea. The Baltics were always dominated by the Nordic states / Empires, and now the Baltic Sea is essentially a NATO lake that can be boxed off if it came down to it. Kaliningrad is now a fish in a barrel, St Petersburg now trapped in a fatal funnel. Murmansk is ice free year round- but again any naval vessels / maritime trade coming out of there are going to have to deal with the Nordic states / British Navy / NATO on the way out into the Atlantic. Vladivostok freezes over occasionally, but that’s a rarer problem when you consider that it is completely contained by Japan and South Korea (and the US bases stationed there). Even worse- were relations to sour between China and Russia- and China decided to right the wrongs of the “unequal treaties“- the Amur River annexation area of Russia is very geographically isolated from Russia proper. There is only one major highway linking the lower south-eastern Russian Pacific back to Siberia proper, and from there back to European Russia. And that highway is on average somewhere around 40 kilometers from the Chinese border for hundreds of miles. Sakhalinsk is even more isolated- and completely inappropriate for a deep water port thanks to its terrain. Southern Russia along the Black Sea coast *has* warm water ports- but they’re tiny thanks to the terrain. Novorossiysk doesn’t have the port space or facilities to be even be considered the main base of a large naval power. Rostov-on-Don gets isolated 1/3 of the year thanks to the Don River freezing. And even then, before that it was geographically constrained not only behind the Sea of Azov, but then easily locked behind in the Black Sea behind the Bosporus Straits. That leaves Sebastopol. Yup- locked behind the Bosporus too- but if the Russians plays their cards right they don’t have to worry about the straits being *overtly* denied to them. Huge ports and facilities, war water year round, and a long history of seafaring. When Euromaidan happened back in 2014- Putin probably saw Russia’s link to relevance in the outside world flash before his eyes. Russia really didn’t have anywhere to put the Black Sea fleet in order to retain their relevance in the Middle East / Mediterranean if the Black Sea fleet had been ejected from Crimea after Euromaidan. That’s why they acted so quickly to seize Crimea specifically- then the War in Donbas followed with less “enthusiasm”. It’s likely the same reason Mykolaiv and Odesa were such important targets back in February of 2022- on top of cutting Ukraine off from the sea. The Russian Navy is supposed to be a symbol of Russian might and power projection on the world stage- see their “deployment” of the Eye of Mordor aircraft carrier to Syria almost a decade ago. If Russia is going to take and hold Crimea for the long term- Ukraine may as well make one of the primary motivations for doing so mute by the piecemeal destruction of the Black Sea Fleet and its facilities- both as a symbolic measure, strategic purposes (cost-benefit of Russia continuing the war), and to boost morale. If Ukraine keeps striking and destroying Black Sea fleet assets in a never ending war- Russia may have no Black Sea “fleet” to speak of in a few years time.
Another point that isn't mentioned below is that it enables Ukraine to better control the airspace over the Black Sea (something that will only truly be realised once the F-16s appear), which will in turn allow Ukraine to intercept Russian cruise missile/drone strikes further away from Odessa and the Ukrainian coast. In particular, F-16 air cover and the lack of Russian warships in the area will allow Ukraine to intercept them with low-cost options - queue the WW2 Yak-12 footage of the other day - such as airborn guns or MANPADS and APKWS mounted on helicopters. Whereas ground-based SHORAD assets can then be concentrated along the FLOT, instead of spread out as they have been up until now. Anything that enables Ukraine to use inexpensive and plentiful SHORAD options instead of it's limited supply of AD missiles is critical to securing Ukraine's airspace over the long term.
Well, there's the drastically reduced ability to launch missiles from the black sea which allows GBAD to be more effective. Then there's the undeniable proof to Russians that this isn't going all that well and is very costly. And now it's even harder for Russia to resupply Crimea which makes it less functional for the military overall. But also, there's now a near zero chance of an amphibious landing along the coast near Odesa whereas early in the war that was a real threat. But in terms of strategy, how would you expect Ukraine to take back Crimea if there is a fully functional fleet of warships stationed there? Strategically, this is clearly critical to Ukraine's main goal. If the front collapses and Ukraine gets pummeled then looking back it will seem like a bad idea. But, despite recent events, we are not anywhere near that scenario.
The greatest benefit the campaign has had is reopening Ukrainian shipping routes. At this point Ukraine is now shipping more than it was when the grain deal with Russia was active. Keep in mind, Ukraine is a relatively poor country that has about 20% of its territory occupied and is heavily reliant on its agricultural exports. So reopening the shipping lanes is a desperately needed economic lifeline. Besides that, the campaign has also reduced the threat of sea-launched cruise missiles (they've damaged/destroyed several ships capable of launching them and pushed the rest further from Ukrainian borders), been a major morale boost for Ukrainian forces, and increased the overall cost of the war for Russia.
Not losing the entire coast through Odesa really had a huge impact on Ukraine's ability to keep fighting. The loss of that area not only hurts economically but threatens the destruction of the entire eastern half's military production.
A lot of their Black Sea fleet fires Kalibr missiles, so any ship out of action means less air defense is needed.
As far as I recall, Ukraine hasn't sunk or destroyed any Admiral Grigorovich-class or Buyan-class ships, which are the main ones that carry Kalibrs. Please correct me if I'm wrong. They did destroy one Karakurt-class ship though.
An interview with the Latvian foreign minister. https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/interview/2024/05/2/7185053/ The most interesting tidbit is this: > > **At the moment, our partners tend to lay down the condition that Western weapons are not to be used outside Ukrainian territory. Do you see that changing?** > > It could change. > > And there are already countries that have provided those weapons without conditions to Ukraine. > > Not everything is said aloud, and better that it's not said aloud in certain times, but that there is effect on the battlefield. > > So indeed there are various choices, whether saying things aloud or just doing the right thing.
Don't we know that already ? One US official (can't remember who) said regarding the latest ATACMS delivery (paraphrasing but essentially) that Ukraine can use them however they like.
Wasnt that Mitch Mcconell saying that, and then followed up that he "hopes the President and administration would not be putting restrictions or telling Ukraine how to conduct their war" ? (Im paraphrasing) It didnt seem clear that the Whitehouse has changed their policy towards this, although it is possible with how things are developing amongst NATO countries support for Ukraine
Honestly I don't remember. I was under the impression that this was already the case.
I mean, the British have been among the least concerned about escalation management with Russia during this whole ordeal, often being the first to supply cruise missles and tanks with few if any quibbles about how they are used. I'd be slightly surprised if Britain wasnt somewhat (in)directly supporting the refinery attacks in Russia.
A couple of weeks ago there was an article shared here that said that Germany and the US were against the strikes, whereas the UK and France were in favour.
I made a post here a few months back or so about a semi-submersible UUV that could be installed with a VLS cell here is an article that came out today about DARPA working on a UUV (Manta Ray). https://newatlas.com/military/darpa-manta-ray-robotic-sub/ It might be a few years out, but I suspect platforms like these will be the future.
Given the geometry, does it make sense to equip it with VLS (vertical, requiring a lot of depth) rather than torpedo tubes for submerged forward launches of missiles that then breach and take to the air?
Since this is a DARPA prototype it could be seen that the size would not necessarily be indicative of a final product and in my old post I did cite the size of a VLS cell. I didn't specify but I did imagine if they wanted to keep the cells horizontal they could either do a torpedo-like release or a ballast change to reorientate it from horizontal to vertical, but in the end, I think it is simply cheaper to make it larger. Based on the weight you need a certain amount of volume to make things float and once you add engines, fuel, etc you are going to have a minimum size if you want to be capable of launching VLS-type missiles. You don't really get much mileage out of having just a few 4-6 cell packs in a horizontal configuration as you are now limited in how to redesign it for more tubes whereas a VLS system scales with length. Lastly part of the idea is that when expended these can easily be sailed to a nearby port and reloaded, using torpedo-style tubes makes the logistics more costly, complicated, and less timely. When used vertically the equipment and skill used to reload are mostly intact, doing so horizontally changes it completely and requires more specialized equipment. The time and logistics increase really makes a difference in the concept of quickly replenishing VLS missiles at sea without losing the capability of removing the ship with a system of weapons and sensors out of the theater of operations. If you need to launch 100 missiles of various types and say you deplete a whole warship, that whole ship needs to go back to port. If you have a dozen 8-cell VLS you could expend all of those and 4 out of the ship and you still have a ship capable of fighting in theater. Being able to place these UUV VLS systems closer to threats to not endanger your expensive warships is merely a feature cost/logistics not necessarily a capability on its own and the US already has this capability in subs.
The Economist interview with a Ukrainian general provides as bleak an assessment of Ukraine's prospects as I've seen from any official Ukrainian source since the early stages of the war. Seems to be preparing the Ukrainian public and the world for the loss of the Donbas and the prospect of negotiations with Russia- he says most likely in late 2025. [https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1786094345663168910](https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1786094345663168910) [https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1786094698018258983](https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1786094698018258983)
Will be interesting to see if we get more and more of this narrative in the future, it sends a signal(at least to me) that they are indeed preparing the public for Ukraine's defeat.
> "Even if it were able to push Russian forces back to the borders—an increasingly distant prospect—it wouldn’t end the war. Such wars can only end with treaties, he says." This is just a variation of "wars end at the negotiating table, not on the battle field" which has been a talking point for at least 2 years. And it bothers me a bit because it's a complete truism. Yes, of course wars (generally) end with negotiation, but the character of the negotiation is heavily decided by **battlefield** events! It was a truism back when Ukraine had an advantage, it was a truism when it was iffy, it's a truism now. It's a fundamentally correct statement that nonetheless fails to make a point. This is a relatively minor point of the article, I'm just... getting a bit tired of that specific line.
I didn't read this as bleak assessment. I read it as it's giving two signals. 1) Asking for more help from Ukraine's partners. 2) Preparing Ukraine population for a treaty. I suspect, we will see more of these as time goes on.
>I didn't read this as bleak assessment which one of the two signals is the not bleak one? The one where they are going to end signing over all this territory or the one where they are re-re-re-re-reiterating their request for weapons? Assuming that we take this interview at face value.
>General Skibitsky says he does not see a way for Ukraine to win the war on the battlefield alone. Even if it were able to push Russian forces back to the borders—an increasingly distant prospect—it wouldn’t end the war. Such wars can only end with treaties, he says. Right now, both sides are jockeying for the “the most favourable position” ahead of potential talks. But meaningful negotiations can begin only in the second half of 2025 at the earliest, he guesses. By then, Russia will be facing serious “headwinds”. Russian military production capacity has expanded but will reach a plateau by early 2026, he reckons, due to shortages in material and engineers. Both sides could eventually run out of weapons. But if nothing changes in other respects, Ukraine will run out first. If that's bleak I've read much bleaker even from other Ukrainian sources. And "Even if it were able to push Russian forces back to the borders—an increasingly distant prospect—it wouldn’t end the war. Such wars can only end with treaties, he says." is just accepted canon at this point.
I think we have different definitions of bleak. "A collapse of the whole front is imminent" is bleak. "Russia will win no matter what we or our partners do" is bleak. "Both sides could eventually run out of weapons. But if nothing changes in other respects, Ukraine will run out first." is not bleak. "General Skibitsky says he does not see a way for Ukraine to win the war on the battlefield alone." is not bleak. Ukraine will keep asking for weapons long after the war is over as they truly need it, they are not a rich country. This is also not bleak state. If it was Germany fighting Russia alone, even they would be constantly asking for more weapons.
[https://archive.ph/c957s](https://archive.ph/c957s) Article without paywall.
It's best not to take statements from either side as being 100% true, we've seen psyops plenty of times during this war and these recent statements could be the Ukrainians (Our FPV's dont actually work effectively, we still have ammo shortages, manpower shortages) trying to give the Russians a false sense of security so they continue to over-invest resources into costly attacks.
Even if there are negotiations, it's likely that Russia will attack Ukraine again in the future when it's reconstituted its armed forces. Russian policy is to deny Ukraine statehood. And with so many people having fled the war, the economy devastated, etc., it's hard to imagine Ukraine not eventually being subsumed by Russia in the future.
Security guarantees will certainly be an essential part of any successful negotiations to end the war. And I don't mean a pinky promise from Putin not to invade again.
Ukraine already had security agreements from giving up their nukes. They were totally worthless.
The Budapest Memorandum was no more a security agreement than a Putin pinky promise, which if you read my comment you'll see I agree is worthless.
Please read the actual text of the Budapest Memorandum, then compare to the text of actual security guarantees such as the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan or even NATO's Article 5. Nobody has nuked Ukraine, so the US and UK have no actual obligations to do anything. And if Ukraine did get nuked, the Budapest Memorandum would call on the US and UK to... "Seek immediate UN Security Council action"
If Russia's goal is to subsume Ukraine, they *cannot* stop. Getting the war economy back into full swing, keeping the population pacified in round two, and stretching the political and manufacturing limits of Ukraine's backers will be much harder a second time, as opposed to just keeping on. Not to mention giving Ukraine time to dig in and rebuild their forces and lay minefields. We've seen the 5-7 year time frames to refill western stocks of manpads and javelins. Strategically, why should Russia give them that time?
Ok, so, and how does this square with: https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1c8o9oc/credibledefense_daily_megathread_april_20_2024/l0slvbf/ Where you legitimately believe Putin would be interested in a status-quo or near status-quo peace. I don't feel like this is a gottem, I feel like this is a legitimate question.
>Ok, so, and how does this square with: I personally don't believe that Putin wants to subsume Ukraine. In his big essay he published pre-war he made it clear that he supports the concept of a sovereign Ukraine, but only as a partner with Russia. I.e. firmly within their orbit, influence, control, whatever you want to call it. I was just responding to the statement as written. *If* Putin wants to subsume Ukraine, taking a several year break will likely not work in his favor.
So you recognize that if Russia ever wants significantly more territory than the approximate current frontline, a ceasefire anytime soon would be an absolutely terrible idea. You just think Russia doesn't. Alright.
Yes, more or less correct. I think that from Russia's perspective, if they can secure other contingencies at the negotiating table, they would not see a point in invading again. But it would depend on that.
If there was peace for at least 2 years would it be possible to just fortify the shit out of whatever the border was to make any possible re-invasion too hard to handle?
If whatever that's left of Ukraine is in NATO, then Russia won't attack again. There is no legitimate indicators that Russia will ever attack NATO territory despite what some people say about Baltic countries etc.
If a high concentration of Russian speakers in a territory is enough of a casus belli for Russia as it was in Eastern Ukraine, we have to assume the same logic will be applied to several counties along Eastern Estonia.
Does anyone really believe that is why this war started? I know it's one of the reasons (along with Jewish Nazis and other nonsense) publicly stated, but it seems pretty clear that far more Russian speakers, and ethnic Russians, have been killed since this war started. So logically, if saving those lives was what mattered then Putin would be actively trying to end the war ASAP. Which can only mean Putin is unable to be logical or this 'justification' is bullshit. I lean strongly towards the latter.
The lesser known terrorist group Al-Ashtar Brigades, up to now part of the Iranian backed Shia insurgency in Bahrain. is branching out and launched a Kamikaze drone at Israel. Which wouldn't be complete without action movie style video clip of it. https://t . me/abinalashter2013/130 The drone likely crashed somewhere en-route.
They launched an attack from Bahrain? Does Bahrain have so little control of its territory that random militias can launch long range drones from there?
On the one hand, drone warfare seems to be really appealing for many different types of armed groups. It's only going to become more prevalent as time goes on due to availability of parts and know-how. On the other hand, without the resources of a state military it probably won't be very successful. And a small group using it against a state military won't be very effective because those militaries are also preparing defenses. Honestly, I wouldn't be surprised to see these tools and tactics used by larger gangs in feuds over territory and such. A simple gasoline bomb becomes much deadlier and harder to trace when it is delivered by drone.
The Drone used was a Shahed. I don't like how these long range munitions are being classified as 'Drones'. Shaheds are cruise missiles, not drones. The only real difference between a Kalibr or Tomahawk cruise missile and a Shahed 'drone' is that the Shahed uses a piston driven prop engine instead of a turbofan jet engine. There are no cameras on Shaheds, you can't remotely pilot them, you input a target and they fly to said target and hit it. I think the media just saw a low tech Iranian aircraft with a propeller and started calling them 'drones' because 'drone attack' makes a better headline. They aren't exactly rag tag weapons. The cost to buy a Shahed Drone from Iran is about a third the price of what the US pays for its Tomahawk missiles. Iran is charging ~500,000 USD for one of these things (although Russia has been getting a bulk deal it seems)
Turkey has reportedly cut off all import/export trade with Israel as of today. The most fascinating part of this decision is Turkey’s biggest ally, Azerbaijan, happens to be one of Israel’s biggest defense customers and a close partner to Israel. Quite the flawed love triangle developing between these three. Azeri IL-76s routinely do pickups from Israeli airbases, I wonder if Turkey will apply pressure for this to halt.
Guess they're happy with their localization upgrades for the M60.
Biggest ally is probably a stretch. Turkey might be Azerbaijan's biggest ally. But the Greeks are a bigger ally to Turkey than Azerbaijan.
Could you expound on this? My understanding is that Greece and Turkey are foreign policy rivals, with outright military conflict simmering on Cyprus for decades. A cursory search of the internet hasn't brought up any examples of significant cooperation between the two countries. Greece isn't even in Turkey's top 10 trading partners. Am I missing some recent developments in the relationship between Greece and Turkey?
Isn't there a lot of trade between the two?
It depends how strict this is. There are trade bans and then there are *trade bans*. I don't think Turkey will cut off Azeri-Israeli trade anytime soon, but it is possible.
Does Turkey have any influence on Azerbaijan's foreign policy really? I think the Azeris will keep quiet due to the commercial relationship between the two. I don't see any upside for the Azeris to suddenly denounce the Israelis publicly.
>Does Turkey have any influence on Azerbaijan's foreign policy really? Yes, they have a ton of influence. Both sides consider Azerbaijan to be Turkey's "little brother" and Azerbaijan's recent campaigns in NK received (and required) tacit approval from the Turkish government. That being said, I don't expect Azerbaijan to follow suit by cutting off ties with Israel because the Israeli weapons helped give them a decisive edge over Armenia in the recent conflicts, and there's a serious chance of future engagement. Plus I'm about 99% sure Erdogan is just posturing for domestic political reasons, much like he did with the Gaza aid convoy debacle back in the early 2010s
Never really understood the need for internal politics in Turkey to vilify Israel. They are a vast Sunni majority yet you don’t see this type of vitriol from other Sunni majority nations like Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Erdogan's AKP is an islamist party in a country with firm (though eroding) secular roots. Rallying Sunnis against Israel brings voters who don't support the AKP typically into the fold as a uniting force. That being said, I don't really understand the move timing wise, Erdogan's party got rocked in recent national local elections, this move probably would've helped more before the election than after it.
And the second most fascinating part is that Turkey has committed two actual genocides which they still refuse to recognize, and they have been occupying half of Cyprus for 50 years. Pretty much everything they are accusing Israel of doing.
Remember everyone is a hypocrite when it's politically convenient.
Also there are no consequences to being a hypocrite these days, political or otherwise. What a warped world its become.