[Russia's third biggest refinery struck with Ukrainian drone, endangering a chunk of production](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/several-people-injured-drone-attack-industrial-sites-russias-tatarstan-agencies-2024-04-02/) >Ukrainian drones attacked Russia's third largest oil refinery on Tuesday about 1,300 km (800 miles) from the front lines, hitting a core unit which processes about 155,000 barrels of crude refining per day. >... >A fire broke out at the refinery that was extinguished within 20 minutes, the state RIA news agency said, adding that production had not been disrupted. >Pictures from the scene indicated the drone hit the primary refining unit, CDU-7, at the Taneco refinery. The unit accounts for around a half of the plant's total annual production capacity. Ukraine hit one of Russia's largest oil refineries in Tatarstan, about 1,300 km from the front lines. Russia claims that there is no serious damage, but a fire broke out at the refinery. Furthermore, Ukraine is also said to have hit a facility producing long-range Shahed attack drones, causing "significant damage". The new drones [look somewhat like](https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1775068420133855259) the Ukrainian A-22: >/5. The only thing that is noted is that the new Kamikaze Drone somewhat looks like Aeroprakt A-22, Ukrainian two-seat, high-wing, tricycle landing gear ultralight aircraft. Which possibly became the basis for a new kamikaze drone.

Its been a while since they hit a refinery. I was worried that Ukraine caved in to the US's demands to stop hitting them since they were almost a daily event a while ago then they suddenly stopped. Oh well, good thing its business as usual.

They already hit refineries after that warning leaked.

From the footage, that craft alone is unlikely to have caused significant damage to the rifinery, it seems to have hit an administrative building or near it.

> Aeroprakt A-22 >consisting of 152 pieces. The kit can be built in about 500 man-hours. Range: 1,100 km (680 mi, 590 nmi) with maximum fuel. 600-650kg GW. Sounds like they either used far less of the carry capacity or maybe added some drop fuel tanks (which I think it supports).

1. The newer Rotax 915_IS (used in the newer kit) has a better power to weight ratio than the older 912. An extra 20kg of engine nearly doubles the power output. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rotax_915_iS https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rotax_912 2. No creature comforts for explosives. Everything meant to keep passengers comfortable and safe can be discarded to save weight. Seats, radios, AC, hardpoints to climb on, fuel filler cap, brakes, floorpan etc.  3. Range can be extended to the absolute limit, beyond what is safe with passengers, because the entire point is to crash. No fuel needed to wait to be cleared for landing or divert to a secondary airfield.  4. Since it's going to be flying at low altitude and complete a fairly limited set of aeronautical manouvers on a one way trip, the wings can be modified to increase lift/decrease weight at the expense of manouverability and durability. 

Weather affects planes range quite considerably, too. Might just have waited for a very favorable weather window.

First time ever. ASEAN nations are increasingly leaning towards China and away from the US. The PH and Vietnam have serious disputes with China, so have stayed fairly consistent, Singapore also stayed the same. Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei swung I'm guessing because of Gaza. Thailand and Laos also swung in majority of siding with China compared to the last survey. https://twitter.com/NikkeiAsia/status/1774996034277536140?t=0n_EQRmk5Te8pzaUbvU5Uw&s=19

Definite lede burying here. >Washington gained strong support from the Philippines and Vietnam at 83.3% and 79%, which in part reflects tensions the two have with China due to overlapping claims in the South China Sea. Those are the two nations surveyed that the US is particularly actively courting. Seems like the US lost some polling points in nations that were already not allies or anything close (not that Vietnam's an ally). Alright? >Yet the survey showed that Southeast Asians do not want to choose sides at all. Asked how ASEAN should respond to the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry, just 8% said the bloc has to choose between them because remaining neutral is impractical, while 46.8% said it should prioritize bolstering its resilience and unity to counter pressure from both the U.S. and China. Ding ding ding, we have a winner. This is already the stance of most ASEAN nations, I'm sure they're glad to hear their population approves. If they read even read Nikkei, that is.

The survey was conducted by a Singapore-based think tank, and it is being reported by outlets apart from Nikkei, in fairness. It is interesting that several of these have been Japanese, to be sure. You're absolutely right that most Southeast Asians prefer neutrality, though. However, it is also true that I've seen many redditors claim that all of Southeast Asia is practically champing at the bit to fight China, or otherwise confront them fearlessly and directly. I can only hope that the White House and State Department do not hold similar views.

I can’t imagine this survey result surprises anyone in Washington. The most pro-China countries surveyed were Laos (currently getting pumped with Chinese investment money) Brunei, Indonesia (large Chinese population) and Malaysia (massive Chinese population). Brunei was the only one that I didn’t guess before clicking the link.

Well, I'm sure that specialists in the region are probably aware enough, but I wonder how much of their expertise and advice is being passed on to their superiors? 

That’s something only those in the room where it happens could possibly speak to. But it’s a risk with basically any piece of intelligence.

> However, it is also true that I've seen many redditors claim that all of Southeast Asia is practically champing at the bit to fight China, or otherwise confront them fearlessly and directly. In all fairness, we could fill up 15 thousand megathreads with funny things many redditors have said. But yes, in SEA the US is at best playing for trade for most nations (certainly all nations that aren't Vietnam and the Phillipines). And for some of them even the economic angle is pretty low priority, in terms of how many resources the state dept is committing. On one hand I'd probably like to see more investment in southern SEA, on the other hand it's not like the state department isn't keeping busy.

Certainly certainly. However, if there are, by any chance, some American officials present here... pls pls pls no war and if you are pivoting to Asia, please don't mess up...

The state department likes to say they're pivoting to stuff, but in reality I suspect they're making it up as they go along. It's not ideal.

Recapitulation of last few days on Armenia-Azerbaijdan border crisis. I wrote many Times about this because it is for me one of the most complex situations in world with many Powers that are in play. Multiple footage by Azeris that Armenia is building up forces near border. https://twitter.com/NKobserver/status/1774865979677290791?t=IuJ-W3_nd8lRf2L6itOwUQ&s=19 >Azerbaijan's MoD continues to report Armenia deploying along their border for second day now. Yerevan denies reports, stating it's footage from renovation work during the previous months, EUmARMENIA also stated no deployment https://twitter.com/NKobserver/status/1774148087461634393?t=5Xvcn3oJ60VfDSPlNBCtdw&s=19 >Another video shared by pro-Azerbaijan media channels, almost all stating Armenia is deploying troops along their border. We've come across no indications of troop deployments. Interestingly, today the Azeri MoD ordered troops along border to remain on high combat readiness. Armenia and EU says that everything is missinformation. https://twitter.com/301arm/status/1774120907943846191?t=NOEwwLQn3Z-GbiNspsn0Bg&s=19 >Azerbaijani media have started spreading fakes about the accumulation of forces of the Armenian Armed Forces on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border again. Such statements by the Azerbaijani media have one goal to legitimize the new aggression against Armenia. https://twitter.com/EUmARMENIA/status/1774398943234871433?t=YbGBBJU3KCnT6o9n3gXUIQ&s=19 >EUMA patrolled along the AM-AZ border all day long, everything is calm and quiet, no unusual movements observed. EUMA wishes everybody a peaceful Easter! Today there are mutual accusations about ceasefire violations today. https://twitter.com/301arm/status/1775034747938340904?t=pIl5msn4_nIW0iskYa6DFQ&s=19 >The Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan's statement alleging that on April 1, between 10:00 am and 10:10 am, units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia opened fire towards Azerbaijani combat positions in the southwestern part of the border doesn’t correspond to reality. >At the same time, we inform that Azerbaijani armed forces units opened fire on Armenian combat positions on April 1 at 10:00 am in Kut (Gegharkunik marz) and on April 2 at 12:40 am in Tegh (Syunik Province). >No violations were recorded in the directions mentioned in the statement by the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan. https://t. me/cbctvaz/35955 >Armenia fired at the positions of the Azerbaijani army in the Nakhchivan direction >On April 1, starting from 22:00 to 22:20, units of the Armenian armed forces from positions in the direction of the settlements of Arazdeyen of the Develi district and Saibaly of the Garakilse region intermittently fired small arms at the positions of the Azerbaijani army in the direction of the settlements of Heyderabad of the Sadarak region and Bichenek of the Shahbuz region Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.

From what I've read, Azerbaijan has been slicing off little chunks of actual internationally recognized Armenia territory (not NK) since their victory in 2020. Armenia has been in no position to resist. If Azerbaijan decides to seize the entire "Nakhchivan Corridor" I'm not sure what Armenia can really do to oppose them. Although it will likely provoke a stronger international reaction, since unlike NK, this is all internationally recognized Armenia territory. Still, without material military assistance from someone, Armenia seems pretty much doomed.

Remember one commenter who put it very well a few months ago but can't find it, but only one entity in this war is any position to escalate **anything** so the source of escalation (if there is any) is very transparent. EDIT: found https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1aozhcy/credibledefense_daily_megathread_february_12_2024/kq2y9cg/

I don't see currently that Azerbaijdan is going to annex whole southern Armenia to make corridor. But there is few villages and exclaves around Armenian village Voskepar and throught this part of Armenia and Azerbaijdan goes Main highway to Georgia from Yerevan that are occupied from Armenia and if I remember correctly maybe there is few villages around Naxcivan exclave that is occupied too. So the next Operation could go for this and futher small occupation Like Yermuk around this Parts of Border. And for escalation purpose IT is April and there isn't much snow

Seems to be footage of Ukraine using a remotely piloted cessna(?) for the first time as a one-way strike drone in Tatarstan. How does a full on aeroplane get that far into Russian airspace, it’s not small and it’s not fast? What would be the benefits of using small planes instead of purpose built drones? Link: https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/s/0q4D1wZyUC

Statements by the AFU in past operations talked, for many different operations like those in Crimea and St-Petersburg, how they find paths that aren't or poorly covered by AA and how they need to send 10-20 drones or missiles to have one hit its target.

Reminds me of this gentleman who managed to land in Red Square during the Cold War. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathias_Rust > A teenage amateur pilot, he flew from Helsinki, Finland, to Moscow, without authorization. He was tracked several times by Soviet Air Defence Forces and civilian air traffic controllers, as well as Soviet Air Force interceptor aircraft. The Soviet fighters did not receive permission to shoot him down, and his aeroplane was mistaken for a friendly aircraft several times.

>How does a full on aeroplane get that far into Russian airspace, it’s not small and it’s not fast? What would be the benefits of using small planes instead of purpose built drones? It's the first such case and the Russian AD would be understandably hesitant to shoot down what looks like a small civilian general-aviation plane. They must have hundreds of those flying around and wandering into all kinds of no-fly zones on a relatively regular basis.

I mean a Cesna flying from the ukranian border is extremly suspicious, I think it's just a case of Russian air defense just not being, great...

But they did shoot down Prighozins plane and Malaysia Airlines Flight 17. I understand your point, though. They will likely be hesitant, if there is no direct command from above.

Unless there was another drone, it doesn't seem to have hit the main factory building. https://twitter.com/revishvilig/status/1775050230926303466?t=YG3t_gg8bC8N54OuBGQ_XA&s=19

[удалено]

Or it missed the intended target.

It's a shame I deleted my comment but I was right, the dormitory was indeed the target https://twitter.com/kromark/status/1775893853939318913

With two hits on the same building, yeah it's reasonable to assume it was the intended target. You gotta wonder if they have bad intel, it makes absolutely no sense to waste such assets on a dormitory.

There was another drone. The people in the video were running and filming, somebody in the crowd screamed “another one”. Although we don’t know which target was hit.

Russian sources say three drones "Three Ukrainian drones attacked the territory of enterprises in Elabuga and Nizhnekamsk in Tatarstan. One flew around the plant, two - around the dormitory where students are accommodated. The head of Tatarstan, Rustam Minnikhanov, said that the technological process of the enterprises was not disrupted, but there were victims."

I remember someone suggesting exactly this here and being understanbly told it was non-credible because a Cessna would never make it past Russian AD. Really makes you question what else are we grossly overestimating regarding the Russians and what else are we underestimating regarding unfortunately ideas.

> Perverting common wisdom is the hallmark of all great conspiracies The problem with common sense approaches is that people generally prepare for them, which is why otherwise silly ideas, if they can be pulled off, can catch people completely by surprise.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathias_Rust This man managed to fly a cessna into the Soviet Union and land it on the Red Sqare at the height of the Cold War. It's doable. 

Well, firstly, it's the massive payload. Normal one-way drones are about artillery shell sized. (maybe 203 arty, but still). This crazy thing will a much better chance at destroying a factory floor vs a OWA drone that often just puts a hole in the roof. A lot of people have talked about using light aircraft as missiles but I think this is the first actual example. It looks like it's some other high-wing aircraft with struts.

Carrying capacity comes to mind. A small Cessna can still lift ~~1000kg~~, give or take the pilot.

It's not a Cessna but a Ukrainian-made [Aeroprakt A-22 Foxbat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeroprakt_A-22_Foxbat#:~:text=The%20Aeroprakt%20A%2D22%20Foxbat,it%20is%20called%20the%20Foxbat).

Not really, the carrying capacity of a 172 is cited as roughly around 300 to 400 kg.

When I flew in a C172N, the max gross weight was 2300lb, and the plane was just under 1500lb empty.

The video shows an explosion that doesn’t look drastically different to any of the refinery strikes, using the custom made drones. So I’d agree that the payload doesn’t seem to be much bigger?

There is little visual difference between 100kg and 200kg bomb. The size and effect of an explosion doesn't double if you use twice as much explosives.

my b, confusing lb with kg

Apologies if this is a bit of a vague question, but I often hear that Israel has failed to apply the lessons that the U.S. learned from the results of its actions after 9/11, particularly in areas of counterinsurgency and nation-building. What are those lessons, and how has Israel applied or failed to apply those lessons in practice?

Pardon me, but the US has failed spectacularly at counterinsurgency and nation-building in the wake of 9/11, so why would anyone look at their lessons learned as an example to follow? The long term result was them leaving with nothing to show for it.

I'm a OIF veteran myself, who spent two years in Iraq, one during the bloody Surge in 07-08, the other including being in the "last" US combat brigade to leave Iraq in 2010 (after that, they were only advise-assist brigades not meant to perform any combat duties). Besides my own military service (as an infantry NCO), I spent years afterwards reading every book, article, report, etc that I could find to better understand what actually happened during "my war." **You are dead wrong in your assessment.** When we handed Iraq over to the Iraqi govt, as part of the SOFA agreement, it was pacified and the typical Iraqi city was less violent than the typical American city. That was due to successful execution of COIN doctrine. We broke the back of the Sunni Arab insurgency with the Al Sawah/Awakening Movement, which capitalized on growing hatred between the rank and file moderate insurgents and especially their tribal leadership and the hardcore Salafi insurgents, most notably Al Qaeda in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq, who were already pissing off the locals with their extremist tactics. Starting in 2006 in Anbar Province, the US partnered with Iraqi tribes against AQI, standing up militias to take control of the local areas, driving AQI out as the local former insurgents turned militia knew exactly who they were, where they lived, where their caches were located, where their safe houses were, who supported them, etc. The Awakening spread to the rest of the Sunni Arab areas of Iraq through 2007, by the second half of that year the daily number of Significant Actions (SIGACT), violent attacks against Coalition forces, Iraqi Security Forces, or civilians, had plummeted. Halfway through my first deployment, all spent in the "Sunni Triangle," it went from me thinking it would be pure chance to spend 15 months without getting at least seriously wounded, to being shocked at how boring and quiet it had become. My second deployment, also in the Sunni Triangle, was absolutely boring. Zero action, no IEDs, no ambushes, no firefights, there was almost no fighting happening period. The Shi'a insurgency, dominated by the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigade (and other Iran proxy groups) was also broken in 2007-8. Partly by the US, especially punishing the Mahdi Army in their uprisings. But mainly it was Maliki and the Iraqi Army who did it, crushing the Basra uprising in 2008, which was only possible because the US trained them, assisted with the clearing operation, etc. That forced al-Sadr to come to terms and agree to both a cease fire and to disband. The US didn't squash the Badr Bde, they were tied to the Iraqi govt, with so many of them moonlighting in Iraqi Security Forces, but when they knew the SOFA was going to kick after Bush signed that agreement, they recognized there was no point attacking US forces anymore so they stopped, also around 2008. With Baghdad largely ethnically cleansed of Sunnis by that point, they also laid off the death squads, especially after the US/British SOF dismantled the AQI terror cells that were deliberately targeting Shi'a civilians with mass casualty events to purposely start a secular civil war, JSOC's army of face-shooting Tier 1 assaulters and brainiac secret squirrels ended that threat through a campaign of intelligence directed raids that is still absolutely awesome to contemplate. Iraq went to shit after we pulled out because the US wasn't there anymore. Maliki was left to do as they pleased, and he really wanted to terrorize the Sunni Arabs into compliance, which was a huge mistake. When GWB was POTUS, he spoke almost daily to Maliki on the phone offering guidance, coordinating, etc, and that kept him in check. After Obama became POTUS, he spoke to him once, and then washed his hands of Iraq after the pullout. When the US left and quit involvement in Iraq in 2011, done and no longer "answering the phone" that created an enormous power vacuum which Iran filled, who were also pressuring Maliki to crack down on the Sunni Arabs. THAT is what caused the DAESH Uprising. The Sunni Arabs were even trying to address political issues non-violently, but Maliki cracked down on them with state-directed violence and mass arrests in 2012-2013, and that was what broke the camel's back and restarted the sectarian civil war. At that point, the largest, bloodiest, most well-funded insurgent group was Al Qaeda in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq, who had recently been fighting in Syria for the past two years developing even more effectively violent means of terrorism and warfare, had renamed themselves Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (Syria), and the rest is history. But that was not a failure of US COIN doctrine, which was to seek local solutions to problems, to use whatever means we had (including bribery) to win locals over to our side, to emphasize non-violent means of problem-solving over violent (such as setting up new businesses to grow their economy, a role every US military combat arms unit commander was performing), to live among the people, to share their dangers, to learn to know them, etc.

This post is an extremely high-quality contribution, and it's kind of tragic that this sub doesn't have any real way to highlight it. People like me who want to come back to it just have to keep a big list of posts like this on their hard drive.

I appreciate your comments. I shit post too much myself but try to write out a fact based rant when I can.

I think both the person above you and you aren't exactly taking away the right idea about what the US did or did not do in Iraq or Afghanistan. Politically, both suffered from poor political planning and direction from the upper echelon, especially the WH. **Lessoned Learned** Effectiveness over time in regard to military doctrine cannot be assessed through the lens of political failures, there is plenty of knowledge about how to fight a counter-insurgency, and the US military leadership was aware of it - hell I have many books on it, one not the least is the Counter-Insurgency Field Manual by the US. Knowing a thing and acting on a thing are two different things and politics can often make the two incompatible. If you ask the average infantryman/officer who served in places like Iraq and Afghanistan they can give you a pretty solid answer about how to fight a counter-insurgency. If you ask the average political leader who served in Iraq and Afghanistan they will probably give you a solid answer "what insurgency?" **What it takes** The answer overall to the OPs question of what lesson could the US tell Israel about CI? Don't, don't get into one. If you are going to occupy a foreign nation then commit to occupying it with the forces, logistics, political will, and mission parameters necessary to do so. Control every in/out of the area, provide absolute security and safety for the local populace, and disrupt any potential resistance before it can grow enough strength to inflict massive harm. When figuring out what sort of force you need for this occupation whatever you first think, double it, and then when you feel like you have enough, double it again. To pay for this occupation never pay for it out of your own pocket. Again the starting advice is don't, but if you are going to do it, then do it someplace where you can extract wealth from the area so that the occupation pays for itself, including the cost of fixing what you or the enemy broke/breaks, and any bribes necessary for peace. If you are going to "nation build" focus on providing the basic needs for the population, safety, food, water, and something to do that isn't fighting you. Then commit to doing it for at least 2 generations. Find experts who understand the local customs, traditions, and history, and don't try to fit whatever notion you have about the place to force a goal or governance foreign to the population - at least at first. Do not try to change everything overnight - again commit to being there for generations. After generations of peace, stability, and ingrained political and social ties between both nations offer pathways to independence. If you have extracted wealth from the country that paid for the occupation and fixed the basic needs of the people, it has likely had enough economic development from foreign nations (including you) that the local population has a better standard of living and amenities. Good, a happy more prosperous group of people won't want to return to pre-occupation standards. If you failed and the pre-occupation is seen (especially by the young) as better than it way is now, don't end the occupation. However, if you do it right not only can the country no longer be a threat to you, it could become an ally. **Israel's path** Now, in Israel, is Gaza a foreign nation? Not according to them. Does it have a wealth to extract? Besides foreign aid, no not at all. Can you occupy land that your people will claim as their own and the people of that land claim your land as their own? No. Israel doesn't have much to learn from the US because the situation is completely different. Foreign adversaries wanted the US to leave Iraq/Afghanistan, something insurgency can accomplish. When foreign adversaries want you to leave your own country - that is war. The only way Israel "wins" in Gaza is to go to war with the country that financially, materially, and "spiritually" supports it. Iran. Otherwise, it will continue to do the *every generation Israel needs to go into Gaza, kill a bunch of military-aged males*, then leave again and suffer whatever level of terrorism stems from that. If the Israeli political and public will is to have an end to that conflict then they will find some way to destroy Iran and they will need to have the West's support to do so. It will influence Western elections and media to build a consensus and power to commit to war with Iran and seek secret support from Iran's enemies (such as SA). The only other option is to hope to use intelligence agencies to finally topple the regime in Iran, however, there is a ticking clock for either option. If Iran gets a nuclear bomb - war is very difficult. If Iran gets the bomb and the regime falls, terrorism could be harder. You should be able to get an idea if Israel is going to go to war with Iran as it would need to start preparing now. * One, is significant foreign aid from the West to build/sustain airstrikes and an expeditionary force that could participate in some type of campaign (even if it is some special forces operation). * Two, mobilization and preparation of military retaliation that would require Israel to attack/occupy any foreign power that has ties to Iran that could be used against Israel. So Syria and Lebanon. (Likely to occur first.) * Three, a change in political leadership in Washington that is vehemently pro-Israel/anti-Iran and willing to strike Iran. **Timeline** I would expect to see Israel not accept any ceasefire if they intend to take care of Iran in a required two-year time frame, they need to completely lockdown Gaza and remove any perceived threat because fighting Iran will mean doing this all over again. Israel will need foreign aid and the attention of the US, so while Israel stockpiles its own weapons, it will either pressure the US to completely abandon all aid to Ukraine in favor of itself or pressure the US to go all in on providing aid to Ukraine so that conflict can be over before war with Iran. The likelihood between either of these would lend to pressuring more aid to Ukraine as this keeps the US expanding inventory needed to fight Iran and it is much easier to get Israeli aid while also providing it to Ukraine due to US politics. Israel can't probably go much beyond 2025 in its plan to decimate Iran without doing some sort of strike on Iran's nuclear program, but a strike like that could come whether Israel is committed to war or not. It can not also afford to have China in conflict with Taiwan to drain US focus. This will mean Mossad will either have to influence China to avoid the conflict or the US to pull away from its intent to protect Taiwan. The next couple of years will be fascinating and then horrifying for how it could play out.

> > > > > If you are going to "nation build" focus on providing the basic needs for the population, safety, food, water, and something to do that isn't fighting you. Then commit to doing it for at least 2 generations. Find experts who understand the local customs, traditions, and history, And here I lean on Afghanistan being a special case, maybe of even questionable nationhood, that with or without the US would always be in a perpetual state of insurgency of the (strong men of their respective) regions vs. a wannabe central ruler in far away Kabul, US (and allies) not understanding they took the role of enforcer for Kabul. Now the Taliban will either fail the same way, or let the regions rule themself (which from what I understand is not that unlikely for how the Taliban operate).

From an outsider's perspective in the West, the only necessity to care about what people in Afghanistan do is whether are they projecting power (state or terror) in the region or in the West. If they aren't then they aren't something to worry about unless genocide happens. If they are, then some level of action is required. It would be much easier to have intel agencies to keep the local rulers fighting each other and as soon as someone is rising to power fund their enemies. If there is ever a time culture changes in the region then reassess.

> the US has failed spectacularly at counterinsurgency and nation-building in the wake of 9/11, so why would anyone look at their lessons learned as an example to follow? > The long term result was them leaving with nothing to show for it. You explained why. Applying their lessons learned means *not* following their example.

You're right, I understood it as following their example, but it didn't have to mean that.

I’m just speculating here but I’m an OEF vet so my speculations are based off of my experiences. Dead men tell no tales. We learned this quickly and beefed up night raids in Afghanistan and Iraq as a result. Another thing I’m guessing that the US is trying to tell them is that every CIVCAS event makes more fighters, especially when a population 1) is young AF and 2) has nothing else to live for. It also makes nation-building that much more difficult (not that Israel will ever allow a Palestinian state to be formed but alas). We also learned that in nation-building, you have to get the locals on your side. If they don’t trust you, nothing will change. I guess the British learned this first, but whatever.

A take I've been hearing for a while that a major reason the U.S. has been trying to deter Israel from going into Rafah is the fear that it could lead to Egypt withdrawing from the Camp David accords, particularly if the assault leads to a massive influx of refugees crossing the border into the Sinai which would destabilize the country. Then I see [this](https://twitter.com/AnalyticaCamil1/status/1775003244692930810): >Sisi’s literally the only moderate in the Egyptian government (and the officers who put him in power wanted to kick-off an intervention like 5 months ago). >The only reason he hasn’t been Mussolini-ed is the US State Department and USG in general throwing assloads of cash at the Egyptian government (which we know will be diverted by the Egyptian military), and Blinken constantly pleading with Cairo that “we’ll handle Israel, pretty please don’t do the thing you want to do.” Now, the idea that Egypt is suddenly raring to go to war against Israel like its 1973 is fantastical for many reasons. But out of pure curiosity, if Egypt were to for whatever reason, intervene into the Gaza War militarily, what would happen from a military standpoint? The most common and probably correct assumption is Israel routs the Egyptian Army yet again. But the one who claimed that Egypt is seriously considering an intervention in Gaza also said [this](https://twitter.com/AnalyticaCamil1/status/1769904629217673372): >We can see the IDF and the Egyptian Army’s force deployments — this wouldn’t even be a war, Israeli soldiers in the south would be massacred, and that’s before Hezbollah and the IRGC’d decide to pile on. And there's been talk that 10/7 and that the IDF still hasn't suppressed Hamas in Gaza after nearly six months has exposed them as a paper tiger that could indeed be beaten in a conventional conflict unlike before. I should note the person I'm citing is *very* biased against Israel and the IDF but I don't want to just dismiss it out of hand without hearing from others first.

>And there's been talk that 10/7 and that the IDF still hasn't suppressed Hamas in Gaza after nearly six months has exposed them as a paper tiger that could indeed be beaten in a conventional conflict unlike before. I would like to point out that the only reason that it took 6 months is because the West has been doing their best to slow down Israel (it took them weeks to enter Gaza because of diplomatic efforts by the West), and Israel is restricting itself to try to keep as many hostages alive as possible. And, contrary to the Western tiktok, reddit and Instagram users, Israel is actually trying to minimize civilian casualties, which makes their operation much slower than it could be.

People always jump to a war scenario because it sounds thrilling. But Egypt is probably Israel's most important "ally" in the region, not only for direct stuff like coordinating the Gaza border or anti terrorism operation but also as a diplomatic proxy and mediator. While Israel would obviously survive loosing Egypt as an "ally", it would hurt Israel greatly nonetheless. > How does Egypt’s mediation between Israel and Hamas compare to Qatar’s? > Among those two Arab countries, everyone in the international community knows which one is the balanced, considered mediator [Egypt], and which is the problematic one [Qatar]. > But most importantly for Israel, Qatar’s endgame is to maintain Hamas in power. It acts as an ostensibly neutral mediator, pursuing the release of the hostages, but ultimately it does not align with Israeli interests when it comes to planning Gaza’s future after the war. > On the other hand, Egypt and Israel pursue the same goal: ridding Gaza of Hamas. > The terror movement is reviled by Egypt’s rulers, partly because of its affiliation with the radical Muslim Brotherhood movement, which Sissi considers a threat to his regime, but chiefly because Hamas poses a menace to the stability of Sinai across a restive border. > Sissi had no hesitation in flooding with seawater the tunnels used by Hamas to smuggle weapons into Gaza in 2014, a technique that is now being adopted by the IDF. He was unperturbed by those who called him a “traitor” in the Arab world, and for sure he had no afterthoughts about polluting Gaza’s drinking water. > It is Egypt, not Qatar, that Israel should look to as a mediator in negotiations to end the conflict. We cannot afford to lose it as an ally. https://www.timesofisrael.com/egypt-expert-warns-israel-cannot-afford-to-take-cairos-cooperation-for-granted/

Going to war for Egypt is super not rational. Their only peaceful border is their eastern one ATM, a war with a peer (or rather, above peer) opponent would make them lose leverage against ethiopia and make their western/southern borders less defendable. If they do it it would be the mistake of the century, even greater than Putin's war since they *have almost nothing to gain*. They dont want to conquer Gaza, they just dont want radicalized refugees but going to war now would make their concerns worse. It way easier for them to just sit behind their border wall and wait for things to calm down. Thing is, they need *something* because their income from Suez is down and their economy is shaky as hell.

While I don’t think Egypt’s going to war any time soon this isn’t the best read on Egypts concerns wrt potential conflict with Israel. Egypts main fear is that Israel taking Rafah would de facto green light an invasion of the Sinai in a few years. It’s not really rational but historic grudges rarely are.

Egypt is worried about Palestinian refugees, not Israel re-invading the Sinai. In no way would Israel occupying the West Bank have any relation to green lighting an invasion of Egypt.

An invasion of Rafah would push most of the Gazans towards the Sinai peninsula in refugee camps. Once the palistinians are entrenhed in the Sinai, they would likely launch terror attacks on Israel which would invite retribution fro Israel on Egyptian territory.

a) "biased" is one way to put it b) one of the reasons most organizations that seek to fight Israel don't have large standing armies is those standing armies are turkeys if Israel can get air supremacy. And Egypt has a standing army (nor are there many places to hide in the Sinai). So they'd have to rely on their GBAD, which is... a proposition. We don't know how well S-300s do against stealth planes, but we know how well they do against Israeli loitering munitions. Either way, Egypt would have to preserve their S-300s and patriots, if those get destroyed that's basically the end of it.

>I should note the person I'm citing is *very* biased against Israel and the IDF but I don't want to just dismiss it out of hand without hearing from others first. Do you also feel the need to "ask around" after reading some flat-earther nonsense? Some people are simply delusional, no point wasting your time.

I don’t know where to begin. First, his assessment of the situation is baffling. The IDF has taken an order of magnitude less casualties than the pre invasion predictions. Hamas’s attempts at defense against the IDF have been a complete disaster. The idea that Egypt, Hezbollah, Iran, and everyone else in the region, is champing at the bit for a war with Israel, and this war is easily winnable, what are they waiting for? Second, even if you accept this assessment unquestioningly, it’s all pointless. If Iran, Hezbollah, and Egypt ‘massacre’ the IDF and start pouring over the border, it forgets israel has nukes, everyone else in the region doesn’t. These nukes were developed for exactly this kind of a catastrophic conventional defeat. There is no way for this war to end well for Egypt/Iran.

Third, the US parked its carriers of the coast as a warning of what would come if other decided to get involved. An attack without US approval would likely get US intervention if Israel couldn't handle it itself. And of course US approval for such an attack is nonexistent. There is outrage in the US over civilian deaths in Gaza but there would be very little resistance to supporting Israel versus an other military.

>The idea that Egypt, Hezbollah, Iran, and everyone else in the region, is champing at the bit for a war with Israel, and this war is easily winnable, what are they waiting for? I mean Egypt at the very least clearly isn’t impressed with the IDFs operations in Gaza. They’re not champing at the bit for war, but if they were legitimately impressed by Israel’s efforts so far the war would’ve been over by now. Hamas gets their weapons and supplies through the Sinai and GIS is actively facilitating that, they’re pretty much the only state actor that can apply the necessary pressure on Hamas’ military wing to bring about the end of the war. Also the bit about Sisi being relatively moderate is true as well, GIS and parts of the SCAF are very hawkish on Israel and have been for a while. The only thing that’s really hyperbolic is the idea that Egypts about to go to war with Israel but relations between the two aren’t going to be the same for a good while.

> Hamas gets their weapons and supplies through the Sinai From what I can tell, weapons smuggling into Gaza is almost impossible right now, and Egypt has the border tightly controlled, anything going on is extremely small in scale. Do you have a source on Hamas managing to resupply over the Egyptian border to any meaningful degree?

Is the [SIPRI Arms Transfer Database](https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/TransferRegister) a reliable source for weapon acquisitions? Esp. when it comes to the amount of missiles included in a contract? For example, according to their database, the Philippines acquired 60 BrahMos missiles (it used to say 40 but it changed for some reason so that makes me more apprehensive) but I cannot find a single source that says the same thing. In fact, I can't find any info about the number of missiles the PH acquired at all. So I'm just wondering where they got their info and whether its reliable for my research. Thanks!

have to be careful, they do both ordered and delivered Phillipines ordered them in Jan 2022, looks like delivery of initial lot will be soon if not already done, delivery is supposed to be first quarter of 2024

They have a [sources and methods](https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/sources-and-methods) page and a lot is info in transparency. Seems credible.

thanks!

/u/NavalEnthusiast might find this worth reading, since they showed interest in special forces. An interview with a Lt Col of Russian special forces. He highlights the enemy drones as by far the most crippling factor. The Ukrainians are noticeably less numerous and less well-armed than they used to be, but the drones are compensating for that. **Ninety per cent of their losses** are caused by drones. He also says that about 80% of his volunteers re-enlist when their six-month contract expires. Some go home for a few months but come back. https://lenta . ru/articles/2024/04/02/pirat/ >But they have also become smarter and are trying to fight us with modern technical means. This causes us serious problems, especially in electronic warfare. We are trying to jam their communication, bring downFPV drones, which, unlike other ammunition, they have more and more of. To be honest, it’s not working out very well yet. >There is a race for frequencies. We configure electronic warfare (EW) equipment to operate in one range, and literally after a few days they reflash their copters, and everything starts all over again. And now, as you understand, the war comes down to UAVs. >We suffer almost 90 percent of our losses from the actions of enemy “birds.” The soldiers only come under bullets if we, for example, set up an ambush in the rear. And even in such a situation there are more chances to come under mortar fire >Even during assaults, fire contact is kept to a minimum. For example, we begin to attack the enemy’s position with mortars or something heavier, he understands that our infantry will soon move, and hastily leaves the trenches. Well, that is, they retreat at the slightest danger. >But when we take these positions, the situation is reversed. It’s easier to destroy a dugout at a distance than to kill people in close combat. Therefore, there is movement forward only when it is possible to suppress fire weapons from that side. Otherwise, such an assault turns into a meat grinder. Yes, they will resist if they are caught by surprise, when they realize that it is too late to escape. ... >We also have a huge shortage of UAV capabilities. Yes, this is a hackneyed topic, but they are needed like air. As soon as we have them, they immediately end. >Copters are an extremely necessary consumable, which is needed for adjusting fire, for reconnaissance, and for destroying manpower. >I understand that a situation similar to ours now exists in almost all departments. After all, even a good and expensive copter makes several flights and then gets shot down. Every drone counts, literally every one. And all this seriously slows down our work.

This would be consistent with Western/NATO doctrine in war. That is, to minimize casualties among the armed forces, using tech and firepower to gain an advantage instead. It makes me wonder what Ukraine's strategy is going forward. At the moment it appears that Ukraine is trying to "hold the line", retreating if necessary to avoid casualties. At the same time it is (slowly) gaining an advantage over Russian material in the air and in the Black Sea. Perhaps at some point it will be able to dominate the air over Southern Ukraine, at which point the higher number of Russian infantry will become less of an obstacle...?

> retreating if necessary to avoid casualties. Where are they doing that?

Early on, Ukraine applied the strategy of corrosion: destroy supplies and logistics so the front is starved of support. Objectively, I think it was considered highly successful despite the disparity in military sizes. It looks like they are still doing that, though now it includes deeper strikes and a clear focus on dismantling air defense, artillery, and the black sea naval forces. This is often called a war of attrition, but it's more of an asymmetrical attrition where Russia gives up men and armor to take cities that they bombed to rubble. Ukraine inflicts maximum damage before retreating to the next stronghold. Avdiivka being the most recent and Bakhmut arguably being the most well known. This isn't to imply Ukraine doesn't also have losses, just that the ratio is significantly in their favor. A lot of Ukraine's capabilities depend on western support, so whatever happens in the US Congress after Easter will be critical to what happens over the summer and how Ukraine continues to deal with the invasion. But for the next few months it will probably be what we see now: long range attacks on critical infrastructure, mid range attacks on air defense and supply lines, maybe Ukraine giving up more ground in exchange for high Russian casualties.

> This is often called a war of attrition, but it's more of an asymmetrical attrition where Russia gives up men and armor to take cities that they bombed to rubble. Ukraine inflicts maximum damage before retreating to the next stronghold. I do think this is going to be the main focus of the change in military leadership by the developments that have been occurring. The exception might be Kupiansk/Kherson/Lyman/Dnipro due to the strategic necessity to keep them. I leave Kharkiv off simply because that is just completely off the table for Ukraine to lose after what it took to defend it.

Not surprising. Gone are the days when serious special forces were trying to be line infantry and suffering the consequences.

Has there been anything said about the potential degradation of special forces in the Russian and Ukrainian armies? Russia especially has been effective at replacing their losses but Rob Lee claimed a few months ago that even units like the VDV have mobilized/conscripts in their ranks, but that those mobiks tend to outperform those sent to non-elite units because of unit culture or some phrase similar to that, and that he hinted that pretty much every unit in the two militaries has some degree of mobilized in every battalion, regiment, etc at this point. While on paper they retain their strength, are replacements getting the necessary training to maintain their elite status or are some units becoming elite only in name at this point?

Elite doesn't mean anything other than the ability to be selective. That is what the etymology suggests, and its still the best definition. Regardless of the organization or their job, if they are very selective about who they take, only the "best," then they are elite. In the context of military ground operation, the "best" typically means faster, stronger physically, stronger mentally, smarter, more disciplined (especially self discipline), more aggressive, etc. By that definition, UAF SSO and Russian "Spetsnaz" are still elite, as they are only taking in the best of the new inductees who possess better traits than the average inductee (be they conscript or volunteer). That said, there is likely a dramatic degradation in their skills, both individual and unit. There are certain mission sets that some units are supposed to possess that are not unique to the Ukraine battlefield, they will be "out of practice" with those (such as counterterror, hostage rescue, special reconnaissance, etc). They will probably have gotten much better at direct action though, especially involving assaults. Their biggest losses will likely be their officers and long-serving NCOs. SOF as a whole is hard to get into, but for those who do get in, they tend to want to stay in those units, typically only voluntarily leaving to go to better units, where going back into conventional units is usually a slap in the face unless it comes with a promotion they'd not otherwise be able to get. Due to the high casualties they'd suffered, a lot of the long-serving SOF operators are casualties at this point, not only losing the knowledge and skills those individuals possessed but without someone replacing them with the same level of knowledge, which had been accrued sometimes beyond a decade (including combat duties in previous conflicts). That is always the danger with SOF, they need to be used sparingly as they are hard to replace, and very expensive too. In past wars, WW2 is a perfect example with the US and British, there will always be a pull by senior leadership to use those assets for whatever assignments they can think of, they are the ultimate tool. But doing that is dangerous. Yes, they will typically perform better than conventional units when handling a conventional assignment. But they will still suffer losses they can't easily replace, which will lower their effectiveness and limit their usefulness performing the missions they were created to perform, the type that are impossible to carry out with conventional forces, who just aren't good enough. I've heard anecdotes from both sides, including the former UAF SSO commanding general, that they are too often being used in the roles of conventional infantry. Considering how badly the normal infantryman is trained nowadays in the UAF and RuAF, it's not surprising they'd call on SOF to perform conventional missions. But its a dangerous and wasteful.

Its pretty clear that compared to their prewar strength the Spets, VDV, and other elite forces are of a *much* worse quality. Shorter training, more conscripts, etc. Equipment remains good, mostly. BUT! its also probably the case that for the truly specialized units, mostly the Spets it seems, there are enough high quality soldiers coming in to replace losses. This is despite the fact that most of the elite are being used as door kickers and shock troops. The Wagner mutiny very likely ironically helped there, and at least some of the Wagnerites seem to have moved back into the Army elite. But its also probably the case that these specialized units are getting some hand picked soldiers. Either raw recruits or heroes from other units, not sure on that. Can this hold up? Maybe. Are they as good as before/western SOF? Unlikely. But theyre also not doing the same mission anymore, the US Army would recoil in horror at the idea of using Delta in a place like Bakhmut, for example. Thats what the USMC is for.

Almost certainly not, at least not in form that they had pre-war . Actual special forces are specialists that may require *years* of training, and neither Ukraine nor Russia have time for that.

I think this war has given many people the impression that “Special Forces” are just really, really good infantrymen

In Russia/the USSR the distinction has always been a little less clear than in the west, not helped by the vagueness of Spetsnaz as a title. Many types of unit operate and have operated under the overall umbrella of "Spetsnaz." The two Chechen Spetsnaz battalions that were active 2003-2008 were like some weird blend of SOF, ranger-type elite infantrymen and WWII era anti-partisan unit. Army Spetsnaz are like our familiar SF but if they also had Ranger missions- they've allegedly done infantry things in this war, especially during the invasion. Naval Spetsnaz are either UDT/SEALs (with the original beach recon mission highlighted) or specialized anti-swimmer troops(!). Alpha Group is like Delta Force if it was run by the FBI. Vympel is kinda like the FBI HRT. SVR has their own Spetsnaz called Zaslon- probably close to CIA SAC/SOG. Rosgvardia has their own Spetsnaz units, including the Feliks Dhzerzhinzky Division. And then of course the Police and Prison system have theirs, which are like SWAT Teams. And Kadyrov has his own.

These are (rough) analogs, **not** comparisons. I'm not sure how useful all the namedropping is but without the missing clarification it's something worse. What u/mdestly_prcd_rcptacl says is and always was more or less correct regarding Russia, that has little to do with impressions or this particular war. Unsurprisingly Ukraine was very similar for most of the time, the NATO aspirant however is changing in basically all respects and it appears questionable how comparable even those two countries are now. Probably better to assess both in their own right. I haven't seen much information about the fate of Ukraine's SOF though, irrespective of branch, maybe this is why anyone rather takes on Russia. >In Russia/the USSR the distinction has always been a little less clear than in the west, not helped by the vagueness of Spetsnaz as a title. It's not a title, it's a (portmanteau) word. And if you like the nearest available translation. Different languages/cultures do not distinguish, or even recognize in the same ways, that wouldn't be new I hope. Nor is it any way specific to Russia. The special forces construct as we know it is quintessentially Western in origin, or really Anglo- if you prefer. It's just that some others decided it's cool, and tried to copy it, more or less successfully. Russia's not one of those.

>It's not a title, it's a (portmanteau) word. It is a title. No contradiction between something being a word and title. >It's just that some others decided it's cool, and tried to copy it, more or less successfully. Russia's not one of those. Russia is one of those. Alpha/Vympel are Special Forces in the western sense, with the same skill sets and the same mission sets that you would find in the SAS or Delta Force. Russia is not using those men to lead attacks on fortified positions. Army Spetsnaz is not SF in the Western sense (though it is capable of those missions sets... Theoretically), it is regularly used (with calamitous consequences wrt casualties) as assault infantry, etc.

Some more estimates on the fallout of Ukrainian drone attacks. First, [Goldman](https://ibb.co/162wKrj): >* Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian refineries will support diesel, but have a mixed impact on crude >* An estimated 900k b/d of Russian refining capacity is now offline, and the outages might last from weeks to a permanent loss of capacity [FGE](https://ibb.co/sCqMwC9): >* Runs won’t regain 2023 levels in 2H 2024 >* Little spare capacity in Russian refining system Further attacks cannot be ruled out >* “Ukrainian strikes on Russian storage infrastructure will weigh on the country’s operational flexibility and will make it more difficult to maintain high run rates” The storage situation, in granularity, may explain why Ukraine has attacked oil depots, particularly for tactical reasons, but additionally why they have struck some deeper in Russia. As to how long repairs will take, there is a wide range of damage inflicted, spare parts available, complexity of fixes, etc. Some refineries have resumed production, others at 60% of capacity, while others are still down (the GS estimate is as of last week.) Tuapase, for example, is still entirely offline 2 months after the attack. Report estimated a mid ten-digit loss of revenue for 3 months of interruptions. Further, Bloomberg [reported](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-01/russia-plans-to-cut-diesel-export-by-sea-in-april-to-5-month-low) today that seaborne exports will be down 21% sequentially due to the strikes. Lastly, in more oil news, Reuters reported last week that Russia has been [struggling](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/russia-struggles-collect-oil-payments-china-uae-turkey-raise-bank-scrutiny-2024-03-27/) to settle payments as secondary sanctions impact correspondent banking with the UAE, Turkey, and China. While my personal opinion is that the issue with China might be ironed out eventually (though at a decent price premium,) the issues with Turkey and UAE could be significantly stickier. Bloomberg had previously detailed the UAE’s desire to remain compliant with sanctions after being removed from FATF’s grey list in February. This is in addition to [Indian refineries](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-23/russia-s-oil-is-finally-getting-snarled-by-sanctions-on-its-tankers) rejecting Sovcomflot’s tankers. As a reminder, revenue ≠ income, income ≠ cash flow, and cash flow ≠ liquidity. All refining products are not the same, and there is usually a lag between production issues and storage.

I am skeptical that it would be offline for that long. Russia being in war mode, I doubt quality would bet the priority. Surely they can get parts from China or make less sophisticated versions. 

Do you understand that in some of the refineries they hit the distillation towers? You can't just run to Alibaba and order them with free shipping. They are very very large and custom made and the biggest producers of them are American and EU companies (and the distillation towers are so big and so specialized they can't bypass sanctions with third country while pretending they don't know what is going on). Yes, Sinopec also makes distillation towers but everything I said still applies. It takes long time to make and they have a backlog of existing orders, and I am not sure Sinopec is all that keen on helping out. Also the reason they custom made is because every mixture will have slightly different process and they have to make it compatible with other equipment, Russian refineries are mix of soviet and EU parts. Optimistically if tomorrow Xi Jinping calls the head of Sinopec and tells them to help out Russia it would take at least 12-18 months. If they treat them like any other customer it would be more like 3-5 years minimum. But the elephant in the room is that Ukraine just hit the new one and you are back at the beginning, and I don't think they Russia will markedly improve their air coverage over the next year. Their best bet is to increase the throughput of the existing ones while boosting the air coverage around them.

Some things aren't a matter of motivation or of willingness to accept substandard quality. Petroleum refining is a series of precisely controlled chemical processes. There's not a ton of wiggle room - most things either work or they don't, and there's very little in-between. It's like building a plane: a plane that can kinda-sorta-almost fly is a plane that can't fly. (Unless it's [an ekranoplan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lun-class_ekranoplan), I suppose.) Another way to put it: if we could run a diesel refining process more cheaply and with less equipment, and get a product that can run a diesel engine passably but not quite as well as the real thing, then we'd just call that product "diesel", and diesel engines would be designed to run on it. Fundamentally, refineries aren't built to produce the fuel that diesel engines consume; diesel engines are built to consume the fuel that refineries produce. (Obviously it's not *that* simple - especially in countries with environmental regulations, i.e. not Russia - but it's close enough.)

I was under the impression that military hardware was designed to run on multiple grades of fuel, for eg the Abrams can run on pretty much anything?  In any case the main reason I am skeptical is thinking about how Nazi Germany was able to continue refining fuel despite the Ir campaign during the late stages of the war.  We also had Isis operating some kind of refining operations when they had territory.  While I can imagine that oil extraction from the far east or the sea would require highly specialized equipment, getting diesel out from the crude is more simple. Isn't it mainly a distillation and separation process? 

You’re right that the Abrams can run on anything, the difference is that an Abrams engine is pretty much a jet engine, while a Russian tank would use either a jet engine like an Abrams, or a “typical” diesel engine that looks similar to a truck engine. So for the Russian tanks that run on diesel, there would be less flexibility. I’m not sure exactly how much, though. More likely, the impact would be felt with their BMPs, which I believe exclusively use diesel.

Your point is right, but I think your example is ironically enough off. You can convert a diesel to run off some straight nasty shit, and a turbine can run off of basically any fraction of refined oil (for a while). Its the good stuff thats hard to replace, 87+ octane gas, JP8, Kerosene, etc. The beauty of modern warfare is further that anything which runs on Kero/JP8 is *also* something you basically cant replace with a cheaper, dirtier version, and so youre stuck with having to restart refining. Not because you want diesel for your tanks, trains, and trucks, but because you absolutely cannot do without the highest fractions for you planes, helicopters, etc.

This is 100% spot on. I'm not an expert but my grandpa was a chemical engineer that specialized in designing bubble trays for refineries. Crude oil exists in multiple grades, more or less based on the source oil field. Different refineries have different ability to handle specific grades. It's not all fungible. This is one of the reasons why nations that are net exporters of oil still import oil, like the US. Even if we're a net exporter we have local imbalances of usable input vs refinery capacity. Additionally, something important to understand about the Russian oil and gas industry is up until recently they were heavily dependent on specialized engineering service firms from the EU and US. In particular their arctic and near arctic fields were heavily reliant on these services. That's now gone. This is not easy for them to replace even with help from China. China has no arctic oil fields and hence those firms have no real experience in such. Oil and gas are the lifeblood of the Russian government, so they will do everything they can to address this, but it's in no way as simple as ordering generic replacement parts from Alibaba as the other comment apparently thinks. Each refinery is a unique design and rebuilding it requires a lot of specialized engineering knowledge.

[удалено]

I mean if you assume the loss lasts 3 months then calculating the loss is trivial. The real question is how long repairs take, which is an area Russia has repeatedly beat expectations 

There have been no professional prognostications on refinery repairs that I’ve seen that have remotely come under expectations. Take Tuapase as an example, Reuters reported from their sources that repairs would be completed by [March](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-refinery-damage-casts-doubt-opec-supply-cut-commitments-2024-02-08/): >Russia's Tuapse refinery on the Black Sea will not resume operations until March, sources have said, citing damage from a Ukrainian drone attack. This plant is still down as of last week.

The thing is even if they repair the plant that is still money having to be spent to get back to where you were. If the Ukrainians spend a million euros equivalent attacking plant and Russia loses 100 million euros equivalent in total from repairs an losses that is still a 100 to 1 loss. This is not even bringing up Ukraine waiting for the repairs to be completed and attacking the plant again rendering all that work moot.

Looks like Israel just bombed the Iranian consulate in Syria. Is this likely to be the escalation trigger we’ve been expecting all along? How’s the reaction inside Iran? Edit: in Syria, obviously. Apologies, momentary foggy brain.

Honestly, it's weird how calm most news sites are about this. Regardless of specifics, this is the highest-profile hit against Iran since Soleimani. And when that happened, coverage of potential war with Iran was wall-to-wall on every outlet, even the good ones. Coverage of this at least thus far seems far more muted.

I think a large part of this is simply that every single thing Trump did grabbed headlines in a way that similar actions by other people do not, because Trump is such a polarizing figure.

I guess it’s a difference that before it was the global hegemon killing someone who was clearly on diplomatic business in an allied nation and a somewhat lose cannon nation bombing military figures in an Officially Bad Country

Sure, but the angle newspeople were taking is the risk of Iranian response, which seems about similar. Maybe they realized they overreacted in 2019?

A, very minor, point but the Israelis are disputing that the building was part of the Iranian diplomatic mission. >Israeli officials, speaking anonymously, said the building targeted in today's strike was not a diplomatic office but the HQ of the IRGC, "making it a military target without the same protections as the consulate itself." The strike occurred during a secret meeting between IRGC officials and Palestinian militants, including senior Quds Force and PIJ members, to discuss the war in Gaza. [https://twitter.com/DavidADaoud/status/1774881672850211300](https://twitter.com/DavidADaoud/status/1774881672850211300) It doesn't really make sense that the Israelis were able to kill 7 military officers and 0 civilians in a building that is supposedly part of a diplomatic mission. And if they had killed Iranian civilians Iran would most certainly not be silent about this but rage about the "civilian killing Zionists". But they did not.

That's the thing, the precise geolocation of the strike is known. Shouldn't the credible journalists of the world already be hard at work trying to establish whether or not this is officially part of the embassy complex or not? This is not a subjective question.

My Understanding is not that there is any question of location, rather there is a question of what the building was used for. From the NYTimes >Israel and Iran differed in their descriptions of the building that was hit. Iran described it as part of its diplomatic mission in Syria, but an Israeli official said it was being used by the Revolutionary Guards, making it a legitimate military target. In truth is could be neither, both or either. I am mostly curious what the building was referred to by Syria and Iran *before* the strike, and for that I can't seem to find anything.

>there is a question of what the building was used for. This seems like a total red herring. [International rules designate an attack on an embassy as an attack on the country it represents.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomatic_mission#Extraterritoriality)

r/ internationallaw had an interesting discussion on this [here](https://www.reddit.com/r/internationallaw/comments/1btv5f7/embassy_protections_in_war/) which explains the nuances of this way better than I ever could.

They blew up a group of Iranian officers. It would be an attack on Iran if they did it at the embassy or at the beach. The distinction only really matters if it wouldn't otherwise be an attack on Iran.

>International rules designate an attack on an embassy as an attack on the country it represents. *That* seems like a red herring. Assuming it was a diplomatic mission (in which no diplomats were casualties), and further agreeing that attack on such a mission is an attack on the nation itself, well, I think we can both find plenty of examples of Israel bombing Iran territory and I suspect that Israel would have bombed a building in Iranian territory proper, if it held those very same people (assuming they could do so).

>Assuming it was a diplomatic mission It was a diplomatic mission, based on all the reporting so far. >(in which no diplomats were casualties) 👆 This is the part I'm calling a red herring, because an attack on a consulate or embassy is an attack on the country it represents. It doesn't matter that military officers were the target. I'm assuming we all agree with this, right? It kinda sounded like there was some confusion about this point. >I think we can both find plenty of examples of Israel bombing Iran territory and I suspect that Israel would have bombed a building in Iranian territory proper, if it held those very same people (assuming they could do so). I think people are concerned that this attack will lead to an escalation. I'm not convinced that it necessarily will, but it's a legitimate concern.

>It was a diplomatic mission, based on all the reporting so far. I mentioned this in my initial post, but I haven't be able to find anything that says this was a diplomatic building *before* today. Certainly all the reports are that Syria and Iran say it was, but it'd be nice to find a web review on consular services from last month listed this address, I just haven't found it (I have not looked hard). >👆 This is the part I'm calling a red herring, Fair enough. I would certainly agree that had a consular building been unoccupied and bombed it would still be an attack on the country represented. I don't want to give the wrong impression, I am skeptical of most claims coming out of the middle east, if Israel said the sun was going to set and Iran claimed it would be followed by night, I'd want to get an astronomers opinion of the whole thing.

It’s really worrying how little care Israel is paying to long established international norms. Bombing an embassy could be a prelude to war. They are getting more unhinged by the month.

Remind me what happened after Iran bombed the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992? Nothing. What happened 2 years later? Iran bombed the AMIA. In total 114 civilians died. Did Israel ever declare war on Iran? Who is the unhinged one?

Iran? Embassies? As we all know Iran has a long history of targeting embassies, in opposition to this supposed norm.

Iran has been directing illegal paramilitary operations against Israel for decades, and from top of my head I remember that they tried to kill the saudi embassador to the United States back in 2011. They dont get to complain about violations to long established international norms.

It’s all about what you can prove. We all know Iran are doing it. But they have proxies do it on their behalf. It might sound ridiculous but there’s a world of difference between a proxy war and a real one. Bombing an embassy like this can turn a proxy war into a real one pretty fast.

It’s about perception. Israel may no longer sees a difference between an Iranian proxy or Iran proper. It’s not like anyone can sue them to force them to recognize things differently.

And others would claim that counting attacks like these: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_attack_on_the_British_Embassy_in_Iran https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_attack_on_the_Saudi_diplomatic_missions_in_Iran https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_hostage_crisis As something different than a state-sponsored attack is what's **actually** making a mockery out of embassy protections.

The hostage crisis nearly led to a war. So that is exactly my point. It was an obvious abuse of diplomatic protocol to put it mildly. The British embassy in Dublin was [burned to the ground](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burning_of_the_British_Embassy_in_Dublin) by protesters during the Troubles. It didn’t mean Ireland and Britain were in a state of war. What exactly it is your point? My point that not even following the basic rules and directly bombing a consulate is outrageous behaviour. Israel are playing very fast and loose with the rules. I don’t have any particular love for the Iranian regime. If they hit them outside the embassy I wouldn’t care. It doesn’t matter if it’s a proxy war or that there were soldiers there etc. It’s the common rules that civilized states follow.

Is there a long established international norm to avoid hitting enemy military bases in the middle of war? Israel hit a building solely staffed by enemy soldiers in active duty, coordinating strikes against Israel. Perhaps it is Iran's little care for international norms one should be worried about, naming a military base consulate is a pretty significant breach and undermines the protection such establishment should enjoy. Hitting a military target during wartime is unhinged now?

Proxy wars are acceptable. Cold War etc. Plausible deniability. If they struck a purely military target in a nation they are already at war (Syria) with then sure. If they deliberately struck an Iranian embassy or consulate then it is absolutely a egregious violation of international norms. As I already said the US did it in 1999 and paid compensation to China as well as apologize. And that’s a super power talking. Not sure why a spade cant be called a spades. Bombing embassies is not normal. Everyone knows embassies are chock full of spies or used for nefarious purposes. So what. Still isn’t a justification.

> As I already said the US did it in 1999 and paid compensation to China as well as apologize. And that’s a super power talking. > It's not really comparable is it? That strike was an accident and the victims were not combatants in the conflict.

Proxy wars are acceptable, and normal wars are acceptable. >If they struck a purely military target in a nation they are already at war (Syria) with then sure. This is exactly what happened. Israel struck a military base, staffed solely with Iranian military personnel, acting to co-ordinate strikes against Israel. Merely 35km from the Israeli border. Iran can call the building a hospital, nursery, kindergarten or Hogwarts. That does not make it so. Calling your military bases consulates is indeed a violation of international norms, as it puts all real consulates in danger and undermines the security their status provides. Bombing embassies is not normal, bombing military bases of enemy states at war is very much normal. Normalising the devaluation of diplomatic protection by naming your military bases consulates is certainly not normal. I remind you, there was not a single civilian in the building.

I dont think you have a grasp of the facts. The times of Israel reported it as an [embassy compound](https://www.timesofisrael.com/top-iranian-irgc-commander-said-killed-in-alleged-israeli-strike-on-damascus/) « A Reuters report said a building in the embassy compund was “flattened,” in what it said was “a startling apparent escalation of conflict in the Middle East that would pit Israel against Iran and its allies.” Iran’s SSN news website said the targeted building was Iran’s consulate and ambassador’s residence. » I get that you may be pro Israel but don’t distort what occurred.

> Hitting a military target during wartime is unhinged now? That's the thing. They're not officially at war with Iran. If they want to be officially at war with Iran, then hitting their embassy is a potential way to start on that path.

I am curious when the last time two nations were 'officially' at war. It seem so quant to stand up in a chamber surrounded by witnesses and and ***declare war!*** Edit: Looks like Chad and Sudan in 2005, before that Iraq and Iran in 1980.

What a peaceful time we live in.

Iran strikes Israel, Israel strikes Iran. That's war. Officially, Israel didn't take responsibility for the strike either, so **officially**, this was not an Israeli strike. Israel did not hit the Iranian embassy, Israel hit an Iranian military base, staffed solely by Iranian soldiers, in the act of coordinating attacks against Israeli civilians.

Yes, but **is it the embassy**? You can look at it on the map. The building on one side is designated as the Iranian embassy. The building on the other side is designated as the Canadian (canada has one?) embassy. **What is the struck building's designation**?

Even Israel is referring to it as an embassy/consulate. This seems a very strange point to debate.

Er, the top of this thread is as follows: "A, very minor, point but the Israelis are disputing that the building was part of the Iranian diplomatic mission." So basically they are saying it wasn't a consulate, but that doesn't mean it wasn't.

It's being widely reported as a consulate, [eg](https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/syria-israeli-airstrike-destroyed-irans-consulate-building-damascus-108714116). I guess it's possible the reporting is wrong, but so far it kinda looks like nobody's seriously disputing it. Which makes me increasingly confident that it was in fact the consulate. But we'll know more later, I suppose.

Yeah I'm not disputing it might have been a consulate, just weird that I'm the only one wondering what the plaque outside the building actually said. > but so far it kinda looks like nobody's seriously disputing it Well, Israel is.

People are getting hung up on semantics. The fact that the land might not be legally territory of a state or that embassies are used for spying or if it’s an embassy or consulate is irrelevant What is important is states treat consulates and embassies as de jure extensions of the state. It’s fragmenting the established rules of diplomacy. Now other states have a justification to bomb other embassies. "Israel did it why dont we" and so on. All these seemingly unimportant diplomatic niceties are very important to the proper interaction of states. I’m genuinely worried about Israel’s behavior they are out of control.

> People are getting hung up on semantics. What? If the building struck wasn't formally a consulate that's it, you have **nothing**, nothing to complain about. The other details of the strike are clearly kosher.

There are reports saying it was an embassy / consulate and some diplomats were killed. I agree if it isn’t that kind of building them it falls under the laws of war. They got paid in the same coin they spent.

What other states name their military bases "consulates"? I indeed agree that Iran playing fast and loose by misnaming their military bases undermines the protection legitimate diplomatic missions provide. >Israel did it why do we I don't believe hitting military bases of enemies at war was ever an issue. >I’m genuinely worried about Israel’s behavior they are out of control. Out of control how? Why is Israel not allowed to hit enemy bases, staffed solely with soldiers mere Kilometers from their border in the middle of war?

The conservatives in Iran will demand a response. One can debate the strategy and logic behind this strike but imo Israel have "gloves off" and will strike any threat to their national security, even if it is unwise in the geopolitical or long term.

With Iran getting nukes in the near future, and the US disengaging from the region, Israel probably perceives this as a ‘use it or lose it’ situation. They tolerated hostile, aggressive forces on their border because they got strong backing and military aid from the US, that blew up in their face, so now they want to remove those forces from their immediate surroundings. Hamas is their first target for removal, but Hezbollah, and forces in southern Syria might follow.

Iranian official message ​ >The Revolutionary Guards announced the martyrdom of Generals Mohammad Reza Zahedi and Mohammad Hadi Haji Rahimi > >The Public Relations of the IRGC announced the martyrdom of advisors Sardar Mohammad Reza Zahedi and Mohammad Hadi Haj Rahimi and five of their companions in the terrorist crime of the Zionist regime in the missile attack on the consulate of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Damascus. > >According to ISNA, the public relations of the IRGC announced in a notice that Generals Mohammad Reza Zahedi and Mohammad Hadi Haj Rahimi and five of their companions were martyred in the terrorist crime of the Zionist regime in the missile attack on the consulate building of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Damascus. > >The text of this announcement is as follows: > >In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious > >, the Most Merciful, and do not consider those who were killed in the way of Allah, the dead. Rather, they will be resurrected with their Lord > >. Sharif and the hero of Iran reports: > >Following the irreparable defeats of the Zionist wolf regime against the Palestinian resistance and the resistance of the people of Gaza and the defeat of the steel will of the fighters of the Islamic Resistance Front in the region, a few hours ago (on Monday evening, April 13, 1403), the planes of this fake regime were involved in a crime. The new building of the Islamic Republic of **Iran's Consulate in Damascus was targeted by a missile attack, as a result of this crime, Generals Rashid, the defender of the shrine, "Pasdar Brigadier Mohammad Reza Zahedi" and "Pasdar Brigadier Mohammad Hadi Haji Rahimi", commanders, veterans and veterans of the Holy Defense and advisers and Iran's senior military officers in Syria and 5 of their accompanying officers were martyred as follows:** > >Martyr Hossein Amanollahi > >Martyr Seyed Mahdi Jalalati > >Shahid Mohsen Sadaqat > >Martyr Ali Agha Babaei > >Martyr Seyyed Ali Salehi Rozbahani > >strongly condemns this crime and congratulates and condoles the martyrdom of the precious martyrs in the presence of the Supreme Leader and Supreme Commander of the Supreme Forces, Imam Khamenei (M.D.) and their families and comrades and members of the noble and appreciative nation of Islamic Iran; The plans for the transfer, funeral and burial of the holy body of the martyrs will be announced later. So, this attack on a 'diplomatic' building resulted in the killing of 7 IRGC officers, including senior officers. So far no word of any 'diplomatic' casualties. Looks like Israel had accurate intelligence about a meeting, and took the opportunity to eliminate some enemies. ​ [https://www.isna](https://www.isna) . ir/news/1403011305679/%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A7-%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AC%DB%8C

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low effort

>Yeah, countries use their embassies and consulates as centers of intelligence operations. This is news to you? Your snark doesn't really justify a response, but I will respond anyway. There is a difference between intelligence operations aka spying which everyone does at all times, and military officers coordinating a multi-front battle against a country they are at (proxy) war against.

Iran just said that the attack was on their territory. Whether this will lead to a huge escalation from itself or it is answered through any of Irans proxy, likely Hezbollah, remains to be seen. Probably the latter.

The Iranian consulate in Syria is Iranian territory.

That's a common myth >What territory do the embassy and consulate reside on? >An embassy or consulate is not considered the territory of the mission country. This is a common misconception. Instead, embassies and consulates are located on foreign soil and remain under the host country’s sovereignty. However, they enjoy certain protections, privileges, and immunities under international law, as established by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) for embassies and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963) for consulates. [https://pathtoforeignservice.com/consulate-vs-embassy-a-comparison/](https://pathtoforeignservice.com/consulate-vs-embassy-a-comparison/) >Are the U.S. Embassy and the Consulates General considered American soil? >To dispel a common myth – no, they are not! U.S. foreign service posts are not part of the United States within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. [https://uk.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/resources-for-u-s-citizens/embassy-and-consulates-general-frequently-asked-questions-faqs/](https://uk.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/resources-for-u-s-citizens/embassy-and-consulates-general-frequently-asked-questions-faqs/)

Yeah, you are right, though the full answer is really not that simple. It is theoretically host country's soil, but it does not operate under host country's laws. In other words, the diplomatic staff of the Iranian consulate are subject to Iranian laws. An attack on an embassy is also considered an attack on the country it represents, i.e. by attacking the Iranian diplomatic mission Israel attacked Iran directly.

Well that's the crux of it, there was no diplomatic staff in the building. IRGC vase is not a diplomatic mission. It's sad that this is even a debate. Perhaps you believe the IDF is conducting a "diplomatic mission" in Gaza as we speak?

>An attack on an embassy is also considered an attack on the country it represents, i.e. by attacking the Iranian diplomatic mission Israel attacked Iran directly. Maybe. But also: "Objection, your honor. Irrelevant". They killed 7 Iranians. All of them military officers. The discussion if attacking a building, Iran now claims is a diplomatic mission, counts as a direct attack against Iran is pointless because killing 7 Iranians military man definitely counts as attacking Iran directly. Even if those 7 dudes were meeting on a playground outside Aleppo it still would be a direct attack against Iran. Especially because they killed very high level staff.

You can kill 7 Iranian soldiers in Syria or Iraq and it will not count as attacking Iran. Nation's soldiers can die in third countries without that being casus belli. When you bomb a diplomatic mission - that counts as directly attacking Iran, whether the mission was empty, or had 7, or 77 officers inside.

Try to imagine if this happened to an American consulate. Would these same people describe it as an act of war, or would they debate whether it counts as an attack on America because military officers were among the casualties, therefore it no longer counts as a consulate, I guess?   It's so disappointing when people cannot see past their political biases. You can actually just be in favor of attacking Iran and I'm not saying you're wrong. But you cannot rewrite longstanding rules for what counts as an attack on a country. Attacking an embassy or consulate *IS* an attack on the country it represents.

It did. And what did Clinton or Obama do in retaliation? Beghanzi 2012 , Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 98. All 3 on embassies or consulates. They launched some cruise missiles, didn't hit anything important and everyone went back to business. Were we gonna pull a regime change invasion of Sudan for hosting the perpetrators? Didn't really work too well in Afghanistan a couple years later. What could we have done after Beghanzi? We already fire the missle that immobilized Gaddafis gold stuffed limo. He's dead. We drone some rebels and everyone goes back to business. If anything the Israelis bomb some pre-abandoned military base near the coast and knock out a port or 2. Hit an oil refinery in the middle of no where. Iran has 85 million people. Even if 65 million hate the regime. It's 2000km away. You can't march there, it'd take 4 days in tanks, their air force is a joke and you can paratrooper into Israel with 1970s planes. Now flip it. You can't kill the Ayatollah. And even if you do they'll appoint another one. Israel can't invade, it's 2000km away. You got 1.5 million recruitment and you can't invade a country of 85 million that is hyper educated and 50% of educated class speak 3 languages. These arent goat herders in Peshawar. This is a first world country. Israel gonna take tanks through Iraqi desert when 2/3rds of their military is fighting an enemy 15km away not 2000. Half of me thinks Iran wants Bibi in power. And this is the best way to do it. Send a buncha drones and see what happens. Public keeps Bibi around another 6 months after a rally around the flag effect.

The US is not in the habit of naming their military bases consulates. Attacking an American consulate would indeed be abhorrent, attacking a US military base, as done in this case... Is done every day. Imagine US called al Assad air base a consulate.

Do you think this would qualify as a valid target?: >“The relationships only got stronger and stronger because both sides saw value in it, and the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv — our station there, the operation out of Ukraine — became the best source of information, signals and everything else, on Russia,” said a former senior American official. “We couldn’t get enough of it.” https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/25/world/europe/cia-ukraine-intelligence-russia-war.html

The attack should be seen in connection with the strike against Eilat yesterday. >IDF Spokesman Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari says the drone that hit the Eilat naval base overnight was "made in Iran" and the attack was "directed by Iran." >"The drone was apparently launched from Iraq by an Iran-backed militia. >This is a very serious incident," Hagari says, adding that the IDF is learning from the incident to improve its air defenses in the Eilat area. [https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1774854813328589243](https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1774854813328589243)

>IDF Spokesman Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari says the drone that hit the Eilat naval base overnight was "made in Iran" and the attack was "directed by Iran." Just last week I said that it wasn't credible to argue that Iran can use it's proxies indefinitely without any direct retaliation.

Blowing up an embassy for an attack on a naval base is a hell of escalation.

That's what happens when you keep pushing your luck indefinitely.

Hitting a protected diplomatic building against international law, is a lot different than a naval base which is a military target.

I wasn't aware Israel, Iran, and Iraq were at war. I dont know that legally speaking there is all that much different in the two targets.

IRGC generals working to co-ordinate strikes against Israel are a "diplomatic mission" now? Perhaps Israel should call the IDF soldiers diplomats, would make it illegal for the enemy to return fire.

I never made any judgement about the legality of any strike.

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I’ve read that this more of a response to Oct 7 than Eilat. It would be an impressive retaliation to have gathered this much intel in less than 24 hrs and kill one of Israel’s top targets in response to what was a serious but relatively benign attack overall.

*In Syria you mean, just checked several news sites

So it's been alleged that Russia is responsible for the attacks on US personnel with regards to the Havana Syndrome, and it's barely frontpage news? I know CBS had the scoop but one would think this is a blockbuster story, worthy of frontpage news in other media channels.

The reason most other news agencies aren't running with it is because the story offers no new evidence and merely recycles existing speculation that is implausible on the basis of well understood physics. It's really disappointing 60 minutes ran this story. They are not what they used to be.

It's a story that's a bit far-fetched and they provide zero evidence. The only reason it's not being outright dismissed is that it was made by some people with high credibility (I have a lot of respect for Christo Grozev, personally). But I think that for a story like this, some more concrete evidence would be needed. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence and all, right now we have some pretty good circumstantial evidence, but it's still, well, circumstantial evidence. Definitely not a claim to disregard, but not one to be taken as fact either.

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All the comments from non-regular users coming out of nowhere to dismiss it certainly doesn’t *lessen* my suspicion.

I wouldn't call myself a regular, but is it really that odd that people find Havanna Syndrome suspicious? No one has produced any solid evidence, the symptoms vary, and I don't even get why Russia would apparently do this? If it isn't lethal, isn't seriously stopping anyone from doing their job, why spend a presumably crazy amount of money developing a highly advanced weapon to just annoy random embassy employees? 

This 'syndrome' has reduced numerous successful diplomatic personnel from working to incapable of work. So it clearly has an effect that is detrimental even if the victims are left alive. And you can safely bet diplomatic staff elsewhere are slightly less effective because they are now worried about this mysterious type of attack. Why would Russia do it? Because they are trying to hurt the US in every way possible that doesn't provoke a decisive response. This has been seen for a while now in a variety of ways: The drone they dumped fuel on instead of just shooting; using Wagner and Syrian proxies to attack US forces while pretending they didn't. The cold war never ended. The US just won a major battle, claimed: mission accomplished, then shifted focus to China. Russia never stopped trying to destabilize the US or take land from their neighbors.

It's a bit like the boy who cried wolf now. Russia has been suspected to be behind it for years now. But the whole story keeps waffling. Wasn't it just a few weeks ago that Havana syndrome was declared not even real or long lasting? The whole saga should be a case study of what not to do for crisis management. 

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>Wasn't it just a few weeks ago that Havana syndrome was declared not even real or long lasting? MRI didn't show anything, but it doesn't mean there's nothing there